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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines contemporary jurisdictional arrangements and how new and 
shifting forms of them impact the ability to map political and socio-political 
configurations, including the analytical and disciplinary tools used to examine them, into 
explicitly defined locations. More specifically, it asks how the jurisdictional 
arrangements found in modern Europe affect mainstream International Relation’s core 
enabling conditions – most critically, that an international realm exists, that it is 
jurisdictionally different and clearly separable from domestic realms, and that it therefore 
requires its own conceptualization. The thesis contends that IR’s ability to assume those 
things rests on a particular resolution to a “jurisdictional problematique” – on a specific 
answer to a “Who decides what, where, how, and over whom” question. While that 
resolution normally comes in a sovereignty-based form, sovereignty is determined to be 
merely one possible resolution and therefore simply one jurisdictional type.  
In that regard, the thesis challenges IR’s answer based on a thick examination of the 
European Union’s (EU) political structures (e.g. its institutional rules, programs, policies, 
and the like) as well as its socio-political relationships (e.g. European citizenship). It 
considers four potential changes, and therein four jurisdictional possibilities in their own 
right – breakdown, maintenance, stratification, and blurring. The thesis determines that 
blurring best captures the complexities, variability, and the potentially conflicting and 
overlapping arrangements constitutive of Europe’s jurisdictional environment. It also 
demonstrates that blurring is a distinct, jurisdictional alternative to sovereignty – a 
complex, process-based, but nonetheless operationalizable answer to the “Who decides 
what, where, how, and over whom” question. Those European findings are then placed 
into a wider perspective to illustrate global, jurisdictional variability. The thesis 
concludes by developing what blurring specifically and jurisdictional variability more 
generally entail for how one descriptively, analytically, and disciplinarily approaches 
modern political and socio-political life and thought. It determines that the question 
based, empirically sensitive foundations underpinning jurisdiction offer better ways to 
approach those issues than those typically used by IR – ways that better bring together 
theory and practice, that offer more appropriate and useful analytical procedures, and that 
help rethink disciplinary divisions in more sensible and efficacious ways.  
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Introduction – Challenging jurisdictional standards 
 
Issues and questions  
This thesis examines the nature of contemporary jurisdictional arrangements and how 
changes to them impact the ability to map political and socio-political structures and 
relationships, including the analytical and disciplinary tools used to examine them, into 
explicitly defined locations. More specifically, it explores whether the continuing growth 
and development of the European Union (EU) problematizes mainstream International 
Relation’s core enabling conditions – most critically, that an international realm exists, 
that it is jurisdictionally different and clearly separable from domestic ones, and that it 
therefore requires its own conceptualizations.1 The study challenges the assumption that 
all political and socio-political action can effectively be reduced to occurring along either 
statically clear domestic or statically clear international levels; that there is a 
domestic/international separation. It asks whether that division – indeed, any comparably 
clear-cut jurisdictional division – is increasingly problematic and, if it is, what new logics 
might be developed in its stead and what new descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary 
mapping procedures might be necessary. 
In that context, the thesis takes as its basic starting point that a direct link exists between 
the empirical and conceptual boundaries of the political community and the study of 
international relations, as an academic field of enquiry and as real-world interactions.2 It 
hypothesizes that a change in the nature of those boundaries as the result of a change in 
the nature of jurisdictional setups would call into question IR’s starting assumptions. It 
would force it to reflect on whether it has the tools to cope with those challenges or 
whether the academic gymnastics required to maintain itself would stretch its 
foundations to such a degree that more substantive and substantial re-mappings would be 
necessary. Thus, the study is ultimately concerned with jurisdictional change and how 
                                                
1 An understanding of mainstream IR is critical to this study. While chapter 1 lays out the precise 
conception used, for present purposes, it is thought to encompass realism, liberalism, the English School, 
and statist constructivism. Unless noted otherwise, “IR” and “international theory” mean “mainstream IR” 
and “mainstream international theory”. 
2 Throughout this study, “international relations” (lower case) reflects the real-world interactions between 
political communities whereas International Relations/IR (upper case), reflects the academic discipline.  
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new and shifting forms of it impact the descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary maps IR 
has traditionally used to make sense of the political and socio-political worlds. 
Jurisdictional starting points 
To get at those issues and questions, the study focuses on and elevates the concept of 
“jurisdiction” and, more specifically, what it terms as the “jurisdictional problematique”, 
to the forefront. While the precise definitions of both terms, including their relationships 
to other commonly used concepts such as power, authority, and sovereignty, are 
discussed in much greater detail in chapter 2, for the time being one can simply state that 
jurisdiction means “the administration of authority” such that the jurisdictional 
problematique is a debate over who administers authority, and what, where, how, and 
over whom they do so. As such, a particular type of jurisdiction reflects a specific 
resolution to the jurisdictional problematique – an answer to a “Who decides what, 
where, how, and over whom” question. And, insofar as one can imagine a number of 
distinct ways of resolving that question, one can also imagine a number of different 
jurisdictional types – again, a point returned to in chapter 2. 
In offering that admittedly rudimentary understanding of both terms, it should be made 
clear that no matter the particular resolution to the problematique present in any specific 
circumstance, it (and therefore jurisdictional debates more broadly) is an unavoidable 
aspect of understanding the conduct of political and socio-political life as well as judging 
the appropriateness of the analytical tools one uses to examine them. Because genuine 
political and socio-political action represent more than power relations – insofar as they 
reflect at least minimal movement out of Hobbes’ jungle via the development of some 
measure of systematized and legitimatized authority relationships – debates about both 
are contingent on some resolution to the problematique (Onuf and Klink, 1989: 52).3 
Whether one is talking about the relationships between sovereignty, the state, and IR or 
an alternative jurisdictional form, member-states, and the EU, because the dynamics of 
political and socio-political life are the underlying concerns, jurisdictional questions – of 
some type – are inevitably at play. 
                                                
3 Chapter 2 establishes that authority and jurisdiction are related insofar as the former is thought to be 
conceptually more inclusive than the latter (hence the definition of jurisdiction as “the administration of 
authority”). 
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With that in mind, and again foreshadowing the more detailed points made in chapter 2, 
the issue is what particular resolution to the problematique is critical for IR. 
Unsurprisingly, that leads directly to sovereignty. There are two important points to note 
at this stage – sovereignty as a type of jurisdiction and sovereignty’s particular resolution 
to the problematique. In the first case, far from being the concept from which all other 
critical political and socio-political logics derive from or operate under the conditions of 
– whether authority or jurisdiction specifically or a more applied issue such as citizenship 
– sovereignty can be dismantled into more rudimentary, sub-components. Directly 
presaging that argument, Onuf (1991: 439) writes, “When sovereignty is sufficiently 
challenged it will decompose into the elements from which it fused centuries ago”. As 
such, and in a reversal of the norm, this study argues that sovereignty is a type of 
jurisdiction, not a prerequisite for it.  
In the second case, if sovereignty is a type of jurisdiction, it is also a type based on a very 
specific resolution to the problematique. Again, summarizing chapter 2’s more 
developed conclusions, in situations of sovereignty, the problematique is resolved based 
on a single actor (who), holding exclusive and functionally complete jurisdiction (what), 
exercised via state agencies (how), within a territorially defined unit (where), and over all 
people within said unit (whom). Most critically for this study, the combination of those 
logics creates the conditions through which a domestic/international separation 
empirically forms and analytically makes sense. On one side, it creates the environment 
necessary to visualize what is viewed as an inside/outside defining political cleavage 
between states. On another side, it forms a socio-politically-based inclusion/exclusion 
separation between individuals (citizens) of different states.4 When taken together, the 
tenets of sovereignty condition a domestic/international binary between the politics and 
the people of different states.  
Extending on that last point, insofar as sovereignty structures the formation of 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations, it also offers 
the means through which IR traditionally carves out its distinct subject matter. The 
ability to make those separations, and therein view political and socio-political structures 
and relationships as occurring along different levels, drives to the heart of IR’s 
                                                
4 The relationship between political and socio-political issues is fleshed-out in chapter 1. For present 
purposes, the former is thought to deal with the structures constituting the jurisdictional boundaries of a 
political community/state and the latter the relationships between the individuals populating them. 
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disciplinary separation from political science (chapter 2). While making such separations 
is not necessarily wrong or even problematic, problems potentially arise in situations of 
jurisdictional change; when the jurisdictional solution offered by the tenets of 
sovereignty no longer holds up due to the development of different jurisdictional forms. 
Put differently, the development of a jurisdictional alternative that does not abide by the 
particular constellation of jurisdictional logics offered by a sovereign form would risk 
throwing open assumptions about how one examines the political and socio-political 
worlds. It would produce a need to assess the nature of any alternative jurisdictional form 
as well as map its descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary outcomes. 
In saying all this, it is worth noting, particularly at this early stage, that IR tends to treat 
sovereignty as both an empirical fact and an analytical device. It largely conflates a 
specific empirical condition – the sovereign state – with an overall analytical outlook and 
strategy – sovereignty-based leveling (Ruggie, 1993; Onuf, 1995). That setup may not 
always be problematic. In situations where sovereignty is the jurisdictional finding, it 
may make a great deal of sense. However, conflating the two risks reifying sovereignty 
in ways that prevent IR from detecting, and therein dealing with, jurisdictional change. 
While those sorts of issues are returned to in chapters 5 and 6, the critical take-away 
currently is that sovereignty, and with it state citizenship, allows for the formation of 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations – those 
binaries being IR’s normally sufficient constants. As such, changes to them would 
precipitate more general, rippling repercussions across the discipline. 
One would be remised not to also make clear that arguing that sovereignty is a type of 
jurisdiction based on a particular resolution to the problematique, that that resolution 
allows for inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations, 
and that IR requires those binaries is not to reject their importance to international 
theory as such. The crucial point is that sovereignty represents simply one possible 
answer to the “Who decides what, where, how, and over whom” question. Not only have 
there been historically different jurisdictional forms (chapter 2), but modern trends 
ranging from globalization to the EU are challenging assumptions that sovereignty is the 
singular, blanket resolution to the problematique. It is the precise nature of those 
challenges, and the changes produced, that this study is after. 
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Jurisdictional options 
To look at and assess the nature of those potential jurisdictional challenges and changes, 
the study constructs a conversation between IR’s enabling conditions on the one hand 
and the EU’s political and socio-political operations on the other. In this dialogue, each 
side acts as the critical foil for the other – IR arguing from a perspective that the world is 
empirically, and therefore analytically, divisible into domestic and international zones 
based on sovereignty and state citizenship and the EU reflecting an instance of 
jurisdictional change and shifted political and socio-political geographies. Accordingly, 
chapter 2 lays out the logics behind adopting a jurisdictional starting point, why 
sovereignty ought to be considered a corollary of jurisdiction, and why international 
theory requires that jurisdictional form. Having done that, chapters 3 and 4 compare 
those assumptions against EU setups.  
In the first case, chapter 3 looks at inside/outside from the context of European political 
rules, institutions, and programs paying particular attention to how they challenge a 
sovereign solution to the problematique – specifically the who, what, where, and how 
components of it. In the second case, chapter 4 turns to inclusion/exclusion and, from the 
context of European citizenship, asks whether the tenets of it alter what had been a state 
citizenship-based, socio-political cleavage between individuals of different states. It is 
largely concerned with the problematique’s “over whom” clause. Put together, whereas 
chapter 3 looks at “the politics” in the context of inside/outside and chapter 4 “the 
people” in the context of inclusion/exclusion, the key concern for both is whether a non-
sovereign resolution to the problematique is forming in Europe and, if it is, what its 
precise jurisdictional dynamics are. 
To that end, the study considers four things that might occur to sovereignty in Europe, 
and therein four effects to the inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and 
domestic/international cleavages – breakdown, maintenance, stratification, and blurring 
(Table 1). Each option functions in two ways. On the one hand, each reflects an 
actionable event; it is an illustrative/descriptive portrayal of what is occurring to the 
specific cleavage at play. On the other hand, each also represents a jurisdictional product 
in its own right. For instance, breakdown is both a description of what might occur to 
inside/outside as well as, when taken to its logical conclusion, an updated resolution to 
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the problematique. While all of this is developed fully in the context of each option’s 
actual consideration, it is useful to provide a brief sketch of them to structure the debate. 
First, the maintenance option implies that the political and socio-political structures and 
relationships between EU member-states and European citizens remain largely 
international in conduct and nature. As the name implies, one would see the maintenance 
of the traditional inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international binaries 
based on a sovereign resolution to the problematique. From a European Studies (ES) 
point of view (chapter 1), the perspective would largely correspond with arguments that 
view the Union more as an international organization (IO) – albeit a highly cooperative 
and advanced one – than as an emerging polity or some sort of sui generis, non-
sovereign or post-sovereign actor (Moravcsik, 1998; Pollack, 2005). The maintenance 
option rejects fundamental jurisdictional changes are taking place in the EU, thereby 
implicitly accepting IR’s interpretations about the nature of political and socio-political 
setups more generally. 
Second, the breakdown option implies that what were previously internationally 
meditated relationships between sovereign states and the citizens populating them are 
uploaded to the Union in a way that creates a common European political inside 
inhabited by an integrated European populous juxtaposed against a non-European outside 
made up of non-European foreigners. From an ES point of view, this option largely 
envisions the EU as a, perhaps federal, but nonetheless consolidated, political 
system/polity (Hix, 2005; Pollack, 2005). Under it, the ability to define clear 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations remains intact, 
just on a European scale. It might therefore be termed “sovereignty-redux”. Holsti writes,  
[T]he idea is not to eliminate states as the essential form of political organization, that 
is to transcend the state system; it is, rather, to create a smaller number of states; a 
world of, say, a dozen regional states compared to one of 158 present units… (Holsti, 
1985: 38). 
That being the case, the only difference between the breakdown option and the 
maintenance one is the size of the units on each side of the separations. The resolution to 
the problematique (sovereignty) remains across both such that the options are effectively 
opposite sides of the same coin. 
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Third, the stratification option reflects the formation of a distinctively European-type and 
European-level of political structures and socio-political relationships – one that exists 
clearly and cleanly alongside existing domestic and international ones. In that sense, the 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations would gain an 
additional European level, however the ability to visualize political and socio-political 
separateness more generally would remain. From an ES perspective, this view 
corresponds with certain variants of the multi-level governance approaches (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2003). 5  Thus, stratification purports to account for increased jurisdictional 
complexity simply by inserting a regional level of analysis into the existing framework 
(Yalem, 1977: 307). While this does challenge sovereignty, largely by stressing the need 
for greater functional sensitivities, it does not challenge the usefulness of analytical 
leveling more generally. As such, stratification ends up being a less radical challenge to 
IR than blurring. 
Finally, the blurring option represents a situation in which jurisdictional claims cannot 
easily and systematically be divided into neat levels of analysis, whether domestic, 
European, or international. From an ES point of view, blurring generally corresponds 
with those who argue for treating the EU as sui generis (Rosamond, 2000; Pollack, 2005; 
Warleigh, 2006).6 It challenges the accuracy of assuming that there are clear political and 
socio-political divisions due to, what turns out to be, the contextual, variable, and 
potentially conflicting and overlapping answers to the jurisdictional problematique 
present within the EU setup. By extension, it also challenges the efficaciousness of 
deploying an analytically leveled approach to studying the Union. Moreover, unlike the 
more static languages of “maintenance”, “breakdown”, or “stratification”, the more 
active connotations – the verbal, grammatical form – of “blurring” reflects the process, 
rather than endpoint, based nature of the concept. That becomes critical in guarding 
against analytical and disciplinary stagnation and reification as well as ensuring an 
overall sensitivity to jurisdictional change (chapters 5 and 6).  
It is worth noting, particularly given the focus the study ultimately places on blurring, 
that under it the issue is not whether the simplicities of the past have given way to novel, 
                                                
5 This primarily in reference to what Hooghe and Marks (2003) term as “Type I” MLG. 
6 In saying that it offers a new perspective, it may be a case of “neo-ism” – the re-birth of an older 
jurisdictional arrangement (e.g. neo-medievalism) (Zielonka, 2006). 
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but still clear, logics. That would point towards stratification. The issue is whether EU 
arrangements create situations of complexity; scenarios in which classifying member-
state relations as occurring along either domestic or international logics becomes 
problematized to the point that visualizing political and socio-political separateness more 
generally becomes both empirically harder and analytically less useful. Blurring 
therefore is the most radical jurisdictional alternative to sovereignty as it offers a wholly 
different, and not easily simplifiable, answer to the problematique. As a result, it 
challenges the basic analytical and disciplinary strategies normally deployed by IR. 
Table 1 – Outcome-possibilities 
 Definition 
Maintenance 
The EU does not generate substantial changes to any separation; inside/outside 
and inclusion/exclusion separations are both present in their classic forms; 
sovereignty and state citizenship divisions are unaffected; a clear 
domestic/international separation exists 
Breakdown 
The EU exists as a homogenous unit with a seamless inside; sovereign, 
inside/outside-forming borders breakdown being replaced by a new EU/non-EU 
one; state citizenship-based inclusion/exclusion separations breakdown between 
Europeans in the context of EU citizenship; sovereignty and citizenship divisions 
exist, however in updated European forms 
 
Inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion separations both exist, however in updated 
EU/non-EU forms; a domestic/international separation exists, however again in 
an updated European form 
Stratification 
The EU and member-states exist in a jurisdictionally stratified relationship based 
on clear functional divisions of labor; sovereignty is replaced by a dual federalist 
type setup EU citizens fall in-between state citizens and non-Europeans when it 
comes to formal and symbolic criteria of inclusion 
 
Inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion stratify through the addition of a European-
specific layer; the domestic/international separation gains a European level 
Blurring 
EU and member-state jurisdictional lines face functional and spatial conflicts and 
overlaps; divisions between the member-states as well as the EU/non-EU zones 
are unclear and unstable; EU citizens are neither fully included nor excluded 
throughout the member-states; sovereignty and state citizenship do not exist 
 
Inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion undergo blurring; the 
domestic/international separation is blurring  
Again, the following chapters deal with all four options in more detail and, in their 
present forms they are offered merely as snapshots of the study’s overall movement. 
Nonetheless, even this basic picture ought to make clear that the heart of the study rests 
on using the EU as the means of exploring jurisdictional variation and how to make sense 
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of the results. Europe and European change act as the substantive, real-world evidence 
for assessing whether a new type of jurisdictional configuration is forming, if it is, how it 
interacts with existing thinking, and ultimately what sort of descriptive, analytical, and 
disciplinarily re-mappings might be necessary because of it. 
Putting it together 
With those points in mind, the study’s core focus is on how contemporary EU 
developments affect sovereignty, what that means for international theory’s ability to 
locate political and socio-political action at specific levels, and what new sorts of 
structures and relationships might arise. To that end, it rests on four sequential 
foundations of dialogue.  
1.  What constitutes the jurisdictional problematique and why 
is it so important to understanding political and socio-
political dynamics? What is IR’s resolution of it?  
2. What happens to sovereignty and state citizenship-based 
inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion separations, and 
together the domestic/international one, in the EU’s 
context? Is there maintenance, breakdown, stratification, or 
blurring? 
3. Based on that answer, what are the new jurisdictional 
dynamics? How is the problematique resolved? How does it 
interact with existing jurisdictional forms?  
4. What sort of descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary re-
mappings are necessary as a result of any possible 
jurisdictional change? How does that impact IR? What new 
debates does it entail? 
In laying out those four sets of questions, certain points warrant immediate clarification. 
First, assessing IR via a conversation with the EU does not rest on determining which 
international theory best explains European integration specifically or international 
relations more generally. While those issues are important, they logically only arise once 
determinations are made regarding the nature of the EU. Thus, as the methodology 
section found in the next chapter develops, the study’s conclusions are largely meta-
theoretical. Second, little interest is paid to normative debates, whether with respect to 
the “worth” of European integration specifically or of jurisdictional change more 
generally. Third, problematizing the standard necessitates a “So what” type question; if 
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the old jurisdictional solution is no longer viable, what replaces it? Though this study 
moves away from the problematique’s traditional sovereignty-based resolution, and with 
it a unifying approach for all of global life, it does not accept the diametrical opposite 
either – a sort of undisciplined encyclopedism. Therefore, chapter 6 offers a set of 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary re-mappings based on the arguments made. 
Structurally, the study has three thematic sections. The first section, which includes 
chapters 1 and 2, establishes the baseline standard against which EU changes can be 
assessed. Because the study is concerned with jurisdictional change, there is a critical 
need to establish a “what was” point of view – in particular, mainstream IR’s underlying 
political and socio-political commitments. Thus, chapter 1 academically places this study 
into existing thinking, within both IR and ES, as well as lays out its underlying 
methodological tenets. Chapter 2 extends on those points, including the specific logics 
behind the jurisdictional problematique, the relationship of sovereignty to it, and why 
that all is critical to mainstream IR. 
By establishing a “what was” point of view, the middle section – chapters 3 and 4 – 
problematizes that vision by offering a “what is” and therefore “what became” 
perspective. Chapter 3 focuses on the nature of political structures in Europe. The critical 
issue is whether inside/outside undergoes maintenance, breakdown, stratification, or 
blurring. In similar fashion, chapter 4 looks at socio-political issues through the lens of 
European citizenship. Again, the underlying concern is whether inclusion/exclusion 
undergoes maintenance, breakdown, stratification, or blurring. In each case, the goal is to 
use the EU’s operationalized and established structures, rules, procedures, and 
experiences to assess the status of inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion binaries and, by 
extension, jurisdictional dynamics more generally. 
The study’s last section – chapters 5 and 6 – contextualizes the meanings of the findings 
made in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 5 looks at the dynamics of, as it turns out, blurring in 
Europe. It defines it as a jurisdictional type as well as lays out what it entails for 
sovereignty and, more critically, legitimacy. The chapter also links blurring in Europe 
with a wider, global perspective. Chapter 6 then answers the critical “So what” question 
noted earlier by making sense of the new structures and relationships. It offers a series of 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary re-mappings in the context of blurring. 
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Lesson plans 
In looking at these issues, the study challenges international theory to reflect on whether 
its core enabling logics hold-up under shifting political and socio-political geographies. 
In doing so, it yields important lessons for IR, but also jurisdictional dynamics more 
generally. These lessons, noted now, developed in the context of the study as a whole, 
and returned to in the conclusion can be grouped into four categories.  
First, there are lessons to be drawn with respect to the relationship between jurisdiction 
and sovereignty. While the assumption has been that sovereignty is a jurisdictional form 
(the former being a corollary of the latter), that is far from an accepted conclusion. 
Indeed, as noted, the norm tends to be the jurisdictional debates arise only within a 
sovereignty-based setup (Shaw, 1986; Gordon, 2005). As such, the first lesson this study 
generates relates to the relationship between sovereignty and jurisdiction, including the 
parameters of each. 
Second, there are the lessons to be derived from (and for) the European case; lessons 
relating to the sorts of jurisdictional changes that are taking place in Europe. In that 
context, the maintenance, breakdown, stratification, and blurring outcome-possibilities 
take on paramount importance. To determine which best fits contemporary EU dynamics, 
each is first developed in the context of political factors and inside/outside and then in 
the context of socio-political relationships and inclusion/exclusion. Jointly, one will see 
that the blurring conclusion is the most appropriate. One should note that, while that 
finding has direct impact on how one views the Union – whether one sees it as a polity, 
an IO, or sui generis – because this study is more interested in the outward effects of 
jurisdictional change, direct consideration of those EU specific findings are largely 
placed aside.  Core lessons have more to do with blurring as found in Europe, and how to 
assess and categorize that sort of jurisdictional change, than with Europe itself. 
Third, lessons can be draw with respect to what blurring means as a jurisdictional type, 
including its relationship with other key concepts like sovereignty and legitimacy. As one 
will see, blurring ends up reflecting a jurisdictional setup defined by neither traditional 
hierarchy nor anarchy. Because of that, legitimacy emerges as a potential “soft-spot” in 
systems of blurring and the critical debate when it comes to assessing its wider effects. 
Included in this process, lessons are also drawn regarding how blurring might fit into a 
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world in which jurisdictional structures may not be uniform; how it might fit into a world 
defined more by jurisdictional variability than singularity. 
Finally, there are lessons to be learned with respect to how one descriptively, 
analytically, and disciplinarily maps a world in which blurring is both a reality in and of 
itself as well as an example of jurisdictional variability. One sees that the old ways of 
mapping are no longer appropriate such that certain shifts in focus and terminology are 
necessary to better describe, analyze, and study the contours and conduct of 
contemporary political and socio-political life and thought. As one will see, the re-
mappings performed under the context of jurisdictional blurring prove beneficial – 
beneficial to the extent that they better bring together theory and practice; beneficial to 
the extent that they offer more appropriate and more useful analytical languages; and 
ultimately beneficial to the process of rethinking disciplinary divisions in more sensible 
and efficacious ways. 
Conclusion 
Altogether, this study offers a perspective on the jurisdictional nature of the Union as a 
means of challenging mainstream IR’s underlying descriptive, analytic, and disciplinary 
beliefs. By developing a series of jurisdictional possibilities – breakdown, maintenance, 
stratification, and blurring – it also offers a schematic through which political and socio-
political life and thought might be mapped. Insofar as blurring is the ultimate conclusion 
in the European case, the study develops an example in which the clean and clear 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary logics coming out of IR give way to more 
contextual and process-based mapping procedures. Accordingly, as is returned to in the 
conclusion of the study, both the procedures used to arrive at the blurring finding as well 
as the tenets of blurring itself prove critical to understanding an environment in which 
political and socio-political change are ever present possibilities. While the European 
case is used to develop the arguments made, both the finding arrived at (blurring) as well 
as the procedures used to arrive it (the importance of jurisdiction) prove valuable outside 
of the case. That, in turn reinforces the need to descriptively, analytically, and 
disciplinarily proceed in more humble and situationally attuned ways.  
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Chapter 1 – Where have we been? Where might we go? 
 
Introduction 
The empirical heart of this study is a debate over how EU political and socio-political 
structures and relationships challenge sovereignty’s (and therefore IR’s) resolution to the 
jurisdictional problematique. While always keeping that overarching concern in mind, it 
is nevertheless helpful to take a step back from that very specific debate to locate it and 
its objectives within the wider literature, including the methodological perspectives 
undertaken and advanced in this study. In those regards, this chapter has three main 
goals. First, it addresses the study’s placement within the wider academic literature on 
the role of sovereignty, particularly those critical of its assumed role as the core, 
structuring concept of international relations (chapter 2). In doing so, the chapter outlines 
where that literature has gone and, in turn, where this study extends and refines it. It also 
develops why Europe proves to be a particularly interesting and relevant case. Second, 
the chapter looks at existing work on Europe and how ES has tended to study it. Again, 
in doing so, it develops where this study pushes, refines, and extends on those existing 
understandings. The chapter concludes by presenting the study’s general methodological 
approach – with respect to its treatment of Europe, its vision of mainstream IR, and 
ultimately its overall conceptual commitments.  
Where have we been? 
Beginning with this study’s placement within the wider academic literature, two issues 
immediately arise – where it fits into existing international thinking on sovereignty and 
change and why the European example is a particularly useful case. In looking at those 
questions, the goal is to situate the argument that ultimately is advanced into the standard 
thinking and, in doing so, make clear the areas of advancement and refinement it makes 
along the way. To foreshadow the position that is eventually arrived at based on an 
examination of the European case, the study finds strong parallels with existing thinking 
on the downgraded importance of sovereignty in international thought. At the same time, 
however, focusing on the EU offers a set of descriptive, conceptual, and methodological 
advantages either not present or not possible in the existing approaches. Accordingly, 
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and as becomes clearer below (and is returned to in chapters 5 and 6), while the study’s 
empirical focus is the Union, the arguments developed and advanced through that 
analysis find wider support and impact. In other words, despite the study’s regional 
focus, the conclusions advanced in it have both natural, global cousins as well as wider 
ranging academic effects. 
One can begin by locating the study’s goals within the wider literature, particularly one 
focused on the need to challenge sovereignty. Without delving too much into a topic that 
has garnered a good deal of attention, but that nevertheless has also not reached IR’s 
mainstream core (see below), the crux of the matter is that it has become increasingly 
common to question whether sovereignty is the underlying, structuring factor of 
worldwide political and socio-political structures and relations. Those arguing from this 
perspective largely agree on the need to theorize – and here the exact terminologies tend 
to differ, but largely all operate under the same logic – what a post-
sovereign/sovereignty-free/post-international/globalized world might look like (Rosenau, 
1990, 2006; Scholte, 2000; Hobbs, 2000; Held and McGrew, 2002; Nye, 2011). 
Unsurprisingly, these studies often revolve around arguments about globalization.1 In 
looking at them, the goal is not to advocate any specific model or position. It is simply to 
note the current state of affairs. 
Across the range of globalization theory, there is general agreement that sovereign states 
are no longer the only significant jurisdictional forces in the global environment. Rather, 
states are increasingly seen as existing alongside other relevant actors, whether 
multinational corporations (MNC), global cities, regional bodies, traditional IOs, 
transnational social movements, and/or other sub-state and non-state agents (Strange, 
1996; Sassen, 1999; Moreno, 2000; Nye, 2011). Indeed, it is precisely from that context 
that Strange (1996: 4) argues that, “The declining authority of states is reflected in a 
growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and 
regional bodies...”. It is also Nye’s underlying point in noting the undeniable “power 
diffusion” process currently taking place in which power is shifting from states to non-
state actors (Nye, 2011).  
                                                
1 There is a diversity of approaches to globalization, many of which differ “in the details”. What is 
presented is merely a general outline. 
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On the one hand, these alternatives disrupt sovereignty in and of themselves – whether 
via their specific affects on capital controls (e.g. MNC) or through mutually agreed-upon 
functional remits (e.g. the ICC). On the other hand, they also all tend to deal with the 
jurisdiction that they have in ways foreign to sovereignty. For instance, non-state actors 
are frequently functionally specific and non-territorially-based. Thus, the ICC deals only 
with the issues laid out in the Rome Statue (crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide), while the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body handles only trade disputes 
between member-states (Lipschutz, 2000: 91). 2  Moreover, their methods of 
administration vary greatly. For example, whereas a traditional IO might rely on 
mutually agreed-upon, formal rules, a leaderless public (e.g. 2011 Egyptian Revolution) 
might express itself in more organic ways through inter-personal connections and/or 
technological prowess. In the latter’s case, the methods may not be state-based, 
hierarchical, or even formal, however they can be real and effective to the extent that 
authority is administered and therefore jurisdictional claims made (chapter 2). 
In addition to these “tangible” effects, one also sees globalization’s influences in more 
ideational ways – for example, through the development of a human rights culture and 
calls for the universalization of certain individual rights. In both cases, the goal is to 
make what happens within the borders of a state no longer the sole purview of that state. 
Moreover, and as a by-product of the communication and travel possibilities brought on 
by the Information Revolution, the ability to connect people across state and national 
borders has vastly increased. By lessoning distances between people, technology 
challenges traditional conceptions of territorial space, political allegiances, and national 
divisions. Insofar as it allows individuals to connect across nation-state boundaries, it 
frees them from static, one-dimensional locations. As evidence of this, one sees increases 
in non-national, non-state groupings (e.g. transnational social causes) as well as more 
universal, human-wide values (e.g. a human rights culture) (Rosenau, 2006). 
From that context Rosenau makes a compelling argument that the socio-political 
interdependences accompanying globalization produce an expansion of individuals’ 
“analytical skills” and “adaptive learning” (Rosenau, 1990). In simpler terms, as people 
                                                
2 Certain areas may be more or less likely to be affected, as conceptualized through the “hard” versus 
“soft” politics division (e.g. security versus economics). Nevertheless, as Keohane and Nye (2001: 22-23) 
point out, strict issue hierarchies are inherently problematic as security issues do not always trump others 
concerns. 
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are exposed to global forces, such as the Internet, they are forced to develop the mindsets 
necessary to operate within such multidimensional mediums. In the process of doing so, 
they undergo “orientation shifts [that] enable them to be both more effective and more 
affective with respect to the demands they make upon their [growing and diversifying] 
collectivities” (Rosenau, 1990: 337-338). Put differently, as individuals become 
increasingly “multiperspectival” in their thinking, the spaces between them lessons as 
they become aware of the multitude of groupings “out there”. Overtime, Rosenau’s 
argument goes, they discover and build connections outside their traditional socio-
political units, the result of which is the development of new, non-state collectivities that 
one might direct his or her allegiances to. 
In advancing this argument – that there are new jurisdictional actors and that the spaces 
between people have lessoned as the result of globalizing factors – problems, but also 
logical responses, arise. In the first case, there is an argument to be made that state 
citizenship and national bonds remain critical aspects of everyday life; that traditional 
inclusion/exclusion lines based on nationality remain prominent and poignant. Indeed, 
despite arguments to the contrary, it is clear that nationalism remains a powerful force 
(A. Smith, 1992, 2001; Walzer, 1994). In a similar vein, Halliday (2001: 498) notes, “If 
there is much truth in the saying that ‘Travel broadens the mind’, the opposite has also 
been known to occur”. Put simply, it is questionable as to whether people and their 
bonds are as “universal” as globalization theory often makes them out to be. 
Despite those concerns, Rosenau’s (1990) argument (and those like his) remains 
convincing for a number of reasons. First, those arguing that there has been a 
proliferation of non-state groups tend not to assume a complete breakdown of traditional, 
national groupings. Rather, the key is to understand how the various groups interact and 
relate; the issues is how the new and the old mesh. This issue is returned to in the context 
of European citizenship in chapter 4. Second, discounting the possibility for any socio-
political change short-changes the possibility for multi-loyalties and hybridized 
individuals – again a point returned to in chapter 4 (Risse, 2010). Finally, there is real 
evidence regarding the growth of non-state allegiances and of universal values (e.g. 
human rights). At the same time, however, the global consensuses that do occur tend to 
occur at a conceptual level with societies differing on implementation (Donnelly, 2007: 
299-301). Thus, inter-national communication may foster core sets of right versus 
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wrong, but achieving those goals remains community based. As Walzer (1994) argues, 
global values tend to emanate through thick cultures such that people neither experience 
the same emotions at the same times nor all converge around a single vision. In moments 
of anxiety, societies reinterpret others’ experiences through their own mind-sets. The 
commonalities formed through communication create the opportunities for linkages 
across national spaces without excising old identities. 
With respect to the more politically focused challenges, there are again a number of 
potential problems with the globalization approach, but also responses. First, one might 
argue that sovereignty has always been an analytical device such that things have always 
been “messier” than might otherwise be assumed (Krasner, 1999). In that vein, some 
argue that modern globalization has pre-modern roots, the implication being that the 
changes brought on and reflected by it are overstated (Nicholson, 1999). Second, states 
undeniably remain highly significant political and socio-political actors. Not only do they 
continue to perform many critical functions for their citizens – health care, social 
security, education, security, and other high priority, high politic functions – but they 
also continue to engage in traditional forms of diplomacy with one another (Anderson, 
1993; Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Third, even when states do cede a measure of 
jurisdiction, one might argue that they do so in classical principal-agent logic (Keohane 
and Nye, 1997). Finally, in the most basic sense, states continue to divide up the Earth’s 
landmass. Jackson writes,  
It would be impossible for Microsoft or Toyota or British Petroleum to engage in 
business activities in different parts of the world without the permission and 
protection of particular states whose territorial jurisdictions they necessarily must 
operate from (Jackson, 2007a: 331, emphasis added). 
Again, while all those criticisms have merit, they also all have responses. Starting with 
the idea that sovereignty has always been contested, it is true that globalization has pre-
modern presages. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the velocity, viscosity, and variety of 
the contemporary form far outpaces previous configurations. Moreover, the costs 
associated with the contemporary variety – of using the globalizing technologies – has 
dramatically decreased thereby opening its potentials up to the masses (Nye, 2011). 3 
                                                
3 For instance, Nye (2011) acknowledges that neither technological advances nor their affects on politics 
are new – the printing press played a large role in the Reformation. What is exceptional about the present 
condition is that the costs associated with them have been radically reduced. It no longer requires large 
bankbooks to overcome collective action problems. Anyone can “get in the game”.  
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Therefore, when debating globalization’s role in empowering non-state actors the 
fundamental questions are not when it began or whether sovereignty has ever been 
pristine. The critical questions are how slow/fast the movements across state borders are, 
how thin/thick the connections between actors are, how few/many non-state, socio-
political linkages there are, and how expensive/cheap making those connections have 
become. And, once those sorts of questions become the central concerns, there is general 
agreement that the velocity, viscosity, variety, and ease-of-entry into present forms far 
outpaces pre-modern variants (Rosenau, 2006; Nye, 2011). 
Moving to the idea that states remain highly significant, and therefore that globalization 
is not as impactful as it is often made out to be, while it is true the states continue to 
divide up the Earth’s land in a formal sense, de facto changes often presage de jure ones. 
The problem is, acknowledging and appreciating them is often incorrectly stymied due to 
engrained beliefs about what the system must look like (Wendt and Freidheim, 1995; 
Culter, 2001). After all, seeing change is understandably hard from a starting point that 
mandates that one look at an issue through a particular theoretical lens and disciplinary 
prism. Therefore, the goal is to create an approach less beholden to any particular set of 
analytical or disciplinary assumptions. This point is returned to in the context of the re-
mapping procedures performed in chapter 6. 
Moreover, Rosenau (1990: 273) notes that, despite theoretical debates to the contrary, 
there is a growing practical understanding that the complexities of the modern world are 
“more than states can manage”. This has two follow-ups. On the one hand, it creates the 
possibility for jurisdictional conflict between states and non-state actors. For example, in 
most cases the ICC has “complementary jurisdiction” with member-states, meaning that 
it can only take-up a case if the latter is unable or unwilling and only over offences 
committed by nationals of member-states or for crimes committed within the territory of 
a member-state. Nevertheless, the Rome Statute grants specific rights to the international 
community, via the Security Council, to refer cases should a situation require it and even 
if the action takes place by a national of a state not party to the statute. As the recent 
Darfur referral illustrates, that creates the potential for fundamental jurisdictional 
conflicts between the Court and a state.  
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On the other hand, far from there being only conflicts, Rosenau (1990: 273) notes that 
states have also developed a wider “mutual acceptance” with respect to the importance 
and relevance of non-state actors. He writes, 
whatever the source of mutual acceptance, it seems clear that states have learned to 
live with a rival world in which they are active but over which they exert limited 
control, much as they may sometimes attempt to assert their authority in it (Rosenau, 
1990: 273). 
Thus, the underling point is that states and non-state actors each see each other as having 
roles to play within the global political and socio-political environment. There is 
practical agreement and acceptance of a division of jurisdictional labor. 
Finally, while there are tendencies to highlight what is new, and in that sense the 
challenges and changes to sovereignty, there is also frequently acknowledgement that the 
new does not fully excise the old. Even Scholte  (2000), who strongly advocates the need 
for a paradigm shift away from the state towards more global thinking, stresses that there 
are no instant transformation to be had. In that sense, because neither sovereignty nor 
states have fully gone away, any attempt to argue the globalization is ubiquitous is 
misguided. At the same time, however, and given the points just made, it is also incorrect 
to argue that sovereignty remains the sole arbiter of global political and socio-political 
life. Under those logics, Rosenau notes the possibility for a bifurcated system; the 
situational coexistence of, in his terms, a “multi-centric world” and a “state centric” 
one.4 The possibility for this is picked-up in chapters 5 and 6 and in the context of 
jurisdictional variability. The point to keep in mind for the time being is that multiple 
jurisdictional processes might co-habit a common map – traditional international 
relationships in some areas and between some actors and non-sovereign forms in other 
areas and between other actors. How one descriptively and analytically deals with such a 
situation therefore becomes a critical debate. 
Put together, there is an established literature associated with challenging the sovereignty 
standard, one largely centered on globalization. That being said, there frequently is an 
acknowledgment made that globalization does not permeate every political structure and 
socio-political relationship. States retain many of their customary roles and remain 
important factors in global life. Thus, whereas globalization theory may over-emphasize 
                                                
4 Rosenau is unsure that bifurcation is the final settling point and merely offers it as a possibility. That 
being said, it is reflective of the point being made: globalization is neither ubiquitous nor unimportant. 
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a complete global flattening, and whereas some skeptics risk treating globalization 
simply as a poetic fad, it may be the case that change and continuity coexist. If that is 
true, the critical task is assessing the precise nature of that relationship – a task taken up 
in the context of the European example and developed under the descriptive, analytical, 
and disciplinary re-mappings coming out of it. 
Where might we go? 
Having offered the state of play, the second question noted in the chapter’s introduction 
was where a European analysis fits into existing thinking and why it proves instructive. 
In the first case, which becomes clearest only after the analysis takes place, one sees that 
the arguments made in the European context find strong allegiances to many of the 
points just offered. In that sense, though the arguments developed are made for the 
European case specifically, they find natural cousins outside the region and through the 
globalization literature just noted. To be sure, that does not mean a direct extension of 
EU logics to the global context is always possible (see page 33). However, given the 
underlying ethos of the existing literature, there are clear indications that the challenges 
and changes defined and developed in the European sphere are not unique to it. 
Therefore, the context just offered help to establish both the supporters the study 
ultimately finds as well as the scope of its overall impact.  
In the second case, which for present purposes is the more immediate point, the question 
is why a European examination is necessary at all given the existing commentaries on 
the challenges to sovereignty. In asking that, the point just made must be restated: this 
study ultimately agrees with much of the tenor and content of the globalization literature. 
At the same time, however, it also finds certain shortfalls that must be taken into 
consideration. These shortfalls illustrate both where existing thinking misses out on 
developing important elements of the changes associated with sovereignty as well as 
why the EU case offers a more targeted analysis and more instructive way forward. 
To begin, the study finds three faults with the existing literature. First, there are issues of 
empirical support and analytical development. Because arguments pertaining to the 
decreased importance of sovereignty tend to be phrased in the context of globalization, 
and insofar as globalization is often stigmatized as a catchall term for any and all 
changes to the state-system, such perspectives risk lacking and/or risk being viewed as 
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lacking the sort of empirical evidence and analytical development thought to be 
necessary within the social sciences (Scholte 2000: chapter 2). To be sure, that does not 
mean that empirical support is never provided or that all studies lack analytical 
development (see pages 29-30). One may not even agree with the need for detached 
analysis and the hope for generalizability. For instance, critical theorists, many of whom 
argue for discarding sovereignty in favor of more universal jurisdictional forms, are 
certainly more concerned with political emancipation than performing the sort of 
“neutral” analysis that a positivist might be (Linklater 1998b). Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that arguments associated with globalization often risk being viewed more as 
political commentary than empirically driven, analytically revealing, academic 
observation and analysis (Rosenberg, 2000, Scholte, 2000). Scholte writes,  
Unclarity, imprecision and inconsistency in respect of definitions have produced a lot of 
confusion and stalemate in knowledge about, and response to, 
globalization…globalization is a malleable catchall term that can be invoked in whatever 
way the user finds convenient (Scholte, 2000: 49).5 
Second, and linked to that first criticism, arguments about globalization often fail to offer 
firm perspectives on the exact nature of the jurisdictional setups replacing the sovereign 
ones. While globalization theory is good at pointing out the challenges that sovereignty 
faces, whether due to technological, political, or cultural change, it is often less 
successful in examining the precise nature of the jurisdictional alternatives supplanting it. 
For instance, in presenting his theory on post-internationalism, Rosenau openly admits 
that he is developing a model without direct empirical realization. He (1990: 3) writes, 
“What follows…consists of theoretical claims rather than empirical proof”. Indeed, he is 
unsure what the final jurisdictional setup will look like, hence his four “potentials” for 
global order. In that sense, while there may be attempts at developing alternatives, they 
tend to be potentials, not examinable, operationalized realities. 
To be sure, the inability to directly examine an empirical outcome may have been 
unavoidable insofar as such examinations were attempting to explain a changing world. 
As such, there was a certain unrealized/ongoing quality to many of the factors under 
investigation. Moreover, because Rosenau, and globalists like him, tend to operate on a 
macro scale, they also tend to be concerned with global trends. Therefore, there is an 
understandable need to maintain a certain “conceptual distance” at the expense of more 
                                                
5 Scholte’s intent in noting this issue is to remedy the problem. 
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applied, case-specific examinations. Nonetheless, while such studies may be successful 
in challenging their internal assumptions about sovereignty – largely that it is the core 
concept structuring modern political and socio-political arrangements – their arguments 
are frequently less productive when it comes to analyzing the precise jurisdictional 
dynamics of any operationalized, real-world substitute – again, because those substitutes 
were unavailable/unrealized at the time or because the cases that did exist proved too 
case-specific for a macro analysis.  
Third, and in an amendment of the point just made, in those instances where an 
established jurisdictional alterative did exist and was made the focus, that typically meant 
dealing with a functionally specific agent, and therefore either political or socio-political 
change. To stress, that is not problematic if the underlying concern is the ICC. It 
becomes problematic, however, when jurisdiction and jurisdictional change are the 
underlying concerns. When they are the focus, an integrated analysis of political and 
socio-political aspects is indispensable given that sovereign setups condition both 
inside/outside (politics) and inclusion/exclusion (people) divisions (chapter 2). Thus, the 
ICC may challenge sovereignty by disconnecting the territorial/jurisdictional/functional 
congruency. However, because that fails to take into account both political and socio-
political change, it is necessarily incomplete.6  
One should be clear that no assumption is being made that a division of labor between 
political and socio-politically focused studies is inappropriate. Nor are any claims being 
made as to the quality of any previous studies. The point is that, because the cases in 
which an established jurisdictional alternative is examined have tended to proceed along 
either a political or a socio-political trajectory, they invariably present a fragmented 
picture of overall jurisdictional change. At the same time, while global focuses may 
pickup on both political and socio-political change, they generally do so at the expensive 
of in-depth examinations of established jurisdictional alternatives. What is needed is a 
case that provides an operationalized jurisdictional impacts to politics and people. 
With those issues and problems as context, this study focuses on the EU both to deal with 
them specifically as well as for more independent rationales. One can start by outlining 
                                                
6 For the same reason, those that focus exclusively on, for example, cultural globalization at the expensive 
of political change, are also skewed.  
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how a EU focus alleviates some of the problems associated with the existing methods. In 
doing so, it is worth repeating that this study finds faults with how many previous 
attempts have challenged sovereignty. It does not disagree with their intent, or even their 
outcomes. As one sees at the end of the study, the arguments presented largely align with 
many of the sentiments coming out of globalization thinking. Nevertheless, the study 
focuses on the EU case for three reasons.  
First, to quell charges that the globalization literature lacks empirical grounding, Europe 
offers an established testing point for both debating challenges to sovereignty as well as 
for assessing the precise nature of the outcome of them. In the simplest sense, Europe is 
widely acknowledged as a hotspot for shifting political and socio-political geographies 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Rumford, 2008). As such, it is a natural test case. In a more 
applied sense, Europe has an established continent via its treaties, rules, Court decisions, 
and the like (methodology section). It also has a large, independent academic record via 
ES (placement section). Accordingly, the EU has a defined, researchable, and established 
set of parameters through which one can challenge sovereignty, but also examine the 
nature of those challenges as an operationalized, jurisdictional alternative. Indeed, as 
noted in the introduction to this study as a whole, all four options considered – 
maintenance, breakdown, stratification, and blurring – represent both a challenge to 
sovereignty as well as a resultant jurisdictional form. Europe therefore offers what 
Rosenau lamented he lacked – an operational example of theoretic change.  
Second, because the changes in Europe affect both political and socio-political factors, it 
offers an integrated view of jurisdictional change. It provides not only an extensive set of 
challenges to sovereignty in a general sense, but distributes them across political factors 
– via the jurisdictional changes contained within the treaties, acquis, Court decision, and 
the like – as well as socio-political ones – via its interface with individuals through 
European citizenship. Therefore, unlike the traditional issue-oriented approaches that 
have tended to focus on either political or socio-political change, the EU is a hotbed of 
both in simultaneous interaction. In that sense, a regional scope that affects politics and 
people and that has an operationalized core is preferred over globalization’s conceptual 
openness and an issue focus’s lack of generalizability. 
Finally, the European case proves historically significant. It is noteworthy that Europe is 
the birthplace of the concepts that are undergoing potential world-changing 
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modifications. As is expanded on in chapter 2, the processes leading to the birth of 
sovereignty and the state-system are quintessentially European events. Moreover, the 
circumstances leading to them – a set of treaties ending a major war – are strikingly 
similar to the processes leading to a potential revision – a new set of treaties arrived at in 
the aftermath of another major war. Therefore, while focusing on Europe risks charges of 
Eurocentrism, the fact that Europe is both the cauldron of the state-system as well as a 
source of prospective problematizing is telling and should not go unnoticed. 
Keeping those advantages in mind, there are of course challenges associated with the EU 
case – most obviously in terms of generalization. For instance, there clearly are areas that 
have not undergone jurisdictional change and remain sovereignty-defined. Moreover, 
even those instances in which globalization is taking hold, there are no assurances that it 
will take on the same dynamics and produces the exact same outcomes as in Europe. 
Indeed, as will become clearer in the following chapters, it does seem to be the case that 
the processes leading to European change as well as its on-the-ground jurisdictional 
dynamics are unique to it.7 For that reason, Gerring (2007: 246) notes that it is “almost 
always easier to disconfirm a theory than to confirm it with a single case”. The danger is 
that looking only at Europe fails to offer the scope necessary to develop a generalizable 
alternative to sovereignty.  
While that concern must be taken into account, there nonetheless are responses to it. 
First, though the European case may be unique with respect to the challenges it levels 
against sovereignty as well as the exact jurisdictional format produced, given the global 
context provided, it finds natural allies. Just as there have been pre-modern alternatives 
to sovereignty (e.g. medieval jurisdictional arrangements, next chapter) there are also 
extra-European ones (e.g. globalization). While that does not mean that those alternatives 
are identical to the EU in form or in practice, and while the Union methodologically 
remains a single case, because it exists in a setup already known to be more complex and 
variable than sovereignty (and IR) make it out to be, the overall effects of European 
challenges should not be taken as unique to Europe.  
                                                
7 For instance, insofar as the US security umbrella was critical to lessening the security dilemma and 
creating the conditions under which European cooperation could take place, and insofar that umbrella is 
absent globally, Europe’s track may be irreproducible (Kagan, 2003). Similarly, as developed in chapter 4, 
Europe’s historical conceptions of itself as a unity may not exist everywhere (Padgen, 2000). 
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Second, even if one rejects that any instances of jurisdictional change are/might occur 
outside of Europe, the changes in it remain relevant insofar as IR is still left with the task 
of dealing with a case that has undergone alteration. And, as the finding is blurring, IR is 
left with dealing with a situation that neither exhibits nor fails to exhibit a clean and clear 
domestic/international binary and that is neither anarchical nor hierarchical in setup. 
Because the tenets of blurring distort, rather than simply breakdown, maintain, or stratify 
that binary, they reopen what tended to be closed questions with self-assumed answers as 
to how political communities are structured and what analytical approaches one deploys 
to examine them. In that sense, one can acknowledge that the EU is a single, 
nonreplicable case while nonetheless maintain that the conclusions about it have more 
systemic importance. Caporaso (1997: 588) is therefore right to comment that, 
“Europe…will tell us a great deal about the appropriateness of our scholarly paradigms”. 
Third, the study acknowledges Gerring’s point that it is easier to challenge through a 
single case than to build a replacement. Nonetheless, it maintains that it can ask whether 
the effects of the blurring in Europe are present in some form and to some degree in the 
wider global environment – again, not an unreasonable thing given the existing 
globalization literature as well as a historical context of jurisdictional variability (next 
chapter). That being said, the results may not fully negate the state model. The study 
does not dogmatically advance the EU’s alternative jurisdictional form as doing so would 
risks reifying it just as IR reified sovereignty. Therefore, any new form that arises is 
treated less as an instance of “change as replacement” in which “new patterns replace old 
forms [and where] replacement means novelty” and more as “change as addition…in 
which old forms are simultaneously joined by new forms” or as “change as 
transformation” in which novel processes derive from older patterns (Holsti, 2002: 28-
31). Whatever alternative form arises is assumed to exist in concert with sovereignty. 
European placement 
Given the focus this study places on the EU as the agent through which one might detect 
a changed resolution to the problematique, it is necessary to briefly note how its 
assessment differs from more traditional ES type analyses.8 As such, it is helpful to point 
                                                
8 For a good understanding of ES as a mode of enquiry, see Wallace 2000; Rumford and Murray, 2003; 
Jupille, 2005a, 2005b; Keeler, 2005; Rosamond, 2007a, 2007b. 
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out where ES has gone, and therein where this study allies/distances itself. In that regard, 
the ES literature can generally be divided into two basic camps. On one side, one strand 
has focused on the process of integration – on why integration has or has not occurred, 
and therein predicting its likelihood in the future. On the other side, an alternative strand 
has focused on what the EU is an instance of with the goal of assessing how that answer 
affects European politics/policy-making. In looking at these strands, the critical question 
is not which side is right and which side is wrong. The critical point is that, despite their 
different focuses, both have largely shortchanged discussions about how EU logics 
radiate outwardly and affect wider academic logics (in this case, IR). One can consider 
each side in more detail. 
The first ES strand focuses on explaining the process of integration. A wide body of 
literature exists that attempts to apply a specific theory of international cooperation – 
both “unadulterated” IR and EU-specific – to the Union in an attempt to explain its 
integrative development. Thus, theories ranging from realism to constructivism have 
been offered to explain events as grand as why France, Germany, and the Benelux 
originally formed the Coal and Steel Community to negotiations as minute as the 
bargaining dynamics behind intergovernmental conferences (Hoffman, 1966; Grieco, 
1995; Moravcsik, 1998; S. Smith, 1999, Pollack 2001). The underlying assumptions of 
those models are very different, however goals are largely the same – using a theory’s 
thinking on the possibilities for international cooperation to explain why integration has 
or has not occurred (and therein predicting future dynamics). Leaving aside which model 
does this best, the common denominator is that integration is a phenomenon in need of 
explanation of which IR may have something useful to say.  
To give an example, in a chapter relating IR and the EU, Andreatta (2005) starts sections 
on realism and liberalism by discussing how each theory’s perspectives on international 
cooperation conditions its view on integration. She notes that whereas realists are 
generally skeptical about the possibility for cooperation given the constraints of anarchy, 
liberalism is more easily adapted given its beliefs in, among other things, the role of 
institutions in reducing transaction costs and generating mutual rewards.9 From that 
context, Andreatta goes on to lay out how each model deals with specific aspects of 
                                                
9 This is not limited to realism and liberalism. S. Smith (1999) argues that constructivism best explains 
integration. Nevertheless, even he remains primarily concerned with integration as a process. 
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European integration based on their own particular conceptual commitments. What that 
chapter, and IR-themed literature on the EU more generally, tends not to do is analyze 
how the product of those processes affects initial assumptions. IR is used to explain the 
process of integration without dealing with how the product of that process impacts 
starting assumptions. 
In addition to “off-the-self” theories, IR has also lent its conceptual backbones to the 
development of EU-specific integration models. Rosamond (2000: 1) notes, “More often 
than not, integration theorists [trade] in the vocabulary of the discipline of International 
Relations”. Without arguing in favor of any one, these models range from Haas’s (1958) 
functionalism to Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism to Grieco’s (1995) 
voice-opportunity thesis. While each contains its own particular explanations for the 
reasons behind integration, as with the more traditional IR models, the focus of all of 
them largely remains on why cooperation has or has not occurred (and therein predicting 
future dynamics).10 The more reflexive concern about how the product of that process 
affects starting assumptions is again absent.11 
To be clear, these tendencies are not necessarily unexpected. Andreatta notes, 
Where most mainstream theories of international politics deal with states and their 
relations amongst each other, the European Union is neither a state nor a traditional 
alliance, and it therefore represents a heterodox unit of analysis…IR theory has a bias 
towards the explanation of broad phenomena it tends towards generalizations, while 
the European Union is, at least so far, a unique example of international cooperation 
and integration (Andreatta, 2005: 19). 
At the same time, difficulty of incorporation is not justification for a lack of it. Moreover, 
given the importance of the EU globally, its jurisdictional logics need to be understood 
and dealt with in a systematic manner. Despite its oxymoronic phrasing, there is a need 
to address how “the EU has dealt with its own international relations, internally” (Hill 
and Smith, 2005: 8, emphasis in original). While IR has debated the Union’s role in the 
international system (e.g. the Commission’s competencies in the WTO), this has largely 
not been met with a willingness to examine the nature of intra-member-state 
                                                
10 These models are not necessarily limited to the EU. Haas (1958) certainly was trying to develop a 
general theory of integration. Nonetheless, the point remains that there is a trend within ES to explain 
processes without reflecting on how their product affects starting points. 
11 For example, while liberalism intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism differ, both share a meta-
focus – explaining why integration has or has not occurred (Moravcsik, 1998; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1999). 
  36 
relationships for the explicit purpose of reflecting those findings back onto its initial 
assumptions. Similarly, EU’s solidarity has been discussed, however it too has generally 
preceded from a perspective of the “linkage between internal dynamics and external 
activity”, not the nature of those relationships themselves and how they impact 
jurisdictional starting points (Hill and Smith, 2005: 8). All told, this study attempts to do 
just that, asking whether EU political and socio-political setups challenge the 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations by offering a 
new solution to the problematique. Knowledge extends from the EU to IR. 
Moving the second strand of ES literature, it has generally centered around two 
sequential questions – what is the EU an instance of and how does that influence 
European politics/policy-making (Pollack, 2005; Hix, 2005). In that regard, Pollack 
(2005) notes that the literature tends to proceed down one of three tracks – the EU is an 
instance of international cooperation (an IO) such that European politics/policy-making 
is internationally mediated; the EU is a polity such that European politics/policy-making 
is comparable to other political systems; or the EU is sui generis such that European 
politics/policy-making requires its own unique conceptualizations. Unsurprisingly, each 
way of defining the EU produces a different view of European politics/policy-making. 
To draw-out these points, the following sections offer more detailed schematics. They do 
so not to debate which is right and which is wrong, but to lay out where ES has gone and, 
in turn, where this study hopes to push it. 
The first perspective, which generally links with the IR literature noted above, views the 
Union as akin to an IO (Milward, 1999; De Gaulle, 2003). Though it may be highly 
cooperative, innovative, and perhaps only understandable by non-rationalist theories, 
insofar as sovereignty-based logics continue to function and a structural division remains 
between the domestic realms of the member-states, the EU is simply an intense area of 
international cooperation. Unsurprising, European politics and policy-making are 
therefore seen as operating along internationally defined and constrained logics. 
Normative issues that might be seen critical to domestic communities (e.g. representative 
democracy) are generally deemed less important due to the structural limitations of the 
international system (Moravcsik, 1998, 2002). It warrants noting that while this point of 
view dominated early debates about the EU, it has given way to the comparative and sui 
generis perspectives (Keeler, 2006). 
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Approaching from an alternative perspective are those who view the EU as a polity and 
political system comparable to other polities and political systems. Pollack writes,  
A second approach…has rejected the application of international relations theory in 
favor of a comparative politics approach which analyzes the EU using off-the-shelf 
models of legislative, executive, and judicial politics in domestic politics (Pollack, 
2005: 357). 
The argument is that after decades of integration, institutional development, 
socialization, and community-building, member-state relationships have ceased being 
internationally determined and have become quintessentially internal to a European 
polity and political-system. Caporaso (1996: 30) writes, “The EU is simply assumed to 
be a polity, and analysis of policy-making within specific issue areas proceeds much as it 
would within a domestic politics”. 
One should be clear that this vision does not necessarily predict the formation of a 
strong, centralized unit and often stresses the EU’s federated nature. Nevertheless, it 
maintains that the EU can function as a full-fledged political system with a distinctively 
“internal” realm of conduct without completely transforming into a traditional, territorial 
state. Furthermore, insofar as the Union has a distinctively internal realm, relationships 
occur within it and under its specific logics, not in an international space defined by 
international logics.12 It is precisely from this point of view that Hix offers his rebuke to 
applications of IR writing, 
We may learn more from the ideas of Madison, Dahl, Easton, Rokkan, Olson, 
Lijphart, Schmitter, Rose and Majone than either from the likes of Morgenthau, Haas, 
Hoffman, Waltz, Keohane, and Moravcsik or from the likes of Lodge, Wallace, 
Wessels, and Nugent (Hix 1996:386).13 
In similar regards, Hix (1994: 1) argues that, “Politics in the EU are not inherently 
different to the practices of government in any democratic system [and] ES’ primary 
concern should be explaining and understanding the politics within it”. Unsurprisingly, 
the key questions under this perspective tend to be governance type issues – institutional 
balances, legislative politics, executive rights, and/or judicial power. Similarly, because 
the EU is a polity with its own citizenry, it experiences the normative needs of any other 
                                                
12 This does not mean that nationally-defined political communities cease to exist. It simply means that 
member-state relationships occur within a common, European political space not an international one. 
13 Again, Hix is not saying IR has no utility, just that the questions it tends to ask are different (and in his 
estimations less interesting for the EU) than those of CP. See chapter 6. 
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political community – for instance, questions of democracy and political contestation 
(Scharpf, 1999). 
Prior to outlining the third possibility, it should be noted that there is nothing illogical 
about combining the first two approaches, arguing that some issues are internalized to a 
EU-as-polity while other remain intergovernmental to a EU-as-IO (Wallace and Wallace, 
2000: 65-81). Without going into full detail as to how one determines which particular 
issues-areas belong in which category, those supporting such an approach generally 
agree that those areas in which the Commission has competencies, that the European 
Parliament (EP) has co-decision powers, and that QMV is used in the Council can be 
considered “internal” to a EU polity. Alternatively, those areas that require Council 
unanimity, where the Commission lacks full competencies, and where the EP does not 
enjoy co-decision powers are more intergovernmental (Peterson, 1999, Wallace and 
Wallace, 2000).14 Withholding judgment as to the appropriateness of this outlook, it 
clearly offers nuances lacking in the either/or nature of the IO or polity points of view. At 
the same time, despite its willingness to shift views in issue contingent ways, it does not 
fundamentally challenge the ability to locate political and/or socio-political action at 
some distinct level – whether domestic or European or international (stratification 
argument, chapter 3). 
The third way of defining the EU is often termed the sui generis approach (Caporaso et 
al., 1997; Pollack, 2005; Rosamond, 2000). Pollack writes, 
A third approach, typically labeled the governance approach, which draws from both 
international relations and comparative politics and which considers the EU not as a 
traditional international organization or as a domestic political system, but rather as a 
new and emerging system of “governance without government” (Pollack, 2005: 380). 
While those operating from this perspective agree that the EU is a unique political 
phenomenon requiring its own language and own theoretical conceptualizations, their 
specific languages diverge along a number of tracks. For instance, a sui generis approach 
might depict the EU via metaphors of multi-level governance, neo-medievalism, or 
networks all of which contain their own nuances (Marks, 1993; Hooghe and Marks, 
2003; Zielonka, 2006; Rumford, 2008). Irrespective of the (often significant) differences 
between such approaches, for the time being, the underlying point is that as a family and 
                                                
14 While discussions may occur within EU institutions, and may even be acted upon using European tools, 
because relationships are intergovernmental, logics remain international. 
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broad heading, the sui generis perspective differs from both the polity and international 
ones – in the first case, it rejects that the EU is comparable to off-the-shelf political 
models and, in the second, it acknowledges that intra-EU relationships are not strictly 
international. As the name implies, the EU is a unique phenomena such that 
understanding its politics/policy-making requires equally distinct approaches. 
Again, withholding judgment as to the correctness of any of those outlooks, there is 
nothing analytically wrong with any of them. Each offers an interpretation of the Union 
and then applies that outlook to European politics/policy-making.15 At the same time, 
however, despite their differences, they all are largely common insofar as they all largely 
take an introspective view of the EU. The critical question always tends to be what the 
Union’s structure (IO, polity, sui generis) reveals about European politics/policy-making 
specifically. Noting the partiality for introspection with ES, Warleigh (2006: 32) writes, 
“EUS scholars…been guilty of intellectual parochialism”. Again, adopting such a 
perspective is not incorrect. However, and where this study moves away from it, is that it 
fails to consider what the EU experience might reveal about wider academic debates.  
In making that point, a subtlety must be made clear. As one sees in chapters 3 and 4, this 
study does address what the EU is an instance of. It does undertake a thick examination 
of EU political and socio-political makeups. Nevertheless, in the context of the points 
just made, its reasons for doing so are separate from those of traditional ES. Asking 
what the Union is an instance of is done simply to assess whether a new jurisdictional 
form arises. That is why the starting point and focus is on the inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations – not any specific EU rule or 
structure. The study examines the EU with the explicit intent of asking how the 
jurisdictional shifts seen in it affect the ability to map political and socio-political setups 
into separate levels. Understanding European change is therefore the entryway towards 
engaging wider debates about jurisdictional change. 
 
 
                                                
15 One might combine the different interpretations based on historical stages, as Diez and Wiener (2009) 
do. They argue that the EU must be studied along historical phases, each of which contains a different 
empirical focus, a different theoretical toolkit, and therefore which spotlights a distinct intellectual goal. 
This is returned in to chapter 6. 
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Methodology – conceptual 
To undertake these arguments, certain methodological elements – both conceptually and 
empirically hued – must be laid out. Beginning on the conceptual side, one must start by 
laying out the vision of IR used throughout the study and, specifically, what is meant by 
the “mainstream” moniker. This study considers realism, liberalism, the English School, 
and statist constructivism as IR’s mainstream models due their conventionalism, 
widespread usage, and general importance within the discipline.16 Prior to going to the 
details of why that is the case, a couple of things must be made clear.  
First, and as the next chapter suggests, while the four models differ greatly, they share 
certain meta-theoretical assumptions. That being said, they are highlighted and treated as 
mainstream first of foremost due to their conventionalism, widespread usage, and 
general importance to IR. In other words, they are not selected due to any perceived 
conceptual commonalities they share – commonalities that post-modern models, for 
instance, may not (and likely do not) share. Second, no claims are made that they 
represent IR’s only models. That is certainly not the case (Burchill et al., 2005). Finally, 
no claims are made that classifying them as mainstream implies correctness. Again, the 
argument is that their conventionalism, widespread usage, and general importance in the 
field justifies treating them as mainstream. 
A case-by-case, argument supporting the mainstream classification follows, however the 
Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey provides a good quantitative 
starting point (Jordon et al., 2009).17 The 2009 study surveyed 2,746 IR scholars across 
ten countries asking them a series of question about the disciplinary status of IR – three 
of which are particularly relevant for this study. First, when those surveyed were asked 
what percentages of their introductory IR courses were devoted to a specific theory, 
when adopting a specific outlook, realism, liberalism, and constructivism topped the list 
and were the only models registering double-digit percentages (22, 19, and 11 percent 
respectively). Second, when asked about their own theoretical allegiances, of those 
                                                
16 The vision of IR presented risks charges of ethnocentrism, in large part due to a reliance on Anglo-
American authors. Nevertheless, as Hollis and Smith (1990: 16) note, while the discussion may take on a 
Anglo-American focus, it does so as mainstream IR originates from those regions. 
17 An updated TRIP study was released in January 2011, however contained findings only from the US 
academic community. This study uses the 2009 survey insofar as it offers a global perspective. 
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adopting a paradigmatic approach, realism, liberalism, and constructivism again topped 
the list (18, 17, and 17 percent respectively). Finally, when asked what percentage of IR 
literature one estimated as falling under a particular paradigm, realism, liberalism and 
constructivism again won out (30, 28 and 21 percent respectively).  
The one family not falling into the top three places in those questions, yet treated as 
mainstream by this study, is the English School. The School registered only an aggregate 
6 percent for the first question, 4 percent for the second, and 7 percent for the third. 
Nevertheless, when limited to UK scholars, it was either the highest or second highest 
percentage across all three questions (Jordon et al., 2009: 18, 31, 41). That is significant 
as the UK was considered the second most vibrant zone of IR thinking outside the US.  
While the survey provides initial evidence as to why classifying realism, liberalism, the 
English School, and constructivism as mainstream under a conventionalism rubric is 
proper, recognizing the limitations of purely quantitative arguments – those numbers 
reveal more about centrality, than acceptance – it is important to offer more case-by-case 
support. Beginning with realism, it is clear that since IR’s establishment it has occupied a 
central position. First, virtually every IR textbook and introductory course begins with a 
survey of it (Hollis and Smith, 1990: 27; Jordon et al., 2009: 41). Second, it has played a 
dominant role outside academia, particularly in foreign policy, decision-making circles. 
Third, IR’s alternative models generally all construct themselves in juxtaposition to 
realism. Jarvis  (2000: 25) notes that, “Realism…is in large measure the rasion d’être for 
the emergence of postmodern perspectives in the discipline”. While realism has faced 
challenges, it remains the point of critical contrast for other international theories such 
that it “must be a part of the analytical toolkit of every serious student of international 
relations” (Donnelly, 2005: 54). 
Like realism, liberalism is treated is mainstream. First, liberalism appears early on in 
most all introductory IR textbooks, reading lists, and publications (DiMuccio and 
Cooper, 2000: 186). Indeed, in a large-n study of IR journal articles, Walker and Morton 
(2005) found that it has surpassed even realism as the most widely cited model. Its 
models are also commonly applied in tangential fields (e.g. international economics) 
(Keohane and Nye, 2001). Second, liberalism’s influences extend beyond academics and 
into policy circles. For instance, its use of game theory in modeling nuclear dynamics has 
been particularly influential (Waltz and Sagan, 1995). Finally, as Keohane (1988) made 
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clear in his 1988 Presidential Address to the ISA, liberalism forms one pillar of the 
“rationalist family” of international theory (the other being realism) – a pillar that 
provides the discipline with a well-defined research agenda vis-à-vis debates about 
international regimes and cooperation.18  
The study also considers the English School as mainstream. As noted, the School is 
predominantly British, perhaps calling into question its inclusion under a 
conventionalism metric. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the wide-ranging 
impacts of Wight’s (1991) three-model typology of IR and Bull’s (1977, 1979) work on 
anarchical societies – both seminal texts to the English School specifically and IR 
generally. Furthermore, questions about international law and humanitarian intervention 
– central debates in modern international politics – frequently occur under the shadow of 
the School’s logics. For instance, while not always in name, the School’s 
solidarist/pluralist cleavage features heavily in questions ranging from the 
appropriateness of NATO’s intervention in the Balkans to the usefulness of international 
legal institutions such as the ICC (Charney, 1999; Jackson, 2000; Wheeler, 2001; Altman 
and Wellman, 2004). Thus, despite its British foundations, the School’s wider-ranging, 
knock-on impacts reflect its conventionalism such that this study is comfortable treating 
it as the most articulated encapsulation of the society-related trends within IR. 
Finally, the study considers constructivism as mainstream IR. In saying that, a degree of 
nuance is necessary. On the one hand, constructivism’s importance to IR is clear. 
Referencing an argument made by Keohane, Krasner, and Katzenstein, S. Smith (2004: 
501) stated in his 2003 ISA address that, “The current situation in the discipline [is] a 
new debate between rationalism and constructivism”. On the other hand, because 
constructivism is primarily an ontological approach advocating the importance of 
socially and intersubjectively defined knowledge, it experiences a large degree of 
internal heterogeneity. As a result, one is often confronted with a question of which 
constructivism one is speaking of at any moment. In a survey of it, Reus-Smit (2005: 
188-212) notes that it often proceeds down three distinct trajectories – systemic/statist, 
                                                
18 That point is critical as Keohane (1988: 392) made it in the context of arguing that “reflectivists” (by 
which he meant post-positivists), “[Would] remain on the margins of the field, largely invisible to the 
preponderance of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly or implicitly accept one or another 
version of the rationalist premises”. While not fully agreeing with that marginalization, his point was that 
until reflectivism develops a clear research agenda, rationalists would continue to dominate IR. 
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unit-level, and holistic. While the approaches share a social ontology, they differ in 
underlying focus – the systemic variety (Wendt) stressing state interactions, the unit-
level (Katzenstein) the relationship between domestic norms and international 
preferences, and the holistic (Kratochwil) the dynamics of change.  
While acknowledging this heterogeneity, the study focuses on the systemic/statist variety 
commonly associated with Wendt. It does this not because it considerers that vision 
correct and the others wrong (its goal is not assessing the efficacy of any one theory). 
Rather, it treats statist constructivism as mainstream because IR tends to view it as the 
most influential and conventional strand. Not only did the ISA award Wendt’s Social 
Theory of International Politics its book of the decade prize, but the text increasingly 
appears as the core outlining material for constructivist thinking more generally within 
introductory IR courses (Wendt, 1999; Jordan et al., 2009: 18). Similarly, the TRIP study 
found that Wendt’s name tops the list among those surveyed when asked who has 
produced the most interesting scholarship in the past five years and ranks second when 
asked whose work has been the most influential over the last 20 years/whose work has 
most influenced their own research (Jordan et al., 2009: 45-47). For those reasons, statist 
constructivism is considered the final mainstream model.  
Having made those technical points, the question arises as to the theoretical allegiance of 
the study itself. Prior to directly answering that, a few points must be laid out. First, as 
hinted at earlier, the goal of the study is not to determine which theory best explains 
international relations; it is not to demonstrate that realism is somehow “better” than 
liberalism. Nor is it to address which international theory best explains the EU. Rather, 
its goals are meta-theoretical centering on whether there is a need to study international 
relations as a distinct political and socio-political endeavor. As chapter 2 develops fully, 
because the mainstream theories share certain meta-commitments, such as to the 
domestic/international separation, the critical question is what happens should that 
commitment fail to materialize. In that sense, the study is less concerned with the 
“traditional questions in International Relations [about] how bounded communities 
interact…[and more concerned] with the neglected and prior issue of how boundedness 
is constituted in the first place” (Linklater, 2007: 53). 
Second, just as the goal is not to assess which theory best explains international relations, 
its method of analysis is not primarily one of theory testing. The study does not examine 
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the mainstream theories in juxtaposition to the EU and its operation in an attempt to 
determine which best explains the Union’s political development. Rather, by establishing 
that all four theories share an implicit commitment to sovereignty, and therein state 
citizenship, the key questions have to do with assessing whether the underlying tenets of 
sovereignty are present in the European context – an analysis in which no assumptions 
are made that sovereignty must exist.  
With those points in mind, the study nonetheless does maintain certain outlooks with 
respect to how it approaches that overall debate – primarily its intent to remain 
paradigmatically open by upholding a measure of skepticism with respect to any one 
theoretical model as well as by questioning that which otherwise might seem immutable. 
Indeed, this overall outlook is a logical offshoot of the study’s meta-theoretical bent 
(Devetak, 2005). As Walker (2000: 27) intonates, by not aligning itself with anyone 
model, one can maintain a “willingness to open up questions about the character and 
location of politics that the practices of sovereignty insist[s] are already answered”. In 
that context, there are certain conceptual perspectives that can be brought forward, 
including a commitment to theoretical self-reflection, an awareness of reification, and a 
belief in the contingency of knowledge. 
First, the need for self-reflection flows from recognizing that theoretical practice is often 
embedded in the phenomena under examination; theory and practice are not wholly 
separate endeavors. On the one hand, failing to realize that theory is not a neutral product 
arrived at from some Archimedean standpoint fails to control for the dangers of 
analytical and disciplinary reification and stagnation (Devetak, 2005). 19 On the other 
hand, by recognizing that theory and practice are not separate, this study recognizes the 
need for conceptual self-reflection. Because sovereignty is not treated as a “fact” whose 
meaning is arrived at from some neutral position, but rather as a concept whose meaning 
is embedded into the theories seeking to analyze it, the study can be critical about it. In 
other words, it can acknowledge sovereignty without being beholden to it. As the 
following chapters make clear, sovereignty as an empirical finding and sovereignty as 
analytical tool are separate things – a distinction that IR does not always make. 
Therefore, self-reflection comes by way of asking whether IR’s enabling conditions 
                                                
19 The argument is not that all of IR fails to recognize the link between theory and practice. Jackson (2000: 
57) notes that the English School’s humanism acknowledges it. The point simply relates to how this study 
approaches the discussion.  
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really work in the ways that IR tells itself that they must; whether the mainstream 
theories are relics born of a different empirical age held onto simply out of analytical and 
disciplinary need. 
Second, by stressing the need for self-reflection, the study is also cognizant of, and 
endeavors to guard against, analytical stagnation and reification. To be clear, stability in 
language and concept is not necessarily bad. By stabilizing both one is able to debate 
them and their effects in logical, often helpful, ways (Thaddeus Jackson and Nexon, 
1999: 300). Nevertheless, insofar as self-reflection is necessary, there is an implicit 
recognition that languages and concepts are not eternal. Again, that does not mean that 
they might not be highly stable. The state and sovereignty certainly are durable ideas. 
Nevertheless, theories cannot presume that languages and concepts always existed in a 
certain way. As Peterson, pejoratively, notes, 
Once in place, oppositional dichotomies act as a filtering device that ‘imposes’ ways 
of think that show how we ‘know’ reality, including how we act in ways that 
effectively ‘produce’ that reality – at the expense of alternatives rendered visual/real 
through alternative linguistic filters (Peterson, 2000: 64). 
Applying this logic to IR, insofar as the mainstream theories claim to offer explanations 
and/or understandings of international relations, they also tend to reify the existence of a 
domestic/international cleavage as the means of creating the international realm so 
integral to their enquiries (chapter 2). While they may be correct that the international 
realm is a long-lasting structure, they are incorrect to reify a specific empirical finding as 
an analytical structure. Indeed, it is hard for IR to be critical of sovereignty, or the 
international realm, if its theories start from the presumption that there is a fundamental 
need for both. 
Third, the study accepts a measure of contingency in knowledge. If knowledge is 
embedded in the prevailing discourse, then all knowledge is “situated knowledge” 
(Rupert, 2003: 186). As such, “facts” gain meaning primarily in relation to the ideas and 
language surrounding them. On a small scale, that means the domestic/international 
separation is significant mainly in the context of the theories and languages surrounding 
it.20 On a larger scale, then “once upon a time, the world was not as it is”; the 
                                                
20 This does not mean “real-world” events are unimportant; they simply need interpretation. Thus, “The 
power statist discourse combining sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship, to which the idea of the nation 
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inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international binaries are contingencies 
rooted in specific ways of thinking (Walker, 1993: 179). To stress, that does not hollow 
those devices out in a post-modern way. It simply means “opposing theoretical positions 
which stress political necessity and historical inevitability, and which fail to enlighten 
human subjects about the existence of alternative political arrangements” (Linklater, 
1998b: 21-22). As such, the argument is against boundary fixing, not the possibility for 
boundaries at all. 
In making all those points, certain dangers arise. First, theorizing about theorizing places 
one at an uneasy crossroad in which one risks losing “any clear sense of what the 
discipline [IR] is about, what its core concepts are, what its methodology should be, 
[and] what issues and central questions it should be addressing” (Hoffman, 1987: 231). 
To be clear, this study recognizes that danger. It recognizes that greater complexity is not 
always met with greater analytical usefulness. And, as is returned to in chapter 6, it 
accepts Hay’s (2010: 23) point that, “[As social scientists] [o]ur task is not to hold up a 
mirror to reality – and, hence, to reflect its ontological complexity—but to build and 
trace narrative paths through it”. In that sense, for IR, the concern has always been 
achieving a level of analytical purchase on an undoubtedly complex reality. 
Nevertheless, making jurisdiction the starting point in order to increase empirical 
accuracy ends up being analytically and disciplinarily necessary, appropriate, and 
impactful. One must deal with change and incorporate complexity if change and 
complexity are necessary – even if that upsets existing presumptions and/or compels 
greater contextualization. Of course, finding the proper balance between empiricism and 
analyticism may be simpler said than done. And there are always dangers of 
undisciplined encyclopediaism. However, those risks should not dissuade one from 
tackling the possibility that changing jurisdictional arrangements require substantial and 
substantive descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary reconfigurations. While further 
comments in those regards are saved for chapters 5 and 6, the point is that complexity 
need not be poetic fad and arguments for it need not arise from political praxis. One can 
disturb, disrupt, and re-build in constructive ways. 
                                                                                                                                           
was subsequently added made various efforts to give expression to different forms of political organization 
seem stumbling and incoherent” (Linklater, 1998b: 29, emphasis added). 
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Second, a belief in situational knowledge risks descending into anti-foundationalism. In 
that sense, as noted, a measure of stability in concept and language is not necessarily a 
bad thing (S. Smith, 1995: 20-30; Thaddeus Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 300; Jackson, 
2000: 52-55). Indeed, by treating all knowledge as historically contingent, how one 
draws any academic conclusions is difficult as everything becomes conditional. Jackson 
and Sørenson (2003: 249) argue that, if everything is self-referential then “there can be 
no true academic disagreements and controversies”. Nevertheless, it is precisely because 
of that potential problem that this study stresses the need challenge the norm with thick, 
empirical analysis (via the EU case) as well as to offer a set of descriptive, analytical, 
and disciplinary reassessments. In that regard, the study accepts the argument that 
criticism without reconstruction is as problematic as stagnation and/or reification. 
Finally, all of this risks being seen as nothing more than a normative dream. There is 
often an assumption on the part of globalization theorists, and those critical of 
sovereignty more generally, that more universal structures are somehow automatically 
“good”. Nevertheless, as Jackson and Schweller note, it is questionable as to whether any 
updated jurisdictional constructions are normatively “better” than sovereignty-based ones 
(Jackson, 1992; Schweller, 1999). For instance, targeting Linklater’s (1998b) critical 
assessment of the Westphalian state and hope for post-Westphalian communities Jackson 
(1992: 274) argues that “[He] provides no philosophical basis [for adjudicating] cases of 
conflict between cultures, which are bound to arise…”. Similarly, Schweller (1999) 
argues that Linklater presents nothing more than “fantasy theory”. By advocating a form 
of political universalism without providing any guidance as to why such an arrangement 
is normatively better than state particularism, the argument is that, at best, Linklater is 
being dogmatic and, at worst, replicating the very problems they attribute to traditional 
theory – embedded biases and immutable knowledge. 
With that in mind, if the goal is to question latent assumptions, one must prevent the 
mistakes of that which one criticizes and not impose a new vision or create new 
reifications. As such, a fine, but firm, line is drawn between questioning the relevance of 
the domestic/international separation, debating jurisdictional change, and ascribing 
normative worth to any updated structure. While the study recognizes the fineness of that 
line, it is secure in its belief that it can examine transformation without imparting 
normative worth to any updated configuration. In other words, questioning IR’s core 
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assumptions via an analysis of the EU counterpoint is not about prescribing a new path. 
Rather, it is about defining a jurisdictional alternative and how its political and socio-
political consequences might be understood. The normative issue of whether that 
alternative is “better” than its precursor is placed firmly to the side. 
Methodological – empirical 21 
Having laid out the study’s conceptual orientation, one can turn towards why Europe – 
and specifically the EU – is the focus. To begin, it is worth repeating the points made 
earlier with respect to why the European case is appropriate. First, the EU is widely 
acknowledged as a hotbed of jurisdictional change with a well developed, researchable, 
and operationalized core. Second, the EU deals with political and socio-political factors, 
both of which are critical to debating the challenges to sovereignty. Third, Europe is the 
historical source of sovereignty. As such, it offers a particularly poignant case.  
If those are the reasons that Europe is the key case, it is necessary to go into more detail 
regarding the type of evidence considered. As has been argued, the study’s primary 
concern is the analytical status of IR’s enabling binaries. Accordingly, the focus is 
logically on the empirical structures most closely associated with them. For 
inside/outside, one is drawn to the structures governing the dynamics and configurations 
of political action – the EU’s institutional rules, ECJ decisions, and the like. For 
inclusion/exclusion one is drawn to Europe’s socio-political aspects and therefore 
European citizenship. This separation of “politics” and “people” should not be taken as 
to imply that sovereignty necessitates state citizenship in a causal sense (or vice-a-versa). 
They are, no doubt, mutually supportive processes such that political outcomes are at 
least partially conditioned by socio-political relationships (again, vice-a-versa). As one 
will see in the following chapters, politics and people are examined separately as each 
tugs at a slightly different concern, as reflected in the contextual differences between 
“inside/outside” and “inclusion/exclusion”. Moreover, despite any structural separations 
that are made, both strands ultimately come together in the context of the study’s 
consideration of the domestic/international separation.  
                                                
21 These methodological issues are returned in the context of the specific issues under investigation in the 
two empirical chapters. 
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In making those points, it should also be made clear that “Europe” is a more inclusive 
term than “EU Europe.” While the varying usages throughout this study is largely 
semantic, the Union is the ultimate focal point as it is the acknowledged center-point to 
any discussion on European politics as well as a key critical case in wider debates about 
jurisdictional change. That does not mean non-EU issues are never important. However, 
when and where they are, it is reasonable to assume that if they are of fundamental 
significance, they will be caught-up in any analysis of the Union.  
Under those broad parameters, two further technical points need to be made clear. First, 
the study acknowledges that because the Union is an ongoing process it is potentially 
problematic to assign everlasting meaning to it. At the same time, that limitation must be 
balanced against the study’s desire to overcome a core criticism of critical of much 
globalization literature – a lack of empirical evidence. Consequently, a balance is struck. 
On the one hand, the empirical portions of the study are told based on largely 
documentary evidence – official EU reports, directives, decisions, and, where 
appropriate, public opinion surveying – up to and included the Lisbon Treaty. Using 
Lisbon as the endpoint makes sense both as it is the first treaty revision after the failed – 
and highly symbolic – constitutional attempt as well as due to its stated goal “to complete 
the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice”.  In doing so, 
the study forgoes consideration of inter/intra member-state/institutional deliberations. 
Little interest is paid to how the Union arrives at a given policy. Political rhetoric and 
legislative bargaining may be important to the policy-making process, however they are 
less important to analyzing how established and operationalized rules impact the 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion and domestic/international separations. 
On the other hand, while focusing on enacted rules shields the study from being overly 
conceptual, the problem of freezing the EU at a particular moment remains. As an 
example of this, Ansell (2004: 245) argues that EU is a hybrid institution. In doing so, 
however, he rhetorically asks whether that hybridity “stable” or simply a “transitional” 
stage between intergovernmentalism and federalism. Ansell is concerned with whether 
his analysis simply “catches” the EU during an intermediary, and therefore temporary, 
stage. In much the same way, this study faces a concern over whether its examination 
offers nothing more than a slice of the EU’s wider evolution – a concern likely to be 
exaggerated under a blurring finding. 
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Though that is a concern, the study also recognizes that the EU’s legislative process 
limits the possibilities for quick, radical change. Whether one takes an intergovernmental 
or a neo-functionalist reading of it, each side maintains that there are high barriers to 
effecting significant transformation – an intergovernmentalist stressing vetoes and 
Council unanimity and a neo-functionalist the “Community Method” and inter/intra 
institutional checks (Wallace and Wallace, 2000). Thus, whatever rules that exist are not 
treated as haphazard decisions or fleeting irregularities. Again, that does not mean that 
they are immutable. Treating them in such a way would reify them in the same ways IR 
does the state. However, contemporary European arrangements can be treated as trends – 
trends that are stable insofar as they arise out of the Union’s collaborative processes, but 
also trends that need always exist in the same ways. While the EU’s current structures 
are taken to be reflective of the Union’s general movement, they are not viewed as 
foundational – a fact that becomes critical in chapter 5’s discussion on the importance of 
process, not end-point, based arguments as well as the conclusion’s one current 
challenges to EU setups.  
Conclusion 
Put together, this chapter, paired with the introduction, introduced the topic of the study, 
provided an outline of its key questions and themes, located it within existing thinking, 
and provided its overarching methodological outlook. In doing so, the chapters 
established that the central issue guiding the study as a whole is the shifting nature of 
jurisdiction, witnessed through an examination of Europe, and how that affects the 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary maps IR has traditionally deployed to understand 
international dynamics. Given those broad goals, the next chapter develops what is 
specifically meant by jurisdiction and the jurisdictional problematique. In doing so, it 
examines sovereignty and why it ought to be considered a corollary of jurisdiction. All of 
that offers the context for analyzing IR’s analytical and disciplinary necessities. 
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Chapter 2 – Jurisdiction, sovereignty, citizenship, and IR 
 
Introduction 
Logic dictates that assessing change – of any type – requires establishing perspectives 
both on “what was” as well as “what became”. In order to examine the sorts of 
jurisdictional changes coming out of the EU experience, and therein their effects on IR, 
one must first establish the baseline standard against which change can be assessed. In 
that regard, this chapter extends on the points developed in the previous one, particularly 
with respect to the importance of jurisdiction as the undergirding concept of analysis and 
why a sovereignty form of it enables IR’s analytical and disciplinary structures. In that 
sense, this chapter’s central purpose is to establish firm perspectives on “the old” in order 
to contextualize the subsequent examination of “the new”. 
To add a degree of specificity to each of those objectives, the chapter is divided into two 
main sections. The first half extends the argument introduced in the previous one – that 
jurisdiction and the jurisdictional problematique are the core issues at play in any 
analysis of political and socio-political life. It both makes clear why a starting point and a 
language of jurisdiction is helpful and necessary in such analyses as well as why 
sovereignty ought to be defined as a specific type of it. To do each of those things, the 
chapter proceeds along two mutually supporting lines. First, it offers an analytical 
schematic for analyzing each concept. It then uses that schematic to conceptually define 
jurisdiction and sovereignty (as well as power and authority). Second, the chapter backs 
up that conceptual framework with a set of historical examples. As one sees, while 
jurisdictional debates are unavoidable parts of political life, sovereignty is not a 
necessary ingredient for political action. Moreover, sovereignty is defined as a corollary 
of jurisdiction. Sovereignty is therefore viewed as a type of jurisdiction.1 
In offering that analysis, a word of initial clarification is necessary with respect to the 
sequence the chapter takes in examining these issues and, in particular, its separate 
                                                
1 To be clear, as page 60 establishes fully, this is not to say that jurisdictional questions might not also arise 
within a context of sovereignty (e.g. the jurisdiction of courts within a sovereign state). The question is 
whether jurisdictional debates might also occur fully outside of sovereign setups. 
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assessments of the political and socio-political consequences of sovereignty. The chapter 
looks first at the relationship between jurisdiction and sovereignty largely from a 
“political” point of view. The focus is more on the structures governing the 
configurations and dynamics of political action – broadly defined – than it is on the 
people impacted by them. That being said, by establishing a rubric of sovereignty, socio-
political factors – factors in which the focus more fully rests on people and how they 
relate to a given political setup – are then considered. And, under the context of 
sovereignty, that largely occurs through a framework of state citizenship and 
inclusion/exclusion. 
As noted in the previous chapter, this sequence of analysis should not be taken as to 
imply that sovereignty necessitates state citizenship. Again, they are, no doubt, mutually 
supportive processes.  Politics and people are examined separately insofar as each tugs at 
a slightly different concern (see below). While the trends ultimately do come together in 
the context of the domestic/international separation, for clarity’s sake the chapter deals 
first with the more overtly politically structuring aspects of sovereignty and how they 
related to jurisdiction and then applies the outcome of that analysis to the associated 
socio-political components. 
If the first half of the chapter offers a firm appreciation of jurisdiction, why sovereignty 
ought to be seen as a type of it, and ultimately the sovereignty standard (“the old”), the 
second half of it links those findings back to IR. It addresses why sovereignty is critical 
to the discipline – both in a general sense as well as in the context of the four mainstream 
IR models. The chapter argues that despite the vastly different vision of and hopes for the 
international realm coming out of each of those models, each must subscribe to a belief 
in the existence of a definable and a distinct sphere of international action. And, insofar 
as the ability to do that analytically relies on the domestic/international binary coming 
out of sovereignty’s resolution to the jurisdictional problematique, they each require 
inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion separations. In making these linkages, one should 
be clear that the intention is to define the counter lines of IR as field of academic enquiry 
and not to assess the appropriateness of any individual model. 
By defining IR’s enabling conditions, the chapter illustrates both why the discipline 
functions in the ways that it traditionally does, but also why those conditions may be 
problematic in instances of jurisdictional change. Arguing that IR has a common set of 
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assumptions shared by its mainstream models may not be particularly surprising. 
However, ascertaining precisely what and where those crosscutting commonalities are 
does open the door towards assessing whether that DNA contains inherent genetic flaws 
and how a changed domestic/international cleavage might trigger mutation. And, 
returning to the point made at the outset, that sets the stage towards debating whether the 
EU lobs any formidable ammunition at those genes and, if it does, what forms do they 
take, what changes do they mandate, and what new ways forward might be found. 
Jurisdictional starting points 
If one accepts for the time being that IR requires sovereignty as sovereignty provides the 
structure for the inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international 
separations at the heart of its disciplinary foundations – an assumption neither 
uncommon nor farfetched – the question that arises is why this study finds it necessary to 
elevate jurisdiction to the forefront at all. In other words, if the study ultimately accepts 
that IR and sovereignty are inextricably linked – linked to the point that the former 
disciplinarily requires the latter to make sense – then why is defining sovereignty as a 
type of jurisdiction important in the first place? If sovereignty offers the structural 
conditions, and therein the conceptual groundings, through which it is possible to 
visualize a domestic/international separation, why is making it a jurisdictional type 
significant to overall understandings of IR in the first place? 
In initiating what is a reasonable line of thinking, it should be clearly stated that this 
study is not rejecting the importance of sovereignty to IR. Indeed, the second half of the 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that very point; it argues that that despite their individual 
theoretical divergences, the four mainstream theories all require it. At the same time, 
however, as presaged in chapter 1, this chapter does setout to illustrate that sovereignty is 
simply one type of jurisdiction and simply one resolution to the problematique. It does so 
in an attempt to demonstrate that while jurisdiction is an ever-present aspect of political 
and socio-political life, sovereignty it is neither an inevitable fact nor a necessary 
ingredient. The issue is whether, far from being the most basic concept from which all 
other critical political logics derive from (or operate under the conditions of), sovereignty 
can be dismantled into more rudimentary sub-components. To illustrate that, the chapter 
examines its relationship with other commonly used terms within IR, most notably 
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power, authority, and jurisdiction. In each case, the primary interest is the conceptual 
“inclusiveness” of each term.  
In doing that, as one sees fully below, sovereignty becomes a specific expression of more 
inclusive, conceptual building blocks. The chapter argues that sovereignty is a corollary 
of jurisdiction; it is a jurisdictional type based on a precise constellation of processes. 
Again, going back to the point spurring this discussion, that in no way negates the 
importance of sovereignty to IR. Neither this chapter nor the study as a whole finds any 
contradiction between sovereignty as non-elemental and sovereignty as vital to 
international theory. De-mystifying it does, however, allow for an examination of its 
development over the longue durée. And that opens the door towards debating whether 
non-sovereign jurisdictional setups exist in modern Europe. 
In addition to that overarching reason for highlighting jurisdiction, three further 
rationales are important. First, on a terminological level, making jurisdiction the critical 
concept forgoes certain stigmas associated with the term “sovereignty.” As is well 
known, there are wide-bodies of literature from diverse disciplines that attempt to 
analyze certain perceived challenges to sovereignty by re-branding it. Thus, one 
frequently encounters terms such as “softened sovereignty”, “non-territorial 
sovereignty”, “floating sovereignty”, “sovereignty-free”, and/or “pooled sovereignty” 
(Rosenau, 1990; Waever, 1995; Wallace 1999; Agnew, 2005).  
To be clear, no claims are made as to the appropriateness of the logics subsumed under 
those headings. Nonetheless, if one accepts that sovereignty is a jurisdictional type based 
on a specific constellation of factors, it stands to reason that sovereignty as a term lapses 
when any component of that constellation changes. While on first glance that may seem 
radical, it gains nuance insofar as sovereignty’s terminological death does not necessarily 
mean the downfall of any specific sub-component of it – hence the logics contained 
under the terms noted above are not necessarily wrong. Their terminology is at fault.  
Second, on an empirical level, approaching sovereignty via a discussion of jurisdiction 
allows one to assess its solution to the problematique over a much larger and longer 
historical panoramic. Because IR tends to treat sovereignty as its enabling condition, it 
also heuristically dates itself to Westphalia. Doing so, however, self-excludes 
considerations of pre-sovereign, jurisdictional structures – which both fails to reflect on 
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those structures in their own right, but also risks short-changing the specific processes 
that make sovereignty itself distinct. Thus, while this study ultimately accepts that 
sovereignty and state citizenship allow for the inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and 
domestic/international separations at the heart of IR, it disagrees that they are timeless 
concepts. The sovereign state is not a “sacred unit beyond historical time” and one 
should not be trapped by such an assumption (Agnew, 1994: 65). Introducing it from a 
perspective of jurisdiction – a term that etymologically pre-dates it – therefore allows 
one to track the arrangements prior to it as well as the specific nature of the shifts leading 
to it. The nature of those shifts underlies the typology used to assess jurisdictional change 
in modern Europe. 
In making that point, one should stress that if sovereignty is simply a jurisdictional type, 
it is not essential for the conduct of political or socio-political life. Extending on the 
point made in the introduction, because political and socio-political action represent 
more than mere power relations – because, as Onuf and Klink (1989: 52) aptly note, 
“wherever there are politics there are limits” – while offering some resolution to the 
problematique is necessary, a sovereignty-specific form of it is not. Accordingly, and as 
the historical sections that follow make clear, political and socio-political life are feasible 
absent sovereignty. And that highlights the critical role played by jurisdiction in 
examining the multitude of arrangements that might exist. 
Finally, on a methodological level, defining sovereignty as a corollary of jurisdiction 
illustrates the contingency of the former in light of the variability of the latter. And that 
sets the stage for European changes. Opening the door to the historical contingency of 
sovereignty removes some of the revisionist pressures on the European focused chapters 
insofar as EU processes are not seen as changing a here-to-forth timeless concept. 
Rather, by demonstrating that jurisdiction has not always functioned in the ways that 
sovereignty tells IR it must (and, as it turns out, that IR tells sovereignty it must), the EU 
counterpoint is merely a modern instance of a pre-modern debate. Returning to Holsti’s 
(2002: 28-31) point, alterations are therefore less instances of “change as replacement” 
and more instances of “change as addition” or “change as transformation”. If there are 
changes to sovereignty, those alterations are occurring to a concept that has historically 
already varied. 
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Core concepts  
Having outlined why a jurisdictional entryway makes sense, one can turn to the trickier 
issue of why sovereignty ought to be considered a derivative of it. To flesh that out, it is 
helpful to expand the debate to four concepts – power, authority, jurisdiction, and 
sovereignty. Power and authority are relevant insofar as both frequently find themselves 
adjoined to sovereignty and jurisdiction. For instance, one often encounters the terms 
“sovereign power” and/or “sovereign authority” as well as “jurisdictional power” and/or 
“jurisdictional authority.” Sovereignty is important for obvious reason. Jurisdiction 
enters the debate as the study’s key theme. Indeed, it should be noted that the term is 
conspicuously absent from most standard IR texts and discussions, the assumption being 
that it matters only within a sovereignty-based setup and therefore is not of great concern 
to international theory as such. As a practical example, a keyword search of ISA 
programs from 2000-2010 finds that whereas “sovereignty” appeared in, on average, 
6.45 panel headings a year (the highest being 2008 and 2012 with 12 each), 
“jurisdiction” appeared just three times in total (once each in 2002, 2003, and 2010). 
Moreover, in looking at the titles of the papers, “sovereignty” appeared, on average, 
42.45 times a year with “jurisdiction” coming in, on average, just 1.63 times. 
To define and relate the terms, the chapter tracks three interrelated metrics – scope, 
number, and method.2 Scope reflects the extent to which power, authority, jurisdiction, or 
sovereignty is exercised. As such, it has connotations of both spatial range and functional 
competencies. Number, which relates to scope, centers on the quantity of decision-
makers, including the autonomy of them. Finally, method refers to how power, authority, 
jurisdiction, or sovereignty is expressed; its mode of execution. Taken together, tracking 
how each core concept operates along each metric allows one to examine which is the 
conceptually most inclusive, and thereby which are derivatives of the others (Table 2). 
Beginning with power and authority, one may be tempted to write-off their varying 
usages as semantic such that each term ultimately denotes the same thing. Nevertheless, 
MacCormick makes clear that while they are related, they define different phenomena. In 
the first case, he argues that power describes the relationship between two or more actors 
                                                
2 One will realize that these metrics correspond with the jurisdictional problematique – number with 
“who”, scope with “what”, “where” and “over whom”, and method with “how”. The study starts with 
number, scope, and method as they offer a more generic and terminologically assessable entry point.  
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and indicates the capacity of one to make the other do something it would otherwise not 
do – whether that means compelling it to perform/not perform an action that it might 
otherwise have/have not been taken or by preventing cognition of all the possible choices 
that might have been available (MacCormick, 2004; Lukes, 2005).3  
As it relates to the metrics, as a concept, power lacks a necessary spatial scope. Being 
relational, it could be as limited as that of parent in a household or as broad as a 
superpower over the globe. Similarly, it lacks a necessary functional scope. An actor 
could have power over a particular issue or over a whole host of them. Second, just as 
there is no necessary scope, there is no pre-determined number (though being relational 
logically requires more than one). One can easily imagine two, three, or more actors 
competing with one another over common issues in common spaces. Finally, there is no 
necessary method of execution. Even when limited to a state context, power might be 
hard in some cases and soft in others (Nye, 1990). Similarly, power might be expressed 
in observable, unobservable, or behavioral ways (Lukes, 2005).4 Irrespective of the 
specifics, however, across all three metrics, power is conceptually open. 
If power is the relational capacity to make another do something that they would 
otherwise not do (or, at least limit the practical and/or cognitive choices available to 
them), authority replicates that definition, however roots it in a normative – a 
legitimizing – order. It is therefore a derivative of power (Onuf and Klink, 1989: 152; 
Rosenau, 1990: 186; MacCormick, 2004: 861).5 To be clear, saying that authority has 
                                                
3 The understanding of power advanced in this study highlights its relational aspects. That being said, 
alterative interpretations might be given. For instance, Lukes cites Arendt’s consensual understanding in 
which power is linked “the res public…[where people] behave nonviolently and argue rationally” (Arendt, 
1970: 56; Lukes, 2005: 33). While Lukes believes such a conceptualization is “rationally defensible”, he 
notes that it risks being of less value than a relational understanding. “Focus[ing] on the locution ‘power 
to’, ignore[s] ‘power over’. Thus power indicates a ‘capacity’, a ‘facility’, and ‘ability’, not a relationship. 
Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power – that fact that it is exercised over people – disappears 
altogether from view. And along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in 
the first place – an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people’s compliance by overcoming 
or averting their opposition” (Lukes, 2005: 34).  
4 In this case, the question arises as to how one identifies the mechanism of power if it either prevents an 
action from being taken (e.g. is unobservable) or is behavioral (e.g. is rooted in social forces/institutional 
practices that prevent an issue from entering the political arena). While these issues are critical to 
understanding power as the independent concern, they are less relevant to understanding its relationships 
to the other key terms. Indeed, while a behavioral view may differ from more traditional relational 
formulations, in either case, the number, scope, and method metrics seem to be open. 
5 One might note that the difference between power and authority may be academic insofar as an actor 
might have authority – for example, to make a law – without having the means – the power – to enforce it. 
Nonetheless, the conceptual difference remains accurate. 
  58 
normative roots reveals nothing about the nature of those groundings. While in 
contemporary political communities it tends to be territorial and democratic, its basis 
could be religious, ethnic, or something else entirely. Thus, saying that authority is the 
normative expression of power simply means that there is a legitimating factor of some 
sort. With authority, 
The question is not so much who can in fact do certain things, but who has the right to 
do so, whose rules or commands ought to be obeyed if issued on certain subjects and 
following prescribed procedures, who has a position defined by some normative order 
empowering them in this normative rather than factual sense to lay down what others 
must receive as, for them, valid or binding norms or reasons for action. Then what is 
in issue is authority, power in its normative form (MacCormick, 2004: 861). 
Given that, one can return to the scope, number, and method metrics. First, while as a 
concept authority lacks any necessary spatial scope – it could be as limited as a parent’s 
authority in a household or as extensive as a religion’s over all parishioners – insofar as it 
has a normative underpinning, in practice it has constraints based on that foundation –
parental authority based on custom or religious authority based on faith. A similar 
situation occurs with respect to its functional scope. Authority is open in theory, but 
defined in practice based on the particular normative order at play. Second, there is 
nothing inherent to authority that mandates a specific number of them in a given 
circumstance. It is just as easy to imagine one authority over all things and in all places 
as multiple authorities sharing authority over different things in different places. 
Nevertheless, in practice, there are again likely to be limits based on the normative 
underpinning present. Finally, authority’s mode is theoretically open – it might be hard in 
some instances and soft in others, formal in some cases and informal in others. However, 
it is defined in practice based on the legitimating structures in operation. Taken together, 
authority’s scope, number, and method variables are open in theory, but are limited in 
practice by a normative order. They are therefore “under-defined” variables. 
In understanding the relationship between power and authority, the question becomes 
which is appropriate for the issues underlying this study. On one side, each has been used 
in international discourse. On the other side, each denotes a different thing. However, 
because this study is more interested in questions of right – who has the right to exercise 
political rule – not brut fact – who has the power to do this or that – it is more concerned 
with authority than power. Indeed, because power is relational, it is also border resisting, 
a fact that would seem to negate the very possibility of defining inside/outside, 
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inclusion/exclusion, or domestic/international binaries. While states may engage in so-
called “power politics” in their day-to-day interactions, they implicitly rely on the 
normative underpinning provided by, as it turns out, sovereign equality (and with it 
territorial boundedness) to structure the international system itself (Bull, 1977). While 
the strength and types of those underpinnings may be debated, insofar as there is an 
international system at all, authority, not power, is the critical concern. 
In accepting that authority is the issue, the question moves to the relationship between it 
and jurisdiction and sovereignty – including why this study privileges jurisdiction. One 
can start by defining jurisdiction, a term that literally means “to speak the law.” As 
noted, it is typically viewed as a state based, sovereignty contingent phenomenon. Shaw 
defines it as, 
The power of the state to affect people, property and circumstances and reflects the 
basic principle of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in 
domestic affairs…Jurisdiction is a vital and indeed a central feature of state 
sovereignty (Shaw, 1986: 342, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Gordon (2005: 5) defines jurisdiction as “the legal authority of the state”, 
having both “prescriptive” (rule-making) and “enforcement” (rule-implementation) 
qualities. It “evokes a certain geography, one that articulates the scope of state 
sovereignty in territorial terms”. Thus, the conventional approach is that a state “speaks 
the law” within its territory based on its sovereignty. Jurisdiction is the legal 
personification of the sovereign state.  
In offering that definition, and prior to challenging it, two provisos must be made. First, 
this study is not blind to the fact that jurisdictional questions have been applied outside 
the state context – for example, in international law. Nonetheless, where and when this 
has occurred, the assumption has tended to be that a state’s jurisdiction is either extended 
to the territory of another based on need (e.g. extra-territorial rights for diplomats) or is 
concluded between states as sovereign jurisdictions (e.g. a contractual relationship) 
(Shaw, 1986: 342-371; Raffo et al., 2007: 16-18). In either case, the state remains the 
enabling unit such that “the internal and external sources of law [remain] traced to the 
‘will of the sovereign’” (Wind, 2001: 90).  
Second, the traditional jurisdiction-within-sovereignty vision is not wrong and no claims 
are being made that jurisdictional issues cannot arise within state contexts. They can and 
  60 
do, whether in the context of a judicial system (e.g. court jurisdictions) or among 
political actors (e.g. separations of powers between legislatures and executives). For that 
reason, the real issue is whether jurisdictional debates might also occur outside of the 
structuring conditions found in sovereignty setups. And, again, given that the term’s 
literal meaning is “to speak the law” as well as that it etymologically pre-dates both 
sovereignty and the state it seems reasonable to at least open the door to the possibility 
that jurisdiction might be unbolted from both. 
Accordingly, returning to the three metrics, like authority, the scope of jurisdiction is 
under-defined. On the spatial side, it is possible to enable rule-making/rule-enforcing 
programs along a number of spatialities – for example, universally, nationally, 
religiously, or culturally. Similarly, there is nothing inherent to it that implies an actor 
must have jurisdiction over all issues. Nevertheless, unlike power, but like authority, 
because speaking the law implies a legitimation process, in practice both scope types 
would function through normative limits. Second, the number of actors having 
jurisdiction within a unit or over a function is under-defined. While in theory there are 
many options – one can imagine multiple jurisdictions “speaking” with their own voices 
over a common issue or a single one “speaking” to everything and everyone within a 
territory – in practice the normative dynamics at play mandate specific number 
dynamics. 6  Finally, in a specification from authority, jurisdiction carries strong 
connotations of administrative development – of rule-making and rule-enforcement 
mechanisms. Administration could take place in any number of ways – through courts, 
norms, parliaments, and/or executives. In that sense, authority and jurisdiction are related 
to the point that jurisdiction is considered “the administration of authority”. Nevertheless, 
as a term and a concept, jurisdiction is privileged due to its firmer translation of authority 
into practice. 
With that in mind, the jurisdictional problematique introduced in the study’s introduction 
forms as a debate over final scope, number, and method orientations. As noted, because 
political and socio-political life requires limits, the goal is about defining the contours of 
the administration of authority. It is about finalizing jurisdiction’s functional scope (an 
issue of “what”), its spatial scope (issues of “where” and by implication “over whom”), 
                                                
6 This may produce empirical conflicts between different jurisdictions over a similar issues/the same 
person, however that does not affect the concept as a whole. See chapter 4. 
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its number (an issue of “who”), and its method (an issue of “how”). In that regard, the 
problematique represents the under-definitions inherent to jurisdiction. It is a debate over 
“Who decides what, where, how and over whom”. It therefore reflects the under-defined 
nature of jurisdiction-the-concept and acts as an extension of the metrics used to assess it. 
Because resolving it in some way, shape, and form is inescapable to political and socio-
political life, the problematique is at the heart of all political and socio-political analysis. 
Having defined and related power, authority, and jurisdiction, one can turn to 
sovereignty. To reiterate, this chapter is not trying to re-imagine it. It is simply 
attempting to define it as a jurisdictional type. Starting with scope, sovereignty is thought 
to occur within a territorially bounded area (Agnew, 1994, 2005). In that territory, the 
sovereign is assumed to have jurisdiction over all issues and all people. There is a 
congruency between territorial, functional, and jurisdictional scopes. Second, sovereignty 
generally implies the presence of a supreme and autonomous source of jurisdiction.7 The 
sovereign has final say inside its territorial borders and is therefore logically independent 
from other like units. MacCormick (2004: 859) notes, “[I]f one ruler were in effect the 
overlord of another, that other would cease to have sovereignty”. Finally, due to its statist 
links, the method of administration utilized in sovereign contexts is thought to occur via 
formal and delineated state agencies internally and ensured by clear and stable territorial 
borders externally (Hertz, 1956, 1968).  
Put together, sovereignty contains a clear scope, number, and method – territorially and 
functionally complete (scope), exclusive (number), and state agencies (method). Indeed, 
those logics can be seen as the legitimating underpinnings necessary for the stabilization 
of the under-defined qualities inherent to jurisdiction. Sovereignty is a normative system 
based on its specific views on the appropriate extent of jurisdiction. Sovereignty provides 
a specific resolution to the problematique – the “who” being the single, autonomous 
sovereign, the “what” being all functions, the “where” being territorial, the “how” being 
state agencies, and the “over whom” being the people within said territory. Whether in 
the context of the three metrics or the problematique itself, sovereignty is a specific 
means of administering authority. Jackson (1999: 432) writes, “Sovereignty is the basic 
                                                
7 A sovereign might federalize his or her jurisdictional, however a hierarchy would remain (Ansell, 2004). 
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norm, grundnorm, upon which a society of states ultimately rests. If states were not 
sovereign political life would have to rest on a different normative foundation”. 8 
It is important to note that the understanding of sovereignty developed has three related, 
but subtly distinctive, aspects (Branch, 2011a: 14). First, sovereignty functions as an 
“actor type” via its depiction of who the legitimate political player is – the sovereign. 
Second, sovereignty functions as a means of “system-wide organization”, its tenets 
effectively dividing and organizing the Earth up into domestic insides juxtaposed against 
an international outside. Finally, it has a “systemic functionality” effect based on 
sovereign equality and non-interference principles; it is a functional cog in the system’s 
overall execution. While these three aspects combine to offer a holistic understanding of 
sovereignty, it is important to keep the distinctions in mind throughout the following 
discussion as each hints at a different aspect of it and, therefore, of its importance to IR. 
Table 2 – Core concepts 
Concept Definition Scope Number Method 
Power 
The ability to make another do 
something that it would 
otherwise not do (whether via 
direct coercion or 
structurally/cognitively 
limiting potential choices) 
Open Open Open 
Authority Power with a normative grounding 
Under-defined; 
open in theory, 
normative 
limitations in 
practice 
Under-defined; 
open in theory, 
normative 
limitations in 
practice 
Under-defined; 
open in theory, 
normative 
limitations in 
practice 
Jurisdiction The administration of authority 
Under-defined; 
open in theory, 
normative 
limitations in 
practice 
Under-defined; 
open in theory, 
normative 
limitations in 
practice 
Rule-making 
and rule-
enforcing 
mechanisms 
Sovereignty 
Territorially-based 
jurisdictional form in which a 
single actor claims exclusive 
jurisdiction over all functions 
and people within a territory 
Territorial; 
functionally 
complete; 
territorial/functi
onal/jurisdiction
al congruency 
Single 
(supreme; 
independent 
from like units) 
State 
agencies/bureau
cracies 
 
                                                
8 This study is not judging the wiseness of such a setup and it may be more to do with prudence and 
convenience than fairness. See Jackson, 1999. 
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Non-sovereign jurisdiction 
By conceptually relating the core terms, one can now turn towards offering a historical 
context. In doing so, the concern is illustrating that a different answer to the 
problematique existed prior to sovereignty as well as reiterating the specific processes 
leading to a sovereignty-based resolution of it. As a methodological note, the sections are 
used heuristically and are not offered as formal historiographies. As is developed below, 
they all contain certain academic obfuscations. Nevertheless, “by selecting specific 
points in space and time that can be considered typical of a particular formation,” one 
can track how critical elements – in this case, jurisdictional configurations – are 
assembled and disassembled across time (Hoffman, 2008: 665). By doing that, one gains 
insight into the tipping-points that prompt movement from one stage to another.  
It is useful to begin the discussion visually with the widely accepted point that the 
modern international map – a map hanging in every elementary school classroom and 
depicting states in starkly different colors separated by firm black borderlines – is very 
different from the political maps of medieval Europe (Jackson, 2007b; Branch, 2011a, 
2011b). Jackson writes, 
[Medieval Europe] was not a territorial patchwork of different colors, which 
represented independent countries under sovereign governments whose population 
exhibit distinctive national identities. Instead [it] was a complicated and confusing 
intermingling of lines and colors of varying shades and hues (Jackson, 2007b: 27). 
From a retrospective perceptive, it is easy to understand the point being made – prior to 
sovereignty, Europe did not exist as a series of distinct states separated by sovereign 
borders. Indeed, acknowledging that something existed before sovereignty, but tending 
not to care insofar as it was not sovereignty, has been a tactic often taken by IR 
(Rengger, 2000). Placing that point to the side for the time being, while medieval Europe 
may have lacked sovereignty, jurisdictional structures were not absent. To that end, 
understanding what forms existed prior to sovereignty is critical to both de-reifying it as 
well as illustrating what lead to it.  
Thus, it is well established that there were multiple authority sources, and therefore 
multiple jurisdictional actors, in Latin Christendom (Mattingly, 1988; Holzgrefe, 1989; 
Brown, 2002; Jackson 2007). As the name implies, on the largest scale there was the 
Catholic Church where, as matter of faith, God claimed com
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jurisdiction. In that sense, popes were thought to wield both temporal and spiritual 
swords and, with them, jurisdiction over all people, all matters, in all lands, and over all 
of time. While a pope might lend his earthly sword to secular rulers, jurisdictional 
supremacy technically rested with him. God spoke the law in its entirety and no border 
could retard it.  
While in theory the pope claimed universal jurisdiction, in practice he co-existed – often 
uneasily – with other jurisdictional agents. For instance, in addition to the Church there 
was the Holy Roman Empire – a mixture of kingdoms, principalities, cities, and other 
sub-units – led by the Holy Roman Emperor (HRE). One might be tempted to think of 
this as early federalism; the Church ceded certain temporal rights to the HRE, but 
maintained overall preeminence. However, the story was hardly so clear-cut. Jackson 
(2007: 36) notes that while the Church claimed the papacy was a “regnum” superior, the 
HRE claimed the office of “sacerdotium” and with it earthy dominance. 9  This 
disagreement was not merely rhetorical, as highlighted by the investiture conflicts 
between Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII (Mattingly, 1988).  
These complications and competitions were not limited to popes and HREs. The latter 
faced jurisdictional battles in their own right with landed nobilities, many of who 
claimed hereditary, jurisdictional entitlements. Loughlin (2003: 57) notes that while the 
HRE was “the suzerain of suzerains and the seignior of seigniors,” that implied 
supremacy over only “those best placed to disobey”, not everyone and everything in the 
empire. Furthermore, the empire itself co-existed with regnas – “islands of local political 
authority” – controlled by landed kings and queens (Jackson, 2007b: 25). These, in turn, 
co-existed with their own sub-actors – nobilities, cities, and guilds. In the end, all the 
various actors – popes, HREs, kings/queens, cities, guilds, and nobles – claimed their 
own unique jurisdictional gambits based on their own individual rationales. While in 
theory the Church formed the top of a hierarchy, in practice there was jurisdictional 
competition. Sovereignty in the Middle Ages, as Zielonka (2006: 11) notes, “was not 
seen as an absolute concept”. 
Given the number of actors, it is hardly surprising that they also all claimed their own 
jurisdictional scopes; the “what” “where”, and “over whom” components varied and 
                                                
9 The HRE did not deny God was supreme, just that he lent his temporal sword directly to him. 
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even overlapped. Setting the stage, Brown  (2002: 35) notes that the medieval era lacked 
“firm and fixed political borders denoting separate territorial jurisdictions…Europe was a 
cosmopolitan Christian world”. His statement highlights two key points. On the one 
hand, despite the competition, the Church played a key role in the era’s political 
structure. According to Christian doctrine, God’s jurisdiction was universal – spatially 
and functionally. In a doctrinal sense, the Church claimed jurisdiction over everyone, 
everything, everywhere, and in all of time. In a more applied sense, popes formulated, 
interpreted, and executed the tenets of canon law independently and supremely.  
On the other hand, and while acknowledging the discrepancy with the point just made, 
because the Church shared the political stage, the other actors of the era claimed their 
own spatial and functional jurisdictions. The exact nature of what they individually were 
is less important than what they all were not – neither territorially nor functionally 
complete. In the first case, the territorial scopes of regna kings and queens related more 
to personal power and prestige than clearly demarcated geographic coordinates 
(Kratochwil, 1986; Mayall, 1990; Ruggie, 1993; Branch 2011a, 2011b). This is not 
altogether surprising given that the regna often lacked territorial cohesiveness. Jackson 
(2007: 27) points out, “Peripheral parts were scattered, like islands, among the territory 
of others rulers; core parts were perforated and interrupted, like lakes, with the 
intervening jurisdiction of other authorities”.10 Moreover, the borders that did exist 
functioned as “large zones of transitions” more akin to Roman limes than clearly 
demarcated and defended borders (Ruggie, 1993: 150).11 To draw an analogy, the 
jurisdictional scope (the “where”) of any regna king/queen was like tossing a stone into a 
pond – it radiated and rippled outwards from a center dissipating with distance. It was 
difficult to determine when one was inside or outside – territorially or jurisdictionally – 
of one regna or another. 
The inability to make clear territorial divisions also made the distinction between 
international and domestic law nonsensical. Holzgrefe (1989:14) notes, “[T]he modern 
distinction between domestic and international law was…unknown. Law was either 
                                                
10 Even in the limited circumstances in which a regna had a degree of boundedness – whether due to 
natural geography or historical longevity – it was neither automatic nor the norm. 
11 Kratochwil (1986: 35) elaborates on the concept of limes writing, “The Roman Empire conceived the 
limes not as a boundary, but as a temporary stopping place where the potentially unlimited expansion of the 
Pax Romana had come to a halt. The political and administrative domain often ended beyond the wall or 
stayed inside it”. 
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peculiar to one community (jus civile) or common to many (jus gentium).” While there 
were means of commutation between the different actors – whether between kings and 
queens or the HRE and the Empires’ various regions – these were dictated more by 
custom and privilege than by the rights of automatous equals, as is the case in modern 
diplomacy (Branch, 2011a: 13). Indeed, the notion of the resident ambassador or 
permanent embassies did not exist in any developed sense (Holzgrefe, 1989: 13). 
In the second case, there were also differing, potentially overlapping functional scopes; 
the “what” and “over whom” aspects of the problematique had divergent, even 
intersecting, answers. Borrowing Ruggie’s (1983: 274) term, jurisdictional structures 
were “heteronomous”, comprised of a “lattice-like network of authority relations”. For 
instance, given the number of jurisdictional actors, there was the real possibility that 
more than one actor might simultaneously claim jurisdiction over the same issue or even 
the same person – the Church by canon law, a regna by civil codes, and a guild by its 
trade rules (Breuilly, 2001: 33). In saying all that, it should also come as no surprise that 
the various jurisdictions operated along different methods; they had different “how” 
answers to the problematique. Mattingly (1988: 19) cites three main types – 
ecclesiastical, feudal, and imperial.  
Viewed together, the plurality of actors, their varying spatial and functional scopes, and 
their different methods of administration meant that the “Who decide what, where, how 
and over whom?” question had a complicated, contextual answer. Jurisdictional lines 
crossed and re-crossed such that it was hard to visualize zones of jurisdictional clarity. 
While conceptions of inside/outside were not absent – the feudal system exemplified 
class borders and Latin Christendom rested on a Christian/non-Christian distinction – 
where and when such divisions existed, they were not based on mutually exclusive, 
functionally complete enclaves of territorially-based jurisdiction. While that did not 
make political life impossible, it did mean that none the three meanings linked to 
sovereignty – as actor type, as system organizer, or as system functionality – were in 
play. Jurisdiction was a complicated matter that did not offer clean-cut definitions as to 
what was inside – territorially or functionally – or outside – territorially or functionally – 
of an actor’s domain. Because of that heterogeneity, determining who was deciding what, 
and where, how, and over whom they were doing so, was a highly complicated, 
contextual process. 
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Sovereign jurisdiction 
If medieval jurisdictional borders were unclear and overlapping, the growth of 
sovereignty is seen as initiating a process in which they territorialized, exclusivized, and 
stabilized to form the real-estate imagery common to the modern map.12 While the 
precise historical reasons prompting the shift from the medieval to the modern are 
important, because this study is more interested in the fact that they took place and took 
hold, they are somewhat placed aside in favor of the overall outcomes.13 Nonetheless, in 
saying that, it is common within IR to heuristically treat Westphalia as the tipping-point 
in which modern conceptions of sovereignty arose and, in doing so, “simultaneously 
created two orders, a domestic one and an international one” (Caporaso, 1997: 581).14 
Westphalia is treated as the point in which the sovereignty resolution to the 
problematique comes into play. 
The classic story is that Westphalia granted individual princes within the Holy Roman 
Empire the right to determine the religious denominations of their realms and, by doing 
so, set into motion a process that would progressively replace the medieval era’s mixed 
jurisdictional setup with a territorially-based, functionally complete sovereign one. In 
that regard, the key sovereignty enabling concept is generally understood to be the 
principle of cujus regio ejus religio or “whose realm, his religion”. Viewed in the 
abstract, the idea is rather simple – the ruler of a region decides its religion. However, on 
a deeper level, by institutionalizing that as the norm of European relations, Westphalia 
did two revolutionary things.  
First, to operationalize the principle, one had to give firm shape to the regions 
themselves. If rulers were to meaningfully gain the right to determine the religion of 
                                                
12 The real-estate imagery is particularly telling insofar as emerging sovereigns often viewed their territory 
as akin to legal property and the system as a map of property ownerships (Kratochwil, 1986). 
13 Any list of why such a transformation took place would include both empirical events (e.g. the 
Reformation, shifts in warfare, bureaucratization) as well as ideational ones (e.g. political theoretic 
developments spanning from Machiavelli to Hobbes and Locke).   
14 The Westphalian story contains certain historical obfuscations (Krasner, 1999; Osiander, 2001; Kuus and 
Agnew, 2008; Straumann, 2008). For instance, Osiander (2001: 264-268) notes that freedom to make 
religious determinations applied only to Christian denominations and, even at that, was often limited by 
constitutional agreements between regions. Despite all this (correct) criticism, Kuus and Agnew (2008: 96, 
emphasis added) still note that, while “the Westphalian ideal of sovereignty…has always been just that: an 
ideal…mainstream theories of [IR], whether realist, neo-realist, or idealist, take the territorial state as 
their starting point”.  
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their realms, there was a logical imperative to demarcate the parameters of them; there 
was a need to clearly demarcate and map territorial spaces (Hertz, 1956, 1968; Branch 
2011a, 2011b). As evidence, and in some senses even as a cause it, Branch notes the 
shift from verbal to visual mapping that took place. Whereas during the medieval era 
territory tended to be defined verbally via travel time or personal narratives, the visual 
mapping opportunities offered under modern cartography allowed for much greater 
detail and yielded more homogenized units. In making that point, Branch goes so far as 
to argue that those new mapping technologies were necessary elements in the shift from 
the medieval to the modern jurisdiction form. He writes that the technologies 
[A]ltered the ideation framework of political interaction, driving and shaping the 
creation of sovereign states defined exclusively by linear boundaries and homogenous 
territorial claims within those lines. Maps and their use were not epiphenomenal to 
political transformation, but rather were a necessary—though not sufficient—
condition of the transformation of the international system (Branch, 2011a: 2). 
Second, if territorial borders divided the Earth into mutually exclusive enclaves, those 
lines gained their political importance insofar as they were treated as contemporaneous 
with a ruler’s jurisdiction. Returning to the cujus region ejus religio principle, because 
that it ostensibly gave rulers supremacy over religious determinations within their 
territories, it freed them to make those determinations without interference from 
outsiders. And, what began with religious supremacy overtime expanded to include all 
functions and all people within a region-come-state (Mayall, 1990; Onuf, 1991; Shaw, 
1997; Wind, 2001). The logics begun at Westphalia initiated a larger and longer process 
leading to the formation of the Weberian state – a sovereign unit whose ruler has 
functionally complete, jurisdictional supremacy within a defined territory. 15 
Jurisdictional borders became territorial, territorial borders became jurisdictional, and, 
within them, a sovereign claimed exclusive rights. Spruyt writes, 
The modern state is very unique, for it claims sovereignty and territoriality. It is 
sovereign in that it claims final authority and recognizes no higher source of 
jurisdiction. It is territorial in that rule is defined as exclusive authority over a fixed 
territorial space. The criterion for determining where claims to sovereign jurisdiction 
begin or end is thus a purely geographic one. Mutually recognized borders delimit 
spheres of jurisdiction (Spruyt, 1994: 34, emphasis added).16 
                                                
15 This maturation process was, of course, more complex than depicted here (Shaw, 1997; Wind, 2001). 
For instance, Shaw (1997: 86) notes four phase of change 1648-1815, 1815-World War I, World War I-
present. Nonetheless, the overall argument remains that states progressively consolidated their sovereignty.  
16 It may be the case that a state cannot practically express its jurisdiction throughout its territory. 
Nevertheless, that does not necessarily mean a formal loss of sovereignty (Jackson and Rosburg 1982, 
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In saying all of this, certain points need clarification. First, there are a number of ways of 
determining the physical location of a state border. However, how one makes those 
determinations has very little impact on a border’s jurisdictional importance (Elden, 
2010, 2011).17 Second, and relatedly, how open or closed a border is also has very little 
relevance to its jurisdictional meaning. For instance, a border might be hard in the sense 
of military fortifications or soft in the sense of passport controls. However, neither 
affects its jurisdictional nature. Third, when locations have changed, whether due to war 
or systemic events (e.g. de-colonization), these shifts have largely remained cosmetic, 
not altering the jurisdictional/territorial/functional congruency. Finally, while there have 
been changes in the number of states comprising the international system as well as the 
system’s polarity, prior to the mid-twentieth century, neither profoundly challenged the 
notion of states as the core actors. Rosenau (1990: 109) writes, “The system neither 
fragmented into small-scale units nor consolidated into a single, unitary actor”. Viewed 
together, the importance of state borders comes from their assumed overlap with 
jurisdictional scopes. “Whatever the historical transformations, states and state-systems, 
exhibit certain regularities across time” (Walker, 1993: 91). 
Jurisdictional forms 
Given these two visions – the jurisdictionally messy pre-sovereign setup and the 
jurisdictionally clear sovereign one – the question becomes what specific changes 
underlie the shift from the former to the latter. On the one hand, it seems sensible to 
return to the scope, number, and method metrics. Were one to do this, one would detect 
the key shifts – scope would become territorial and functionally complete, number would 
become singular and exclusive, and method would link to state institutions. On the other 
hand, because the study is interested in why sovereignty is important IR, and therein how 
Europe affects that vision, it seems more useful to shift to a typology geared specifically 
towards it as the jurisdictional starting point. Doing so does not make it timeless, but it 
does  highlight its conceptual clarity and academic pervasiveness. 
                                                                                                                                           
Krasner 1999). Moreover, none of this is to deny that sovereignty was/is messy. However, as Held (2002b: 
163, emphasis added) makes clear, “Acknowledging the complexity of the historical reality should not lead 
one to ignore the structural and systematic shift that took place from the late sixteenth century in the 
principles underlying political order”. 
17 For instance, during the Westphalian era, rulers were generally more concerned with their own interests 
than the make-up of those populating their lands. This changed with nationalism and popular sovereignty 
such that the borders of the nation, the state, and the people become normatively linked. See below. 
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Accordingly, and in conjunction with its conceptual definition, a sovereignty form of 
jurisdiction rests on basic four logics – exclusivity, territorialization, congruency, and 
overall clarity and stability. First, sovereignty rests on the fact that a ruler is assumed to 
have exclusive jurisdiction within a territory. As such, the sovereign is logically 
independent from other like units. Second, sovereignty is fundamentally a territorial 
concept; it occurs within territorially defined units. Third, it is a functionally complete 
concept. A sovereign is assumed to have sovereignty over all functions and all people 
within a specific territory. As such, there is jurisdictional, territorial, functional 
congruency. Finally, sovereignty occurs within a largely stable setup based on clearly 
demarcated territorial borders. All four aspects define sovereignty as a jurisdictional type 
and all four reflect its particular resolution to the jurisdictional problematique.18 
Table 3 – Jurisdictional types 
Jurisdictional system Definition Sovereign metric 
Medieval system 
A jurisdictional form in which 
jurisdiction is mixed between and across 
actors, spaces, and functions in 
potentially conflicting manners 
Exclusive No 
Territorialized  No 
Congruency No 
Stability/clarity No 
Sovereign system 
A jurisdictional form in which 
jurisdiction is territorial bounded, held 
by ruler with excusive jurisdiction over 
all functions and people in said 
territory; a jurisdictional form defined 
by clear, stable, and concurrently 
territorial/jurisdictional/functional 
borders 
Exclusive Yes 
Territorialized Yes 
Congruency Yes 
Stability/clarity Yes 
People and politics 
Having developed a conception of jurisdiction and sovereignty, as well as the 
relationship between them, the missing piece is the role of individuals. On the one hand, 
the assumption has been that the problematique’s “over whom” clause is implicitly 
resolved territorially; those in a state’s territory fall under its jurisdiction. On the other 
                                                
18 Despite arguments to the contrary, sovereignty is not an economic concept. Jackson (1999: 432) writes, 
“Sovereignty is not an economic notion… The expression of ‘economic sovereignty’ is a conflation of two 
different concepts that are best kept in separate compartments”. 
  71 
hand, while that assumption remains true in a practical sense, it is necessary to fully 
establish how sovereignty deals with the people component. Indeed, as Hurrell (2007: 
127, emphasis added) notes, “[States] demarcate not just abstract units of administration, 
but communities that are supposed to share both an identity and a legitimate political 
purpose”. While the political structuring aspects of sovereignty are critical, they matter 
only to the extent that they affect individuals. 
To look at those issues, it is important to probe what sovereignty entails for the socio-
political bonds between people and their political communities. And, in making that the 
focus, the critical concept understandably becomes citizenship – what it is, what 
sovereignty entails for it, and why a state-based form of it is important to IR. Offering 
perspective on those issues opens to door towards debating what sort of socio-political 
challenges European citizenship generates and how they feed into jurisdictional change. 
Rosenau writes, 
Individuals have become, both as group members and as citizens, a major 
battleground on which states, governments, sub-national groups, international 
organizations, regimes, and transnational associations [and the EU] compete for 
support and loyalties, thereby posing for them choices that cannot be easily ignored 
and that serve as both a measure of global change and challenge to global stability 
(Rosenau, 1990: 213). 
With that introduction, one must begin with a brief narrative on the evolution of 
citizenship. As was the case with sovereignty, this historical context is not offered as a 
formal historiography. Rather, it is used descriptively to demonstrate that the 
construction and content of citizenship is not pre-determined. Accordingly, Heater 
(1990) begins a wide-ranging text on the concept noting that citizenship requires a degree 
of sophistication that simpler notions, such as loyalty, lack. He (1990: 2) argues that 
citizenship requires an individual to understand his or her role “entitles status, a sense of 
loyalty, the discharge of duties and the enjoyment of rights not primarily in relation to 
another human being, but in relation to an abstract concept”. From that, he tracks its 
development, beginning with the Greek polis moving through the Roman Empire and 
ending with the state. Forgoing the details of this evolution, by historicizing citizenship, 
Heater establishes its variability, both in constitutive units (polis, empire, state) as well as 
execution (Greek as limited and participatory, Roman as open and passive). He therefore 
rejects those who define it solely in reference to the state (Brubaker, 1992; Miller, 2002). 
Linklater writes of Heater,  
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[He] argues that citizenship need not be confined exclusively to the rights and duties 
that individuals have as members of particular sovereign states. Citizenship…can be 
associated with any geographical unit stretching from the city to the whole of 
humanity (Linklater, 2007: 101). 
At the risk of negating the point just made, it is nonetheless also clear that the birth, 
development, and totalizing project of the modern sovereign state made state citizenship 
the standard. The dawn of sovereignty, the growth of individual rights, and the 
development of nationalism all contributed to a process in which citizenship came to be 
regarded as the relationship between an individual and his or her nation-state. This ought 
not be surprising. If the Earth was divided along sovereign lines, it was sensible to 
develop a method of socio-politically locating individuals amongst those units. Writing 
during that seminal era, Bodin notes,  
[What] makes a man a citizen [is] the mutual obligation between subject and 
sovereign [in which] faith and obedience are exchanged for justice, counsel, 
assistance, encouragement, and protection…Foreigners…being subject to the 
authority of another, [have] no part in the rights and privileges of the community 
(Bodin, 1967: 19-21). 
Accordingly, state citizenship relies on division, particularism, and, in the most general 
sense, the lack of a socio-political amalgamating agent. Because all polities are bounded 
communities, and insofar as there are multiple states, there are multiple citizenships. 
Noting this dynamic, Linklater (1998b: 189) writes, with great simplicity, “Citizenship 
has been central to the politics of inclusion and exclusion”. For the included citizen, it 
has meant “the right of political participation, duties to other citizens and the 
responsibility for the welfare of the community as a whole” (Linklater, 1998b: 184). For 
the excluded foreigner, it has meant a lack of analogous rights and responsibilities. 
“Individuals left the state of nature by granting each other determinate rights and duties, 
the rights and duties of citizens. Between their respective political associations, however, 
the state of nature continued to exist” (Linklater, 2007: 18). 
Citizenship in concept 
With that historical context, one arrives at a two part-conclusion. First, as a concept, 
citizenship is not static. The units constituting it as well as its execution have varied. 
Second, while dynamic, the importance of sovereignty has made the state form the norm. 
In light of this duality, the issue is finding a metric that accommodates its dynamism, but 
that also provides an essential typology. To do this, the study uses Wiener’s (1998) 
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formulation. Wiener argues that rather than providing a one-shot definition of citizenship 
that may be valid in a given situation, but is not generalizable or adaptable, one should 
work with and within its dynamism. On the most rudimentary level, she argues that 
citizenship reflects the relationship between an individual and a polity – whether that 
polity is a polis, an empire, a state, or the EU. That relationship then gains its substantive 
content and meaning based on a triad of conditioning variables – rights, access, and 
belonging. Rights relates to the privileges of membership, access to the rules for 
acquiring status, and belonging to identity. Put together, citizenship forms in the context 
of the concrete practices accompanying it. 
It should be acknowledged that this method runs contrary to two common alternatives, 
one that attempts to extract general understandings from a specific historical make-up 
and another that tries to define citizenship via sets of normatively significant attributes. 
While each has a place in citizenship studies, each fails to provide an adequate 
understanding. In the first case, Olsen (2008: 19) notes there is a tendency to “take 
Marshall’s historical tri-partite model of rights as the template for citizenship in 
theoretical terms; to define it solely in reference to the possession of certain civil, 
political, and social privileges”. The problem is, a rights-as-citizenship definition 
overlooks Heater’s variability arguments. It overlooks the fact that the rights underlying 
Greek and Roman citizenship were not the same as those highlighted by Marshall’s study 
of 20th century Britain. Therefore, either each reflects a fundamentally different concept 
or a more flexible definition is required.  
In the second case, attempts have been made to define citizenship through a specific 
theoretical tradition – for instance, a liberal conception (Rawls), a republican vision 
(Miller), or a cosmopolitan standpoint (Linklater). In each case, each model tends to 
stress one particular aspect of citizenship based on its own normative commitments. 
Thus, liberals generally stress the importance of civil and social rights, republicans 
participation, and cosmopolitans interconnectedness. While one can debate between 
these visions, the problem with all of them is their reliance on a particular normative 
underpinning. Because each model presents itself as the most desirable version, each 
risks short-changing alternative aspects of it – liberals participation, republicans rights 
and identities, and cosmopolitans the stickiness of nationality. A conceptualized 
definition offers a fuller, more adaptable, albeit more situational, metric. 
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In saying all that, a conceptualized definition rooted in a set of practical variables, not 
established properties, does face its own challenges, most notably that it is so flexible 
that it reduces citizenship to an empty signifier. Noting this potential, Bellamy (2004: 3) 
writes, “To be recognizable as accounts of citizenship, conceptions must share certain 
common…conceptual features”. While Bellamy is correct that to be useful a concept 
must have certain standardized features, it is precisely because of that potential criticism 
that it must be made clear that a contextual understanding does not hollow citizenship out 
in a post-modern way. Defining it as the relationship between an individual and a polity, 
conditioned via variables of rights, access and belonging, simply means that 
understanding it requires viewing it in practice. It retains a core set of meanings however 
appreciating them, and it, requires viewing them, and it, in context. 
State citizenship 
Having offered a conception of citizenship, one can turn to the state type implicitly 
assumed and relied on by IR (Table 4).19 Returning to Wiener’s individual, polity, and 
their relationship components, it is clear that everyone, regardless of race, religion, 
gender, or nationality is an individual. Individuals both provide for and take from their 
communities. They provide material resources, such as labor, as well as abstract ones, 
such as cultures. They also demand certain things, ranging from protection to education. 
While group rights, such as for minorities, have increasingly entered the political lexicon, 
the traditional focus of state citizenship remains the individual (Jackson-Preece, 2005). 
The second variable, the polity, has historically varied, however since its inception the 
state form has been the dominant type. In the broadest sense, a state provides laws and 
governance, external borders, and traditionally monopolizes the legitimate use of force. 
Furthermore, states are thought to have a common culture, normally viewed through the 
nation (whether civically or ethnically based) (A. Smith, 1992, 2001; Zimmer, 2003). To 
be sure, states exist alongside other units – both sub-state and non-governmental. 
Similarly, they operate in era in which their abilities to control their borders – territorial, 
financial, and cultural – has diminished. Nonetheless, while states face many challenges, 
in all cases they are seen as necessary for traditional state citizenship. 
                                                
19 Using Wiener (1998) to layout a statist perspective does not mean her conception is statist. It is done 
simply to provide a substantive starting point. Furthermore, because the study is ultimately concerned with 
broad-based, conceptual understandings, it utilizes ideal-types. 
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Given all that, citizenship reflects the relationship between an individual and a polity – 
what Wiener (1998) terms “citizenship practice.” In the state context, that has meant the 
relationship between an individual and his or her nation-state. In this relationship, a 
citizen might demand the right to vote. Reciprocally, a state might demand military 
service. Moreover, who has citizenship is a decision left to the state, a decision typically 
involving debates about national identity. In saying all this, and whatever the specifics 
dynamics are, state citizenship is singular insofar as it is between an individual and a 
state. While this does not preclude multiple citizenships, even in such cases the 
relationship remains between an individual and a state. There are simply more of them.20 
State citizenship gains formal substance through the rights, access, and belonging 
variables. They are the adjustable scales mediating and regulating “a process-oriented or 
dynamic notion of citizenship” (Wiener, 1998: 9). 
The rights variable can be viewed along Marshall’s civil, political, and social categories. 
In his study of Britain, Marshall (1950) argued that as the state began monopolizing 
power in the 17th century, individuals began demanding certain privileges – first civil 
then political and finally social. Civil rights relate to individual freedoms and 
institutionally link to courts. Political rights focus on suffrage and link to parliaments. 
Social rights connect to economic and social security and traditionally link to education 
systems, heath care and the like. For Marshall, the civil-political-social rights progression 
forms the core meaning of citizenship. While this study does not accept that definition, 
both for the reasons outlined above as well as Turner’s (2001) more targeted points, it 
does use its categorization as a framework for assessing the allocation of rights.21 
In the state context, typically only citizens enjoy full civil, political, and social privileges. 
Jenson (2007: 55) writes, “Citizens have rights and responsibilities within the frontiers of 
a polity; non-citizens and denizens do not have the same rights”. This does not mean that 
non-citizens do not enjoy any civil or social protections. However, when and where they 
do, they likely do based on human rights and/or liberal norms, not citizen-status. 
Furthermore, non-citizens generally have few political rights (Koopmans et al., 2005: 
31). Brubaker (1992) goes so far as to argue that states restrict non-citizen rights as a 
                                                
20 This may create practical problems, but does not alter one-to-one dynamics (Kovács, 2006).  
21 Turner (2001) argues that Marshall’s understanding fails to establish the causal mechanisms underlying 
the evolution of rights or to differentiate between active/passive types 
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means of forging citizen bonds based on rights differentiations. In more concrete terms, 
though a French, American, or Chinese citizen is protected equally under the law in the 
UK, lacking British citizenship, none could vote for a Member of Parliament.22  
Turning to the second variable, if rights relate to the privileges of membership, access 
deals with whom they apply too.23 Bauböck (2004) defines three types – internal, internal 
in reference to external, and external. Internal access relates to those who have 
citizenship status and whether they have the resources to utilize their rights – for 
instance, knowledge of voting procedures. Internal in reference to external pertains to 
resident aliens – those legally in a state, normally long-term, who are not citizens. 
External deals with the process of acquiring citizenship. External rules vary on a state-
by-state basis, however are traditionally governed through either ius solis – access based 
on territorial birth – or ius sanguinis – access based on ethno-cultural criteria – codes 
(Brubaker, 1992).24 Despite any differences in access rules, the locus of citizenship 
remains the state with access decisions flowing from it alone.  
The final variable, belonging, deals with the reciprocal ties joining an individual to a 
community – “the point[s] at which ‘we’ end and ‘they’ begin” (Migdal, 2004: 5). 25  In 
the state context, it has normally centered on nationality – irrespective of whether it is 
more civic or ethnic (Delanty, 2007: 65).26 To be clear, nationality matters “both in the 
narrow passport-holding sense…and the more complicated notion of identity” (Jenson, 
2007: 56). Thus, an individual might demonstrate it by singing an anthem, celebrating a 
patriotic day, or expressing a cultural heritage. Or he or she might experience national 
                                                
22 States differ on the exact rights they provide citizens and non-citizens. In the first case, a citizen of a 
liberal democracy likely has more political rights than one of a dictatorship. Nevertheless, both likely 
differentiate between citizen/non-citizen ones. In the second case, states differ on the rights they provide 
non-citizens. Again, however, states likely provide different ones to citizens than to non-citizens.  
23 Access and belonging are related, however for this study access is treated legally and belonging 
symbolically. 
24 A de-/re-ethnicization process may be occurring in which traditionally civic-minded states are moving 
towards ius sanguinis codes to deal with un-integrated immigrants and classically ethnic states are shifting 
towards ius solis laws due to a combination of liberal values and nation/state congruence (Joppke, 2003). 
In either case, however, access remains state-based. 
25 None of this means that communities are homogenous and, as Wiener (1998: 30) notes, “[N]umerous 
studies have stressed, these boundaries [racial, gender, ethnic] often impede full membership even from a 
position within a community”. Nevertheless, the point highlights that citizenship is not simply about rights 
and is buttressed against and enhanced by symbols, myths, and identity related components. 
26 Citizenship and nationality are not necessarily contemporaneous, however “in most contemporary 
dictionaries the two terms connote indistinctively the conditions for and of membership in a nation-state” 
(Stolcke, 1997: 62). 
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belonging more internally, via a willingness to die for one’s nation or imagined kinship 
with co-nationals (Anderson, 1991). In the end, nationality both defines groups as 
internally one as well as externally separates them from others. “[The] community is 
defined in terms of a nation-state [and] nationality provides citizens with ‘a common 
world of meanings’ that are explicitly linked to a political unit capable of acting on 
them” (Bellamy and Warleigh, 1998: 459).  
Viewed together, the three constitutive elements and the triad of conditioning variables 
form a contextualized understanding of citizenship. A statist perspective defines it as the 
relationship between an individual and a state. Citizens enjoy full civil, political, and 
social rights. Non-citizens, while possibly enjoying many civil and social ones, are 
generally excluded from political ones. Moreover, where and when they have privileges, 
it is due to human rights and/or liberal norms, not citizenship status. Access is regulated 
on a state-by-state basis and reflects a singular individual-state bond. Belonging defines 
the reciprocal, national ties between individuals and their communities. Those not 
meeting access or belonging criteria are excluded. Put together, state citizenship creates 
“a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged distinction 
between citizens and foreigners” (Brubaker, 1992: 21).  
Table 4 – State citizenship 
Individuals Universal, everyone 
Polity State 
Individual-state relationship 
Rights Based on citizen-status 
Access State determined; nationality component 
Belonging Reciprocal ties joining an individual to a community; a function of nationality  
Inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion 
The sections above collectively reflect a picture of “the old” and, in particular, an image 
of sovereignty-based political structures and state citizenship based socio-political 
relationships. In the first case, sovereignty was defined as a jurisdictional type, offering a 
specific resolution to the problematique based on commitments to territorialism, a 
territorial/functional/jurisdictional congruency, a supreme, autonomous ruler, and overall 
stability and clarity of construction. In the second case, state citizenship was seen to 
divide individuals up amongst sovereign states. In that sense, is a logical complement to 
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sovereignty.27 Irrespective of what one thinks about the normative appropriateness of this 
vision, in accepting its broad story or, at least acknowledging as Walker (1993: 131) does 
that it has become “all-pervasive”, the issue moves to why both trends are critical to IR. 
There are again two interrelated sides – the role of sovereignty in constructing of an 
inside/outside separation and the role of state citizenship in producing an 
inclusion/exclusion one.  
Starting with inside/outside, sovereignty fosters a separation between the states as a 
matter of organizational structure as well as endows that structure with a particular 
system functionality. In the first case, when sovereignty’s constellation of processes are 
combined, they produce an organizational structure in which jurisdictional, territorial, 
and functional borders are congruent, clear, and stable and where the sovereign is 
assumed to have exclusive, autonomous rights inside those borders. If a border is “a line 
of demarcation [that] creates a distinction between an inside and an outside”, then 
because sovereignty defines its borders as concurrently jurisdictional, territorial, and 
functional, it creates a series of mutually exclusive enclaves of territorially-based, 
jurisdictional significant insides and outsides (Delanty, 2006: 187).  
For that reason, state borders are inherently Janus-faced. They simultaneously face 
inwardly at a state territorially defining its zone of jurisdictional conduct as well as 
outwardly differentiating it from other states. They organize a system of jurisdictionally 
meaningful, territorially-based, and functionally complete inside/outside divisions. 
Agnew notes, “[The] merging of the state with a clearly bounded territory” reflects “the 
geographical essence of the field of international relations” (Agnew, 1998: 80). Walker 
follows up by pointing out that, 
Problems of international relations…are usually framed in terms of differentiations of 
political space. They emerge from the geo-political separation of territorial 
communities in space. (Walker, 1993: 61, emphasis added)  
In the second case, that organizational effect also has a functional component; a 
sovereign resolution to the problematique not only structures an inside/outside division, 
                                                
27 Again, as noted earlier, questions of functional logical may arise – for instance, does sovereignty 
necessitate state citizenship or does state citizenship necessitate sovereignty? While that sort of question is 
important in building a precise historical narrative, it is less important to the issues at hand insofar as it is 
their combination that IR has traditionally seized on. In other words, whichever way the causal arrow 
flows, both factors condition the domestic/international cleavage so critical to international theory. 
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but it also mandates a particular functionality to the each side of the binary. Knutsen 
(1997: 3) dubs this as the “twin notions” of sovereignty. On the inside, sovereignty 
allows for domestic jurisdiction by legitimizing political rule based on the specific tenets 
of its resolution to the problematique. It allows for jurisdictional debates (in the 
traditional, intra-state sense) to take place because it already legitimized wider systemic 
rules based on its four tenets. On the outside, because sovereignty grants supremacy 
within a given territory, it logically mandates equality and non-intervention principles 
between sovereigns. It therefore prevents analogous jurisdictional opportunities between 
units. The outside is deemed anarchic (Wight, 1978: 102; Milner, 1991). 28  The 
organizational and functional aspects of sovereignty therefore combine to generate the 
contrast between inside/domestic and outside/international – the former allowing for 
jurisdictional opportunities and the latter having an ordering problem.29 
Given the link between sovereignty and inside/outside, it is also understandable that the 
state becomes the assumed container of political life (Caporaso, 2000; Ferguson and 
Mansbach, 2002; Cherlino, 2006; Beck, 2007). Whether in terms of the allocation of 
public goods, claims to homeland security, or democratic expression, states are treated as 
ready-made analytical building blocks. Walker (1993: 169) notes, “Once state 
sovereignty is defined as a centering of power/authority within a given territory, the way 
is open for emphasis on other things, like justice and law, freedom and social progress”. 
Through that, methodological statism arises – a starting point that holds that whatever 
political or socio-political process one is interested in can be neatly bundled through the 
nation-state prism (Beck, 2007; Rumford 2008).30 This becomes critical as, “The way in 
which sovereignty is comprehended by scholars performs a large role in constructing a 
                                                
28 As one sees below and in the context of liberalism, the English School, and constructivism, anarchy does 
not necessarily mean cooperation is impossible or that a degree of order unachievable. Is simply means that 
where and when either occurs, they occur through sovereignty’s structuring conditions. As such, one is 
really talking about cooperation under anarchy or anarchy being “what states make of it”. In both cases, 
the assumption remains that there is a distinctly anarchic, international realm in which the structuring 
logics of sovereignty prevent analogous jurisdictional relationships from forming.  
29 In saying all this, inside/outside is significant for separate, but interrelated, reasons. On the one hand, it 
is a matter of organization and functionality. On the other hand, just as inside/outside generates the 
physical conditions for IR, IR perpetuates them through its own models; it is as much a producer as a 
consequence of inside/outside (see below) (Hansen, 1997: 320-325). Accordingly, if inside/outside is both 
a cause (a keystone) and an effect (a product) of IR, should it be challenged, that would generate serious 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary problems. 
30 Methodological statism/nationalism is not a value judgment, but a taken-for-granted belief that nation-
states boundaries are the natural containers of politics and people (Beck, 2007). 
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particular ontology of international politics” – in this case, one dominated by states as 
primary unit (Schmidt, 1998: 454).  
One should note that, none of that means there is an impenetrability between insides and 
outsides (Milner 1998, Moravcsik 1998). Nor does it mean that there might not be a 
degree of hypocrisy when it comes to respecting another’s sovereignty (Krasner 1999). 
Nor does it reveal anything as to the precise dynamics of insides (e.g. governmental 
types) or the outside (e.g. realism versus liberalism). It simply means that, in principle, 
just as sovereignty organizes a jurisdictional structure of particular, domestic insides 
separated from an international outside, it also endows each side of the setup with a 
different functional logic. Therefore, while state borders may organizationally appear as 
simple lines on maps, their functional value comes from the twin notions of sovereignty.  
Turning to the citizenship side, if “[t]he primary good that we distribute to one another is 
membership in some human community,” then citizenship is self-evidently critical to the 
construction of socio-political geographies (Walzer, 1983: 31). At the same time, insofar 
as there is a plurality of states – none of which has universal membership – there is a 
plurality of citizenships. Moreover, insofar as “everybody is at some point in time subject 
to the territorial sovereignty of a state,” state citizenship necessarily produces lines of 
inclusions and exclusions between individuals of different states (Bauböck, 1994: 207). 
Wiener writes, “The politics of modern citizenship have contributed to establishing the 
modern inside/outside balance in global politics with states as the most powerful 
elements” (Wiener, 1998: 27). 
That proves critical for IR insofar as it illustrates the Janus-faced nature of state 
citizenship. On one side, its significance for the development of internal socio-political 
bonds is critical in two ways. First, citizenship creates “powerful justification[s] for the 
existence of separate nation-states and for obligations owed to them rather than to 
humankind in general” (Hurrell, 2007: 127). In other words, it further supports the 
inside/outside separation coming out of sovereignty by linking it with a comparable 
socio-political one, both formally via rights and symbolically via nationality. Second, 
Halliday (2001: 447) argues that the dangers of the international system mean that, “[N]o 
state can survive and compete in the international arena without the promotion of a sense 
of national identity and purpose domestically”. Therefore, the bonding and legitimating 
effects of state citizenship foster the stability of states and, in turn, of the system. 
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On the other side, the construction of internal constituencies only comes by way of 
dividing individuals into different citizenries. Just as citizenship is integral to the 
construction of the American, French, Japanese or German citizen, it is equally important 
to the idea that an American might travel to France or a German to Japan. And, it is those 
interactions, and all practical things that go with them (e.g. passports, embassies, border 
control), that generates, constitutes, and conditions the inter-citizen and inter-citizenry 
spaces constitutive of international relations. By populating states, in the most basic 
sense, state citizenship creates the possibilities for interactions between citizens of 
different states. And that produces the descriptive, analytical, and ultimately disciplinary 
opportunities to examine the logics underwriting those interactions. State citizenship is 
engaged in both the politics of home and the politics of abroad such that “[t]he 
contradiction between men and citizens [can be] regarded as the critical problem of 
international relations (Linklater, 1982: 25).  
In realizing that state citizenship is exclusive, and that most everyone is subject to 
location within a state, its importance to IR is therefore readily apparent. Simply put, it 
fashions an inclusion/exclusion cleavage that, when conjoined with sovereignty and 
inside/outside, creates and structures the spaces through which a domestic/international 
separation forms. Rosenau writes, 
Global politics, national politics, bureaucratic politics, and local politics are separate 
enterprises only to the extent that individuals maintain a separation among their roles 
in the various systems and conduct themselves accordingly (Rosenau, 1990: 213, 
emphasis added). 
It is also why, to the extent that citizenship cannot maintain such separations or people 
are unwilling to operate through them, serious problems arise for the feasibility of 
defining an inclusion/exclusion binary. For example, it is why anomalies to the state 
system, such as refugees and national minorities, are particularly thorny issues for IR. 
Indeed, it is telling that Haddad (2004) defines refugees as “individuals between 
sovereigns” and Guibernau (1999) minorities as “stateless nations”. 
The domestic/international separation and IR 
View together, IR’s ability to presume an international realm – to define a 
domestic/international separation – relates directly to its capacity to define inside/outside 
and inclusion/exclusion dichotomies. Onuf (1995: 44) writes, “Two analytic foci, or 
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levels of abstraction have long satisfied [IR] observers’ need[s]” – the domestic and the 
international. Again, the historical evidence supporting the formation and existence of 
these separations is strong. Nevertheless, irrespective of the exact empirical 
evidence/configurations present at any given historical moment, one is hard-pressed to 
define an international realm without first assuming inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, 
and therein domestic/international splits. That also means, as Keating (2003: 192) notes, 
“[A]ny suggestion that [the sovereignty-based, domestic/international separation] may be 
transcended is sometimes seen as a threat to the discipline itself”. 
If a discipline requires a central object of concern that is defined in such a way that 
makes it real and non-reducible to other related fields, for IR that has typically been 
achieved through its belief that there is a distinct international realm of action with an 
ordering problem.31 Knutsen (1997: 3, emphasis in original) writes, “Theories about 
international society distinguish themselves from other political theories by being 
preoccupied with human behavior in an anarchical society”. To that Jarvis (2000: 17) 
adds, “For there to be theory in International Relations…without first defining the 
domain of international politics would be altogether pointless”. As Knutsen and Jarvis 
both imply, to satisfy the disciplinary need for a defined, definite, and non-reducible 
object of enquiry, IR assumes a domestic/international separation as the means of 
constructing a distinctive international realm of action.32 And, doing all that, as pointed 
out, relates directly to the ability to construct inside/outside (sovereignty) and 
inclusion/exclusion (state citizenship) dichotomies.  
To illustrate this more fully, one can return to the mainstream theories, arguing that 
despite their different visions of and hopes for the international realm, each operates 
under the common assumption about, and need for, a sovereignty-based, 
domestic/international separation. First, realism’s reliance on this separation is well 
known (Milner, 1991). Whatever sort of realist one is, there is general acceptance that 
there is a distinct realm of international action and that that realm has an ordering 
problem. As an example, Waltz’s (1979) three-level imagery creates levels of analysis 
whose make-ups and operations are non-reducible. While for him structural constraints 
                                                
31 For that view on disciplinary, see Durkheim, 1951, 1982, 1984; Lukes, 1982; Wagner, 2009. 
32 Once established, one can imagine IR debating the nature of the problem itself, as some normative, 
critical, and post-modern perspectives do (Beitz, 1979; Walker, 1993; Brown, 2000, 2002; Peterson, 2000; 
DiMuccio and Cooper, 2000). Nevertheless, these are not mainstream approaches as defined. 
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explain why certain methods are repeatedly used, irrespective of which level one focuses 
on, the setup as a whole is contingent on independently operating images and 
autonomously definable levels. Again, there may be good reasons for accepting this 
imagery under sovereignty. However, and irrespective of those reasons, in order to 
objectify the international realm and make it distinct, realism must assume the levels; it 
must assume a domestic/international split. That is why “the ontological givens in the 
international system are Westphalia states, understood as unitary rational actors operating 
in an anarchic setting…” (Krasner, 2001: 21).  
Second, like realism, liberalism also relies on the domestic/international separation 
coming out of sovereignty and state citizenship. While often caricatured as an attempt to 
provide a more positive conception of international life than realism, and irrespective of 
how well one thinks it has been in accomplishing that goal, liberalism accepts realism’s 
core assumptions regarding the definability of an international realm and its anarchical 
nature. Though it attempts to offer a more optimistic vision of international order by 
providing a set of logics open to cooperation under anarchy, because it assumes 
sovereign states are the key players, it too implicitly relies on inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion and domestic/international separations. Keohane writes,  
International regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international 
order ‘beyond the nation state.’ They should be comprehended chiefly as 
arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of systems on which 
sovereignty remains a constitute principles  (Keohane, 1984: 63, emphasis added).  
One should be clear that liberals do believe that domestic preferences can influence 
international outcomes, for instance in a two-level game type scenario (Milner, 1998, 
Moravcsik, 1998). Nevertheless, this is done largely with the hope of better explaining 
the links between domestic preferences and international outcomes, not for debating 
whether there is a distinct international level itself. While there is cross-level theorizing, 
cross-level theorizing does not question the separateness of the levels themselves.  
Third, the English School, as Wight (1966) laid out, was developed to provide a “via 
media” between the perceived harshness of the realist-inspired international system and 
the utopianism of world-society perspectives. The School’s theory of international 
society acknowledges and accepts sovereignty, and therein its organizational 
consequences, but nonetheless attempts to explain the historically high levels of global 
stability. For example, it accepts that sovereign states are the key units, that state 
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pluralism has normative worth, and that states exist in anarchy. Nevertheless, it rejects 
that that necessarily produces a dangerous, security-driven system. Bull (1977: 53-55) 
argues that simply because the international realm has an ordering problem, that does not 
make things like limiting violence, upholding rights, or ensuring contracts any less 
important. For that reason, he views the realm more as an international society than 
system.  
A society of sates (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull, 1977: 13). 
To be clear, Bull is not saying that to have order, international society must be analogous 
to domestic communities. He explicitly rejects the domestic analogy viewing it as one of 
realism’s great misnomers. Rather, he argues that international society is a distinctively 
anarchical society; because states have predictably common interests, a self-regulating 
setup can form. Order is a by-product of mutually beneficial norms that all states respect, 
both in the sense of agreeing with them and abiding by them. In that sense, the School 
differs from realism as it finds a role for norms in international life. However, because it 
does not challenge the existence of an international realm or it is anarchic nature, it too 
relies on the belief that an international realm exists and is fundamentally different from 
domestic ones. Like realism and liberalism, it rests on a domestic/international binary.  
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, constructivism also relies on a 
domestic/international separation. On the one hand, unlike the previous models, Wendt’s 
(1992, 1999) starting point is that the structure of the international system is not 
predetermined or even material. The system neither necessitates a given set of 
preferences nor arises independently from the units constituting it. Rather, the structure 
and the units forming it are mutually constituted. State identities and preferences affect 
the structure of the system just as much as the structure of the system affects state 
identities and preferences. And, because ideas and identities help drive preferences, 
international politics is – at least partially – conditioned by the endogenously generated 
ideas and identities of the states themselves (Wendt, 1999: 139).  
It is important to note that Wendt does not discount the possibility of states acting based 
on security concerns. Nor does he reject the idea that states might view one another as 
others. Constructivism is not the panacea for conflict. Rather, its contribution lies in the 
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nuance that, when states do act based on security interests, just as when they act based on 
a logic of appropriateness, they do so based on the particular orientation of a socially 
defined anarchy and not a set of structurally predetermined material logics. Anarchy is, 
in Wendt’s (1992) famous words, “what states make of it”. It “gains meaning by the kind 
of people and communities who live in it…flux[ing] between a confrontational 
Hobbesian orientation and more civilized Lockean and Kantian types based on the level 
of corresponding identities” (Wendt, 1999: 257).  
In those ways constructivism clearly differs from realism and liberalism. Moreover, it 
differs from the English School by way of its social ontology on how norms arise and 
affect preference formation. Nevertheless, it does not mark a radical departure from 
assumptions about a definable international realm of action based on claims to 
sovereignty. First, Wendt acknowledges that his task is to provide a theory of 
international politics that is more cognizant of the effects social meanings have on 
international life. He (1999: xiii, emphasis added) states in the introduction to his 
seminal work that his goal to develop “a theory of the international system as a social 
construction”.  
Second, Wendt admits that he shares many realist assumptions about the nature of the 
international system. In a response to Mearsheimer’s influential article on the problems 
with liberal institutionalism, Wendt (1995: 72) states that he “share[s] all five of 
Mearsheimer’s ‘realist’ assumptions including that international politics is anarchic…a 
commitment to states as units of analysis, and to the importance of system or ‘third 
image’ theorizing”. While he goes on to reject many of Mearsheimer’s beliefs as to why 
the system exists in the way that it does and what that entails, those criticisms are not 
levied at the importance of sovereignty, states, or the reality of an international sphere as 
such. For that reason, Bickerton et al. (2007: 28) are clear in their contention that 
Wendt’s constructivism treats sovereignty as “an institution” and the international realm 
as “behavior regularity based on shared understandings”. Similarly, Thaddeus Jackson 
and Nexon (1999) argue that Wendt operates under an interactive form of 
“substantialism”. While the attributes (e.g. identity) of a state may change as the result of 
interactions, its core setup remains intact insofar as it exists prior to any 
relations/interactions. 
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Finally, just as Wendt assumes the reality of an international realm, he also assumes it 
has an ordering problem. While he views the realm as a social construction and therefore 
alterable, even his most well ordered version of it maintains a separation between 
domestic realms by stopping short of predicting a universal state. He (1999: 299) writes, 
“Real assurances [in Kantian anarchy] come not from a Leviathan who enforces peace 
through a centralized power…but from shared knowledge of each other’s peaceful 
intentions and behavior”. Constructivism opens the door for a transformed international 
sphere, however it does not dispute the reality of it. Like realism, liberalism, and the 
English School, it accepts the existence of a distinctly international realm.  
Put together, the four mainstream theories each offers a different vision of and hope for 
the international realm: realism views it as security driven, liberalism as an arena ripe for 
cooperation and institution building, the English School as an anarchical society, and 
constructivism as a social creation. Despite those differences, however, each shares a 
common presumption of and a need for an international realm. 
Realists, neorealists, institutionalists, neoliberals, statist constructivists, and others are 
to be commended for trying to analyze the world as it is, but their state-centric 
blinkers make it impossible for them to perceive the full spectrum of political reality. 
The glasses behind their eyes are focused on statist never-never land (Ferguson, 
2000: 202, emphasis added). 
None of this is necessarily shocking, particularly given Cox’s (1981: 129) point that 
problem-solving theories must assume a degree of fixity to the world in order to “fix 
limits or parameters to a problem”. Moreover, as noted, there traditionally have been 
strong empirical foundations for assuming the existence of distinctly domestic and 
international realms. Finally, the debates between the various theories are not 
unimportant or ill guided. The point simply is that because the theories all assume the 
domestic/international cleavage coming out of sovereignty’s resolution to the 
problematique, the debates between them are fundamentally intra-IR conversations. 
[T]here are disputes as to how that [international] world operates. There are disputes 
about what part of that world are more important or weight or casually significant 
than others. In the IR field, Realists may believe that material factors, like the 
distinction of military capabilities matter more than ideas. Constructivists may believe 
otherwise. But the world itself is not under dispute. Both have the same basic picture 
in mind when they refer to the international states-system (Deibert, 1997: 174). 
One might add that the mainstream theories may be value-free when it comes to their 
actual application. Whether they really are or not is a separate argument that this study 
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does not wish enter. What this study does not concede is that their constructions are 
value-neutral. Each is value-laden to the extent that each functions through certain meta-
parameters – assumptions about the inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and 
domestic/international binaries. Therefore, no matter how sophisticated the models are, 
so long as they remain within IR’s disciplinary bubble, they rely on its enabling 
conditions. Prior to any “real-world” theorizing taking place, they must assume the 
existence of an international realm. They might – and do – differ on whether that realm is 
structural or social. They might – and do – debate whether that realm is conflictual or 
more well ordered. Nevertheless, they all maintain that the international realm is real, 
discernable, distinct, and in need of explanation and/or understanding.  
Disciplinary sides 
Brought to its fruition, all of this structures the commonly held assumption that IR deals 
primarily with the interactions between political communities and political science the 
construction of and dynamics within those units. In saying that, this study is under no 
illusion that disciplinary borders are pristine (Dunn, 1948; Beitz, 1979; Walker, 1993; 
Elshtain, 1995; Palan, 2007). Dunn (1948: 142) correctly notes that, 
The boundaries that supposedly divide one field of knowledge from another are not 
fixed walls between separate cells of truth, but are convenient devices for arranging 
known facts and methods in management segments for instruction and practice (Dunn, 
1948: 142). 
At the same time, however, the political science/IR divide is relevant to the extent that it 
has traditionally been viewed as significant, whether in terms of institutional structures, 
professional organizations, and/or overall academic world views (Hollis and Smith, 1990; 
Milner, 1991; Deibert, 1997; Ferguson, 2000). 
In that regard, if a discipline represents “the tools, methods, procedure, exempla, 
concepts, and theories that account coherently for a set of objects or subjects [and which] 
organize and concentrate experience into a particular ‘world view’”, political science is 
normally viewed as highlighting questions concerning the nature of the political 
community (Klein, 1990: 104). Hix (2005: 9) writes, political science rests on 
understanding “the processes of government, politics and policy making”. Underlying 
that belief, Wight (1991: 1) defines political theory, as a brand of political science, as 
“speculation about the state”.  
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While states differ on the particularities of their governance structures, national make-
ups, and ways of life, as political units, all are thought to be common insofar as all are 
viewed as separate from one another. The sovereign state offers a “spatial 
resolution…[and] a very powerful, even elegant, answer to the deeply provocative 
question as to how political life is possible at all” (Walker, 1993: 64). Under its 
conditions, political science’s core task has therefore been to better explain, to better 
understand, and to normatively evaluate the contours of them, the relationships within 
them, and, ultimately, whether there are prospects for changing them. 33  
If political science’s task has been to explain, understand, and evaluate the makeup of the 
state, and the political and socio-political setups within them, IR’s concentration has 
been on the interactions of those units within an international system thought to have an 
ordering problem (Wright, 1955; Hollis and Smith, 1990; Olson and Groom, 1991; 
Knutsen 1997). Therefore, as a discipline, IR has generally forgone questions concerning 
the construction of states, opting instead to offer explanations and understandings on the 
nature of their interactions – interactions assumed to take place in “an objective reality 
set apart from other human practices” (Onuf, 1989: 14). Accordingly, and in contrast to 
his definition of political theory, Wight (1991: 1) defines IR as “speculation about the 
society of states, or the family of nations or the international community”. 34  
In saying that, certain nuances must be allowed for. First, none of that means that IR 
requires a particular internal arrangement of a state. States might be democratic and 
sovereign or autocratic and sovereign. In either case, sovereignty, not internal 
governmental type, is the necessary feature. Second, arguing that IR rests on a core, 
disciplinary need – an international realm with an ordering problem – does not mean that 
it lacks breadth. One sees a broad array of topics, ranging from foreign policy analysis to 
international economics to arms control, operating within its rubric. The point is noting 
their crosscutting linkage – understanding policy/economics/arms control in an 
international realm. Third, saying IR is not concerned with the nature of the political 
                                                
33 The argument is not that political science is limited to the state. Nor is it that states exist in isolation. 
Globalization dispels the notion of pristinely independent units. The argument is simply that, since its 
formation, the state has formed the key type of political community and therefore has been the focus. 
34 In this sense, Claude (1968: 1, emphasis in original) notes that Bentham’s “unfortunate adjective 
‘international’ obscures the fact that our concern is with inter-state affairs”. While this study is willing to 
concede that point, it is less concerned with having a semantic debate than with the well-established 
understandings within the discipline. 
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community does not make internal issues wholly beyond its remit. Constructivism’s 
focus on identities certainly opens the “black box”. Nevertheless, the assumption is that 
such things matter insofar as they permit fuller understandings of international 
interactions. There is little challenging of the political and socio-political separateness 
coming out of sovereignty-as-jurisdiction more generally.  
Finally, the study admittedly constrains itself to mainstream IR and, at that, operates 
under a traditional reading of it – a reading that is generally thought to flow from a 
particular understanding of the First Great Debate (Wright, 1955; Hollis and Smith, 
1990; Olson and Groom, 1991; Knutsen 1997). That being said, revisionist scholars 
argue that a re-reading of IR’s birth may offer a better framework for understanding its 
evolution – particularly one less tied to a domestic/international separation (Schmidt, 
1998, 2002; Long and Schmidt, 2005). That potentially becomes important insofar as it 
may make any EU alterations more reflective of a “back to the future” scenario than 
novelty. Withholding judgment as to the correctness of that line of thinking for the time 
being, traditional understandings of IR are the most common as well as are the contexts 
through which the mainstream theories developed. Therefore, while it is important to 
note the revisionist strand as context, because this study focuses on mainstream IR, 
reinterpreting its foundations prior to laying out its logics risks prejudging established 
positions. 
With all that in mind, the disciplinary separation between the two fields is 
commonsensical. One mode of enquiry deals with the units (the trees, political science) 
and the other their interactions (the forest, IR). The danger is, however, by limiting its 
focus to the international and by foregoing substantive discourse on the nature of the unit 
itself assuming it to be the sovereign state, IR reifies both in problematic ways. This is a 
prime reason Hobson (2002) calls IR “historophobic”, “chronofetished”, and 
“tempocentric”. It is also why Walker (1993: 37) notes that “[t]here can be no 
meaningful reference to a tradition of international relations theory without specifying 
what one means by a tradition of political theory”. While there may be a diversity of 
ways of looking at the international realm, those differences are internal to IR as they 
rely on the ability to separate out a distinctively international zone of action. They rely 
on a sovereignty-as-jurisdictional belief. For that reason, it is problematic to speak of 
international relations as a reality or IR as a mode of enquiry prior to sovereignty and the 
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separatist tendencies it initiated. Deibert (1997: 169) writes, “[IR] focuses on ideas 
within a shared vocabulary rather than on the vocabulary as a whole. As a result, [there 
is] little or no way to examine it critically, let alone escape from [its] ‘conceptual jails’”. 
From this context one can bring the discussion back to the study’s wider concern of 
whether EU arrangements challenge IR’s disciplinary needs by problematizing what are 
assumed to be separable concepts. By defining IR – its meta-commitments and 
mainstream models – one has the standard (“the old”) against which one can assess 
European challenges and changes. Therefore, the issue shifts towards examining 
whether, and therein how, sovereignty and state citizenship change in the context of 
European integration. The issue is whether Europe offers a non-sovereignty resolution to 
the problematique, and how that affects existing conceptions of the inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion, and the domestic/international separations – and ultimately IR itself. 
While Waltz (quoted in Jarvis, 2000: 142) may be correct that “International Relations 
cannot be a theory of everything,” the question is how appropriate and how useful its 
mainstream core remains in the context of jurisdictional change. And, as one sees in the 
subsequent two chapters, that means examining whether European political and socio-
political structures and relationships affect a breakdown, maintenance, stratification, or 
blurring of IR’s enabling cleavages.  
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Chapter 3 – Inside/outside in Europe 
 
Introduction 
Together, the previous two chapters established the roles played by sovereignty and state 
citizenship in constructing inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international 
separations. In doing so, they argued that those separations were necessary, though not 
necessarily sufficient, factors for mainstream IR’s ability to carve out a distinct area of 
international action and research. Moreover, as noted, that entire process was critical for 
this study insofar as it offered a vision and presented a baseline standard of “the old” – 
albeit one interpreted through a language of jurisdiction and in the context of the 
jurisdictional problematique. By providing that standard, the issue now moves to one of 
change. More specifically, the focus becomes appreciations of “the new” as the means of 
tracking and tracing the precise nature of the jurisdictional shifts leading from one stage 
to another.  
In that regard, the next two chapters focus on European political and socio-political 
structures and relationships – this one on political structures in the context of the 
inside/outside binary and the next one on socio-political relationships in the context of 
the inclusion/exclusion separation. In both cases, and in making the transition to the 
European focused sections of this study more generally, the critical question is whether 
an alternative resolution to the jurisdictional problematique is arising and, if it is, what its 
exact nature ends up being. For this chapter specifically, the issue is the nature of 
European jurisdictional structures, their relationship to sovereignty, and ultimately 
whether they produce a breakdown, maintenance, stratification, or blurring of the 
inside/outside binary (Table 5).  To examine which occurs, the chapter compares the core 
structuring logics of sovereignty – exclusivity, territorialization, congruency, and 
clarity/stability – against EU setups.  
The chapter has five sections. First, it revises why Europe is the critical case, what 
differentiates this study’s use of it from more traditional ES points of view, and lays out 
the key methodological issues at play. Second, the chapter develops the four possible 
impacts to inside/outside – the breakdown, maintenance, stratification, and blurring 
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options. Establishing those baselines sets the standards of analysis for the empirical 
sections that follow. Accordingly, third, the chapter analyzes EU structures. It uses the 
four possible effects as guideposts, considering breakdown and maintenance as pair and 
subsequently stratification and blurring (also as a pair). The chapter concludes by 
drawing the metaphorical lens back out and noting the key jurisdictional updates coming 
out of the analysis. Conclusions are drawn with respect to the inside/outside binary as 
well as sovereignty’s resolution to the problematique. 
Sovereignty revisited 
Prior to getting into the heart of the chapter and whether there is breakdown, 
maintenance, stratification, or blurring, it is helpful to briefly revise why Europe is the 
focus, how this study’s approach differs from more traditional ES perspectives, and the 
methodological logics it deploys. To begin, as noted in chapter 1, this study focuses on 
Europe generally and the EU specifically for three key reasons. First, it does so to quell 
charges often leveled at the globalization literature, mainly that it lacks empirical 
grounding. Aside from being an acknowledged hotspot for shifting political and socio-
political geographies, the EU is an established, critical test case with a clear, researchable 
core – a core, one might add, useful for debating challenges to sovereignty as well as 
assessing the operationalized effects of them. Second, the changes witnessed in Europe 
occur across political and socio-political factors. It therefore offers an integrated view of 
jurisdictional change. Third, Europe is the historical birthplace of the concepts that are 
potentially undergoing world-changing modification. As such, it offers a particularly 
salient case.  
In remembering why Europe is the focus, it also important to remember what this study 
is not attempting to do. Whereas traditional ES approaches have tended to examine the 
EU as either an aberration in need of explanation (to explain integration) or as an entity 
whose character (IO, polity, sui generis) is important only insofar as it affects 
understandings of European politics/policy-making, this study analyzes the EU as a 
means of challenging IR’s prevailing wisdoms. While that admittedly opens the door 
towards addressing “What is the EU an instance of”, and therefore the possibility for 
European specific conclusions, the more immediate concern is on how those findings 
radiate outwardly and affect standard jurisdictional presumptions. In that sense, the study 
is more concerned with the influences EU change has on wider political and socio-
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political debates than with the EU itself. Indeed, when all is said and done, it does not 
enter discussions as to the best way to terminologically classify it.1 It is also why the 
emphasis is on how EU structures challenge inside/outside (and inclusion/exclusion) – 
not those structures in their own right. 
Having made those points, a few methodological notes must be expanded upon, 
beginning with the base-line definition of the “Europe” under consideration. First, as has 
implicitly been the case thus far, insofar one is concerned with jurisdictional issues one is 
most concerned with political, not cultural or sociological, debates. That does not mean 
that such factors never influence politics. Religion certainly played a key political role in 
medieval Europe. Nevertheless, saying that the Church mattered during that era is really 
saying that it exerted definable, jurisdictional effects. The same is true in the present 
context. To the extent that this chapter is concerned with challenges to sovereignty, it 
means assessing those factors that produce definable jurisdictional influences. And that 
entails looking at the EU’s politically oriented policies, programs, structures, and rules.  
Second, in saying that “Europe” is the concern, one is understandably drawn to the EU – 
again, not why or how its forms, but its existing policies, programs, structures, and rules 
and their cumulative impact on sovereignty and inside/outside. As already noted, 
“Europe” is a more inclusive term than “EU Europe.” Nevertheless, using the Union as 
the focal point makes sense as it is the acknowledged center-point to any discussion on 
European politics. Moreover, it is a key case in wider debates about jurisdictional 
change. That does not mean non-EU issues are unimportant. However, when and where 
they arise, it is reasonable to assume that if they are of fundamental significance, they 
will be caught-up in any analysis of the Union. In saying all that, one should also 
remember that the EU is offered only as a modern example of a pre-modern debate, such 
that the processes it highlights are not necessarily unique to it. 
Finally, because the primary concern is the nature of the changes to inside/outside, what 
that reveals about sovereignty, and therein the emerging alternative jurisdictional form 
not any specific EU policy, program, structure, or rule, one must take a holistic view of 
the Union. Indeed, focusing on a single issue or set of issues risks biasing the study 
                                                
1 In that sense, the terminological debates that inevitably arise – for instance, whether the EU is a neo-
medieval empire or an instance of multi-level governance – matter only insofar as they reflect 
jurisdictional change. They are not considered as independent interests. 
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towards its/their particular effects. Accordingly, the empirical examples that are 
highlighted, whether in support or refutation of a given outcome-possibility, are chosen 
due to their saliency in relation to it. For instance, the strongest examples are cited to 
support breakdown.2 While that does not mean every example of support is cited, the 
critical cases are such that one has the pertinent evidence to draw overall conclusions. 
Moreover, because the study considers and progresses through all four options – options 
that together represent the scope of feasible inside/outside arrangements – determining 
which is the most appropriate becomes a process of logical induction. 
Jurisdictional options 
One can return the four possible effect to the inside/outside dichotomy. In outlining 
them, three key points must be kept in mind. First, the examination begins “imminently” 
from a starting point of sovereignty (Devetak, 2005: 144). The debate is how European 
jurisdictional arrangements impact the pre-existing, IR-assumed, sovereignty-based 
cleavage – a cleavage rooted in the particular quadripartite constellation of jurisdictional 
logics underpinning sovereignty. Second, each of the options represents a specific 
descriptive effects to inside/outside. Each is an actionable event; an illustrative portrayal 
of what could occur to the inside/outside binary. Third, and in the context of the point 
just made, each of the four options also ends up representing a jurisdictional outcome in 
its own right. For instance, breakdown is both a description of what might occur to 
inside/outside as well as, when taken to its logical conclusion, an updated resolution to 
the problematique in its own right. In considering each of the possibilities, in the first 
instance, each describes a specific effect to inside/outside. However, in the second, each 
also represents a distinct jurisdictional outcome. In the final analysis, those outcomes are 
the most important. 
One can now outline the tenets of each option. Beginning with breakdown, its underlying 
descriptive position is often reflected in a variety of rhetorical imageries – Europe as 
“monotopia”, as a “single space”, or “without frontiers” (Rumford, 2008). The belief is 
that as integration progresses, sovereign borders will progressively melt yielding a 
homogenous, European inside. Rumford writes, 
                                                
2 As chapter 1 noted, the focus is on documentary evidence up to and including Lisbon. 
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[A] single, common space within which all constrains to the movement of goods, 
peoples, services, and money have been removed…Europe [would be] increasingly 
interconnected and its various component parts (member states, sub-national regions) 
[would be] seamlessly woven together (Rumford, 2008: 33, emphasis added). 
On a technical level, for breakdown to occur, claims to jurisdictional exclusivity would 
remain, however would have to shift to a Union-defined level. Thus, what were 
previously the exclusive rights of sovereign states would collapse and fully upload to the 
EU.3 Second, one would see a complete functional transference from the state sphere to 
the European one. As such, an updated congruency between the EU’s jurisdictional and 
functional borders would form. Third, territory would continue to define spatial scope, 
however would relate to membership-defined, territorial borders. Finally, all of this 
would produce a largely stable and clear unit, particularly with respect to the location of 
the Union’s membership-come-territorial borders. In offering this picture, it is important 
to note, as Wind  (2001: 122) does, that under breakdown, “[W]e would be back on 
‘highway one’ with the traditional state-centric inside/outside logic just at a new higher 
European level” (the outside being the non-EU world). The size/scale of the unit 
constituting one side of the division would change, however because jurisdiction would 
still occur along logics of exclusivity, congruency, territorialization, and clarity/stability, 
a “sovereign-redux” dichotomization would remain. 
If breakdown predicts the development of a common European space, maintenance is the 
polar opposite. For it to be the conclusion, one would have to see a continuation of 
traditional sovereign state logics – a possibility, one might note, that should not and 
cannot be excluded ex ante given the historical stability and viability of the state and 
sovereignty. In offering this option, as noted in chapter 2, one should be clear that it does 
not necessarily prevent bridges from being formed between the state and European 
levels – for instance, in a two-level game or principal-agent type fashion (Milner 1998; 
Moravcsik, 1998; Milward, 1999). Nevertheless, to the extent that states maintain control 
over the entrances/exits of those bridges/functional bodies, a state-based, inside/outside 
separation would still function. 
The third possibility is stratification. Under it, the basic contention is that instead of 
having a single, binary inside/outside separation, sovereignty would give way to more 
complex formulations, thereby effectively allowing an inside(state)/outside(non-state), 
                                                
3 This would not necessarily deny federalism, but would make the European level the highest jurisdiction. 
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inside(European)/outside(non-European) separation to develop. 4  For it to occur, a 
number of things would be required. First, exclusivity, and therein claims to functional 
congruency, would have to stratify across member-state and European levels, likely in an 
issue contingent manner. Member-states and the EU would therefore each have exclusive 
jurisdiction over some, but not all, issues. Second, spatial scopes would remain 
territorial, but would again likely be issue contingent. Thus, when a member-state has 
jurisdiction over an issue, its jurisdiction would apply within its territory. Conversely, 
when the EU has jurisdiction, its jurisdiction would apply within its membership-defined 
territory. Third, all of this would occur along clear and stable lines, both in terms of 
which functions exist at which level as well as overall membership borders.  
In theoretical terms, this perspective largely predicts what Hooghe and Marks (2003) call 
“Type I multi-level governance” and Schutze (2007) dubs as “dual federalism”. 
Whatever one calls it, however, the basic point is that sovereignty would lapse as its 
quadripartite constellation of logics would not materialize. At the same time, because 
jurisdiction would functionally divide between the state and EU locations in clear, stable, 
and functionally and territorially coherent ways, the ability to visualize distinct levels of 
jurisdictional action would persist. Stratification accounts for the “increasing 
complexity…by inserting a regional subsystem level of analysis” (Yalem, 1977: 307). 
The final possibility, blurring, reflects the most dramatic shift away from inside/outside 
and sovereignty by rejecting the possibly for clearly and cleanly dividable and boundable 
jurisdictional locations. In doing so, it questions the possibility of viewing political 
action along neatly structured analytical levels of analysis (Ruggie, 1993; Onuf, 1995). 
For blurring to be true, as with stratification, one would have to see movement away 
from sovereign exclusivity. However, whereas stratification predicts the formation of 
new, clear, and accepted issue-based jurisdictional divisions, and with them updated 
congruencies between state/EU functional jurisdictions and their respective territories, 
blurring rejects such clear and simple divisions and overlays. Moreover, it expects a high 
degree of ambiguity when it comes to territorial/membership borders – for instance, the 
division between EU and non-EU zones. Thus, juxtaposed against the connotations of 
stability and clarity found under the stratification option, blurring predicts volatility and 
complexity regarding the location of territorial, and therein jurisdictional, borders. 
                                                
4 Stratification is open to more than two levels. The number is less important than the overall logic. 
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Finally, blurring expects a growing saliency of de-territorialized challenges – challenges 
that defy the EU/non-EU border, such as those brought on by globalization. Put together, 
blurring envisages descriptive, and by extension analytical, murkiness when it comes to 
the ability to make clean and clear differentiations between jurisdictional insides and 
outsides. Rumford writes, “European space is not only increasingly networked internally 
but distinctions between inside and outside, European and non-European have also 
become blurred” (Rumford, 2006: 160). 
Table 5 – Outcome-possibilities – inside/outside 
 Definition Sovereign metric 
Breakdown 
The EU exists as a homogenous unit with a seamless 
inside; sovereign, inside/outside-forming borders 
breakdown and are replaced by a EU/non-EU one 
Inside/outside is present, however between EU/non-
EU; sovereignty exists, however in an updated 
European form 
Exclusive (EU-level) 
Congruency (EU-based) 
Stability (EU borders) 
Territorialized (member 
based) 
Maintenance 
The EU does not generate substantial changes; 
member-states maintain their sovereignty. 
Inside/outside present in its classical formation; 
sovereignty is unaffected 
Exclusive (states) 
Congruency (states) 
Stability (states) 
Territorialized (states) 
Stratification 
The EU and member-states are in a stratified 
relationship based on clear functional divisions of labor 
and associated territorially-based divisions; EU/non-EU 
division is clear 
Inside/outside undergoes stratification; sovereignty 
does not exist being replaced by a dual federalist 
structure 
Shared (EU & members) 
Non-congruent division of 
labor 
Negotiable, but stable/clear 
Territorialized (member-
states & EU) 
Blurring 
European and member-state jurisdictional lines face 
potential functional conflicts and overlaps; territorial 
based jurisdictional divisions between the member-
states themselves and EU and non-EU zones are 
unclear and unstable  
Inside/outside undergoes blurring; sovereignty does not 
exist 
Unclear (EU & member-
states) 
Non-congruent division of 
labor 
Unclear, not stable 
De-territorialized 
Having outlined the options, the task now moves to determining which is the most 
appropriate. The chapter considers them in pairs – breakdown/maintenance together as 
they represent opposite sides of the same coin and stratification/blurring together as they 
both reject sovereignty, but disagree over the clarity and stability of the resulting 
situation. In each case, the sections first consider the reasons for supporting a particular 
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option. The chapter then moves to the problems with it via an analysis of an alternative 
choice. Final conclusions are therefore arrived at inductivity, starting with breakdown 
and progressing all the way to blurring. 
Breakdown/maintenance  
With those options as guidance, beginning with breakdown, there are prima facie reasons 
for supporting its tenets. On the simplest level, the EU has repeatedly cited a desire to 
create a “common European home” and a “Europe without frontiers”, both of which 
imply a measure of European homogeneity and cohesion. Similarly, with the enactment 
of Lisbon, the EU was transformed into a “single legal personality” able to, for instance, 
negotiate and enter into international agreements and exert itself as a consolidated, legal 
entity therein. For Cremona that proves critical as it implies and imparts a measure of 
cohesion to the Union as an actor in the international system. 5 Indeed, in offering much 
longer history of what she calls the “emergence of an international identity for the EU”, 
Cremona (2011: 261, emphasis added) notes that while the Union has always had 
international roles to play, “until Lisbon, there had been ambiguity surrounding the legal 
personality of the Union itself”. 
On a more applied level, much as been made about the EU’s institutional bodies, the 
rules governing them, and their abilities and prerogatives to act outside traditional, state 
structures – for instance, the Commission and its powers of initiation and enforcement, 
the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, EP co-decision prerogatives, 
and European Court of Justice (ECJ) created doctrines (see below) (Wallace and 
Wallace, 2000; Hix, 2005). Alongside those institutional matters, the acquis 
communautaire contains the familiar list of EU controlled policy areas. On an issue-
specific level, it lays out specific areas in which the Union has exclusive jurisdictional 
competencies – for instance, with respect to the functioning of the internal market. 
Underpinning that is the fact that full participation in the Union’s rule-making and rule-
enforcing mechanisms requires a state to be a fully acceded member. In other words, to 
                                                
5 As an example of this and of the Union’s view of itself as a consolidated international actor, Cremona 
notes that in the 2008 Kadi case the ECJ annulled the EU’s implementation of a UN Security Council anti-
terrorism sanctioning regime resolution based on its own, internal procedures and property protection 
standards (Cremona 2011: 261Weiler 2008, de Búrca 2010). In other words, the EU, via the ECJ, acted as 
a consolidated agent in invalidating the Security Council regulation – which for Cremona exemplifies the 
Union's status as a  “single legal personality” and consolidated international identity. 
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be completely inside the EU’s jurisdictional sphere, one must be a member-state – key as 
that reflects the formation of a membership-based EU/non-EU division. Therefore, prior 
to a single, real-world decision from being made, the EU’s internal, institutional 
structures and rules appear to upset sovereign exclusivity as well as create an updated 
membership-based political space.  
These logics easily extend to the EU’s more specific programs, ranging from monetary 
policy and European Monetary Union (EMU) to movement and Schengen. Schengen 
offers a particularly salient example given that it deals directly with the 
construction/deconstruction of borders, in both the physical (e.g. movement checkpoints) 
as well as the jurisdictional (e.g. the loss of unilateral border control) senses. On the 
physical side, Article 21, Title II of the Schengen Border Code requires that member-
states dismantle border checkpoints between one another. The Code reads, “Internal 
borders may be crossed at any point without a border check on persons, irrespective of 
their nationality, being carried out”. That, in conjunction with the free movement 
provisions provided by EU citizenship (next chapter), reflects a substantive and 
substantial dismantling of state-based fortifications and a shift towards European control. 
On the jurisdictional side, Schengen also mandates common entry provisions (e.g. the 
Schengen visa) as well as creates a common external fortification system (e.g. the 
Schengen Information System, Frontex) (Bigo, 2005; Vaughn-Williams, 2008). In both 
cases, control over the entry/exit provisions between member-states into the area is no 
longer the exclusive domain of any one state. Those rights shift to Europe, prompting 
Balibar  (2002: 78) to note that the borders of any one member-state are “increasingly 
representative of all others” and Guild (2006: 71) to write that the “traditional concept of 
the state as an area around which one can draw a line of sovereignty in red ink no longer 
applies to the EU”. In short, and as both of those statements reflect, the Agreement 
appears to shift a Schengen state’s entry/exit sovereignty – the ability to control its 
borders in both the physical and jurisdictional senses – to the European level. And that 
points to a breakdown of state exclusivity and territoriality in favor of European control 
over European territory. 
In addition to the institutional and program specific changes, one must note the 
particularly significant role played by the ECJ in affecting state sovereignty and with it 
inside/outside. An influential strand of ES literature argues that the ongoing 
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constitutionalizing process of the Union treaties – a process occurring under the ECJ’s 
stewardship – has progressively sapped the sovereignty of the member-states and 
uploaded many of their once exclusive prerogatives to the Union (Wallace, 1999; Wind, 
2001, Stone Sweet, 2010).6 For instance, frequent reference is made of the ECJ-created, 
EU bolstering legal doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, exclusivity, and preemption 
(Chalmers, et al. 2010). As a specific example, Wallace (1999: 510) notes that the 
supremacy doctrine – which in essence places EU law hierarchically over and above that 
of national law in cases of conflict – represents “the most radical infringement of the 
accepted concept of sovereignty” in the EU’s entire setup. Caporaso and Jupille use the 
critical (in the methodological sense) case of the UK and its long-held principle of 
parliamentary supremacy to illustrate the significance of the changes brought-on by ECJ 
doctrines and the constitutionalization process. They write, 
[A]s the EU [has become] progressively constitutionalized, it has injected its 
substance and procedures into the UK’s constitutional order…[T]he United Kingdom 
has struck a sovereignty bargain in which it has traded the autonomy of parliament in 
return for membership in the EU (Caporaso and Jupille, 2004: 87, emphasis added). 
One must be clear that none of this means that there are never disagreements over the 
ECJ’s powers specifically or the hierarchy of legal rules more generally (see below). 
There have been tense relationships between the ECJ and national constitutional courts, 
most notably in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Germany. Moreover, no state has yet 
fully accepted a “European constitutional sovereignty” position (Chalmers et al., 2010: 
190). Nonetheless, as Chalmers et al. (2010) are keen to note, the established norm tends 
to be one of acceptance of EU rules. As such, when an issue exists on the Union level, 
where European law exerts itself, and where no fundamental constitutional conflicts 
exist, member-states generally comply with Union rules.  
[Member-states] are willing to grant EU law authority subject to it not violating 
certain national taboos. Their assertion of national sovereignty is rather an assertion 
of the power to put ultimate safeguards into action rather than an assertion of regular 
control of the application of EU law (Chalmers et al., 2010: 204). 
Viewed in these ways, across institutional, program specific, and legal fields there is 
evidence that state-based sovereignty breaks down and, in its stead, an amalgamated 
                                                
6 Caporaso (1997: 582) defines constitutionalization as “a process whereby the treaties entered into by 
member states…become relevant for the individuals with those states…[It] captures the transformation of 
an intergovernmental organization governed by international law into a multitiered system of governance 
founded on higher constitutional law”. 
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European political space takes hold. Indeed, after upwards of 50 years of integration, 
those processes have arguably become internalized to the preferences structures – to how 
states determine their distinct “national” interests – of the member-state. As Ruggie 
writes, “The constitutive processes whereby each of the [27] defines its own identity – 
and identities are logically prior to preferences – increasingly ‘endogenizes’ to the 
existence of the other[s]” (Ruggie, 1993: 172). To reiterate, none of this negates 
sovereignty or inside/outside. It simply enlarges the parameters of each creating a 
European inside separated from a non-European outside. If that is truly the case, in 
principle, IR could simply replace the individual member-states with the EU in its 
models and “get on with its subject matter.” While it may have trouble explaining how 
member-states initiated substantive cooperation programs in the first place – it may have 
trouble explaining the process of integration – once they did, dealing with the outcome 
would be less problematic. 
The problem with this entire vision is that while it is accurate in and of itself, it is also a 
highly selective, highly biased reading of the EU and its broader meanings. It 
intentionally focused on those factors supporting breakdown at the expense of alternative 
arguments. While there is nothing analytically wrong with highlighting those factors, or 
the breakdown option as a possibility more generally, when it comes to a holistic 
analysis of the Union there are also good reasons for rejecting them and it. In other 
words, there are good reasons for potentially supporting the maintenance, not the 
breakdown, option. 
In that regard, it is clear that not all issues fall within EU competencies and, for those 
that do not, member-states generally maintain their exclusive jurisdictional rights over 
them (Wallace and Wallace, 2000; Hix, 2005). For instance, it is a long-standing truth 
that the EU lacks exclusive jurisdiction over most foreign and defense policies. 
Moreover, despite Lisbon calling for the establishment of an external action service, the 
creation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and making 
the EU a single legal personality, member-states continue to setup national embassies, 
exchange ambassadors, and engage in other forms of classical diplomatic practice more 
generally – including with one another.7 To be sure, member-states do talk about foreign 
                                                
7 Cremona (2011: 262) amended her pervious statement on the transformation of the EU by making clear 
that the EU is not a member of the United Nations as only states are eligible for full membership status. It 
does have permanent observer status. 
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and defense policy in EU forums. They may even feel certain Euro-socialization effects 
because of them (K. Smith, 2003). And, there have been limited EU-lead peacekeeping 
mission. Nevertheless, because these things occur outside the Union’s exclusive 
competencies and do not utilize QMV within the Council, member-states maintain their 
national vetoes. Thus, and in a more general sense, insofar as not all functions exist on 
the EU level, and where they do not member-states largely maintain their excusive 
jurisdiction, inside/outside cannot be said to be fully broken down and state sovereignty 
negated. 8 
In addition to this functional argument, one might also take a different reading of the 
status of the EU treaties. For instance, not only does Lisbon allow for member-states 
withdrawal from the Union via Article 50, but also the ECJ is not formally integrated 
into national legal systems.9 Indeed, with respect to the latter of those points, as 
Chalmers noted earlier, no state has accepted unconditional European constitutional 
sovereignty. In that sense, the ECJ and its created doctrines might be seen along classical 
principal-agent logics. From this point of view, the Court and all its associated doctrines 
are not so much sovereignty-reducing institutions but the 
[M]ost readily available and most effective solution to the problems of incomplete 
information and incomplete contract that would otherwise have hindered cooperation 
in the EC…a neutral surveillance agent controlled by the principles (Garrett and 
Weingast, 1993: 178). 10 
Outside the ECJ’s case, Glencross (2007: 11) notes that because there are no EU treaty 
ratification processes prescribed by the Union, member-states are free to choose their 
own methods – including the usage of the national referendum. And that, he argues, 
“embod[ies] the autonomy of member states in choosing how to deal with the political 
challenge of integration”. Thus, insofar as the member-states determine the extent of 
their own EU obligations based on their own particular methods, they would seem to 
maintain, at the least in situations of emergency, their traditional sovereign prerogatives.  
                                                
8 This argument is not limited to foreign and defense areas and extends to a host of other non-EU 
competency areas. See Hix, 2005 for a complete breakdown of issue-area divisions. 
9 No assumptions are made that these visions are correct, and there certainly are feasibility issue regarding 
the possibility for withdrawal. The point is that breakdown has not gone unchallenged. Whether that means 
maintenance, however, may not be the case as the stratification/blurring debate highlights. 
10 The argument tends to be that member-states have allowed the ECJ to amass power to both overcome 
incomplete contracting problems common in building a common market as well as because ECJ rules 
generally “accord with the interests of the powerful States…German and France” (Garret, 1992, 556-559). 
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The effects of the EU’s supposedly boundary-breaking programs may also be more 
limited than otherwise assumed. Returning to the Schengen example, Hix notes that 
while the Amsterdam Treaty formally incorporated Schengen into the acquis, it did so in 
a largely intergovernmentalist way. As such, it is questionable to the extent that “Europe” 
really controls any one Schengen’s states borders. He writes,  
The Council, acting by unanimity, became the main executive body…and the 
Schengen secretariat became part of the Council’s general secretariat. While the ECJ 
was granted jurisdiction over some decisions, decision-making in this area remains 
highly secretive. The EP has no formal right of consultation, and the Schengen 
protocol explicitly excludes the ECJ from exercising jurisdiction on matters of law 
and order or internal security that arise from the Schengen Convention (Hix, 2005: 
436, emphasis added). 
Moreover, while under ideal conditions the Agreement may remove internal border 
controls, Busch and Krzyanowski (2007: 121) are keen to note that states can unilaterally 
suspend the open border provisions for security reasons via Articles 22 and 23 of the 
Border Code. That possibility has proven to be more than a paper tiger. For instance, 
Italy suspended Schengen’s open borders during the 2001 G8 to exclude potential rioters 
– EU citizens or not – from Italian territory. Therefore, in the context of Articles 22 and 
23 of the Border Code, states retain significant jurisdictional prerogatives over 
entry/exist issues – at least in situations of emergency. 
Finally, there is evidence that Schengen fails to create an outer-border around its 
members, something both logic and semantics dictate is necessary for a European 
“inside.” For instance, and somewhat paradoxically, the EU has attempted to lessen the 
Agreement’s exclusionary nature for certain non-EU citizens through a border-resident 
permit program, via Regulation 1931/2006. While there may be very good economic and 
normative rationales for pursuing such a policy, it prompts Zielonka (2006: 145) to note 
that it also makes the idea of a clearly defined, separation forming border “more a matter 
of rhetoric than reality”. In short, by lessoning Schengen’s exclusionary effects, it also 
negates the idea of a EU/non-EU borderline. 
Extending on that point, breakdown faces problems in the context of EU territory and 
therefore membership. On the one hand, breakdown wants to see the formation of a 
homogeneous European political space. The implicit assumption is that Europe’s spatial 
scope is membership based – to be inside its jurisdictional space, whether in terms of 
rule-making or rule-enforcing, one must be a member-state. On the other hand, EU 
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membership is a vastly more complicated issue. For instance, not all EU members 
participate in all EU programs, whether due to opt-outs (e.g. the UK and EMU), 
transition periods (e.g. newly acceded member-states), or a failure to meet certain 
requirements (e.g. Romania and EMU). In those contexts, Glencross (2007: 9-10) argues 
that those institutional differences may actually be reflective of state sovereignty, what 
he terms “sovereignty assertions as a state’s right to a special status”. To similar effect, 
not all of the EU’s various programs impact jurisdictional issues in the same ways. 
Schengen-Europe – its members, its processes, and its jurisdictional impacts – is very 
different from EMU-Europe – its members, its processes, and its jurisdictional impacts. 
For those reasons, intra-EU program diversity negates the notion of a homogenous, 
internal European jurisdictional space. 
Similarly in logic, formal Union membership is not necessarily required for being – at 
least partially – inside Europe’s jurisdictional sphere. For example, non-acceded states 
are frequently included in the Union’s space through quasi-membership agreements, 
ranging from the extensive (the European Economic Area (EEA)) to the specific (EU-
Swiss) to the preparatory (European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)) (K. Smith, 2005; 
Grant, 2006; Palmer, 2008; Wallace, 2009).  Lavenex and Schimmelfennig and Lavenex 
(2004, 2009) also note that the Union increasingly engages in what they term as 
“external governance” or the transfer of Union rules to associated, non-member states. 
Forgoing the details for the time being (they are returned to on pages 116-117), these 
programs and membership diversities clearly highlight the non-congruency between 
jurisdictional and membership-come-territorial borders. And that contradicts the idea of 
a clear, European-based inside/outside border. 
Finally, one must also take note of the global context. On the one hand, breakdown is 
meant to reflect the collapse of state sovereignty and the replacement of it with an 
analogous EU version. Sovereignty and inside/outside would be upheld, simply on a 
EU/non-EU basis. On the other hand, walling off insides from outsides of any size is 
problematic due to increasingly saliency of de-territorialized, globalizing challenges. As 
returned to below, whether in the context of transitional organizations, human rights, 
capital flows, or global risk, there is an increasing mismatch between the EU’s territorial 
borders and its ability to close itself off to a non-EU outside world (Bigo and Walker, 
2007; Vaughan-Williams, 2008; Beck, 2009). For that reason, breakdown makes the 
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mistake of assuming it can simplistically replace methodological statism with a sort of 
methodological Europeanism. After all, given that the essence of globalization is its de-
territorialized effects, it seems just as problematic to assume that EU borders can 
compartmentalize them, and thereby create an outer European wall, as it is to assume 
that state borders can. 
In saying that, one might question the extent to which global factors really affect 
jurisdiction. For instance, as noted in chapter 1, some argue global forces only occur 
within in a world sustained by states and state structures (Jackson, 2007b). To similar 
effect, Krasner (1999: 13) argues that “a state can be recognized as a juridical equal by 
others and still be unable to control movements across its borders”. While both of those 
criticisms have merit, there are also responses. First, there has been a proliferation of 
binding global institutions, such as the ICC. Second, Krasner seems to be targeting the 
informal aspects of globalization. Nevertheless, even he admits that a loss of control may 
force formal sovereignty alterations (Krasner, 1999: 13-15). Indeed, the UK’s 1970s EC 
applications, despite its sovereignty concerns, might be seen as an example in which 
British economic woes forced formal changes. Finally, and most simply, not everyone is 
so skeptical about globalization’s impacts (Rosenau, 1990, 2006; Tuathail, 1998; Scholte 
2000; S. Smith 2001). S. Smith (2001: 224) writes, “Contra Krasner, I do believe that 
globalization is transforming sovereignty…”. 
Put together, there are clear problems with breakdown. As such, one re-arrives at the 
initial issue of how to understand jurisdiction, and therein inside/outside, in Europe. 
Given the arguments against breakdown, one is understandably tempted to draw the 
completely opposite conclusion and argue that sovereignty and inside/outside are 
maintained in their traditional forms. Indeed, many of the previous sections’ arguments 
pointed in precisely that direction. That fact that states maintain autonomy across a host 
of core issue areas and preserve opt-out, suspension, and even withdrawal prerogatives 
all appeared to support a maintenance conclusion. Were one inclined to accept that line 
of thinking, one might be tempted to compile a ledger – one point for maintenance each 
time an issue remains at the state level, one for breakdown each time one Europeanizes – 
to determine which side the system leans further to. 
The problem with such an approach is, however, that it never really addresses the nature 
of inside/outside. First, there are a whole set of issues that did/do not support breakdown 
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or maintenance – such as membership conflicts and globalized, de-territorialized 
challenges (see below). Second, insofar one needs a ledger at all, neither breakdown nor 
maintenance applies seamlessly, prompting one to ask whether jurisdictional debates are 
really organized in the neat and tidy ways both need them to be. Because exclusivity, 
congruency, territorialization, and clarity/stability never line up at either location 
(member-state or EU) as sovereignty-the-concept requires, sovereignty is not the 
operative term. Individual aspects of it may apply in certain circumstances, however 
because its precise constellation of logics never forms and never lines up, it is not the 
underlying concept at play. Finally, by recognizing that, one also recognizes that 
jurisdiction – the conceptual precursor to sovereignty – ought to be made the key 
concept of analysis. Because it is a more inclusive notion, it offers the conceptual space 
necessarily for classifying for Europe’s political diversities. And, in realizing that, one is 
free to move beyond the either/or nature of breakdown/maintenance towards 
stratification/blurring. With it, the critical question becomes one of overall stability and 
clarity of structure. 
Stratification/blurring 
There is evidence that points directly towards a stratification conclusion. First, with 
respect to competency issues, member-states maintain exclusive jurisdiction over a host 
of functions and, when they do, do so within their traditionally defined, territorial 
borders. However, as was also established, the EU has gained exclusive jurisdiction over 
a host of other issues and, where it does, generally does so within its membership-
defined territory. Thus, France institutes French tax laws within French territory while 
the EU administers European competition law within the Union’s territory. Accordingly, 
just as there is a jurisdictional/territorial inside/outside separation between member-
states with respect to national tax law, there is an analogous binary between the Union 
and non-EU zones with respect to European competition law. In each case, the EU and 
member-states are co-equals in an issue-based division of labor. Schutze (2007) dubs this 
“dual federalism” while Hooghe and Marks (2003) term it “Type I multi-level 
governance”. Whatever one calls it, however, the critical point is that once freed from 
the assumption that there must be a functionally complete, territorial/jurisdictional 
congruency, as was the case under sovereignty and therefore under both the breakdown 
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and the maintenance options, a statist inside/outside division can be maintained and a 
EU/non-EU one can be added.11 
Second, stratification gains support due to the Union’s differentiated memberships, By 
recognizing that there does not have to be a homogenous European jurisdictional space, 
stratification is open to the possibility that there might be diverse sets of jurisdictional 
locations within Europe. In other words, it allows for the fact that there might be EU-
Europe, EMU-Europe, and Schengen-Europe – and all the practical differences 
contained therein – all at the same time.12 Indeed, and whatever the precise language and 
details are, the “core-periphery”, “concentric circles”, and “multi-speed” metaphors often 
cited in the ES literature all epitomize the need to move beyond inside/outside’s binary 
nature and utilize more functionally attuned setups (Lavenex, 2011). By recognizing that 
there is not necessarily a homogenous European space, at least on the surface 
stratification allows for the jurisdictional diversity that exists. 
In saying all that, three points need highlighting. First, stratification creates the 
conceptual space needed for a re-leveled inside/outside division by accepting that there 
need not be an overlay between territorial, jurisdictional, and functional borders. Just as 
one is free to define a jurisdictional (not sovereign) inside/outside separation between 
member-states when an issue is outside the EU’s competencies, one is free to define a 
jurisdictional (again, not sovereign) one between Union and non-Union members when 
an issue is within its competencies. Second, despite being issue-based, jurisdiction, 
territory, and inside/outside remain related as jurisdictional scopes still play out along 
territorial scales – in the case of the member-states via their traditional territorial borders 
and in the case of the EU via the combined territories of its members. Finally, the 
assumption throughout all of this is that the separations between the various locations 
and functions are stable and clear. While there may be multiple membership types and 
issue contingent competencies, the lines separating both are assumed to be readily 
apparent and exhibit an overall durability. Stratification therefore depicts a setup in 
                                                
11 Based on this, one could return to the ledger imagery to layout which functions exist on which levels. 
However, whereas the breakdown/maintenance ledger was primarily geared towards logics of generality – 
“In general, the Union functions this or that way” – under stratification each level would be independently 
valued. As such, its purpose would not be to determine which side has more competencies, but to illustrate 
that each side jurisdictionally dominates in some, but not all, areas. 
12 Of course, this point gains further support in the context of London’s 2011 veto of French/German treaty 
revision plans in light of the 2011 debt crisis and all the resultant talk of two-speed Europe (Parker and 
Barker, 2011). See the concluding chapter. 
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which the either/or nature of inside/outside, the territorial/functional/jurisdictional 
congruency, and the notion that there must be a single, contiguous zone of sovereign 
action (and with all that that there must be either breakdown or maintenance) all give 
way to a functionally attuned system in which both member-states and the EU have 
distinct zones of jurisdictional action.  
Without denying the nuances stratification offers, the issue remains whether the 
structuralism inherent to it offers the best approach. By shifting away from a 
sovereignty-based jurisdictional form, stratification is willing to expand the number of 
possible jurisdictional levels. As such, it is an improvement over the binary, either/or 
nature of breakdown or maintenance. However, even in overcoming their limitations, the 
perspective remains wed to the idea that jurisdictional locations are clearly and cleanly 
defined such that they can be analytically treated as separate from one another, whether 
in terms of which functions exist at which level or the membership lines of the various 
locations themselves. The difficulty is, and as the remainder of this chapter makes clear, 
the existence of unambiguously defined and divided jurisdictional locations in Europe is 
more problematic than it otherwise may seem. And that makes blurring the best 
conclusion. 
To start, stratification needs there to be a clear functional division of labor between 
jurisdictional locations. The difficulty is that is not always the case and, in practice, 
member-states often disagree on the scope of Union jurisdiction. There are, of course, 
instances in which the EU and the member-states each have exclusive jurisdiction over a 
particular issue, just as Schutze’s dual federalist model implies. Moreover, there are 
cases of defined, shared competencies – areas that allow the member-states to make and 
enforce rules to the extent that the EU has not legislated. Thus, on the surface, there do 
seem to be clear, functional divisions of labor between the EU and member-states. 
Indeed, as noted, in theory, even areas of shared competencies appear to have 
jurisdictional standards attached to them; member-states are free to make their rules to 
the extent that the EU has not legislated (Stone Sweet, 2010).  
Nevertheless, and where this setup gets more complicated than a language and logic of 
stratification would seem to allow for is when that all is put into practice. In other words, 
problems arise and conflicts potentially occur when those theoretical claims of clean and 
clear functional divisions play-out on an on-the-ground level. Despite attempts to create 
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unambiguous, functional divisions of labor, member-states and the Union often disagree 
on whether a particular issue ought to fall within the latter’s jurisdiction or not – if for no 
other reason than the member-states are historically used to having control over all 
functions. There are conceptual and empirical sides to this point.  
On the conceptual side, Stone Sweet (2010) notes that member-state/EU functional 
conflicts generally occur in three main instances – when the EU/ECJ chooses to apply 
treaty law to areas formerly thought to be in the national domain due to a “spillover” 
effect of established Union competencies (e.g. telecommunications, air transport); when 
the Court evokes provisions to and of a higher “constitutional status” and, in doing so, 
carves out legal positions on functions that might otherwise fall outside the EU’s formal 
functional remit; or when the ECJ holds that specific policy dispositions are required by 
treaty law. 13 In pointing out each of those possibilities for conflict and overlap between 
the member-states and the EU, and again despite all the formal attempts to create clean 
and clear competency lines, Stone Sweet’s argument is that the EU, largely via the ECJ, 
has nonetheless managed to carve out significant jurisdictional prerogatives in areas that 
might otherwise formally fall outside of its functional remits. And that, as the following 
empirical examples establish more directly, creates the possibility for conflicts and 
overlaps between the EU and the member-states on particular functional issues.  
Accordingly, in moving to the practical side, one can look at a number of examples of 
conflict and overlap between the member-states and the Union over particular functional 
issues. For instance, much has been made of a 2003 German case, finalized in the so-
called Mangold judgment, in which the ECJ negated a German labor law having to do 
with age-discrimination in employment matters (Schiek, 2006; Herzog, 2008; Kokott, 
2010). Forgoing the litany of legal details contained in it, the basic debate was over 
whether the ECJ (and therein the EU) overreached its functional jurisdiction by negating 
that German law as labor markets and social policies formally fall outside of the Union’s 
                                                
13 To this, one might add there are also areas in which the development of jurisdictional hierarchies 
between member-states and the EU is not even the goal. For instance, the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) represents a jurisdictional approach in which “common action at EU level is no longer 
synonymous with further formal transfer of competencies, and with the development of homogenous and 
binding political solutions” (Borras and Jacobsson, 2004: 199). Moreover, the relationship between the 
various actors is not fixed, predetermined, or even stable. The formation of a neat division of jurisdictional 
labor is not the primary goal. One might argue that the OMC is not really jurisdictional insofar as it is 
informal, however the fact remains that under it authority is being administered, just based on mutual 
agreement. Jurisdictional claims are therefore made, albeit in informal and non-hierarchical ways.  
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competencies (and therefore remain in the member-states’ domains). In advancing 
precisely that argument, former German president Roman Herzog (2008) writes that, 
“[The] case clearly demonstrates to what extent EU regulation and EU 
jurisdiction…interfere in the governing of these [labor market and social policy] core 
[state] competences”. He goes on to argue that in justifying itself the ECJ resorted to a 
“somewhat adventurous construction” to invalidate the German law – “constitutional 
traditions common to the member states”.  
In advancing that line of thinking, Herzog effectively mirrors Stone Sweet’s point 
regarding when functional conflicts between member-states and the EU might arise; in 
this case, when the ECJ claimed rights and evoked provisions in domains that it might 
otherwise not have had jurisdiction over based on claims to and of a higher constitutional 
status (general non-discrimination ideals). One should be clear that, while the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ultimately upheld the European decision – it 
dismissed the constitutional claim against the ECJ – the case illustrates the conflicts and 
debates that might arise over particular competency issues in the context of the EU’s 
complex legal system. Moreover, and perhaps more critically as one sees in relation to 
legal pluralism, developed below, it also implicitly opens the door towards imagining the 
legal havoc that might have resulted had the FCC reached an alternative decision and 
rejected the ECJ ruling.  
One should be clear that the sort of legal conflict seen in the Margold judgment is not an 
isolated occurrence. Returning to Stone Sweet’s conceptual points, member-state/EU 
disagreements have also proven common in instances in which the Union claims 
jurisdiction in an area that it would otherwise be formally restricted from due to its 
interpretation of the tangential affects that area might have on an issue within its 
competencies (as noted above, a sort of “spillover” functionality claim/process). To give 
an example of this, a 2003 Commission directive (Directive 2003/33) restricted tobacco 
ads in local newspapers citing an “inten[t] to protect public health”. However, because 
the EU lacks formal healthcare competencies, the official legal justification used and 
cited later on in the relevant directive was based on “internal market” rationales, which 
of course do fall within the EU’s control.14 Viewing this linkage as overly artificial, the 
                                                
14 More specifically, if one member-state banned such ads, the argument was that that would effectively 
prevent foreign newspapers from being sold in that member-state, thereby impacting the functioning of the 
internal market. Under that logic, EU jurisdiction was deemed appropriate. 
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German government sued, though the case was eventually dismissed. Similarly in logic, 
a 2005 ECJ decision allowed for more European control in criminal law as it pertained to 
environmental protections, all the while stating that, “Neither criminal law nor the rules 
of criminal procedure fall within the Community’s competencies” (Case C-176/03). As 
with the ad ban, the ECJ justified its actions based on competencies that it did have – in 
this case, environmental regulation – and the need to properly execute them. 
As these examples illustrate, jurisdictional conflicts and overlaps do potentially arise in 
the context of Europe’s complex legal structure – largely, as one sees more fully below, 
due to the fact that the various actors in that system (member-states and the EU) all tend 
to view themselves as independently authorized jurisdictional actors. And, from the 
member-states’ perceptive these conflicts and overlaps are generally seen as the 
unjustified seizer of traditional state sovereign rights. Herzog writes, 
The ECJ deliberately and systematically ignores fundamental principles of the 
Western interpretation of law, that its decisions are based on sloppy argumentation, 
that it ignores the will of the legislator, or even turns it into its opposite, and invents 
legal principles serving as grounds for later judgments. They show that the ECJ 
undermines the competences of the Member States even in the core fields of national 
powers (Herzog, 2008: 5, emphasis added). 
Again, in raising this issue and offering these examples the point is not that Germany (or 
any other member-state) did not ultimately abide by any particular ECJ ruling; they did 
and, as Chalmers noted earlier, always tend to. Rather, the point is that while in theory 
there may be clear competencies lines, in practice those lines are often less well defined 
and frequently called into question. And that, at the very least, illustrates the debates at 
play and the problems with the clarity of divisions assumed under the stratification 
option. Moreover, the argument gains even more relevance in the context of European 
legal pluralism, to which the chapter now turns. 
Taking a step back, the breakdown/maintenance debate implied that the Union’s legal 
system either gains or fails to gain full supremacy over the member-states. Moreover, 
dual federalism implicitly assumed that, while there might be more significant actors, 
there ultimately are clear standards for determining legal hierarchies, such as between 
the EU and member-states when it comes to a particular competency. As such, whether 
from the context of breakdown/maintenance or from that of stratification, the assumption 
was that “in the legal domain…integration is an ‘all or nothing’ process’” (Weiler quoted 
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in Wallace, 1982: 65). Someone – the EU or the member-states – had to sit atop a clearly 
established jurisdictional order.15 
The problem is that legal integration has proven to be a much messier process, whether 
due to conflicts over the ECJ’s powers, debates over competencies, or the deep-seated 
sovereignty concerns of the member-states (again, as pointed out above). Underpinning 
that messiness is the fact the various entities in the European legal system – whether the 
member-states themselves or a EU body like the ECJ – all tend to individually assume 
themselves independently relevant and empowered. As such, the potential for conflict 
and overlap between them based on their countervailing legal opinions is an ever-present 
possibility (MacCormick, 1995; Wind, 2001; N. Walker, 2002). N. Walker terms this a 
form of “epistemic pluralism” and uses it to highlight both the multiple jurisdictional 
organs that do exist as well as their individual interpretations of themselves as 
independently sanctioned and empowered actors (N. Walker, 2002). That is not to say 
there are never methods of resolving disagreements between them. As Chalmers (2010: 
205-207) notes, there are. Moreover, a status quo of acceptance by the member-states of 
the EU has developed. Nevertheless, because the actors in the system all tend to be 
informed by their own institutional placement within that system, there are no assurances 
that legal processes alone will always be sufficient. The possibility for conflict and 
overlap, as the examples cited above made clear, are ever-present possibilities. 
It is important to note, as MacCormick (1995: 264) does, that the jurisdictional debates 
that might arise in the EU system – again, such as those pointed out in the previous 
section – tend not to arise due to an “absence” of legal rules, but “a superfluity” of them. 
To stress, this is for no other reason than the various actors all claim their own unique 
jurisdictional rights – for the EU, as expressed via the supremacy of EU law and, for the 
member-states, their traditional state sovereignty prerogatives.16 To give an example of 
how this all plays out, despite ECJ mandates about the supremacy of EU law, the Czech 
Constitutional Court has stated that it will intervene against the Union if it does not act in 
accordance with its principles as a “democratic law-based state” (Chalmers et al., 2010: 
222). Similarly, the FCC has made the transfer of jurisdictional to Europe conditional on 
                                                
15 In technical terms, this corresponds with a monist/hierarchical approach to law (N. Walker, 2002) 
16 MacCormick (1995: 265) follows up by noting that none of that is “logically embarrassing” as “the 
answers are from the point of [each] different system”. 
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the protection of the rights laid down in Basic Law such that “if [those] rights are 
infringed, the court insists, it can reclaim them” (Economist 2009, emphasis added).17 In 
those contexts, Kokott (2010: 101) notes that it is that sort of legal pluralism that creates 
the potential for conflicts and overlaps between member-states and the EU over 
particular issues; conflicts and overlaps rooted in the difference between the “protection-
of-sovereignty-approach of the [FCC and other constitutional courts] and the integration-
oriented approach the [ECJ/EU].” Because under legal pluralist reading “who” is 
jurisdictionally supreme is not necessarily clear and might depend on one’s institutional 
placement, it is hard to speak of a final legal arbiter. The door is therefore always open 
towards jurisdictional overlap and conflict. 
While all of this may be practically problematic, especially from a starting point that 
assumes that there must be a hierarchy of legal norms (as breakdown, maintenance, and 
stratification implicitly all do), once one moves away from sovereignty towards 
jurisdiction, the setup immediately becomes less conceptually awkward. Of course, as 
Wind (2001: 193) notes, it may compel one to address whether the complexities of the 
EU legal system require an updated vocabulary in which jurisdictional systems can 
coexist under conditions of jurisdictional competition. However, that does not negate the 
possibility for jurisdiction absent sovereignty. Indeed, it is from the context of those 
complexities – complexities that highlight the plethora of legal actors and their 
independent and potentially conflicting and overlapping opinions as to their jurisdiction 
remits – that MacCormick (1995: 264) writes, “The most appropriate analysis of the 
relations of legal systems [in the EU] is pluralistic rather than monistic and interactive 
rather than hierarchical”. It is also Wind’s (2001: 193) argument in dubbing the EU’s 
legal system as “polycentric comprised of multiple jurisdictional centers”. 
View together, because jurisdiction is not vested in member-states or the EU exclusively 
and because none exists in clear supremacy to all others in all cases there is the 
possibility for legal conflict and overlap between them. Separating jurisdictional insides 
from outsides becomes harder as where one is within the system impacts one’s vision as 
                                                
17 As a practical example, while a 2009 ruling by the FCC in the Lisbon Case allowed Germany to go 
forward with ratification of the treaty, Kokott (2010: 100) notes that the Court also made clear that any 
parliamentary act approving it “will be seen as compatible with Basic Law only if it takes into account the 
safeguards established by the [FCC]…the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon must be interpreted in 
conformity with the Constitution”. 
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to the appropriateness of any action. And all of that seems far more in line with blurring 
than breakdown, maintenance, or stratification. Writing from outside the EU’s context, 
but on a related topic, Hofstadter conceptualizes the thought process well. He writes, 
A fascinating area where hierarchies tangle is in government—particularly in the 
courts. Ordinarily, you think of two disputants arguing their cases in court, and the 
court adjudicating the matter. The court is on a different level from the disputes. But 
strange things can start to happen when the courts themselves get entangled in legal 
cases. Usually there is a higher court which is outside the dispute…But what happens 
when there is no higher court[?]…The irony is that once you hit your head against 
the ceiling like this, where you are prevented from jumping out of the system to a yet 
higher authority, the only recourse is to forces which seem less well defined by rules, 
but which are the only source of higher-level rules anyway…the general reaction of 
society (Hofstadter 1999: 692-693, emphasis added). 18 
Moving on from legal structures, given the attention paid to Schengen earlier, one would 
be remised not to note that it too exhibits blurring elements. While under optimal 
conditions the Agreement supported breakdown, the institutional rules, the possibilities 
for suspension, and the lack of a firm, external border problematized full adoption of that 
perspective. As such, it would be easy to argue for a logic of generality – “In general, 
Schengen does this or that.” The problem is, as with the legal sphere, the Agreement 
effects are more complex than breakdown, maintenance, or stratification allow for. For 
instance, Article 45 of the Schengen acquis specifically mandates that hotels and other 
accommodations register all foreigners – including European citizens – upon arrival. To 
be sure, a registration requirement is not the same as a fortified checkpoint. Nevertheless, 
it does support Balibar’s (2002) more wide-ranging claim regarding “the ubiquity of 
borders” in modern Europe. She writes, 
Some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all, in the geographico-politico-
administrative sense of the term. They are in fact elsewhere, wherever selective 
controls are to be found, such as, for example, health or security checks (Balibar, 
2002: 84). 
In that sense, if borders matter due to their practical impacts, not their abstract location, 
insofar as Schengen diffuses them throughout a European space, when and where one is 
inside or outside of them becomes a lot less clear; borders become “everywhere and 
nowhere” (Balibar, 2002: 78). In that vein, Rumford writes, “There are many borders in 
our midst but about which we have no awareness unless we are the recipient and target 
of the bordering practice” (Rumford 2008: 42). View in those ways, Schengen’s effects, 
                                                
18 This is why, as chapter 5 develops, legitimacy debates become so important in blurring systems. 
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and European bordering processes more generally, seem more in line blurring, than 
breakdown, maintenance, or stratification. 
Shifting away from the Union’s rules and picking up on a point made previously, 
stratification also short-changes the global context. The fact is, insofar as there are global 
challenges, they are by nature de-territorialized and universal, constrained by neither 
state territorial nor EU membership borders. On the one hand, one might be tempted to 
shirk this point by noting that not all issues are globalized (just as some are not 
Europeanized). As such, there simply is a “global level” to the stratification argument. 
On the other hand, and though that may be true, because the interest is how those factors 
that are globalized impact inside/outside, one can both acknowledge that not all issues 
are global and hold firm that those that are, are boundary-defying. Beck’s (2007) work 
on global risk offers an illustrative entry-point. He starts from an assumption that much 
modern day risk exhibits fundamentally de-territorialized qualities that no state has the 
wherewithal to unilaterally address or bracket-away. He (2007: 287) writes, “Global 
risks [Chernobyl, 9/11, the swine flu] tear down national boundaries and jumble together 
the native with the foreign”. 
With that in mind, there is little reason to expect that a bigger, yet still fundamentally 
territorially-based unit, will be able to bracket out global threats. Because they are by 
definition non-territorial, they will no more respect EU borders than state ones. One sees 
evidence of this in the EU’s case. In a study of the Frontex program, Vaughan-Williams 
argues that if a border is a place where control takes place, then 
The activities of Frontex in practice challenges commonsensical notions about the 
location of the border that separates the internal from the external realm. Such a 
control on a subject’s movement increasing takes place hundreds of miles away from 
member-states’ territorial and the geopolitical edge of the EU. This ‘off-shoring’ of 
the border complicates the geopolitical imaginary of the EU as an entity with a 
readily identifiable as inside; paradoxically the inside is projected externally 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2008: 67). 
He goes on give examples of that process, noting that EU policing frequently occurs far 
removed from Union territory – off the waters of Mauritania, Senegal, and Cape Verde – 
in an attempt to deal with the de-territorialized challenge of migration. Similarly, he 
notes that surveillance planes from Finland and Italy are increasingly penetrating deep 
into African territory to deter would-be migrants from even starting journeys to the EU.  
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As those examples illustrate, the question understandably becomes, where does EU 
jurisdiction stop? When is one inside/outside of Europe?19 In the context of Frontex’s 
activities, the answer appears to be that the Union’s formal, membership-come-territorial 
borders do not overlay with its jurisdictional ones such that it is hard to determine when 
one is firmly inside or outside of it (Bigo, 2000; Bigo and Walker, 2007). One might add 
that, the more de-territorialized threats proliferate, the more likely the 
jurisdictional/territorial-come-membership overlap is likely to unbundle. To visualize 
what is occurring, and in talking about Frontex specifically, Bigo and Walker develop 
the concept of the Moebius strip. It has clear similarities with blurring. They write, 
It is impossible in a Moebius strip to define once and for all what is inside and what is 
outside. No one can identity, whether objectively or even consensually, the location 
of an edge differentiating once and for all the internal and external. In relation to the 
ingrained assumptions of so much political analysis, it challenges any claim that there 
must be a sharp line differentiating self and other, friend and enemy, state and state, 
or state and international system (Bigo and Walker, 2007: 736). 
To conclude, one can examine EU membership itself. The previous perspectives on the 
European jurisdictional form all implicitly assumed that membership determined the 
spatial scope of EU jurisdiction. Jurisdiction remained territorial, but that territory was 
based on the territory of those on its membership scrolls. While stratification allowed for 
more than one membership type, and therefore was an improvement over the binary 
nature of breakdown/maintenance, it also assumed that there was a clarity and stability to 
those memberships. The difficulty is, the membership borders defining the EU’s various 
jurisdictional spaces are much less clear and must less stable than stratification needs 
them to be. The distinction between EU and non-EU – and all that implies – is blurring. 
First, with respect to clarity, the EU’s plethora of association programs – ENP, Swiss-
EU, and the EEA – soften the EU/non-EU division. To be sure, that softening has 
traditionally been the Union’s explicit goal, particularly as a means of preventing a post-
Cold War divided continent. However, the effect of that decision has also been that who 
is jurisdictionally inside versus jurisdictionally outside the Union is frequently a matter 
of degree (K. Smith, 2005; Grant, 2006; Palmer, 2008; Wallace, 2009; Lavenex 2011). 
In that context, as noted earlier, the EU also increasingly engages in what Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig (2994, 2009) termed as “external governance”. While varying in form – 
                                                
19 To be sure, the EU may be more effective than states in dealing with global risk, however as the extra-
territorial activities of Frontex illustrate, even EU walls are insufficient. 
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it might be hierarchical, networked, or market based – the underling affect is a de-linking 
of EU membership from its jurisdictional gambit. Using accession papers as the metric 
for deciding when a state is jurisdictionally inside or outside of the EU is therefore 
problematic. Outside is, very often, at least partially inside. 
Second, there are issues of stability. Despite the EU’s attempts to develop stable halfway 
houses, associated, non-EU states frequently find themselves unsatisfied with “less than” 
or “all-but institution” approaches. For example, while the ENP is formally enlargement 
neutral (in no small part due to the Union’s desire to shirk inside/outside decisions), in 
practice the Union tends to view it simply as an instrument to forge closer ties with 
neighbors. The difficulty is that ENP associates tend to see the program as a necessary, 
but preliminary step to accession (Palmer, 2008: 16). In that context, K. Smith argues 
that just as EFTA did not stave off accession for long, the ENP appears to be lagging 
behind aspirations in many of its members (K. Smith, 2005). As a result, the EU’s, often 
intentional, ambiguity with respect to membership decisions creates an unstable, outer 
border – especially from the perceptive of those on the “outside”.20  
That fact feeds into broader questions of enlargement, as a policy and as a question of 
“to whom”. On the policy side, enlargement has been a constant feature of the Union’s 
development, with some going so far as to call it the EU’s raison d’état (Fierke and 
Wiener, 1999: 722). That being the case, today’s outside might easily become 
tomorrow’s inside. Moreover, just as today’s outside might be tomorrow’s inside, the 
reasons for moving an outsider to the inside have varied. Rationales for previous 
enlargement have ranged from geopolitics to economics to rhetorical entrapment 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedemeier, 2005). Because the Union’s membership borders are 
under constant negotiation – because they lack permanency – determining a clear 
inside/outside line becomes more tedious and less clear. 
Enlargement as a policy ties into enlargement as a question of “To whom?” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedemeier, 2005; K. Smith, 2005; Grant, 2006; Diez 2006; 
Palmer, 2008; Wallace 2009). On the one hand, the Union’s founding documents 
declares it open to all “European states”, which both allows for enlargement itself as well 
                                                
20 There have been calls for better halfway houses – a European Commonwealth, or deep free-trade areas 
(Grant, 2008: 65). However, again, none of these guarantee stable gradations to membership. 
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as conditions a binary: to be an EU member, one must be a European state. On the other 
hand, no firm conception of what being “European” meant was provided. While the 
assumption was that Europe shared certain commonalities – a fact that helped underwrite 
integration as a whole – what those commonalities were was/is less clear (Pagden, 2002). 
The EU has developed certain rules to help dictate enlargement decisions – for instance, 
the Copenhagen criteria in the context of Eastern enlargement. However, those 
requirements were more about defining the political, economic, and social conditions 
necessary for enlargement than with what “being European” means.21 (If those were all 
that mattered, all liberal democracies would become potential members.) As such, one is 
still left with what “being European” entails. The problem is, there is no agreement as to 
the answer to that question. Some impart a geographical meaning, only to find that they 
then argue over what those dimensions are (K. Smith, 2005: 769; Grant, 2006: 13). 
Others replace culture with geography, only to find that they soon disagree on its 
content. And yet still others view enlargement as a normative tool of foreign policy. 
Irrespective of which side of these debates one agrees with, their existence illustrates the 
ambiguity regarding “Who is European?”. Until there is an agreed to final frontier, 
inside/outside will be neither stable nor clear. As Bigo (2005: 51) whimsically notes, 
“Uncertainty lies at the heart of European identity”.  
Jurisdictional updates 
Putting this altogether, one arrives at the blurring conclusion with respect to the status of 
the inside/outside division in Europe. While breakdown, maintenance, and stratification 
were each considered and each made valid points when viewed in isolation, the 
contradictions between them made blurring the most appropriate option. Given that, and 
given the descriptive effects to the inside/outside cleavage found under the blurring 
option, the question becomes what one can say about its significance as a jurisdictional 
outcome specifically. Therefore, to take a step back, thus far blurring (indeed all four of 
the options) has primarily been used as a means of illustrating the nature of the change 
that the inside/outside binary is undergoing; it is blurring. Nevertheless, as noted at the 
outset of the chapter, each of the four options also represents a distinct mode of 
                                                
21 It is easy to exclude politically suspect states. However, if Ukraine reforms its political system, it is less 
likely they will be satisfied with an all-but approach. The question then becomes: Are they European? 
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jurisdictional action in their own right. Consequently, and in the context of the 
descriptive effects rendered, the task becomes addressing what blurring means 
jurisdictionally; what is its resolution to the jurisdictional problematique. While a 
complete analysis of that is taken up in chapter 5, it is clear that blurring presents a 
different set of logics than sovereignty.  
First, under blurring, the “who” aspect of the problematique varies as it includes both the 
member-states as well as the EU as jurisdictional agents. Second, under blurring, “what” 
determinations shift between those various actors in potentially conflicting and 
overlapping manners, a point reflected in the debates between the member-states and the 
EU (particularly the ECJ). Third, under blurring, “where” determinations, whether due to 
the proliferation of global threats, debates over enlargement, or practices of external 
governance, are unclear and unstable issues. Fourth, under blurring, “how” lacks 
established standards, whether in the context of how EU rules are laid-down (e.g. 
directives versus decisions) or the means through which jurisdiction is exercised more 
generally (e.g. OMC versus external governance). Finally, under blurring, “over whom” 
lacks clarity, as the enlargement and external governance debates demonstrates (also 
next chapter). Together, the operation of the European system illustrates a jurisdictional 
setup that is not sovereignty-based. While some attempt to graft a name to this situation 
– Europe as a borderland, as neo-medieval, as a maze – for this study the primary interest 
is in illustrating the effects on inside/outside, not offering the EU a specific title. 
In opening the door towards defining and developing blurring as a jurisdictional form, 
one should be clear that at this stage the goal is not to argue what all that means for 
jurisdictional debates specifically or IR more generally – again, those tasks are left for 
chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Rather, it is to make clear that blurring describes an effect 
to inside/outside and, in doing so, appears to offer a new set of positions on resolving the 
problematique. In saying that, and to foreshadow the points made in those future 
chapters, that all ultimately proves so interesting as well as so potentially problematic 
insofar as it challenges sovereignty’s resolution to the problematique in ways that 
necessitates descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary re-mappings. In short, while blurring 
replaces sovereignty in Europe, it does not do so in a way that it can be 
“unproblematically” slotted into sovereignty-vacated maps. Its tenets and logics end up 
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necessitating more substantial and substantive re-mappings – re-mappings to both help 
depict blurring itself, but also ones that allow for wider jurisdictional variability. 
Table 6 – Jurisdictional types – Europe 
Jurisdictional type Definition Metric 
Sovereign system  
A jurisdictional form in which jurisdiction is 
territorial bounded, held by ruler with excusive 
jurisdiction over all functions and people in said 
territory; a jurisdictional form defined by clear, 
stable, and concurrently 
territorial/jurisdictional/functional borders 
A clean, clear, and stable inside/outside binary exists. 
Exclusive Yes 
Territorialized  Yes 
Congruency Yes 
Stability/clarity Yes 
European system  
A jurisdictional form that lacks firm territorial 
boundedness, clarity, and stability; a form in which 
jurisdiction is neither functionally complete nor 
rooted in a single actor; a form in which jurisdictional 
prerogatives potentially conflict and overlap between 
actors and were the mode of execution varies  
The inside/outside binary is blurring. 
Exclusive No 
Territorialized No 
Congruency No 
Stability/clarity No 
In the end, therefore, the blurring finding provided in this chapter proves significant for 
the study as a whole due to relationship between inside/outside, the 
domestic/international separation, and IR. The key take away is not that European states 
managed to cooperate. The key take away is that that cooperation has not produced 
jurisdictional clarity. Simply put, it is increasingly difficult to visualize a clean and clear 
sovereignty-based, inside/outside separation among Union members. Again, final 
conclusions regarding the systemic effect that has on political structures, and what new 
ways forward might be developed, are reserved for chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless, even 
at this early stage, a blurring inside/outside and with it the formation of a alternative 
resolution of the problematique offers initial evidence as to the fundamental challenges 
sovereignty-based mapping faces in Europe and therein the new types of descriptive, 
analytical, and disciplinary maps that might be necessary. 
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Chapter 4 – Inclusion/exclusion in Europe 
 
Introduction 
Having developed a conception of inside/outside and jurisdiction under EU logics, the 
study shifts gears towards an examination the domestic/international separation’s second 
core component – inclusion/exclusion. Whereas the previous chapter looked largely at 
the EU’s political influences, this one examines its influences on the socio-political 
placement of people within the European system. It examines the interplay between the 
state citizenship standard developed in chapter 2, European citizenship, and 
inclusion/exclusion. 1  The critical question is whether EU citizenship produces a 
breakdown, maintenance, stratification, or blurring of the ability to determine whether an 
individual is considered included or excluded from a given political community. 
Understanding socio-political relationships is critical, as Rosenau (1990: 213) noted 
earlier, insofar as the separations between domestic, European, international, and even 
global politics are relevant only to the extent that people maintain such separations 
amongst themselves and act accordingly. To the extent that they do not, cannot, or will 
not, one has cause to question the descriptive appropriateness and the analytical 
usefulness of operating along and through such levels. 
To determine which of the four outcome-possibilities is the most convincing, the chapter 
is divided into four sections. First, it briefly revises the conception of state citizenship 
developed in chapter 2. In the process of doing so, it also reviews some of the key 
methodological issues at play. Second, the chapter summarizes the key tenets of 
European citizenship, both what it entails as well as who has access to it. Third, as done 
in the context of inside/outside and sovereignty, the chapter defines each of the four 
outcome-possibilities, this time in the context of citizenship and inclusion/exclusion. 
Fourth, informed by those options, it juxtaposes the tenets of state citizenship against the 
European form asking whether there is breakdown, maintenance, stratification, or 
blurring. It does so through an analysis of the formal rights components as well as the 
symbolic issues of belonging constitutive of EU citizenship. The chapter concludes by 
                                                
1 The terms “European citizenship,” “EU citizenship,” and “Union citizenship” are used interchangeably. 
Similarly, the terms “national citizens” and “state citizenship” are used interchangeably.  
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considering the jurisdictional outcomes of that finding. Together, it acts as an extension 
of and counterpart to the previous one, shifting the focus from politics to people. 
Citizenship revisited 
Prior to examining EU citizenship directly, it is useful to recall this study’s approach 
towards citizenship more generally and state citizenship specifically. In the first case, the 
study operates under Wiener’s conceptualized framework, defining citizenship as the 
relationship between an individual and a polity conditioned by a triad of variables – 
rights (civil, political, and social), access, and belonging. In looking at that conception, 
two sub-points are critical. First, if citizenship is the relationship between a polity and an 
individual, it is not necessarily state based – even if the state variety has been the most 
prominent. There is therefore nothing to conceptually prevent a non-state agent, like the 
EU, from developing its own version. Second, citizenship includes both a formal, rights 
based component as well as symbolic issues of belonging. Any analysis that does not 
account for both factors is incomplete. 
Given those points, in the second case, while technically open to any sort of polity, the 
state variety – state citizenship – has been the most prominent. As chapter 2 noted, it was 
a logical outshoot of the politically structuring and dividing effects of a sovereign setup. 
In that regard, state citizenship defines the relationship between an individual and a state. 
In this relationship, a citizen has the state’s full cadre of rights (civil, political, and 
social) based on his or her citizen-status. Moreover, the state possesses the sole authority 
to make access decisions; in deciding who has accesses and who fails to access their 
citizenship. Finally, all of that is rooted in a certain understanding of belonging – 
nationality (whether civically or ethnically based). Put together, insofar there are multiple 
states none of which has universal citizenship, state citizenship necessarily creates lines 
of inclusion/exclusion. The question is how European citizenship affects that state 
citizenship based, inclusion/exclusion dynamic.  
To be clear, the issues raised in this chapter relate only to the impact the development of 
EU citizenship has on the relationship between a Union citizen and a member-state other 
than his or her national one – the French/EU citizen in Britain or the Hungarian/EU 
citizen in Italy. While the EU increasingly occupies itself with third country national 
(TCN) issues, the focus is on Union citizens specifically as their relationship to the EU 
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and the member-states logically should be the most developed given that they are both 
actors’ core constituencies. Therefore, in the event of a blurring conclusion, one can be 
assured that it pertains to a population that ought to be considered the most “established” 
in the European system, not a group whose position is, a priori, less clear. 
To look at the possible changes, the chapter examines the formal and symbolic aspects of 
EU citizenship – again, the formal aspects dealing with civil, political, and social rights 
and the symbolic ones questions of belonging/identity. As one sees below, access to 
European citizenship itself is not included in the analysis insofar as determinations on it 
are fully state-based. Accordingly, one assumes from the outset that the individuals in 
question have EU citizenship. Where and when access considerations do become 
important is in the context of whether or not any given European citizen has equal access 
to a given member-state’s rights as compared to a national citizen. In that sense, 
questions of access ultimately underpin the entire rights based discussion. 
Methodologically, the focus for the formal sections is documentary evidence, largely the 
Union’s own rules up to and including Lisbon. For the symbolic questions, the chapter 
draws on public opinion polling, via Eurobarometer (EB) statistics, as well as the major 
theoretical debates from the literature. In either case, little concern is given to how EU 
citizenship arose or the intra/inter institutional debates underpinning its evolution. Nor 
does the chapter enter normative debates over the desirability of it. The concern is simply 
whether Union citizenship produces a breakdown, maintenance, stratification, or blurring 
of the ability to determine whether any EU citizen is considered included or excluded 
from any member-state other than their own. 
European citizenship  
Prior to going into the interpretive task of assessing the influences of European 
citizenship on inclusion/exclusion, it is necessary to provide its empirical content 
(Meehan, 1993; Wiener, 1998; Bellmay, 2004) (Table 7). To begin, the Commission’s 
Fourth Report on Citizenship states, “The importance of Union citizenship lies in the fact 
that Union citizens have genuine rights under Community law” (Com(2004)695: 4 
emphasis in original). EU citizenship therefore provides rights based on citizen-status, 
not economic activity or normative values. The Report goes on to cite that its substance 
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is found both formally, via four expressed treaty rights (originally A8, now A20), as well 
as through supplementary and applied privileges peppered throughout the acquis.  
Starting with formal rights, A20 has four linked privileges – freedom of 
movement/residency (A21); EU-wide participation in local and EP elections (A22); 
diplomatic and consular protection (A23); and a right of petition to the EP or EU 
Ombudsman (A24).2 While A20-A24 contains the privileges linked with the formation of 
EU citizenship, they are not the only elements. Guild notes, 
As the [Treaty on European Union] provides that citizens of the Union shall enjoy the 
rights conferred by the treaty there does not appear to be any reason why those rights 
are limited to those set out in Article 8 EC itself. Indeed, the wording clearly suggests 
that all rights conferred by the treaty, in whichever paper, are conferred on citizens of 
the Union (Guild, 1996: 31-32). 
In that regard, one can identify a number of applied privileges including, but not limited 
to, a right of response from the EU in one’s native language, a right to work in the EU 
civil service, gender equal pay, and consumer protections. Moreover, Article 18 formally 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality as applicable throughout the treaty, 
which includes Title X’s social policy chapter. Similarly, the ECJ has interpreted A20 as 
implying certain social protections (see below). Finally, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, brought into legal force under Lisbon, both restates A20-A24 as well as contains 
sections on dignity, freedom, solidarity, equality, and justice.  
Having outlined that content, the question moves to whom it applies; who accesses 
European citizenship. Formally speaking, A20 mandates that “every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union” (Lisbon 2008). Therefore, 
Union citizenship is a derivative of national citizenship and it is the prima facie decision 
of each member-state to determine their citizens. One must stress that member-states 
differ on domestic citizenship regulations. Nevertheless, the Commission 
(Com(2004)695: 5, emphasis in original) is clear that, “Union citizenship depends on 
national rules as regards acquiring and loss of citizenship”. When there have been 
conflicts, such as in the 1992 Micheletti case, the ECJ (cited in Shaw, 1997) has 
supported the mutual recognition position stating that, “It is not permissible for the 
legislation of a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of nationality of another 
Member State”. For those reasons, Closa (1995: 510) describes EU citizenship as “a 
                                                
2 As is noted below, A21, A23, and A24 are classified as civil rights and A22 as a political one. 
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derived condition of nationality” and Bauböck (2004: 220) likens it to Corinthian temple 
of separate national columns supporting a European roof. Implicit to all of this is that 
there are no EU-specific access rules. Access is contingent on naturalizing in one of the 
EU-27. By extension, member-state nationals are EU citizens regardless of their 
affections towards Europe.3  
Table 7 – European citizenship 
Individuals Member-state citizens 
Polity EU-sourced, member-state experienced 
Individual-polity 
relationship 
Rights A20-A24; Charter of Fundamental Rights; applied EU law 
Access Member-state nationals 
Belonging Member-state nationalities 
Citizenship options 
With that summary of EU citizenship as guidance, one can now outline the four 
outcome-possibilities. First, for breakdown, European citizenship would have to fully 
replace state citizenship as the critical inclusion factor amongst EU member-states. 
Member-states would no longer differentiate based on the national citizenship of Union 
citizens when it came to access to rights. Moreover, a general sense of common 
Europeanness would replace individual nationalisms throughout the Union. The EU 
citizen would be fully included throughout the member-states based on their EU citizen-
status, a fact underpinned by a sense of collective Europeanness.  
Second, on the flip side, for maintenance to work, EU citizenship would have not to 
significantly affect the relationship between member-states and non-national, EU citizens 
when it comes to either rights or belonging determinations. While there might be 
cosmetic changes, national exclusions would ultimately remain more pertinent and 
poignant. That being the case, as was true with inside/outside, maintenance and 
breakdown are effectively opposite sides of the same coin. They debate the size/scale of 
                                                
3 Belonging does become important when it comes to determining whether or not EU citizens are 
considered symbolically included or excluded throughout the member-states. The point here is simply that 
feelings towards Europe are not necessary to formally have EU citizenship. 
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the units constituting the inclusion/exclusion division, but not the possibility for drawing 
it or its binary quality. 
Third, for stratification to be the conclusion, one would have to see a distinct level of 
European inclusion forming. More specifically, one would see a level of European 
citizenship rights forming along side of, but distinct from, national citizenship ones. One 
would also have to see a level of Europeanness arising, but again one that would exist 
separately from national identities. Consequently, while this option would add nuance to 
inclusion/exclusion by predicting the formation of a specifically European level of 
inclusion when it came to both rights and belonging determinations, it would not affect 
the ability to locate individuals at some distinct layer more generally. As noted in the 
previous chapter with respect to political stratification, citizenship stratification would 
effectively account for the increased socio-political complexity produced by Union 
citizenship by inserting in a regional level of analysis between the existing domestic and 
international levels. It would not, therefore, fundamentally problematize the 
inclusion/exclusion separation. 
Finally, blurring reflects the most radical challenge and a wholesale transformation of the 
inclusion/exclusion separation coming out of state citizenship. For it to be the 
conclusion, one would have to see a rejection of dividable, containable, and boundable 
citizenship locations, and therein an inability to compartmentalize individuals into 
analytically neat positions based on either rights based or symbolic criteria. For rights, 
one would have to see European citizens simultaneously endowed and not endowed with 
the same rights of a national citizen. For belonging, one would have to see, to borrow 
Risse’s term, more as a “marble cake” identity construction than a “layer cake” one 
(Risse, 2002, 2010). Together, the effects of blurring problematize the 
inclusion/exclusion separation by rejecting the possibility for clearly dividable, 
containable, and boundable citizenship locations – formally or symbolically. 
To determine which of these options is the most convincing, the chapter undertakes a 
process identical to the one used in the previous chapter and in the context of 
inside/outside. It starts with arguments for and against the breakdown/maintenance pair. 
Having done that, it then progresses to the stratification/blurring couple. In doing this, 
one should note that the chapter considers the formal and symbolic aspects of EU 
citizenship separately, starting with the former and moving to the latter. It does this 
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simply for clarity’s sake. Taken together, the sections progress through the various 
options across the formal and symbolic aspects and dynamics of EU citizenship to 
inductively reach a conclusion. 
Table 8 – Outcome-possibilities - inclusion/exclusion 
Breakdown 
European citizens have the same rights a national citizens throughout the member-
states; there are no nationality-based right differentiations for EU citizens; 
Europeanness replaces nationality in issues of belonging; a new European/non-
European inclusion/exclusion division forms 
Maintenance EU citizenship fails to significantly affect the relationship between member-states and 
non-national EU citizens; national/non-national divisions remains 
Stratification 
European rights exist alongside, but separate from, national ones; Europeanness 
forms, but is distinct from nationality; a distinctly level of European inclusion arises; 
an included(state)/excluded(non-state), included(European)/excluded(non-European) 
separation forms 
Blurring 
Wholesale problematizing of the inclusion/exclusion separation; rejection of 
dividable, containable, and boundable citizenship locations; inability to 
compartmentalize individuals into analytically neat locations based along either 
formal or symbolic criteria 
Breakdown/maintenance – formal 
Looking at formal structures in the context of breakdown/maintenance, there are prima 
facie reasons to support each side’s underlying tenets. Beginning with breakdown, civil 
rights, and A21 specifically, Shaw (1997, 2002) argues that including freedom of 
movement/residency into A20 disassociated it from the economic logic of the single 
market and recast it as a civil right. Thus, whereas previously freedom of 
movement/residency was a precondition for economic integration, the Treaty on 
European Union legalized it as an expressed privilege of Union citizenship. If A21 is the 
right’s broadest formulation, Directive 2004/38 defines its execution. It establishes, 
among other things, that Union citizens, by virtue of that citizenship, are free to move, 
work, travel, study, or reside throughout the EU-27 without substantial hindrances. For 
example, a EU citizen may live in any member-state for up to three months with the only 
condition being the possession of a valid identity card or passport. Should a EU citizen 
wish to reside for longer than that, he or she is free to do so, however faces certain status-
based rules. Nevertheless, as the Directive makes clear, in all cases A21 is an un-
qualified privilege such that “The fundamental and personal right of residence in another 
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Member State is conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty and is not dependent 
upon having fulfilled administrative procedures”.  
Given all that, there is cause to think that A21 breaks down state-based 
movement/residency privileges by de-linking them from state citizenship status. For 
instance, Soysal (1994, 1996) argues that because Union citizens are free to move, reside, 
study, and work throughout the EU without needing visas or work-permits, A21 
effectively negates the relationship between national territory and citizenship. She 
(1996:19) writes, “EU citizenship itself breaches the link between the status attached to 
citizenship and national territory, by conferring rights which are not necessarily located 
in a bounded nation-state”. Extending on and further supporting Soysal’s contention, 
Marko (1998: 369) writes that under A21, “It is no longer [the member-states’] ultimate 
power or ‘sovereign’ right to decide freely who is allowed to enter their territory and to 
stay there”. Indeed, as evidence of the real-world impacts of A21, a 2010 EB report 
(#294) found that 89 percent of respondents knew about their A21 rights with eight 
million EU citizens and their families residing in member-states other than their own and 
millions more travelling without hindrances. Therefore, based on those numbers, the 
legal-conceptual points noted by Soysal and Marko find real-world support. 
Second, breakdown also finds support from A23’s provisions.4 It provides that, 
Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by 
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same condition as the 
nationals of that States. Member State shall establish the necessary rules among 
themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection 
(Lisbon 2008). 
That being its broadest formulation, Decision 1995/553 operationalizes the right. Article 
5, Section 1 of it lists assistance possibilities in cases of death, serious accident, illness, 
arrest or dentition, victims of violent crime, and repatriation. Furthermore, Section 2 
states that, “The diplomatic representatives or consular agents serving in a non-member 
State may…come to the assistance of any citizen of the Union who so requests it in other 
circumstances”, thereby leaving the door open for aid not expressly noted in Section 1. 
Putting that all into context, a 2006 Commission Green Paper (Com(2006)712) noted that 
                                                
4 Following Stein (2002: 282), A23 is classified as a civil right. “[A23] contains a civil right, the content of 
which as well as its respect and application in a given case might be decided upon by the Court of Justice”. 
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the then EU-25 were uniformly represented only in three states – the US, China, and 
Russia. Moreover, a 2007 memo (Com(2007)767) stated that there are 10 countries in 
which no member-state is represented and 17 with only one, including popular tourism 
destinations like the Bahamas, Barbados and the Maldives. As those numbers reflect, and 
as Stavridis and Thouez (2001: 166) point out, A23 appears to be “potentially a right 
worth having”. 
With that background, as was the case with A21, there are again reasons for believing 
that A23 removes member-state nationality as a relevant factor in diplomatic and 
consular assistance decisions. For instance, Decision 1995/553 clearly states that, 
“Diplomatic and consular representatives which give protection shall treat a person 
seeking help as if he were a national of the Member State which they represent” 
(emphasis added). Laying-out how that might work, Geyer challenges one to,  
Imagine you are spending a pleasant summer vacation at a beach resort on some 
Caribbean island and you suddenly realize that your passport, credit cards and all 
your cash is gone…Imagine that in [this] case your home country does not have 
diplomatic or consular representation…At least in theory there should not be reason 
for despair as every EU citizen has the right to be protected by the diplomatic and 
consular authorities of all the EU member states (Geyer, 2007: 1, emphasis added). 
Thus, the underlying point Geyer is making is that the Hungarian/EU citizen in Jamaica – 
where Budapest is not represented – in need of diplomatic or consular assistance is free 
to go to the German embassy – which is represented in Kingston – and be treated as if he 
or she were a German national. In such a situation, the relationship between the German 
embassy and the Hungarian/EU citizen would, at least according to A23/Decision 
1995/553, be one of full access and full inclusion. The statist inclusion/exclusion divide 
would effectively breakdown as the Hungarian/EU citizen, based specifically on his or 
her EU citizen-status, would gain equivalent standing as the German national. 
Third, and last for the expressed civil rights, A24 grants EU citizens a right of petition to 
the EP or EU Ombudsman. More specifically, it gives individuals the right to lobby the 
EP on issues of general need, to make grievances, or to request clarifications on positions 
of public interest. Furthermore, it allows one to complain to the Ombudsman over issues 
of maladministration by Union institutions, apart from the ECJ. To be clear, unlike A21 
and A23, which are reserved specifically for Union citizens, A227 and A228 of Lisbon 
grant anyone legally residing or having an office in the Union’s territory petition 
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privileges. Therefore, there are no nationality-based restrictions such that, in its limited 
context, it appears to be a fully post-national privilege. 
Having discussed civil rights and breakdown, one can turn political ones. A22 states, 
Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national 
shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the 
Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that 
State (Lisbon 2008, emphasis added). 
In laying that right out, it is important to note that because political participation is often 
viewed as the critical factor in forging ties between individuals and their governments, to 
the extent that A22 truly alters traditional state provisions regarding political rights, it 
would be a highly significant departure from the norm and a major challenge to the state-
based inclusion/exclusion binary (Linklater 1998a, 1998b). And, there is evidence that 
exactly such a scenario is occurring.  
On the most basic level, A22 mandates that local and EP participation rights must be 
granted to European citizens “under the same conditions as nationals of that State” 
(Lisbon 2008) On a more applied level, in operationalizing local participation 
specifically, Directive 1994/80 continually establishes equivalencies between the rules 
governing national and EU citizens.5 Article 8, Section 2 of the Directive states that, “In 
order to have his name entered on the electoral roll, a voter…shall produce the same 
documents as a voter who is a national” (emphasis added). To similar effect, Article 4, 
Section 2 establishes that if a member-states’ rules mandate that “its own national may 
vote or stand as candidates only in the basic local government unit in which they have 
their principle residence…[EU] citizens’ shall also be subject to this condition”. As both 
those sections make clear, member-states cannot establish different local participation 
rules for nationals and Europeans.6 The Hungarian/EU citizen living in France is subject 
to the same rules for voting and running in local elections as the French national.  
                                                
5 The focus is on local participation as they deal directly with domestic communities. While not denying 
the importance of EP rights, they do not have the saliency of domestic elections insofar as they are “not 
seen as engaging in a direct way with how [people] govern themselves” (Shaw, 2002: 15) 
6 As a comparison, member-states have granted participation rights to non-national, non-Europeans. 
However, when and where they do so, they generally have not created an equivalency between the rights of 
the non-citizen and the national. Non-Europeans requirements “go beyond the normal conditions for their 
own nationals” (Geyer, 2007: 7).  
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Again, it should be stressed that if political participation is the core method of linking 
individuals to their governments, then A22 represents a radical break from the state 
citizenship-sourced political rights perceptive highlighted earlier. Moreover, because 
local politics are often the most visible in the lives of voters, dealing with things such as 
trash collection, parks, and road conditions, the right is far from window-dressing. By 
incorporating Union citizens into the local decision-making processes of member-states 
on an equal basis as nationals, A22 appears to breakdown the state citizenship based 
inclusion/exclusion structure in a highly significant way. 
Having examined civil and political rights, one can turn to social ones. On the one hand, 
social rights are not formally expressed in the context of A21-A24. On the other hand, as 
Guild (1997) made clear, there is no reason to think EU citizenship rights are limited to 
those articles alone. In that regard, social rights can be found in a combination of treaty 
provisions, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and applied EU law (Hix, 2005: 256; 
Chalmers, 2007: 597-603). For instance, by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
nationality as applicable throughout the treaty, A18 guarantees rights including, but not 
limited to, equal access to schooling, housing, and social security. Moreover, the Charter 
states commitments to a similar set of values, again ranging from education to personal 
dignity. Finally, Leibfried notes the importance of applied EU law. 
Lost amidst the noisy fights over the Social Charter and the Social Protocol has been 
the quiet accumulation of EU constraints on social policy connected with market 
integration. The last four decades have witnessed a gradual, if incremental, expansion 
of EU-generated rights, and especially, court decisions that have seriously eroded the 
sovereignties of the national welfare-state and have overlaid European welfare-states 
with a new mobility-driven and competition-friendly regime (Leibfried, 2005: 256). 
Put together, despite not formally being included in the context of A20 rights, it is clear 
that the EU has dealt with the social rights of its citizens. Indeed, from those contexts, 
Chalmers (2007: 597) goes so far as to write that, “The effects of EU citizenship have 
been felt most dramatically in the field of social rights”. 
With that in mind, there again is evidence of breakdown. For instance, in the context of 
A18’s non-discrimination provisions, A153 places workers’ health and safety within the 
EU’s competencies and framing Directive 1989/391 operationalizes practical 
coordination. Thus, employers must adhere to certain safety standards for their workers 
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regardless of those workers’ nationality.7 To similar effect, and again in A18’s context, 
A153 grants the Union coordinating powers over certain aspects of national social 
security regimes and Regulation 1971/1408 operationalizes practical coordination.8 Thus, 
member-states cannot nationally discriminate when it comes to sickness or maternity 
leave, invalidity, pensions, survivors’ care, occupational injuries, unemployment, family 
benefits, and/or death grants. While in all cases member-states retain formal control over 
their national social security schemes, they must respect the principle of equal treatment 
regardless of nationality in the application of them.9  
EU citizen residents in another Member State are entitled to a range of social benefits 
on the same basis as a state’s own nationals…includ[ing] substance allowances, 
allowances facilitating access to the employment market and tax breaks (Chalmers, 
2007: 590). 
For the German doctor or the Spanish foreman it matters little if their patients or 
employees are German or Spanish, French or Greek. They must treat each equally 
because of their EU citizen-status.10 
When viewed across the civil, political, and social fields, there clearly is evidence of a 
breakdown of state-based inclusion/exclusion. There is evidence that member-state 
nationality ceases to be an important factor in the allocation of certain core civil, 
political, and social rights. That being the case, one is tempted to conclude that a new, 
European/non-European division forms based around EU citizenship (the assumption 
being that there is a non-European division).11 Nevertheless, and as one might have 
predicted given the argument offered in the previous chapter, while the story just told is 
accurate in and of itself, it is also incomplete. It highlights the aspects of EU citizenship 
that support breakdown at the expensive of alternative points and alternative readings. 
Consequently, and when viewed from those alternative perspectives, just as there were 
                                                
7 These rules establish minimums. While that may lead to a race to the bottom, they are nationally neutral. 
8 Regulation 2009/120 updated 1971/1408 to ensure more efficient operations. 
9 In other words, while EU citizens have equal access, the Union does not create a single assurance 
scheme. Johnson (2005: 202) notes, “A severed limb does not result in equal compensation in France and 
Greece”. Nevertheless, whatever the compensation in each state is, it must be the same for all workers. 
10 The examples provided are not exhaustive and are offered merely to establish that across a host of core 
social rights areas EU rules appear to disassociate allocation from nationality. 
11 While this study does not, one could also challenge breakdown due to the fact that TCNs increasingly 
are gaining analogous rights as EU citizens. That would negate the EU/non-EU division. 
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prima facie reasons for supporting breakdown, there are also prima facie reasons for 
arguing against it and supporting maintenance.  
Returning to A21, it is clear that EU citizens gain a large degree of movement inclusion 
rights. Indeed, the very idea of a mobility of labor is a center-point of the Union’s ethos. 
Nevertheless, and without denying that such privileges have opened up, national 
differentiations remain. For instance, Directive 2004/38 mandates that students looking 
to study in member-states other than their own for longer than three months must prove 
comprehensive health insurance as well as sufficient resources so to not become a burden 
on the assistance systems of the host member-state. Similarly, member-states retain the 
right to restrict movement based on public policy, security, or health concerns. Indeed, 
both Italy and Finland have rules on the books regarding the expulsion of EU citizens 
who commit crimes of a certain gravity (Com(2008)840/3: 8). While the ECJ has been 
clear that resources violations alone do not allow for deportation and that heath and 
security restrictions must be proportional and individually applied, the possibility for 
national discrimination cannot be ignored – irrespective of how ineffectual they may be. 
Member-states can still exclude EU citizens based on their member-state nationality. 
In addition to those possible derogation issues, there are also transposition problems. A 
2008 Commission report (Com(2008)840/3: 6) found that, “The overall transposition of 
Directive 2004/38/EC [A21’s key directive] is rather disappointing. Not one Member 
State has transposed the Directive effectively and correctly in its entirely”. The report 
then goes on to state that 12 member-states transposed the “sufficient resources” clause 
“incorrectly or ambiguously” – critical insofar as it is one of the admittedly few 
rationales that a state might cite as justification for the exclusion of an EU citizen. 
Indeed, insofar member-states are left to interpret the clause individually, it is hard to 
argue that it impacts inclusion/exclusion consistently throughout the EU sphere. It 
therefore also is hard to argue that A21 breaks down nationality-based 
movement/residency provisions. 
Turning to A23, on the surface breakdown again appeared to be a logical argument. 
However, it too encounters serious problems on a deeper reading. To start, Geyer (2007: 
4) notes that, “Nothing is more disillusioning than a right that only exists on paper [and] 
does not materialize when it is needed most”. Under that logic, breakdown fails in its 
relationship with international law. Under the principle of pacta tertii nec nocent nec 
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prosunt as well as Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties 
are binding only to the parties subject to them (Dugard, 2006). Non-EU states have no 
obligation to respect EU provisions, which is, understandably, particularly important in 
the context of exercising diplomatic and/or consular protections. Dugard writes, 
Third States are not bound to respect any of the provisions contained in treaties and 
conventions in force within the European Union and are not obliged – and with 
respect to diplomatic protection are unlikely – to accept protections by States that are 
not the State of nationality of an individual EU citizen. A “citizen” of the European 
Union is not a national of all member States of the European Union, which means that 
European Union citizenship does not fulfill the requirement of nationality for the 
purpose of diplomatic protection (Dugard, 2006: 10). 
In that context, because under international law diplomatic protection, as distinct from 
consular assistance, applies only between a state and its nationals, state citizenship is the 
critical qualifier. It is by virtue of nationality alone that diplomatic protection can be 
exercised (Künzli, 2006: 88).12 Therefore, there is no guarantee that a third-party would 
recognize A23. While the article cites the need to start the negotiations with third parties 
to secure the privilege, a Commission report notes that neither all the member-states 
individually nor the Union as a whole has completed that process (Com(2006)712: 12).13 
There are certain nuances to all of this. First, while consular assistance is normally 
extended only to co-nationals, international law does not explicitly prohibit its extension 
to non-nationals (Künzli, 2006). Therefore, member-state embassies could offer aid, and 
third parties might accept it, on a case-by-case basis. The problem remains, however, that 
consular assistance does not cover the most serious needs, such that diplomatic 
protection may be required but not necessarily available. Second, the Vienna Convention 
of Diplomatic Relations does permit states to entrust diplomatic protection powers to a 
third party as a “protecting power”, provided the receiving state accepts such a decision. 
While A23 might be seen as establishing exactly such a mandate across the entirety of 
                                                
12  Diplomatic protection is generally considered to involve judicial proceedings whereas consular 
assistance is thought to involve “interventions outside the judicial process” (e.g. visas, passports, 
repatriation) (Künzli, 2006: 68). 
13 An updated 2011 Commission report (Com(2011)149: 7) reinterred this general point noting that, 
“Under international law, the consular protection of a citizen by another State requires the consent of the 
receiving State”. It went on to note that the Commission has been encouraging member-states to “include a 
consent clause in future bilateral agreements with third countries, i.e. a clause providing for the agreement 
of a third State that the consular and diplomatic authorities of a represented Member State can provide 
protection to nationals of unrepresented Member States under the same conditions as to its own nationals. 
The Commission - taking due account of the specificity of each negotiation - proposed to include a consent 
clause in mixed agreements with certain third countries. Negotiations are ongoing”.  
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the EU-27, that authorization would still require third party acceptance – something, as 
already noted, that is currently lacking. Therefore, A23 still appears to reflect more an 
instance of maintenance than breakdown. 
Turning to A24, the study accepts that because it is universal and lacks any significant 
derogation possibilities, it is a post-national right that breaks down state-based 
inclusion/exclusion lines. That being said, three things limit its overall impact. First, 
citizenship is more than a single right and A24’s inclusiveness must be weighed against 
wider relationships – A21-A23, social rights, and symbolic issues (two of which have 
already illustrated a failure of breakdown). Second, Gregory and Giddings (2001: 78) 
note that the Ombudsman is “not able to intervene to protect Union citizenship rights 
against the actions or inactions of Member States”. Therefore, whereas A21 affects 
member-states directly, A24 is EU-based, EU-generated, and EU-executed. It may negate 
nationality as relevant with respect to its provisions, however because they are limited to 
EU devices, the impacts on the member-states directly are slight. Finally, and most 
simply, Monar (1998: 178) wryly makes clear that A24’s provisions are “certainly not 
the most important [EU citizen rights]”.  
Moving to political rights, breakdown again presented a logical argument and there was 
support for its overall outlook. Nevertheless, when compared to the political rights of 
nationals, Europeans still face significant exclusions. First, A22 applies only to local and 
EP elections.14 The Union citizen who has lived in another member-state for decades 
remains excluded from national participation. Second, A22’s execution contains a host of 
nationality-based derogation possibilities. For instance, Article 5, Section 3 of Directive 
1994/80 stipulates that member-states can specify that only national citizens be electable 
to head local units of government. Similarly, Article 12, Section 1 permits limiting EU 
citizen voting rights if the proportion of non-nationals in a given unit exceeds 20 
percent.15 To be sure, such limitations may be necessary “to ensure that the ‘traditional 
political balance’…is not upset” (O’Leary, 1996: 57). However, that should not detract 
from their exclusionary effects and, as O’Leary (1996: 57) notes, may ultimately “defeat 
the purpose of extending the franchise in the first place”. Thus, irrespective of how minor 
                                                
14 There may be good political theoretical reasons for excluding national rights (see below), however 
because as A22 prevents full political participation for European citizens, state-based exclusions remain. 
15 Luxembourg uses the 20 percent derogation as its proportion of non-national, EU citizens is greater than 
35 percent (Com(2005)382). 
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the limitations are – or, put differently, irrespective of how natural nationality-based 
political exclusions seem – their existence illustrates their relevance and a failure to 
negate state citizenship as a relevant factor in inclusion/exclusion decisions. 
Finally, as with civil and political rights, social rights also do not necessarily reflect 
breakdown. First, Chalmers (2007: 598) notes that national non-discrimination is not as 
“straightforward” as it may seem. 
[While] the Court has ruled that EU citizens claim social assistance on the same basis 
as a state’s own nationals...we have [also] seen that the non-discrimination principle 
does not grant EU citizens the same political rights as a state’s own nationals. They 
cannot vote in national elections or carry out certain politically sensitive activities 
(Chalmers 2007: 598). 
In other words, while non-national, social rights may expand under A18, that does not 
negate the importance of state citizenship across other variables – again, some of which 
have already been showed to problematize the breakdown argument. 
Second, Faist notes that while the EU has competencies over some social policy issues, it 
lacks them in other, often very significant, areas such as redistributive programs (Faist 
2001). Moreover, and for Faist most critically, the EU generally lacks full competencies 
in those areas thought to require the strong communal bonds provided by 
nationality/state citizenship. He writes, 
Morally demanding social rights, for example those involving redistribution of funds, 
require support by strong social and symbolic ties of generalized reciprocity and 
diffused solidarity. Such ties are usually limited to collectives which are much 
narrower than the category of “European people”…[G]enerational reciprocity in 
pension systems does not reach from Finland to Portugal (Faist, 2001: 46). 
To be clear, Faist is not saying that member-states do nationally discriminate over such 
matters (A18 largely prevents that). Rather, he is pointing out that the reluctance to fully 
upload issues requiring strong communal bonds fully to the European level reflects, in 
the simplest sense, a lack of Union competencies and, in a deeper one, a lack of 
European solidarity. And that echoes the sustained importance of state-based 
inclusion/exclusion divisions (also symbolic sections below). 
Piecing this together, there clearly are problems with the breakdown argument. 
Therefore, and as was the case with inside/outside and sovereignty, one is tempted to 
draw the completely opposite conclusion and contend that because the 
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inclusion/exclusion divide linked to state citizenship does not breakdown, it is 
maintained. Indeed, many of the problems with breakdown pointed in that direction. 
Were one to take this tactic, and again as was that case in the previous chapter, one might 
be tempted to compile a ledger to determine which side the debate leans further to – one 
point for breakdown insofar as a right its granted fully to European citizens throughout 
the member-states and one for maintenance each time national differentiations remain. 
The problem is, insofar as one needs a ledger at all, neither breakdown nor maintenance 
applies completely. While each outcome-possibility remains analytically coherent and, in 
isolation, the points made under each option remain valid, when put together the conflicts 
between them – the support for each in certain circumstances as well as the problems for 
each other circumstances – means that neither fully fits. Accordingly, rather than using 
the ledger’s logic of generality, it seems sensible to ask whether an alternative method of 
conceptualization might altogether fit better. In opening that door, the question becomes 
whether stratification’s connotations of clarity or blurring’s of haziness better reflects the 
impact of EU citizenship on the state citizenship based inclusion/exclusion binary. 
Stratification/blurring – formal 
One can begin with the arguments for stratification. In the most general sense, 
stratification attempts to overcome the conceptual difficulties inherent to the either/or 
nature of breakdown/maintenance by reframing the issue entirely, arguing that EU 
citizenship produces, and inserts, a quintessentially and distinctively European level of 
European rights to the inclusion/exclusion relationship. Setting the stage Monar writes, 
It seems perfectly possible to have a EU citizenship co-existing with national 
citizenship. Both parts of this ‘dual citizenship’ are to be related to different levels of 
public authority and each fulfills the function of establishing and maintaining a 
relationship of rights, duties, and political participation (Monar, 1998: 175). 
What Monar is effectively arguing is that national and Union citizenships are 
interlocking and layered, not conflicting and competing. One can apply that argument 
jointly across A21-A23 and social rights. A24 is excluded from the analysis as the study 
accepts that it is a post-national privilege. In doing so, one finds support for such a 
layered/stratified framing. 
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First, the Union itself has consistently stressed that the purpose of EU citizenship is not 
to replace member-state citizenship, but to compliment it. Indeed, De Waele (2011: 193) 
notes that by defining European citizenship as “additional” to the state variant, Lisbon 
illustrates its additive, non-competing, nature. Second, A21, A22, A23 as well as social 
protections only kick-in in very specific circumstances – when an EU citizen wants to 
travel/work/study/reside throughout the EU-27; when a person lives outside his or her 
national state and wants to vote in/stand for a local/EP election; when a citizen is in a 
non-EU state without national representation; or when a person is living/working abroad. 
In each case, because each right only activates under very specific, normally moment-
based, conditions, each might be considered more remedial than primary. In other words, 
it would be nonsensical to compare the civil, political, and/or social rights of the 
French/EU citizen in London with the British national in Liverpool. They each reflect a 
fundamentally different individual-polity relationship. 
From this point of view, Union citizenship does not so much replace state citizenship as 
it plugs national coverage gaps. There are civil, political, and social rights between states 
and their nationals based on state citizenship, different civil, political, and social rights 
between member-states and Europeans based on EU citizenship and, presumably, yet still 
other civil, political, and social rights for non-national, non-European based on different, 
non-citizenship-based rules.16 In this setup, each individual-polity connection defines a 
different empirical relationship and therefore each operates along its own distinct 
analytical level – one between a national citizen and their nation-state, another between a 
European citizen and a member-state with the EU as interlocutor, and another between a 
non-national, non-European and any European state. Consequently, there is an 
included(state)/excluded(state), included(European)/excluded(non-European) divide 
when it comes to rights based classifications. While this adds nuance to 
inclusion/exclusion by overcoming its either/or nature, it does not prevent one from 
locating individuals at some defined level. The ability to make inclusion/exclusion 
determinations remains. It is simply more complicated. 
It should be stressed that the stratification argument is an improvement over the 
breakdown/maintenance binary insofar as it allows for the increases in socio-political 
complexity coming out of integration. The difficulty is, however, that it faces its own 
                                                
16 One could add more levels, however as noted the numbers of layers is less important than the argument. 
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problems, the combination of which makes blurring the better option. Accordingly, 
arguing that A21-A23 and social rights only kick-in in limited circumstances, and 
therefore do not replicate the state-national relationship, misses the issue entirely. The 
question is when those rights do kick-in, how do they affect inclusion/exclusion? And, in 
those situations, treating EU and state citizens as somehow on different “levels” is 
simply not reflective of reality.  
For example, while A21 certainly is EU-generated, its execution occurs within the 
member-states directly, not some hypothetical “European movement realm”. As such, it 
produces on-the-ground social effects that are not easily glossed over by rhetoric of 
“stratification”. One need only consider British fears of Polish plumbers flooding the UK 
during Warsaw’s accession talks as emblematic of the deep, communal emotions 
involved.17 To stress, the right may be European, however because individual national 
communities are left to deal with it in completely unmediated ways, whether via influxes 
of new cultures, people, or ways of life, a real-world understanding of it makes it seem a 
whole lot less “secondary” or “remedial” in nature.  
A similar effect occurs across the other EU rights. When A22 is drawn-on, it influences 
member-states and their local communities directly. The foundation of the democratic 
method is one person, one vote, and that each vote counts equally. As such, when 
Europeans politically participate in member-states other than their own, there is no 
difference between their vote and that of a national – a fact that is hard to square with a 
language and logic of “stratification”. When it comes to marking a ballot, A22 does not 
create layers of inclusions with Euro half votes and national full ones. Each has equal 
voice, equal say, and equal influence. Furthermore, stratification fails to realize that 
when European social protections exist, national non-discrimination principles apply. 
European’s do not exist in a “better-than-foreigner-but-not-quite-national” position. 
Finally, while A23 only kicks-in in certain circumstances, and despite the practical 
problems associated with its implementation, it is based on the idea of national non-
                                                
17 This is a caricature, however it does illustrate the on-the-ground impacts of EU citizenship rights. It 
reflects the fact that action is occurring within national communities. 
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discrimination. There are not separate national and European lines. There is a single line 
for national and EU citizens.18 
Put together, the problems with stratification lead to a blurring conclusion. To be clear 
from the outset, blurring does not mean that it is impossible to determine when a EU 
citizen has or does not have a certain privilege. It simply reflects a scenario in which the 
overall relationship between a EU citizen and a member-state other than his or her own is 
not one of full inclusion, full exclusion, or a neatly separable layer of European-
inclusion. The complexity inherent to EU citizenship and access to national rights 
contained therein effectively places Union citizens into an ambiguous grey-zone between 
competing conceptual models; it places them between the particularism characteristic of 
state citizenship and the more universal aspirations of a fully post-national form of 
European citizenship. Thus, whether in terms of civil, political, or social rights, European 
citizens are not quite included, but also not quite excluded in member-states other than 
their own. Going back to a point O’Leary (1996) made in the context of political rights, 
placing EU citizens into such an ambiguous grey-zone may be necessary to ensure that 
the traditional national prerogatives are not fully done away with, however it should also 
not distract and does not detract from the fact that full inclusion has not been achieved. 
To be sure, none of this ought to be altogether unexpected. On the one hand, the EU has 
always acknowledged the vitality of the classical-defined political community and, with 
it, state citizenship – just as maintenance noted. On the other hand, through its actions it 
has also continually attempted to lesson many of the exclusionary effects of state 
citizenship and build a community writ-large – just as breakdown noted. And, despite 
attempting to walk the fine line between each of those opposing models, the real-world 
applications of EU citizenship make a stratification argument appear, at best, 
disingenuous and, at worst, outright wrong. Therefore, while in a wholly state-based or 
wholly post-national European system a person would be clearly and cleanly included or 
excluded based on either their national or European status, in the EU system such clean 
and clear divisions are not possible. European citizens effectively slip between 
competing conceptual models. When it comes to civil, political, and social rights, 
                                                
18 In these cases, were the EU ensuring rights created by, sourced to, and fulfilled by the Union specifically 
(e.g. like petition to rights against EU institutions), stratification might be more convincing. However, 
because the rights granted through Union citizenship are state created, sourced, and fulfilled, a language of 
stratification seems disingenuous.  
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whether any Union citizen is included or excluded in any member-state other than their 
own is clearly unclear.  
Breakdown/maintenance - symbolic 
Having examined the impacts of EU citizenship on inclusion/exclusion in the context of 
formal structures one can now turn to the symbolic ones.19 On the one hand, symbolic 
issues may seem unimportant given that access to European citizenship is an automatic 
derivative of member-state nationality. Affections towards Europe do not come into play. 
On the other hand, symbolic issues are critical towards determining whether non-national 
identifications are forming. Therefore, while the statist framework made nationality the 
critical representation of symbolic identification, in the European context the question is 
whether a sense of Europeanness is forming and, if it is, whether it affects a breakdown, 
maintenance, stratification, or blurring of nationally-based inclusion/exclusion. 
As was the case with rights, there are reasons to believe that a European consciousness 
exists and that it might break down nationality as the critical source of symbolic 
inclusion. On the most basic level, European states have never been fully cloistered units 
having long held certain self-understandings that they share certain commonalities –
whatever those commonalities end up being. Pagden (2002: 3) writes, “That there exists 
such a place as Europe has been evident to those who inhabit it since the fourth century 
BCE if not earlier”. He goes on, 
Europeans have persistently described themselves, usually when faced with cultures 
they found indescribably alien, to be not merely British or German or Spanish but 
also European: “we are Europeans” (nos Europai), as the English philosopher Francis 
Bacon said in 1623 (Pagden, 2002: 33). 
Of course, saying all that risks charges of esotericism insofar as it never directly 
addresses the exact nature of Euro-commonalities; for example, it never deals with 
whether they were/are culturally, politically, geographically, or religiously based. 
Nevertheless, acknowledging the long-held belief that some sort of Europeanness exists 
does help contextualize modern change. Therefore, leaving aside for the moment what 
                                                
19 European identity is treated as contemporaneous with EU membership. While the two are not necessarily 
the same, Laffan (2004: 75-76) notes that the EU has increasingly taken-over the role as identity-builder. 
“Identity building has been fostered by membership, the external projection of an EU identity, the 
appropriation by the EU of the concept of ‘Europe’, and the cement provided by the founded values and 
the addition of EU symbols to Europe’s forest of symbols”. 
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Europeanness actually is, the contention under breakdown is that as it grows it will 
breakdown national forms, replacing them  with a single European consciousness (Haas, 
1958: 16).20   
To be clear, there is nothing wrong with arguing that Europeanness might replace 
nationality as the basis of community. Indeed, it has become commonplace to recognize 
that modern “patterns of inclusion and exclusion we now take for granted are historical 
innovations” such that nations are historical inventions that need not always be (Walker, 
1993: 179). Similarly, Rosenau’s (1990: 228) notes that individuals are “habdaptive 
actors” – a combination of rationalism and habit – capable of learning and adapting, 
whether due to “startling new” stimuli or the development of new skills. They are not 
locked into existing nationalisms. It is therefore reasonable to theorize that a common 
sense of Europeanness might grow and replace nationality-based sources of belonging. 
Indeed, as is developed empirically below, there is strong evidence that feelings of 
Europeanness exist in and throughout modern Europe. 
The difficulty is, however, that such a vision – the replacement of individual nationalities 
with a common Europeanness – “cannot be [fully] realized as long as national identity is 
made central to the political community” (Linklater, 1998b: 200). In other words, so long 
as nationality as a concept remains powerful and poignant, it will be hard for 
Europeanness to completely replace it/to break it down. And, in a practical sense, 
because nationality has proven to be so durable and sticky throughout Europe, it has also 
proven highly resistant to full-fledged European replacement. Indeed, from a conceptual 
standpoint, Rosenau (1990: 210) dovetails his previous point on habdaptive actors noting 
that while people certainly are capable of change, they can nevertheless also “be quite 
ridged and resistance to new patterns”. 
To illustrate the argument being made, and while recognizing that some sense of 
Europeanness exists, there is nonetheless widespread agreement and evidence that its 
development has not come by way of the displacement of nationality. For example, EB 
polling reveals that national identity consistently trumps Europeanness. Across an 18 
year period (1992-2010), when those surveyed where asked whether they saw themselves 
                                                
20 Haas’ arguments were largely elite-based, however his, and neo-functionalist thinking more generally, 
assumed elite spillover would prompt wider acceptance.  
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as “European only”, “European and nationality”, “nationality and European”, or 
“nationality only”, on average, 45 percent viewed their identity as “nationality and 
Europe” and 41 percent as “nationality only”. Juxtaposed against that, on average, only 7 
percent viewed themselves as “European and nationality” and only 4 percent as 
“European only”. Indeed, levels of “European only” never went above 7 percent for any 
one year and levels of “nationality only” never fell below 33 percent. As those statistics 
make clear, there is hardly a breakdown of nationality in favor of Europeanness. In that 
sense, Citrin and Sides (2004: 182) are correct that, “If a European identity means that an 
Englishman feels equally at home in London and Warsaw and an Italian equally at home 
in Rome and Frankfurt, its gestation period is bound to be long”. 
Table 9 – Degrees of Europeanness  
 
           (Source: Eurobarometer) 
In dismissing breakdown, it would be easy to conclude that because nationality remains 
powerful, Europe remains divided by them – maintenance. However, that argument 
immediately also fails on conceptual and empirical grounds. On the conceptual level, it 
fails to consider the complexity of identities and the possibility for multiple loyalties 
(Walzer, 1994; Risse, 2004, 2010; Rumford, 2008). Risse (2010: 29) notes that, “It is no 
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were ever as clear-cut as the either/or imagery of inclusion/exclusion implies is 
altogether problematic. Societies, and the individuals populating them, are hardly ever 
homogenous, cloistered units. People are complex entities capable of holding a variety of 
intertwining identities. A woman can be a mother, a leader of a company, a flag-draped 
spectator at a football match, and a European-minded, European citizen all at once. 
Moreover, none of those various identities are banal; people have faith in all of them. 
Thus, when viewing the world, people tend not to see their nationality and “the rest,” but 
gradations. People have, and are, pluralities of identities.  
On an empirical level, one sees that conceptual logic play-out with national identities and 
Europeanness co-existing. Returning to the data cited above, while it is clear that 
Europeanness does not replace nationality, it is also clear that some sense of 
Europeanness exists. For instance, a clear majority of those surveyed – 56 percent – 
viewed themselves as at least partially European (the preponderance being in the 
“nationality and European” category). Indeed, “nationality and European” was, on 
average, higher than “nationality only” (45 percent to 41 percent). It also registered the 
highest individual high – 49 percent against 46 for “nationality only”. To that, one might 
add a 2008 survey that found that when asked if it was easier to see values common to 
Europe as opposed to other continents, a full 60 percent agreed with that sentiment with 
only 22 percent disagreeing. Simply put, a clear majority recognized that, despite their 
national differences, some sort of common European character exists (EB69 2008).21 All 
told, the conceptual arguments and empirical findings both point to a position in which 
people are capable of having hybrid identities. Individuals are defined more by a 
both/and than either/or logic. 
For this study, that means that whereas state-based inclusion/exclusion debates tend to 
occur along a binary, either/or logic, largely operating under the false assumption that 
identity formation is a zero-sum game, the possibility for multiple belongings mandates 
novel approaches. Put more simply, the dichotomous qualities of breakdown and 
maintenance, as well as the binary nature of the inclusion/exclusion separation, are 
insufficient for dealing with people who exhibit multiple selves and multiple senses of 
belonging. Risse (2003: 488, 490, emphasis in original) sums this situation up best 
                                                
21 These numbers pertain to the EU as a whole. A country specific breakdown reveals higher levels of 
Europeanness in some member-states and lower levels in others. Irrespective of that, however, the broader 
point remains that on average some measure of Europeanness is felt throughout the EU-27. 
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writing, “Most European citizens identify with their national or regional communities 
and with Europe…[it is] wrong to conceptualize European and national identities in 
zero-sum terms...[they] are both ‘imagined communities’”. 
Stratification/blurring – symbolic 
Given that nationality and Europeanness co-exist, the question logically becomes how do 
they relate; is the relationship clearly layered (stratification) or is it more marbled 
(blurring)? In asking that, the stratification side implies a European identity that forms 
separately from national ones – a layer-cake model. On the other side, burring reflects a 
comingling process in which national and European identities co-constitute one another – 
a marble-cake setup (Risse, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2010). Beginning with the arguments for 
stratification, D’Appollonia (2002: 188) notes that the stickiness of Europe’s existing 
diversity means that any pan-European identity “cannot be associated with one national 
cultural model”. To be accessible by everyone, and to allow different national 
communities to exist under its common rubric, Europeanness must form independently 
from national structures. As such, the contention frequently is that it must be more civic 
than ethnic. That view is often captured under the legal ties and constitutional patriotism 
perspectives (Habermas, 1994, 1995; Wiener, 1998). 
On the legal side, the argument is that the formal structures of EU citizenship, such as 
those developed in the first half the chapter, are capable of generating civic based, 
belonging bonds based on who has and who does not certain rights. For instance, 
European citizens, via A23, share certain common EU-wide political participation 
privileges that non-European citizens do not. As such, under its conditions, while the 
Frenchman “belongs” in London just as much as the Englishman in Paris, the same 
cannot be said for the American in either place. One can apply a similar logic across the 
scope of EU citizen privileges. In doing so, the argument is that there is a shift away 
from “feelings of belonging” to the “legal ties of belonging” (Wiener, 1998: 295). 
Wiener writes, 
‘European citizenship’ does not supersede national identities. Instead, it has evoked 
multiple identities…access to certain social rights, new voting rights, a ‘European’ 
passport, changed rules of border crossing and practices that would contribute to 
create a feeling of belonging (Wiener, 1998: 295, 299). 
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Linked with legal based belonging is constitutional patriotism. Ignoring the normative 
debates over its desirability, the viewpoint starts from the premise that the construction 
of European identity should not mirror the nation-building process (Lacroix, 2002; 
Müller, 2006). Ferry (quoted in Nicolaidis and Lacroix, 2003: 134) argues that modeling 
European belonging on national belonging would represent “a chauvinism of European 
unity [and] a duplicating [of] the nationalist principle at the supranational level”. It risks 
making Europeanness simply nationalism writ-large, which in turn risks recreating the 
problems associated with it as well as short-changing the positives created by it. 
Instead, constitutional patriotism advocates rooting European belonging in, as the name 
implies, the Union’s constitutional values. In the simplistic sense, it would link and root 
Europeanness with the EU’s concrete constitutional principles – commitments to 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law to name of few. On a deeper level, 
however, Müller (2006: 15) notes that the argument is more abstract based on the “the 
idea of citizens mutually justifying political rule to each other – and thus, in the end, the 
moral intuition that things should not just be done to people”. In other words, by 
establishing just methods of citizen recognition, European constitutional governance 
necessarily creates the bonds of affection needed for democratic consolidation and 
community-building. 
One should note that this entire argument rejects the idea that the democratic political 
community is irrevocably link to nationality. Habermas writes, “The nation-state 
established only temporarily the close link between the ethnos and the 
demos…Citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity” (Habermas 
1995:259). Consequently, a constitutionally-derived, legally-rooted European identity – 
of which EU citizenship might be considered the institutional expression of – would be 
the novel means of engendering the common points of public identification needed for 
democratic polity development. European citizenship would therefore provide the 
“abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers” (Habermas, 2001b: 16).  
Under this broad vision, stratification becomes the most logical imagery. Again, under it, 
one sees in content and construction separate types/levels of national and European 
belongings (as well as, most likely, sub-national, non-national, and non-European ones). 
While these various groupings might mix across each other in complex ways – for 
instance, in a Russian doll fashion – none of that would detract from the overall position 
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that nationality and Europeanness remain separate concepts rooted in separate identity 
constructions, forms, and locations. Identity plurality would therefore be defined via the 
various and distinct hats an individual might concurrently wear at any one time. 
To be clear, the argument just made is cogent and is an improvement over the either/or 
nature of the breakdown/maintenance picture. Nevertheless, it fails to offer a fully 
convincing argument, which in turn makes the blurring option the most appropriate 
finding. First, viewing European community as built on legal ties risks shortchanging 
belonging’s (and therefore inclusion’s) two-way dynamic. After all, it seems highly 
presumptuous to assume that, simply by sharing certain legal rights, European citizens 
will all internalize them in the ways that engender communal linkages. While a legal 
approach to Europeanness may offer the means of generating senses of common civic 
belonging, it offers no assurances that the mere existence of those rights will transform 
into feelings of popular sentimentality. Sharing EU rights does not necessitate feeling a 
sense of European belonging.22 
Second, the legal ties/constitutional patriotism argument faces problems in execution. 
Sourcing European belonging civically only works if there are high levels of popular 
understanding of those EU rights. It requires Union citizens to know, understand, and in 
some cases to actively draw on their common privileges in order to expose them and 
their linkages with others having them. The problem is that such awareness is currently 
lacking. A 2008 EB (#213) report states that,  
Although the majority (79%) of EU citizens claim familiarity with the term ‘citizen of 
the European Union’, only 43% say they knew its meaning and less than one-third 
(32%)…consider themselves well informed about their rights (EB#213, 2008: 5). 
Moreover, if political participation is the critical factor for fostering civic bonds, then the 
findings are even more troubling. The same report found that respondents were 
“especially perplexed” about the A23’s local rights with a 15 percent awareness drop 
                                                
22 The inverse is also true; a lack of European legal rights does not imply a lack of Europeanness. Indeed, 
while the poll cited above found a sense of common Euro-values, it also found that a majority considered 
those values overlapping with a wider set of “Western” ones (EB#69, 2008). 
 148 
from 2002 to 2008. While a distinctly European layer of civic belonging may make sense 
theoretically, it is not matched empirically.23  
Third, constitutional patriotism faces its own problems. On the simplest level, and with 
the 2005 rejection of the highly symbolic Constitutional Treaty, the body of EU law that 
currently exists is an eclectic mix of treaties, directives, decisions, regulations, and court 
rulings – all things hardly conducive to engendering popular identifications. On a deeper 
level, however, even if one had an appreciation of all of those elements, it is questionable 
whether they evoke the passions needed to build the us/them dichotomy often viewed as 
necessary for internal consolidation and external differentiation. For instance, Lacroix 
(2002) notes that the term “constitutional patriotism” is altogether oxymoronic. She  
(2002: 949) writes, “The word ‘constitutional’ is often believed to have cold and 
jurisdictional connotations whereas the word ‘patriotism’ evokes a warm feelings coming 
from our hearts”. To be sure, the Euro, common passport covers, and other “Euro-
symbols” exist, however thus far they lack the resonance of national ones.24 Moreover, 
and as the ethno-symbolist stand of nationalist theory stresses, such devices are likely to 
be effective only insofar as they draw on pre-existing historical sentimentalities – again, 
something Euro-symbols largely do not have access to (A. Smith, 2001).  
Finally, in a practical sense, neither legal ties nor constitutional patriotism offers much 
guidance as to which community should be the object of loyalty at any given moment. 
On the one hand, Haas (1958: 14) qualified his original argument for multiple loyalties 
stating that they exist “either because no conflict is involved between various foci or 
because the political actor manages psychologically to ignore or sublimate a conflict 
even if it does exists ‘objectively’”. On the other hand, Herrmann and Brewer (2004: 12) 
argue that institutions that seek political power, like the EU, often insist on hierarchies 
among identities. Which identity “wins-out” is therefore critical, as the European 
solidarity debates – and roadblocks – over things such as structural funds and financial 
bailouts illustrate (Thomason, 2010). The problem is, because neither legal ties nor 
constitutional patriotism offers much guidance as to which ought to win-out, debates 
                                                
23 An understanding of constitutional values also requires unambiguous EU support of them. The problem 
is the Union’s commitment to them, particularly in relation to Eastern enlargement, has been less than 
perfect. For instance, K. Smith notes that the Union’s normative values were often trumped by political, 
economic, and/or security related calculi (K. Smith, 2005). 
24  Habermas (2001a) acknowledges that people are not motivated by abstract principles alone. 
Nevertheless, if EU institutions are meant to play that role, thus far they have been largely unsuccessful. 
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about them risk morphing into nothing more than the well worn normative one between 
communitarians and cosmopolitans. In other words, it would lead one down a path that 
would seem to entail either outright disintegration (maintenance) or much greater fusion 
(breakdown). In doing so, both fail to consider the possibly for, and reality of, multiple 
identities. Little effort is made in relating them. 
Given all that, one is left with a two-part conclusion. On the one hand, Europe neither 
breaks down nor maintains the exclusive role played by nationality in the 
inclusion/exclusion debate. On the other hand, there are problems with treating 
Europeanness as a distinct level of inclusion. Therefore, one is left with determining a 
way to understand a scenario in which nationality remains important, however also 
where Europeanness co-exists with it. Accordingly, this chapter moves away from the 
implicit structuralism of those previous standpoints towards Risse’s more fluid marble-
cake setup – a setup open to the pervasiveness of national bonds as well as 
accommodating to Europeanness. Outlining its tenets, Risse writes, 
According to the [marble-cake] model, the various components of an individual’s 
identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels…What if identity components 
influence each other, mesh and blend into each other? What if my self-understanding 
as German inherently contains aspects of Europeanness? Can we really separate out a 
Catalan from a European identity? (Risse, 2004: 251). 
Thus, the model portrays a setup in which European and national identities are not neatly 
separable from one another. Rather, states, and their citizens, experience and define 
Europe in their own ways. In the process, they both condition senses of their own inner-
selves in juxtaposition to it as well as contribute to its (Europe’s) definition as a whole. 
“European identity works not so much through transnational processes…but on the 
national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or ‘being European’ is gradually 
being embedded in understandings of national identity” (Risse, 2005: 305).25 One finds 
support for this in both historical and contemporary contexts. 
On the historical side, European states have continually attempted to define Europe, and 
in the process have defined themselves, in their own ways. For instance, in the 19th 
century it was Napoleon’s “ce qui est bon pour les français est bon pour tout le monde” 
vision under which France sought to define Europe in its likeness and, in the process, 
                                                
25 This does not mean that individuals are in a schizophrenic no-man’s land. Indeed, that seems more likely 
under stratification where there is little guidance as to which level ought to win-out at any moment.  
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solidified an internal belief that it was the birthplace and bastion of republican 
civilization. Explaining and expanding on the dynamics at play Fontana writes,  
Its central assumption was that if Europe was the most civilized part of the world and 
revolutionary France the most civilized nation in Europe, then the same historical 
process leading to the reform and modernization of France would create in due course 
a united European continent in her image (Fontana, 2002: 120). 
Similar in logic, however different (and more tragic) in effect, 20th century German 
Nazism attempted to define the continent in its image, the defeat of which would in turn 
define both post-war German and European consciousness (see below). For more 
peripheral countries, defining Europe, and therein themselves, often took the form 
defending Europe, and therein themselves, from outsiders. Thus, Spanish conflicts with 
Muslim invaders helped solidify Europe’s, and in the process its own, Christian heritage 
(Armstrong, 1982). Irrespective of the particular state in question, the point is that 
European states have always been engaged in a complex process of defining Europe in 
national ways and, in doing so, defining and redefining themselves in juxtaposition to it. 
They have simultaneously justified Europe’s existence as a whole all the while 
conditioning their own national identities in comparison to it. 
Turning to the contemporary scene, and adding in the EU’s institutional context, those 
historical trends find modern replication. For instance, Marcussen et al. (1999) argue that 
modern British identity is, at least partially, derived from a view of Europe as “Other” – 
for example, whether for reasons having to do with historical memories of empire, 
traditions of economic liberalism, or Commonwealth and Special Relationship ties. 
There is still a feeling of ‘them’ vs. ‘us’ between England and the 
Continent…‘Europe’ continues to be identified with the Continent and perceived as 
the, albeit friendly, ‘other’ in contrast to Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism (Marcussen et 
al., 1999: 625). 
In simpler terms, understanding Britishness only comes in juxtaposition to understanding 
Europeanness. By the same token, understanding Europeanness only comes in 
juxtaposition to understanding Britishness. On the first side, by identifying itself as “not 
European”, British identity uses a negative imprint of Europe (and the EU) for its own 
identity construction – a fact Marcussen et al., (2001) note is often reflected in the 
language, content, and tenor of British political discourse. On the other side, that 
“othering” process acts to both justify “Europe’s” existence as real as well as contributes 
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to its character content as somehow “not British” – whatever that actually means. Both 
sides therefore gain substance in the context of the other.26 
A similar process can be seen as occurring, though again with a very different outcome, 
with respect to post-war German identity. Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002) offer an 
argument that since World War II Germany identity has been deeply rooted in a desire to 
be “good Europeans”. At the same time, by anchoring itself to Europe, German identity 
has both justified Europeanness as real as well as provided it with content – Germanness. 
Accordingly, German identity mixes with Europeanness and Europeanness with 
Germanness such that “nowadays…to be a ‘good’ German means to be a ‘good’ 
European” and vice-a-versa (Risse and Engelmann-Martin, 2002: 287). Defining one 
without the other – or separating one from the other – is largely impossible as the 
identities are mutually constitutive.  
While the exact details of this marbling – blurring – process certainty differ across 
countries, Risse (2010) is clear in his contention that the logic holds true across the EU-
27. European and national belongings are not so much separate layers as they are co-
constituted mixtures. 27 Europe provides each nationality with a piece and image of itself 
just as each nationality provides Europe with a piece and image of itself. Asking which 
“wins-out” is nonsensical as nationality and Europeanness are not separate levels. 
The overall effect will not be homogenous leading to a generalized EU identity. 
Rather European and the EU become enmeshed with given national identities leading 
to rather divergent identity outcomes. (Risse, 2005: 296) 
While stratification is correct that individuals hold multiple identities, its structured 
imagery fails to pick-up on the complexities and co-constitutions at play. Because senses 
of Europe and senses of nationality blend, inclusion/exclusion loses much of its 
dichotomous clarity. Everyone shares a bit of Europe and, therefore, of everyone else. 
                                                
26 None of this is to say that the Europeanness-Britishness link is exclusive in the sense that the character 
of each side is singularly linked to the character of the other. As Risse (2003: 500) notes, Britishness has 
traditionally had strong linkages to Empire, to the Commonwealth, and to a wider English-speaking world. 
Rather, the point simply is that when looking at the relationship between Europeanness and Britishness 
specifically, both sides gain substance in the context of the other such that neither side is neatly severable 
from the other. 
27 Risse’s (2003: 501) study on feelings on the Euro in Germany, the UK, and Italy offers an example of 
this process. In it, he concludes that, “The key category is the ‘marble cake’ model of multiple identities 
pertaining to the degree to which Europe meshes and blends into collective understandings one’s own 
nation-state”. 
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Citizenship updates 
Putting this together, one arrives at situation in which EU citizenship – across both 
formal and symbolic structures – produces a blurring of the state citizenship-based, 
inclusion/exclusion separation. To be sure, there are important practical and normative 
implications coming out of such an argument that warrant development (Bauböck, 2007). 
Nonetheless, and without discounting the significance of those focuses, for this study 
blurring proves more important as a description of the sort of socio-political challenges, 
and therein changes, coming out of integration. Recalling the point made in chapter 2, 
state citizenship was critical to IR insofar creates a separation between individuals of 
different states. It creates the British and the French citizen and all the practical things 
that go along with such a division. Blurring challenges that notion by challenging the 
idea that there is a fundamental difference between the French and British citizen; that 
the French/EU citizen in London or the British/EU citizen in Paris ought to be considered 
“international” travelers. While the next chapter expands on what that means for 
jurisdictional structures and the domestic/international separation as a whole, the critical 
take away currently is that European citizenship makes it difficult to clearly and cleanly 
divide individuals up amongst the member-states based on state citizenship calculations. 
And that makes it hard to visualize areas of domestic versus international action. 
Again, as was the case with inside/outside, none of this ought to be totally unexpected 
given the EU’s continual attempts to walk the line between the particularism of the state 
system and the universalism of post-nationalism/statism. However, it is significant to the 
extent that it implies a need to re-open what, for IR, tend to be closed questions with self-
assumed answers about how individuals are socio-politically related. For instance, it 
raises question like: What is migration absent firm state citizenship divisions? If refugees 
are “an inevitable, if unintended, consequence of the international state system,” what are 
they absent statist inclusion/exclusion divides (Haddad, 2004: 1)? What is “foreign” aid 
in the context of blurring inclusion/exclusion lines? Again, at this stage the point is not to 
answer any of those questions. It is simply to strike home the message that a blurring of 
inclusion/exclusion problematizes the standard way of socio-politically locating people 
within states. Recognizing that, in turn, sets the stage for the descriptive, analytical, and 
disciplinary re-mappings to political and socio-political structures and relationships offer 
in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – Jurisdictional blurring 
 
Introduction 
As has been noted, a central theme running throughout this study has been that of 
change, a theme coalescing specifically around whether on-the-ground changes to 
European political and socio-political structures and relationships problematize the 
traditional descriptive, analytic, and disciplinary tools deployed to help understand those 
same structures and relationships. In saying that change has been the underlying concern, 
one must also return to the point made earlier in the study – that truly understanding it 
requires appreciating both the past as well as the present. On the one hand, it compels 
one to define “what was” in order to establish the baseline standard that might undergo 
transformation. On the other hand, it also speaks to and of the present – and even the 
future – as the contrast to the old. Accordingly, on the most rudimentary level, insofar as 
one seeks to appreciate the dynamics of change, one must grasp both “what was” as well 
as “what became”.  
With that as context, the study’s first two chapters jointly endeavored to provide a “what 
was” picture and standard. Chapters 1 and 2 told a story in which international relations 
empirically and IR analytically and disciplinarily grew out of a specific resolution to the 
jurisdictional problematique. Given the problematique’s content as a debate over who 
decides what, where, how, and over whom, the chapters argued that sovereignty, and 
with it state citizenship, offered the basis through which international relations and IR 
gained their footings. In making that argument, the chapters also laid out a set of 
analytical binaries constitutive of that process – inside/outside in the context of political 
structures and sovereignty and inclusion/exclusion in the context of socio-political 
relationships and state citizenship. When put together, those separations jointly 
conditioned the domestic/international binary underpinning it all. 
Change being the concern however, chapters 1 and 2 only presented half of the material 
necessary. While they did establish the baselines and standard languages through which 
international thinking made sense, the issue quickly became how those assumptions and 
beliefs might transform in the context of an alternative, non-sovereign resolution to the 
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problematique. And, once that became the debate, it meant examining an instance of “the 
new” which, in this study’s case, meant the EU.  
In that regard, the previous two chapters offered in-depth investigations of the European 
system. The chapters, respectively, examined the Union’s political structures 
(institutional rules, programs, and the like) in the context of inside/outside as well as its 
socio-political relationships (EU citizenship) in the context of inclusion/exclusion. Each 
chapter did so by tracking four possible changes to the traditional sovereignty-based, 
state citizenship conditioned binaries – breakdown, maintenance, stratification, and 
blurring. The chapters determined that none of the first three options were wholly wrong 
and, at times, each contained an element of truth. Nevertheless, they ultimately 
concluded that blurring was the most appropriate finding. In the first case, chapter 3 
argued that because sovereign structures gave way to more fluid, more complex, less 
territorial, and possibly conflicting and overlapping jurisdictional setups, inside/outside 
underwent a process of blurring. In the second case, chapter 4 concluded that because the 
relationship between EU citizens and member-states, across both formal and symbolic 
aspects, diversified in ways that rejected the either/or categorizations inherent to state 
citizenship, inclusion/exclusion also underwent a process of blurring.  
Given those findings, one finally arrives at a point in which it is logical to conclude that 
the sovereignty-based division separating the domestic and the international, as well as 
the European and the domestic and international, levels has become increasingly tenuous. 
Because drawing political borders, and therein socio-politically locating people within 
them, is a progressively more complex and contextual process, defining a 
domestic/international separation between the member-states is no longer an empirically 
easy and analytically clear-cut matter. The domestic, European, and international levels 
exist more as dynamic mixtures than immiscible levels. While that does not mean 
separations can never be made, when approached from a holistic perspective, European 
setups are defined more by blurring that any other of the outcome-possibilities. 
Recognizing that fact, as the following sections develop in earnest, prompts, pushes, and 
requires one to consider what it might mean to move beyond “the metaphor of ‘levels’ to 
new appreciations of the interpenetration of spaces, their fuzziness, and their 
multiplicities…” (Rumford, 2008: 15). 
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This chapter’s task therefore rests on developing a fuller and more systematized 
appreciation of blurring as found in Europe and as a jurisdictional type – what it is, what 
its tenets entail, and ultimately how it fits with preexisting thinking. It begins by offering 
an explanation as to why the term “blurring”, and not the more definite “blurred”, has 
continually been used and made the focus. Second, the chapter offers a substantive 
understanding of blurring as found in Europe via an analysis of its definable and 
locatable traits and effects. To do that, it returns to the three metrics first used in chapter 
2 – number, scope, and method. Third, based of those findings, the chapter reinterprets 
blurring back into the “Who decides what, where, how, and over whom” language; it 
looks at blurring as a specific resolution to the jurisdictional problematique. In doing so, 
one sees that it reflects neither an instance of traditional anarchy nor of hierarchy. 
Fourth, in offering a conception of blurring, the chapter contrasts that vision against 
preexisting conceptual understandings of sovereignty and, as it turns out most critically, 
authority/power (legitimacy). Authority and power are considered jointly insofar as they 
represent opposite sides of the same coin differing only over the presence (authority) or 
lack of (power) a legitimizing factor. Making these comparisons is critical as they 
illustrate the relationship jurisdictional blurring has with preexisting understandings of 
the nature of political and socio-political action – where it supports them, where it differs 
from them, where it complicates them, and even where it may fail to offer adequate new 
positions. Making those comparisons helps locate the underling analytic properties of 
blurring. 
The chapter concludes by bringing the argument back around to the global context noted 
in chapter 1. By defining blurring in Europe, and therein extracting its underlying logics, 
the chapter asks whether similar processes might occur in the wider global environment. 
In doing this, no assumptions are ever made that blurring is occurring or must occur 
everywhere. Nor are any assumptions ever made that the processes leading to it, or the 
precise dynamics of it, are the same outside of Europe as inside. The chapter 
acknowledges the methodological limitations at play in using a single case to make those 
sorts of broader generalizations (Gerring, 2007). Nonetheless, given the globalization 
context already offered, it maintains that it is appropriate to, at the very least, ask 
whether the traits and effects of the blurring seen in Europe and developed analytically in 
the context of this chapter might be present, to some degree and in some form, in the 
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wider global environment. Doing that helps set the stage for viewing blurring both as a 
jurisdictional form in its own right as well as an example of global jurisdictional 
diversity more generally. 
In the end, this chapter brings together the points made in chapters 3 and 4 by defining 
blurring as found in Europe and, through that process, offering a baseline analytical 
understanding of it. Through that, one will gain a substantive conception of it as a 
jurisdictional alternative to the clean and clear logics highlighted by sovereignty and 
present under the breakdown, maintenance, and stratification outcome-possibilities. All 
of that in turn provides the context for the study’s next and final substantive chapter on 
the influences blurring has on IR’s descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary maps. 
Processes versus endpoints 
Prior to getting into the heart of the chapter, is necessary to say a bit more on the nature 
of the key term itself – particularly why the more open-ended “blurring” and not the 
more definite “blurred” has continually been used. Two questions seem to underlie why 
such a debate is likely to arise/why the difference in terminology might be important. 
First, if blurring is a process, as the grammatical form used suggests that it is, then ought 
it not logically yield some definite outcome – for instance, a blurred result? Second, and 
in the context of that first question, does the current process-based conception leave too 
much overall empirical inconclusiveness to be analytically/disciplinarily useful 
(Thaddeus Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Albert and Kratochwil, 2001; Lapid, 2001; Albert 
and Kopp-Malek, 2002). 
In asking those questions, it should be made clear that it is not illogical to probe what 
blurring might produce when taken to a logical conclusion. Indeed, it is a perspective that 
is often advanced in the context of the Union specifically and jurisdictional change more 
generally. For instance, Sørenson (1999: 180), based on a set of arguments similar to the 
ones made in this study, takes them to a conclusion by presenting an argument for the 
development of what he calls a “post-modern state” [he cites the EU]…characterized by 
transnationally integrated, globalized economies; by multi-level governance; and by 
identities that are no longer exclusively tied to [the] nation-state”. In a similar thought 
process, but with different imaginaries, Zielonka (2006) and Rumford (2008) also both 
attempt to define the EU via endpoints – Zielonka via his neo-medieval setup and 
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Rumford via his networked model. In each case, each imagery attempts to present the 
jurisdictional change seen in the EU in the context of an endpoint – in the first case, by 
harkening back to an older system and, in the second, by utilizing the imagery of the 
Information Revolution.  
Without commentating on the appropriateness of any of those models specifically – and 
each of them may “bring something to the table” – the problem with all of them as 
reflective of endpoint perspectives more generally is that they risk missing out on the 
dynamisms inherent to the European jurisdictional form. One can look at this a number 
of ways and, in doing so, argue why a process-based option is better. First, change in the 
Union has been historically commonplace, whether in the context of a specific treaty 
revision, of membership enlargements, or of a particularly far-reaching ECJ decision. As 
such, it is problematic to assume temporal stoppage within the Union’s system. (In this 
case, it is perhaps telling that it is often rhetorically described as a “project”.) Endpoint 
views risk viewing the Union in overly teleological terms. The large amount of 
jurisdictional restlessness that exists in the EU – a point returned to in the study’s 
conclusion in the context of the current challenges facing Europe – makes it more 
sensible to keep ontological finalities open by highlight the blurring process, not blurred 
outcomes. A process-based view is simply more reflective of the empirical dynamisms of 
the EU system than an endpoint one.  
Second, saying blurring is process-based does not mean that it ignores endpoints (or the 
possibility for them) completely. Indeed, in recognizing the pervasiveness of 
sovereignty-based perspectives, blurring defines itself in opposition to that endpoint. Its 
underling meaning therefore forms, at least partially, via the specific modifications 
witnessed to the sovereignty standard. Endpoints remain “in sight” to the extent that 
blurring is constructed against, and contingent on, their baselines. Moreover, nothing 
about blurring, or a process-based approach more generally, rejects the possibility for 
stabilization in particular instances (e.g. for a specific issue or area of Union activity). 
The point simply is that such a perspective would not be constitutive of blurring as a 
whole, where active and ongoing jurisdictional debates are defining features and where a 
holistic view of the Union is the concern. 
Third, by suspending judgment as to final structures, a process-based view maintains the 
flexibility needed to guard against analytical and disciplinary stagnation and reification. 
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As the next chapter develops more fully, while that may mean accepting high levels of 
empirical contextualization, and while an outcome-based perspective might make for 
analytically and disciplinarily “simpler” setups, a process oriented approach preserves a 
sensitivity to change by keeping ontological finalities open (Thaddeus Jackson and 
Nexon, 1999; Albert and Kratochwil, 2001; Lapid, 2001; Albert and Kopp-Malek, 2002). 
“Verbing” the core concept, and therein holding open what political and socio-political 
setups must look like, creates the spaces needed for debating, and eventually re-mapping, 
the descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary contours of those setups under conditions of 
change (again, next chapter). Lapid writes, 
Subscribing to processual/relational/verbing mode of thinking should allow us to do 
far more than just marginally improve on our ability to refer to the accelerated 
movement of preformed entities through preformed and predemarcated spaces, 
places, and territory…[I]t should improve on our ability to theorize identities, 
borders, and orders ‘in-formation’ and ‘in-relation’ [and] a full digest of the 
theoretical, conceptual, and methodological ramifications of these ideas will most 
likely necessitate profound changes also in our understandings of every single 
component of IR’s long-troubled disciplinary self-designation (‘the ‘inter’, the 
‘nation’, the ‘relational’ and by extension also the ‘political’) (Lapid, 2001: 5). 
Put together, and somewhat oxymoronically, while the term “blurring” risks carrying 
connotations of pejorative ambiguity and analytical laziness, as the sections below 
develop, as a concept it is an operationalizable jurisdictional option whose essence rests 
in its process-based form. In that sense, echoing Rosenau (1990: 264, emphasis added), 
“[T]he absence of hierarchy in the multi-centric[/blurring] world gives an appearance of 
considerable disarray…But that appearance is deceiving: underlying the disarray are 
discernible patterns…” 28 
Blurring as found in Europe 
With those terminological points in mind, as noted in chapter 3, blurring (indeed, all four 
of the options) represented two separate, but ultimately interrelated, arguments. On the 
one hand, and what the empirical evidence presented in chapters 3 and 4 tended to 
                                                
28 A process-based argument is also critical outside the European context (see global sections below). For 
example, because globalization theory is often focused on some sort of globally inspired telos – the global 
community, global democracy, or global institutions – it risks shortchanging the more interactive, complex 
nature of modern political and socio-political life, whether that means alternative, non-globalized 
perspectives or the possibility for change within the system itself (Linklater, 1998b; Habermas, 2001a; 
Held, 2002a). Highlighting the processual nature of blurring helps maintain an overall ontological 
flexibility, which is both reflective of the dizzying pace of modern global life as well as guards against 
analytical stagnation by compelling consistent contextualization.  
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highlight, blurring is a description of what was/is occurring to the inside/outside and 
inclusion/exclusion separations as a result of European change. Blurring was largely 
utilized as a descriptive tool to illustrate the sorts of alternations taking place to each 
relevant binary (e.g. inside/outside was blurring). On the other hand, and where this 
chapter expands on, blurring also represents a distinct jurisdictional conclusion in its own 
right; a conclusion that requires firm contextualization with respect to its specific tenets. 
It represents both a description of the changes taking place as well as a jurisdictional 
form in and of itself.  
In saying all that, one should be very clear that the goal is not simply to state what 
blurring is not; it is not merely a matter of arguing that the EU’s political and socio-
political arrangements problematize sovereignty and state citizenship based perspectives. 
While those things are undoubtedly true, as demonstrated by the blurring-as-descriptor 
finding, at this stage the more pertinent issue relates to the more foundational meanings 
of blurring – as they relate to Europe specifically, but also in more analytically. Again, 
those meanings will, at least partially, always be conditioned by sovereignty given that it 
is a long-standing jurisdictional form. Nonetheless, one ought to be able to generate a 
more “independent” understanding of blurring. 
Therefore, to operationalize the blurring found in Europe as an independent jurisdictional 
finding, and therein to generate an analytical understanding of it, one can return to the 
number, scope (spatial, functional), and method metrics developed and deployed in 
chapter 2. The goal is to use those metrics as the means of depicting blurring less as a 
description of what occurs to something and more as a force unto itself. In using the three 
metrics, one ought to be clear that it is done so under the informed background of the 
problematique itself. Therefore, analyzing the number, scope, and method metrics of 
blurring allows one to comment on  particular resolution to the problematique and the 
resultant political and socio-political configurations. 
Beginning with number, it ought to immediately be clear that the developments seen in 
the EU system came largely as the result of the proliferation of jurisdictionally 
significant sources. Harkening back to the medieval setup noted in chapter 2 – a setup in 
which popes, regna kings/queens, cities, nobles, and guilds all competed within a 
heterogeneous jurisdictional environment – one saw a very similar situation in modern 
Europe. On the political stage, based on the points made in chapter 3, member-states and 
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the EU (as a unit itself as well as the separate entities within it) were shown to be 
engaged in a dynamic process of jurisdictional competition in which neither side was 
able to gain full control. Indeed, MacCormick’s (1995) comments regarding the Union’s 
“polycentric legal order” made clear that the various actors in the system, each believing 
themselves to be acting within their own legitimate jurisdictional prerogatives based on 
their own understandings of Union rules, compete, and even conflict, for jurisdictional 
prerogatives (also see functional scope).29  
In that regard, were one to place oneself behind a sort of “political veil of ignorance”, 
forgetting all previous assumptions about sovereignty and its related claims of number 
singularity (and with it supremacy), in looking at modern Europe, one would not come 
away with a view that there is a single, jurisdictionally important actor. Rather, one 
would see multiple actors engaged in a complex, interactive, and often messy process of 
jurisdictional competition. One would see the various actors each basing their 
jurisdictional claims through their own interpretations of the rules – states often falling 
back onto traditional claims of sovereignty in cases of conflict and the EU onto its own 
interpretations of the treaties. As is extended on below, this setup creates a scenario of 
neither hierarchy nor anarchy, thereby making legitimacy the central concern. 
Irrespective of how one looks at it however, the number metric is no longer singular 
within the European setup.  
Moving to the socio-political aspects of the number metric, because political action has 
practical influence only to the extent that it affects people, based on the points made in 
chapter 4 the development of European citizenship, both formally and symbolically, 
created a new, non-national, non-state source of attachment. While state citizen rights 
and identities did not vanish, through EU citizenship individuals gained new civil, 
political, and social rights as well as increasingly began viewing Europeanness as one 
component of their marble-caked identities. In that sense, the number of sources of socio-
political attachment competing for political loyalty grew. It was no longer simply the 
state such that talking about blurring in Europe means, part-and-parcel, talking about 
multiple individual-polity relationships. One might add that this did not produce clarity. 
European citizens were found to exist in an unclear halfway house, being neither fully 
                                                
29 One might extend the argument to include other sub-state (e.g. regions) as well as global (e.g. the UN) 
actors. The point is not to layout every relevant actor, but to make clear that the number metric has 
diversified and, in doing so, created competition.  
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included nor fully excluded throughout the member-states. Accordingly, and as the scope 
metric extends on below, not only does EU citizenship reflect a growth in the number of 
jurisdictionally important socio-political relationships, but also a new variant of them. 
If blurring models a system with more than one jurisdictional actor, the second metric 
centers on scope. On the spatial side, as one saw with issues ranging from enlargement to 
the extra-territorial activities of Frontex, the derogation potentials within Schengen to 
external governance, defining a clear, stable, and territorially-based, jurisdictionally 
significant inside/outside separation between member-states as well as against the non-
EU world was increasingly difficult. In that sense, what was seen to be occurring echoes 
Ruggie’s (1993) arguments regarding the “unbundling” of territory, a process in which 
the neat and tidy overlay between jurisdictional claims and the territorial scope no longer 
holds as unyieldingly true. Whereas territory previously offered the singular and clear 
legitimatizing factor for spatial scopes, and in dong so created a territorially mapped, 
jurisdictionally significant inside/outside binary, Europe’s setups and activities were 
found to prevent those connections. They de-linked jurisdictional and territorial scopes as 
well as displayed a striking amount of complexity and impermanence – again, whether in 
the context of enlargement, external governance, or extra-territorial jurisdictional 
activities. In doing those things, there was clear evidence of a blurring of the 
inside/outside binary.  
To be clear, saying the blurring unbundles European territorial and jurisdictional 
overlays does not mean that territory no longer matters (Elden, 2005, 2011; Burgess and 
Vollaard, 2006). As Burgess and Vollaard (2006: 7, emphasis in original) argue, 
“[T]erritory always matters somehow, in some way, for social and political relations”. 
For example, the EU continues to speak in a language of it, particularly in the context of 
immigration. Moreover, despite any general trends towards unbundling that have 
occurred, instances still remain in which territory remains critically important. For 
instance, territorial sovereignty is often seen as a central goal in nationalist, secessionist 
movements (Mayall, 1990: 60-63).  
Nevertheless, while those caveats must be taken into consideration, what makes blurring 
so interesting, but also so challenging, is its both/and qualities with respect to change and 
preservation. Though territorialism – where territorialism means that all jurisdictional 
space is reducible to sovereignty-based mapping – no longer holds true, that does not 
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mean that territory no longer matters (Scholte, 2002). Thus, saying that there is spatial 
blurring in Europe is not the same as saying territorial scopes are irrelevant. It simply 
means that the link between jurisdiction and territorial borders is no longer exclusive. 
One is therefore left with a situation, similarly to number, in which spatial scope is 
contextual insofar as the old territorial setup is neither fully left behind nor fully replaced 
by a EU membership alternative. And, as is picked up on below, that again makes 
questions of legitimacy critical. 
It is important to stress that this territorial unbundling occurs simultaneously through, 
and even reinforces, European social networking and a blurring of the 
inclusion/exclusion binary. As chapter 4 argued, whether due to the increases in 
communicative connectivity, easing of intra-EU travel, or the formation of cross-border 
business communities in the context of A21 rights, individuals increasingly operated 
outside national contexts and throughout the European space (Rumford, 2008). Again, 
that did not mean that state citizenship or national attachments vanished. However, as the 
opportunities for non-national integration proliferated, and as Europeans gained the 
“analytical skills” needed to operate in such interactive environments, the sort of spatial 
blurring reflected by territorial unbundling was reinforced by socio-political blurring. 
Moving to functional scope, Europe’s functional diversities, in the conjunction with 
number and spatial shifts, again pointed towards blurring. As chapter 3 developed, 
because member-states and the EU might conflict on competency issues (e.g. the 
Mangold judgment) and because the various actors in the European system all tend to 
view themselves as independently empowered, conflicting opinions over common issues 
were shown to be an ever-present possibility. That did not mean that defining 
jurisdictional lines was always impossible or that member-states do not abide by EU 
rulings (they did and generally do). However, insofar that were cases in which 
jurisdiction lines were in debate (or in which creating clear a hierarchy was not even the 
goal), the possibility for disagreements between actors existed. It was therefore the 
combination of an increased number of actors all whom viewed themselves as 
independently authorized and the fragmentation of the functional/territorial/jurisdictional 
congruency that created the possibilities for conflict and overlap between actors and 
embodied by blurring. And, once again, that moves legitimacy questions to the heart of 
future studies. 
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On the socio-political, functional scene, EU citizens were found to both gain and fail to 
gain – often in the context of the very same privilege – member-state wide rights. 
Moreover, the day-to-day operation of those rights, as chapter 4 made clear, 
problematized the idea of a clean and clear stratified European level of inclusion. To be 
sure, that did not mean that it was impossible to determine when a Union citizen had or 
failed to have a certain privilege. Rather, it reflected a scenario in which the overall 
relationship between any given EU citizen and any member-state other than his or her 
own was not one of full inclusion, full exclusion, or a neatly defined layer of European 
inclusion. Functionally speaking, EU citizenship placed Europeans in a grey-zone 
between the included, rights-endowed citizen and the excluded, rights-denied foreigner. 
As chapter 4 put it, European citizens fell in the gap between particularistic and 
universalistic conceptual models. 
Finally, European experiences revealed that the day-to-day execution of jurisdictional 
claims – the methods associated with them – varied greatly. In the simplest sense, one 
saw that there were technical differences, whether between how the member-states and 
the EU administered their jurisdictions or within the Union’s own procedures (e.g. 
directives versus regulations versus the OMC). In a more developed sense, European 
jurisdiction was seen to take on non-territorial, functionally diverse, and even informal, 
but nonetheless still generally effective and accepted, means administration (e.g. 
enlargement conditionality, external governance). For those reasons, Pollack (2005: 380) 
writes that Europe reflects a “nonhierarchical mobilizing of networks of private and 
public actors who engage in deliberation and problem-solving efforts guided as much by 
informal norms as by formal institutions”.  
All told, blurring in Europe represents a process whereby the number, scope, and method 
metrics multiply, diversify, increase in complexity, and possibly conflict and overlap. It 
represents the simultaneous proliferation of the number of jurisdictional actors, the 
development of complex, variable, potentially conflicting and overlapping spatial and 
functional scopes, a diversity of methods of administration, and a muddling of 
individual-polity relations. In laying that out, one should stress, particularly given the 
inter-connections across the metrics, that the argument rests on there being shifts to all 
three. It is therefore the combination of changes across the metrics that underlines 
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blurring. With that in mind, the issue moves to how the vision just outlined relates to 
jurisdiction-the-concept and its problematique.  
Blurring as jurisdiction 
In turning to the relationship between blurring and jurisdiction-the-concept, two issues 
immediately arise. First, there is a debate as to whether the effects produced by and 
reflected through blurring are applications of the broader, conceptual parameters of 
jurisdiction (is blurring a type of jurisdiction as has thus far been implicitly assumed) or 
whether they are reflective of the under-definition inherent to the concept itself (and 
therefore prompt greater specifications out of it)? Second, provided that the answer to 
that question is that blurring is an application/a type of jurisdiction, based on the 
information gleaned from the three metrics, what is its precise resolution to the 
problematique? Dealing with both of these issues ought to help both further contextualize 
the meaning of blurring as well as offer a reading of its underlying analytic properties. 
Starting with the first question, chapter 2 made clear that, as a concept, jurisdiction 
generates its “problematique” by holding open its appreciations of the three metrics. 
Indeed, the fact that sovereignty provided firm answers to the number, scope, and 
method variables made it a derivative of jurisdiction, not the more common inverse. 
Following the same logic, and as the previous sections made clear for the European case, 
by defining the number metric as greater than one, spatial and functional scopes as 
complex, variable, potentially conflicting and overlapping, and method as multiple, 
blurring does offer resolutions to each metrics. Therefore, in an logic very similar to the 
sovereignty-as-jurisdictional one, the relationship between blurring and jurisdiction is 
one of conceptual specification; a movement from the under-defined qualities of 
jurisdiction-the-concept to the established parameters – however interactive and variable 
those parameters may be – of blurring.  
Viewed in this way, blurring and jurisdiction are not one in the same. Blurring is a type – 
a corollary – of the latter. While it is fundamentally odds with sovereignty in content and 
execution, it is not contrary to the idea of or the possibilities for “the administration of 
authority” more generally. Therefore, just as sovereignty is a type of jurisdiction – a 
specific way of administering authority based on its particular quadripartite constellation 
of processes – so too is blurring a type of jurisdiction based on its own set of logics. 
 165 
Indeed, the medieval example historically and the EU currently both reflect the very real 
possibilities for jurisdictional action absent sovereignty.  
In saying all that, what makes blurring potentially problematic with respect to 
jurisdictional debates is how it resolves the problematique. On the one hand, the strength 
of sovereignty was its ability to create a simple, singular, and concurrently empirical and 
analytical framework. The belief was that, by bundling jurisdictional, territorial, and 
functional claims together, the political and socio-political setups offered through 
sovereignty allowed for the clear conceptual outcomes displayed under the 
inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations. Moreover, 
underpinning all that was an assumption that wherever there was jurisdiction, it was 
sovereignty-based; that sovereignty was the normative bedrock of the entire international 
system. Going back to Jackson’s (1999: 432) point from chapter 2, sovereignty was 
assumed to be the “grandnorm, upon which a society of states ultimately rests. If states 
were not sovereign political life would have to rest on a different normative foundation”. 
On the other hand, because the hallmark of blurring is its jurisdictional complexity, there 
is an implicit acceptance for the possibility of debate, and therein conflict, within its 
remit. In other words, there is an implied tolerance that multiple sources of jurisdiction – 
multiple normative frameworks/ways of administrating authority – might cohabite a 
common space or be present over a common function. As such, not all political and 
socio-political setups are neatly bundled under the same normative framework. By 
extension, not all are necessarily conceptualizable along the same neat analytical 
structures.  
To be sure, for a starting point that assumes jurisdiction requires a single, legitimating 
source of action that is likely to be problematic. However, by keeping the broader 
meaning of jurisdiction in mind, variation, and with that a lack of firm hierarchy, does 
not necessarily mean a lack of jurisdiction. Although blurring may require, as the 
following sections as well as the next chapter develop, new ways of mapping its 
outcomes absent clear levels and in the context of divergent sources of legitimization, 
that fact that there is variation and the potential for conflict does not negate the 
possibility for jurisdiction more generally. It may simply entail more descriptive and 
analytical detail based on the particular structures and/or relationships at play. 
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Given that argument – given that blurring is a complex, application of jurisdiction – the 
issue becomes what is its resolution to the “Who decides what, where, how, and over 
whom” question. With the knowledge gained from chapters 3 and 4, as well as the three 
metrics noted above, the “who” logically becomes a dependent variable, appreciable only 
in the context of the specific function, space, and/or socio-political relationship involved. 
While at times it may be singular, just as sovereignty needs it to be, at other times it may 
be multiple. In opening the door to multiple significant jurisdictional actors, one should 
be clear that that means that there are no guarantees that all the actors will express their 
jurisdiction based on the same normative source. For example, because there is more 
than one significant actor – actors, one might remember, who in the EU system view 
themselves as independently empowered based on those own specific legal rationales – 
the critical debate becomes one of legitimacy. The key question becomes whether a 
state’s claims to sovereignty ought to “win-out” over the ECJ’s interpretation of a 
particular treaty provision or claims to higher constitutional status (Stone Sweet 2010). 
Closely related to “who” are the “what” and “where” functions. They are also contextual 
under blurring. In the first case, “what” determinations are circumstantial insofar as no 
one actor has jurisdiction over all functions at all times. Moreover, because there is a 
possibility for disagreements between actors over common functions, and because those 
conflicts are not necessarily resolvable via pre-established legal hierarchies, questions of 
legitimacy are central. In the second case, while the “where” generally remains 
territorial, whether in the context of a member-state borders or the membership-defined 
EU ones, the fluidity of external borders means that that is not always the case. Territory 
and jurisdiction are not always neatly bundled. In those cases in which they are not, the 
issue becomes the legitimacy of any non-territorially-based jurisdictional form. 
Like the first three components, “how” and “over whom” also vary. First, as seen with 
the method metric, “how” determinations differ between the EU and member-states, 
within the EU, and ultimately across both formal and non-formal approaches. Indeed, in 
the latter’s case particularly, a method’s legitimacy, not its formality, often ends up being 
the determinate factor. Second, the “over whom” aspect shifts in the context of who, 
where, and what determinations. For instance, in the case of EU external governance, it 
extends over a population outside of the Union’s formal membership area while in the 
case of A21 it is for EU citizens alone. In either case, the variable is an active question 
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requiring an appreciation of the broader environment  – including the legitimacy 
dynamics of it – for exact determinations. 
Finally, underpinning all of this is the possibility for a European population neither fully 
state nor European based. Whether in the context of rights or identities, it is a population 
that falls between conceptual models. Because European citizenship problematizes the 
notion that individuals can be clearly and cleanly located within single units based on 
state citizenship, and therefore to the extent that individuals cannot be neatly separated 
amongst those units, there is an incompatibility between the application of state 
citizenship to situations of blurring. Bringing that back around to Rosenau’s point noted 
in chapter 4, socio-political blurring negates the idea that global, European, national, and 
local communities are neatly divided domains as it prevents one from establishing clear 
and stable separations amongst individuals across and within the domains. 
Put together, the resolution to the problematique offered under blurring models an 
interactive, variable, and potentially conflicting and overlapping jurisdictional space. In 
doing so, it also creates a situation in which legitimacy emerges as the critical factor in 
determining precise jurisdictional affects and effects. Saying that there is blurring means 
accepting that multiple, potentially clashing sources of jurisdictional legitimacy – 
sometimes state-based, sometimes EU-centric, and potentially something entirely else – 
might simultaneously operate. Moreover, it means accepting that they can operate in the 
context of common functions, in common spaces, and ultimately compete for the right to 
underpin political and socio-political structures and relationships more generally (next 
chapter). All of that is a sharp difference from the standardized, homogenized single 
sourced sovereignty view found in in traditional setups.  
All of that also creates a scenario in which blurring produces neither clear anarchy nor 
hierarchy. Anarchy normally forms in one of two ways, when there is no accepted/no 
legitimate resolution to the problematique such that everything is power-defined or when 
the answer that is provided functions in a way that precludes analogous 
accepted/legitimate jurisdictional structures in certain contexts (e.g. under sovereignty, in 
the international realm) (Milner, 1991). Neither of these visions is true under blurring. In 
the first case, while some may be tempted to say that blurring fails to resolve the 
problematique reflecting instead an instance of (highly tamed) anarchy, that perspective 
fails to realize that the problematique is resolved. It is simply resolved in situational, 
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complex, and normatively diverse ways. For example, the conflicts between the ECJ and 
the member-states are not anarchical as each side acts in accordance with its own 
interpretation of the rules (N. Walkers “epistemic pluralism” point) (N. Walker, 2002). 
Those interpretations differ and that creates the prospect for real disagreements (e.g. 
between the FCC and the ECJ). However insofar as the various sides/actors root their 
interpretations through acknowledged sources (and, as noted below, the EU and the 
member-states are both generally seen at legitimate entities) and claim their specific 
prerogatives based on their own interpretations of those sources, anarchy is not in play. 
Things are simply perspectival. 
In the second case, while there may be occasions in which aspects of sovereignty reign 
under blurring – there certainly are cases in which a member-state maintains supremacy 
over a specific function in its territory – that does not create outright anarchy between 
member-states insofar as the full constellation of core structuring logics of sovereignty 
do not line up. Going back to chapter 2, sovereignty is sovereignty, and therefore 
sovereignty is applicable, only when all four of its traits are present. As such, there is no 
logical fallacy in saying that member-states retain exclusive jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances while also saying that that does not reflect sovereignty within and, by 
extension, anarchy between. Indeed, the essence of blurring is its both/and qualities, such 
that it can upset sovereignty without excising any individual component of it everywhere 
and at all times. 
While there may not be anarchy, there also is not full hierarchy. In this case, hierarchy 
reflects a setup defined by an established sequence of jurisdictional rights. As such, it is 
often treated as the antithesis of anarchy (the absence of anarchy meaning the presence of 
hierarchy). Blurring rejects that dualism. Again, the Union’s “polycentric legal order” 
and the fact that the various actors all view themselves as individually authorized 
illustrates that while there is not outright anarchy, there is not clear hierarchy either. 
Indeed, as MacCormick (1995) noted, it is not so much that there is an absence of legal 
rules in the EU system, but an excess of them, as expressed via supremacy of EU law 
from the Union’s point of view and traditional state sovereignty from the member-states’ 
perspectives. Therefore, it is the fact that the various actors all tend to interpret the rules 
independently that creates the possibility for the conflicts, overlaps, and complexities 
constitutive of blurring. 
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In saying this, two nuances must be made clear. First, blurring does not prevent 
hierarchies from forming in specific instances, such as in the context of a particular 
function. Nevertheless, because there is functional diversity and, in that diversity, the 
potential for jurisdictional conflicts and overlaps, hierarchy is not the sole organizing 
concept. Nor, therefore, is sovereignty the appropriate terminological approach to 
describe blurring. Second, insofar as the possibility for jurisdictional conflicts exists 
based on unclear functional or spatial lines, there is a constant possibility for a reversion 
to power politics in which all claims to and recognition of legitimacy collapse. However, 
as is developed below, that is not an automatic event and thus far the EU system has 
managed to muddle through with its differing normative sources (Kokott 2010).30 
One is left with a situation in which anarchy is left behind, but hierarchy is not created. 
In a conceptual sense, that means accepting, recognizing, and ultimately incorporating 
the contextualism, complexities, and indeterminacies inherent to a blurring system – no 
matter the social scientific difficulties that may create (next chapter). In an empirical 
sense, it creates an imperative to deal with how the EU specifically and blurring systems 
more generally navigate though the legitimacy debates that arise in the absence of a 
hierarchy/anarchy dualism. As the following sections develop, that answer may be less 
about creating a single, normative underpinning for systems of blurring than with 
understanding and organizing how multiple forms might coexist. 
Sovereignty and power/authority (legitimacy) 
Having made those points, one can shift the issue slightly and turn to the relationship 
between blurring and the other key conceptual terms, specifically sovereignty and 
authority/power (legitimacy). First, with respect to blurring and sovereignty, it is clear 
that the blurring process defined Europe is fundamentally at odds with sovereignty. 
Simply put, it rejects and replaces the constellation of logics found under sovereignty – 
supremacy, territorial/jurisdictional/functional congruency, territorialization, and stability 
– with a proliferation of actors, complex, variable, potentially conflicting and 
overlapping spatial and functional scopes, and varying methods of administration. Again, 
though both offer perspectives on it, sovereignty and blurring each have different 
                                                
30 In this context, one might go back to the point made earlier that while Germany largely abides by ECJ 
rulings, the FCC insists that if Basic Law rights are infringed on by Europe, it can “reclaim them” and its 
jurisdictional prerogatives from the Union – hardly a steadfast commitment a clear hierarchy of legal rules. 
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answers to the problematique – sovereignty offering one based on assumptions about the 
existence of clean and clear political and socio-political structures and relationships and 
blurring rejecting that clarity and instead arguing that on-the-ground complexity and 
variability prevents standardized, static answers. 
In saying that, one must keep in mind that while sovereignty has undergone the de facto 
changes developed throughout the previous sections and chapters, the de jure nature of it 
may remain more intact. Put differently, whereas the blurring arguments just made were 
based on how political and socio-political processes played out on an on-the-ground 
basis in Europe, de jure appreciations of those challenges may be lagging behind (Wendt 
and Freidheim, 1995; Culter, 2001). For instance, EU documents make clear that 
member-states maintain what Krasner (1999: 14) calls “international legal sovereignty” – 
a trait that establishes a state as an independent entity in the international community. 
Moreover, as noted previously, despite Lisbon making the Union a “single legal 
personality”, member-states continue to hold their respective positions within 
international organizations, like the UN, and maintain reciprocal forms of diplomacy 
with each other (Cremona, 2011: 260-268). Therefore, despite any de facto changes to 
sovereignty seen under blurring, member-states remain sovereign from an international 
legal point of view – an argument that parallels Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982) negative 
sovereignty thesis in a “first world” context. 
While it is important to consider this potentially mitigating factor, there is a logical 
response to it. After all, the idea of de facto changes presaging de jure ones is hardly 
new. In looking at the history of sovereignty, it is clear that it developed over an 
extended period of time and, before states were sovereign in a de jure sense they (and 
sovereignty itself) underwent a lengthy period of de facto evolution. Accordingly, if de 
jure sovereignty is, however problematically, heuristically dated to Westphalia, the 
principles underlying it – territoriality, non-intervention, and sovereign equality – all 
began their de facto development centuries before. Brown (2002: 26) writes, “The 
significance of the Peace of Westphalia is not so much that it established new principles, 
rather that after 1648 challenges to the principles that had been established over the 
previous century become few and far between”. 
Viewed in that way, blurring in Europe may reflect an instance of desuetude in which the 
Union is making the international legal sovereign character of its member-states 
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progressively less pertinent. The difficulty is, however, that IR risks missing such shifts 
by largely privileging de jure side of the debate. Wendt and Freidheim (1995: 690) write 
that by privileging the de jure side of sovereignty “makes it hard to see any de facto 
authority structures that might exist in the system”. Put a little differently, while de jure 
sovereignty may technically still exist, that should not detract from the importance of the 
de facto changes that are occurring. With that in mind, one re-arrives at a situation in 
which blurring is both antithetical to sovereignty and the sovereignty-based 
domestic/international cleavage as well as is a substantive, alternative, operationalizable 
mode of political and socio-political organization altogether. 
Having developed the relationships between jurisdiction and blurring and sovereignty 
and blurring, one can move to the connection between blurring and authority/power 
(legitimacy). As noted earlier, authority and power are considered jointly insofar as they 
represent opposite sides of the same coin, debating the presence of (authority) or lack of 
(power) of a legitimizing factor. In saying that, it may seem strange to return to 
authority/power debates insofar as the study has featured jurisdiction specifically to 
capture authority’s more active connotations – the administration of authority. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to take this step back to address the defining feature of the 
authority/power division – the presence or the lack of a legitimatizing foundation. 
Because authority is a corollary of power, jurisdiction of authority, and blurring of 
jurisdiction, by upsetting traditional sovereignty lines, blurring re-opens debates about 
the legitimate basis of political and socio-political power. 
Sovereignty offered a singular, clear normative underpinning for jurisdiction, rooting it 
in a combination of territoriality (within a given territory, a government has supreme 
jurisdiction over all issues/people) and, overtime, democracy. The difficulty is, by 
rejecting sovereignty, blurring upsets those normative foundations. It challenges the 
possibility for them in their own rights as well as creates the likelihood for new and 
multiple ones under its rubric. For instance, the de-territorializing effects, number 
variability, and functional debates that are constitutive of blurring negate the 
territory/jurisdiction/functionality congruency. Not only does that make creating a setup 
of legitimate domestic rule in territorially-based insides separated from a foreign, 
international anarchic outside problematic, but also it challenges the notion that a single 
ruler concurrently holds jurisdiction over a set of territorial/jurisdictional/functional 
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borders. By extension, blurring also creates problems for democracy. For example, 
Glencross (2007, 2009) argues that any discussion about EU democracy must take into 
account the connection between democracy and sovereignty in a context where the aim is 
to “overcome anarchy without replicating hierarchy” (effectively a form of blurring). By 
upsetting sovereignty, blurring upsets traditional assumptions about the possibilities for 
and the execution of state-based democracy. And that entails a need to rethink democracy 
under blurring specifically (next chapter). 
One should note that the EU has attempted to deal with legitimacy issues – for instance, 
through subsidiarity principles. Moreover, not everyone agrees that the Union has a 
legitimacy/democracy problem (Majone, 1994, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002). Nevertheless, 
neither argument offers a convincing picture with respect to “solving” (or in the latter’s 
case rejecting) the EU’s legitimacy concerns. First, because subsidiarity “employs the 
criterion of effectiveness for defining the applicable level of government action”, it is not 
necessarily focused on legitimacy at all; there is nothing automatically “legitimacy 
forming” about placing authority closer to “the people” (Glencross, 2007: 8). Indeed, it is 
conceivable that local institutions might be illegitimate themselves (e.g. due to vested 
interests). Moreover, insofar as subsidiarity simply seeks to limit their portfolios, it fails 
to address the legitimacy of “higher” actors themselves – actors that are central to certain 
very controversial issues, such as terrorism. 
The deficit-denying arguments are also problematic. First, because blurring is the core 
finding, the EU is not merely a “regulatory state”, as Majone (1994, 2000) argues. 
Absent that, even he accepts that there is a credibility gap between the EU and its 
policies, thereby in essence arguing its setups creates core legitimacy concerns. Second, 
the tool-of-states argument fails to realize that the EU is not simply an agent of the 
member-states.31 As this study established, European political and socio-political setups 
are heterogeneous, interactive zones that defy the either/or, IO/polity, approaches.32 As 
such, interpretations of EU democracy based on an either/or assumption are incorrect. 
                                                
31 Were the EU simply a tool of the member-states it may not require input legitimacy. However, since that 
is not the case – the EU is a blurring hybridity – the argument misses the mark. 
32 Rumford and Murray (2003: 86) go so far as to note that those who “advocate a [singular] choice 
between comparative politics and international relation approaches” do ES a “grave disservice”. See next 
chapter. 
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Given those problems, one returns to the authority/power coin and two critical questions. 
First, if the singular, old legitimating source of legitimacy is problematized, does blurring 
edge towards power? Second, if it does, how does one create legitimacy in a blurring 
environment? In the first case, power might come into play insofar as legitimacy debates 
fail to resolve themselves. In a direct sense, a situation of blurring might deteriorate into 
relationships of power to the extent that the relevant actors fail to legitimate their actions 
– in the Union’s case, for example, in the context of a particular functional action or in 
cases of external governance. While, the EU has not yet reached that point – EB data 
shows that levels of trust in it consistently exceed levels of distrust (on average, 47 to 40 
percent respectively between 2005 and 2010) and external governance programs tend to 
occur only with the consent of the non-member – issues of legitimacy remains “in play”. 
In a more abstract sense, because blurring creates the possibility for conflict between 
actors over functions and/or spaces, a reversion back to a state of nature is always on the 
horizon. Again, under sovereignty, there were clear lines demarking domestic 
jurisdiction (hierarchy) on the one hand and international power relations (anarchy) 
between those units on the other. The jungle was tamed through the birth of Leviathan 
within a set of borders, while a state of nature remained between the units. The problem 
is, by accepting that there might be complex, conditional, and even conflicting and 
overlapping jurisdictional lines (and therein rejecting the anarchy/hierarchy binary), 
blurring rests on an uneasy balance. It contains the latent possibility for deterioration 
away from its complex, yet also largely accepted, setups towards the sort of power 
politics imbued in realist thinking; the EU’s polycentric, interactive jurisdictional order, 
by being polycentric, interactive (as well as neither hierarchical nor anarchical) carries a 
risk of deteriorating towards power politics. Indeed, one might rhetorically ask what 
would have happened had the FCC ultimately rejected the ECJ’s ruling in the Mangold 
case or if the Czech Constitutional Court deems a particular Union action contrary to its 
principles as a “democratic law-based state”. With those questions as context, Hofstadter 
(1999: 693, emphasis added) writes, in the context of what he calls “tangled hierarchies, 
that, “[I]n a societies like ours, the legal system is, in a sense, a polite gesture granted 
collectively by millions of people—and it can be overridden just as easily as a river can 
overflow its banks. Then a seeming anarchy takes over…”. 
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In saying that a domestic/international separation might reemerge, one should be clear 
that the assumption is that a sovereignty-based setup is the likely settling-placing.33 In 
making that assumption there may be cause for criticism given that the preceding 
chapters all strove to establish that sovereignty is a historical contingency. Nonetheless, a 
sovereignty-reversion assumption is reasonable. First, sovereignty is a long assumed, 
long lasting structural belief. If historical longevity counts for anything, a failure of 
blurring is likely to lead to a reversion to that standard. Second, despite the relatively 
steady levels of satisfaction in EU democracy, recent debates, such as those in the 
context of the 2008 financial crisis and the socio-political upheavals accompanying it, 
have heightened concerns in ways that point towards less not more Europe.34 Thus, the 
complex answer to the problematique constitutive of a blurring jurisdictional form 
inevitably creates a measure of nervousness with respect to systemic stability – a point 
that obviously takes on renewed importance given the current Euro/debate debates (see 
the study’s conclusion). 
If blurring risks deteriorating into power, it obviously creates the need to debate 
legitimacy under it shadow. While blurring may change perceptions of how legitimacy 
ought to be achieved by upsetting the clarity of previous configurations of it, it does not 
negate the need for it. Whatever the solution ends up being, and this study does not have 
the practical or normative perspectives to enter that debate in earnest, the underlying 
point is clear: because blurring is a jurisdictional type, it must ensure some measure of 
legitimacy exists under it. In saying that, and because there are multiple “whos”, 
“whats”, “wheres”, “hows”, and “over whoms”, it may be the case that multiple types of 
legitimacy are necessary in different circumstances. As such, and as the next chapter 
develops fully, one must ensure that one’s analytical outlooks have the flexibility 
necessary to debate issues like democracy absent sovereignty. Nevertheless, however 
they form and whatever they are, blurring requires legitimacy structures of some type. 
In the end, the relationships between blurring and jurisdiction, blurring and sovereignty, 
and blurring and authority/power (legitimacy) each nip at slightly different aspects. In the 
first case, blurring is a particular configuration of jurisdiction more broadly. While 
                                                
33 In the EU’s case, a reversion might not yield the 27 original states, however there would be revitalization 
of the domestic/international separation based on reconstituted sovereign borders between units. 
34 Despite still outpacing overall mistrust levels, EB data shows trust in the EU is down 19 percent from a 
four year high (57 percent in May 2007 to 42 percent in June 2010).  
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complex, variable and active, it nonetheless offers an operationalizable way of resolving 
the problematique. In the second case, blurring is understood through that what it is not – 
sovereignty. And, in the third case, blurring creates questions about legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, being a type of jurisdiction, it necessarily must root itself in some 
normative structure. Therefore, saying there is blurring means arguing that Europe’s 
political and socio-political structures and relationships are, again borrowing Ruggie’s 
(1993) term, “heteronomous”. The problematique is resolved in that who decides what, 
where, how, and over whom is driven by, and contextual too, the specific actor, space, 
function, method, and/or socio-political relationship at play. While that may prevent the 
one-size-fits-all, state-based, jurisdictional understandings possible under sovereignty, 
the possibility for jurisdiction more broadly remains viable. Therefore, the critical debate 
becomes an actor’s normative foundations – again, a point the next chapter picks up on. 
The global context revisited 
Having examined blurring in Europe and attempted to extract some analytical standards 
out of that examination, it is important to remember where this study began, largely from 
a perspective in which the European case was the means of further developing existing 
sovereignty critical perspectives. In that sense, and while all considerations are made for 
the difficulties of generalizability out of a single case, given the understanding of 
blurring just provided, blurring clearly finds support outside the European region. For 
instance, and again as chapter 1 laid out, one certainly sees a proliferation of 
jurisdictional actors with varying scopes and methods throughout the global 
environment. While the dynamics of those things will no doubt differ from the European 
case when it comes to on-the-ground execution, the underlying arguments with respect to 
jurisdictional blurring remain pertinent. Just as blurring in Europe represents a specific 
type of jurisdiction, blurring outside of it also logically represents a way of 
administrating authority at odds with sovereign assumptions. 
In that sense, the blurring seen in Europe presages blurring found globally or, in the 
reverse, the blurring seen in Europe represents a subset of the blurring found in the 
global environment. Whichever way one prefers, the point is that blurring is not 
necessarily confined to the European case. Whether in Europe or in the wider world, it 
represents the simultaneous proliferation of the number of jurisdictional actors, the 
development of complex, variable, potentially conflicting and overlapping spatial and 
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functional scopes, a diversity of administration, and a muddling of individual-polity 
relations. Moreover, whether in Europe or in the wider environment, blurring exists in 
similar relation with the other core terms – negating sovereignty, updating jurisdiction, 
and creating legitimacy questions.  
Extending on that last comment, when cases (or aspects) of blurring appear outside of 
Europe, there is an implicit rejection of the empirical and analytical application of 
sovereignty-derived assumptions – a point central to globalization and its rejection of 
territorial boundedness and the jurisdictional/functional/territorial congruency (N. 
Walker 2010). Therefore, to the extent that one accepts that globalization is occurring, 
one must accept that its processes are fundamentally at odds with sovereignty. In saying 
that, one should be clear that this has “negative” and “positive” effects; just as 
globalization has desirable and undesirable impacts, so does blurring (Scholte, 2000; 
Held and McGrew, 2002). While in its more constructive forms, such as the EU, it 
arguably produces many goods, it potentially has more problematic variants, such as in 
the case of Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982) negative sovereignty argument in Africa and/or 
the more problematic offshoots of globalization (e.g. transnational terrorism). 
Furthermore, with respect to the power/authority coin, the possibility for blurring 
globally creates debates over legitimacy globally. As foreshadowed by the EU example, 
by upsetting sovereignty, blurring also upsets the normative structures developed under 
it. There are again two sides to the story. In the first case, there is a problematizing of the 
old. For instance, representative democracy is understandably harder without clear 
political centers, strong national bonds, and with increasingly mobile populations 
(Kymlicka, 1999; Dahl, 1999; Nye 2001). Moreover, the evolving human rights culture 
has problematized non-intervention principles such that certain ethical breaches are now 
deemed beyond a state’s rights.35  
In the second case, the failure of the old compels one to ask what new forms of 
legitimacy are necessary (Habermas, 2001a; Held, 2002a, 2002b; Linklater, 2007; N. 
Walker 2010). In that regard, some have attempted to deal with the effects of blurring via 
the development of more open forms of democracy (McGrew, 2002). Others note the 
                                                
35 This does not mean that human rights are always respected. The point is that even the most atrocious 
states generally pay lip service to human rights (Donnelly 2007).  
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need for updated forms of citizenship based less on soil or blood and more on interests 
and discourse (Linklater, 1998a, 2008b). Irrespective of how legitimacy is achieved, 
however, the basic fact remains that because blurring is a jurisdictional process, it must 
have a normative underpinning. While, as was the case in Europe, a return to power 
relationships remains a possibility, the critical question going forward is how legitimacy 
ought to develop in an era of differing, potentially conflicting, and contextual who, what, 
where, how, and over whom determinations. And, again, that means having the analytical 
outlooks necessary to appreciate and understand those alterations (next chapter). 
Jurisdictional variability 
In making those points, a critical clarification must be made. While there certainly are 
examples of blurring outside the European case, instances certainly remain that do not 
reflect blurring. Blurring does not permeate every political and socio-political structure 
and relationship globally, and where it does not, the other three possibilities remain 
valid. 36  Moreover, insofar as each of them remains possible, the inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations retain a degree of empirical 
viability and analytical usefulness (again, next chapter). Thus, and as chapter 1 noted, 
whereas some globalization theory risks over-emphasizing their arguments by assuming 
a complete flattening and interconnecting of the world, non-blurred structures and 
relationships continue to persist and must be taken into account. In simpler terms, 
understanding jurisdictional variability is critical. 
As an example of this, one need only illustrate the continuation of sovereignty-based 
setups. In that regard, it certainly seems to be that case that the relationship between, for 
example, the US and North Korea operates more along the lines associated with classical 
assumptions about a sovereign jurisdictional form than those of blurring. In that 
relationship, the number, scope, and method metrics all appear to operate in their 
sovereignty-defined ways – the state is the controlling actor, territorial borders are 
patrolled and protected, and relations are dictated by traditional forms of diplomacy and 
practice. A clean, clear, and static domestic/international separation exists – a setup 
fundamentally dissimilar to the blurring one between EU member-states. 
                                                
36 The argument for breakdown would essentially be an argument for the formation of a world state – 
something Wendt (2003) argues is not only possibly, but “inevitable”. While this study does not take sides 
in that debate, the possibility for global breakdown must remain in one’s analytical toolbox. 
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In making this distinction, one might be tempted to argue that it simply confirms 
Wendt’s point that anarchy is “what states make of it” and that the norms, values, and 
identities shared between the UK and France produce a different type of anarchy than 
between the US and North Korea (Wendt, 1992). Nevertheless, while anarchy may be 
what states make of it, saying that there are different types of it based on the 
existence/non-existence of certain sets of common identities fails to address blurring 
insofar as it remains wed to sovereignty of some type. There may be relationships defined 
by varieties of anarchy (and by extension hierarchies), however there also might be areas 
in which sovereignty is not the operative issue and where political and socio-political life 
is fundamentally blurring. In those situations, not only is the anarchic/hierarchy binary 
misleading, the domestic/international separation is nonsensical as foreign/domestic 
divisions cannot readily or reliably be established.  
Thus, returning to the issue spurring this discussion, it is possible to have both blurring 
and non-blurring scenarios occurring on a common global map – a setup that appears 
closer to Rosenau’s bifurcated world than varieties of anarchy.37 That being the case, it is 
necessary to be analytically sensitive to both scenarios, including when each becomes 
more or less likely, without being beholden to either. While that is picked-up in earnest 
in the next chapter, the point is that multiple jurisdictional processes can co-habit a 
common global map – traditional international relationships existing in some areas, in 
some circumstances, and between some actors and blurring ones in other areas, in other 
circumstances, and between other actors. Therefore, blurring ends up being critical as a 
force unto itself, but also an example of jurisdictional variation within the global setup. 
And that naturally opens the door to asking how one might actually go about 
descriptively, analytically, and even disciplinarily mapping such a world. 
Conclusion 
Based on the arguments made in this chapter, as well as more fully throughout the study 
thus far, one arrives at a situation akin to Strange’s (1996) memorably named 
“Pinocchio’s problem” – for, once Pinocchio grew up, he no longer had his familiar set 
of strings to help guide his actions and make his decisions. In much the same way, once 
                                                
37 This may not be a perfect analogy insofar as Rosenau is willing to attribute a degree of permanence to 
bifurcation. That may be true. However this study does not leverage a prediction with respect to longevity.  
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the guiding strings of a uniformly sovereignty-based jurisdictional world are cut – or, 
perhaps more appropriately, once some are cut, others combined, and yet others created 
anew – old assumptions about the movement and the mapping of international relations 
are thrown open. The possibility for jurisdictional blurring and, with it, jurisdictional 
variation forces reflection on questions as basic as they are provocative: What and where 
are domestic zones? What relationships constitute them? How does one map them? What 
and where is the international zone? What relationships constitute it? How does one map 
it? Can one divide political and socio-political life into discrete levels? What new actors, 
scopes, and methods emerge? What new forms of legitimacy are needed?  
Based on those questions – questions one is compelled to ask due to blurring and 
jurisdictional variability – the study’s next, and final substantive chapter focuses 
specifically on what sort of new guiding strings might be fashioned. It asks what shifts in 
focus and terminology are necessary to better describe, analyze, and study the contours 
and conduct of contemporary political and socio-political life and thought under blurring. 
In doing so, one sees that the re-mappings performed under its context prove beneficial – 
beneficial to the extent that they better bring together theory and practice, beneficial to 
the extent that they offer more appropriate and more useful analytical languages, and 
ultimately beneficial to the process of rethinking disciplinary divisions in more sensible 
and efficacious ways. 
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Chapter 6 – Mapping jurisdictional change 
 
Introduction 
If the previous chapter was concerned with providing an operationalizable, process-based 
conception of blurring, this one is interested in tracking why that shift in concept and 
language is critical. To do so, it turns to and develops the idea of mapping – mapping as 
a method of structuring the debate as a whole as well as mapping as a means of 
illustrating how one might navigate through the substantive impacts of blurring. To 
accomplish those tasks, it analyzes three distinct, but ultimately interrelated, mapping 
types – what it terms as descriptive mapping, analytical mapping, and disciplinary 
mapping.1 In each case, blurring is the key concept at play with the core question being 
how its tenets impact the particular mapping type in focus.2 Moreover, in each case, 
blurring is looked at both as a conclusion in and of itself (mapping blurring) as well as 
one possible jurisdictional type among others (mapping jurisdictional variability). 
In the first case, the chapter deals with descriptive mapping. In doing so, the focus is on 
how the real-world effects of blurring alter perceptions about how political and socio-
political life ought to be described. Thus, as is developed below, descriptive mapping 
addresses how one might best illustratively capture the jurisdictional claims and even 
conflicts and overlaps that arise out of blurring. In doing so, it also tracks how one might 
map a world in which some areas operate under blurring’s logics while others remain 
largely sovereignty-based; how to depict jurisdictional variability. Put together, 
descriptive mapping is really all about re-mapping those classic, sovereignty-based, 
colorful classroom maps in ways that acknowledge, accept, and incorporate blurring 
specifically and jurisdictional variability more generally. Because the focus is on 
illustrating the real-world impacts of the blurring finding, descriptive mapping is not 
directly concerned with achieving overall analytical leverage – a distinction, as is 
                                                
1 Drawing these distinctions is done primarily for heuristic purposes. All three ultimately play off of each 
other such that descriptive re-mapping logically necessitates an analytical one and an analytical one a 
disciplinary one. 
2 It is important to note that IR does not always recognize these differences. Because IR analytically and 
disciplinary needs the political and socio-political worlds to look a certain way, its analytical and 
disciplinary readings have become reified creating a theory-practice gulf that must be fixed. See below.  
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returned to below, often forgotten under sovereign mapping. As the name implies, the 
focus is on generating accurate description, not analytical purchase. 
In the second case, the chapter does then deal with analytical mapping, which, as the 
name implies, is concerned with determining how one might logically map the changes 
brought on by blurring and jurisdictional variability in analytically useful ways. For it, 
the main concern is determining what blurring entails for the leveling assumptions 
inherent to the sovereign-based approaches used by IR. Thus, whereas descriptive 
mapping was all about offering a vision of the on-the-ground impacts of the blurring 
finding without direct concern for achieving analytical purchase for those maps, 
analytical mapping is about locating and defining the key variables and new languages 
that are necessary in the process of analyzing and organizing the study of modern 
political and socio-political life. As one sees, that requires adopting very different kinds 
of ontological starting points than those found under sovereignty-based, leveling 
perspectives.  
In the third case, the chapter deals with disciplinary mapping. Again, as the name 
implies, under it the emphasis is on how the descriptive and analytical changes brought 
about by blurring and mapped in the first two sections impact, most directly, mainstream 
IR, but also more general beliefs about how political and socio-political phenomena 
ought to be academically approached. Thus, the primary concern is how blurring impacts 
academic divisions of labor – both what challenges arise as well as what alternatives 
might be necessary. In the end, the study concludes that blurring necessitates holding 
disciplinary boundaries “in suspense”, thereby prompting and promoting both a greater 
degree of pragmatism and pluralism within international thinking and beyond. 
Altogether, the series of re-mappings presented in this chapter represent the necessary, 
appropriate, and ultimately more useful guidelines to understanding the dynamics of 
modern political and socio-political life and thought given blurring. Reflecting back on 
the study’s initial question of whether the domestic and the international realms are really 
separate entities requiring separate conceptualizations, the blurring illustrated in Europe 
ends up being both the challenge and the response – the challenge insofar as it 
problematizes the adequacy of traditional maps and the response insofar it helps structure 
the new logics and the new perspectives through which new maps are developed. 
 182 
While some may criticize blurring for its perceived penchant for and acceptance of 
analytical ambiguity, outcome inconclusiveness, and high degrees of contextualization, 
the maps developed in this chapter are the forceful reminders not only that blurring is a 
fact of contemporary life that must be dealt it with, but also that understanding it and its 
effects can be organized in descriptively, analytically, and disciplinarily sensible and 
efficacious ways. In the final analysis, the chapter answers the question introduced at the 
outset of the study – how does jurisdictional change affect IR’s ability to make sense of 
political and socio-political life and thought – by providing a new and more useful set of 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary ways forward derived from, based on, and 
filtered through the blurring finding. 
Mapping mapping 
Prior to going into the specifics of what shifts in thought and language blurring prompts, 
it is necessary to briefly develop the importance of mapping and maps as the 
undergirding concepts of the chapter. Beginning with a terminological issue, there are 
two subtly different terms at play – mapping and map. With the term “mapping”, the 
focus is on the practices, procedures, judgments, and/or methods one uses in the process 
of creating a map. In a study devoted to the topic, Dorling and Fairbairn (1997: 39) write 
that mapping involves “decisions on what features to include, whether to exaggerate, 
displace, and classify them, and how to symbolize and simplify them…”.  
In saying that, it should be stressed that because mapping involves choices of what to and 
what not to include as well as how to depict those selections, it is an unavoidably 
subjective activity. In other words, however one does it, mapping is not a purely 
“analytic” or “academic” endeavor and eventually always involves making judgments as 
to what factors to focus on, what factors to exclude, and therein how to depict those 
various choices. Branch (2011a: 7) writes, “Maps and mapmaking are never value-
neutral scientific practices”. For present purposes, therefore, the key debate is over what 
practices, procedures, judgments, and/or methods provide the most appropriate and most 
useful means of understanding modern political and socio-political life in the context of 
blurring – whether in and of itself or through its role in creating jurisdictional variability.  
If mapping focuses on processes, “the map” reflects the artifact. While maps are often 
geographic and spatial in nature, neither is a necessary feature and they increasingly take 
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on more interactive, multidimensional, and even non-physical properties (e.g. three-
dimensional brain mapping and/or mental maps) (Dorling and Fairbairn, 1997). In a 
technical sense, maps generally contain a number of explanatory elements, such as a 
key/legend, scales, and other signifying devices (though none of these components are 
necessary and one might encounter some, others, or none at all). In making the 
distinction between mapping and maps, the critical point is that the latter represents a 
stabilization of the former such that mapping logically precedes the map. In a similar 
way, the initial focus of the following sections is on descriptively, analytically, and 
disciplinarily mapping blurring. Nevertheless, the artifact – the map – is never far off and 
becomes the focus.  
With those terminological points as guidance, the door is open towards addressing a 
more important question: why mapping is traditionally performed/what are maps 
conventionally used for? On one level, the response is commonsensical insofar as maps, 
of all types, are commonplace aspects of everyday life. From this view, mapping is done 
and maps are used to deliver a measure of information in an assessable, likely visual, 
manner. For instance, not only does one find the international map cited throughout this 
study in virtually every school classroom and used to impart knowledge about the 
world’s political structures, but one frequently also encounters maps depicting 
transportation lines to help with travel, weather to guide clothing choices, and landmarks 
to direct tourists around a city. Whatever the type of map one encounters in their day-to-
day lives, from this commonsensical point of view, their goals are largely the same – to 
offer a symbolized depiction of reality (or a section of it) in a way that informs and 
furthers knowledge about that reality (or a section of it). 
If that is the commonsense purpose of maps, on a deeper level, and what seems to 
underlie the nature of mapping itself, is a desire to balance simplicity with complexity 
and accessibility with depth. As such, mapping might be considered as the pursuit of a 
middle ground between the austerity of unrestrained analytics and the virtually unlimited 
particularities that exist in any specific empirical situation. This means that all maps 
contain intentional limitations, whether by focusing on a specific issue at the exclusion of 
others or through simplification in the name of accessibility. Maps both describe and 
ascribe knowledge. They describe – reflect – it based on the content of that which they 
are representing. They ascribe – create – it based on their ways of presenting it. 
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In saying that the purpose of maps is to carve-out a middle ground between parsimony 
and complexity, the argument is not that maps are pejoratively “simplistic”. Of course, it 
may be the case that a map simplifies in the name of accessibility. London’s public tube 
map is no doubt more “basic” than the engineer’s map. However, it may also be the case 
that a map contains a great deal of detail and attempts to create a very accurate image. 
For example, one can easily imagine roadwork teams using very precise maps of the 
locations of underground sewage, water, and electrical lines. Nevertheless, even in the 
cases in which a map stresses actuate depiction, it remains subjective insofar as it ignores 
factors not relevant to its overall purpose. Those, in one sense, highly detailed roadwork 
maps undoubtedly fail to consider things that a tourist map might.3 Thus, while some 
maps simplify to create easy-to-understand snapshots and others contain a great deal of 
detail for a specific purpose, all maps submit to some form of distortion. The task is 
finding the proper balance between the need to represent reality – to depict knowledge – 
and the need to do so in a way that achieves the greatest measure of analytical purchase 
over the issues most relevant to one’s goals – to ascribe knowledge. 
Bringing this back to the issue at hand, the arguments presented in this chapter, whether 
in the descriptive, analytical, or disciplinary context, are attempts to build updated maps 
of modern political and socio-political life and thought given blurring. In doing so, the 
argued shift from older to newer versions is seen as vital for purposes of both depiction – 
to better bring together theory and practice – as well as ascription – to allow for more 
interesting and more useful perspectives. Indeed, both processes ultimately reinforce 
each other. A judgment is therefore made that the changes brought on by blurring 
transform political and socio-political setups to such an extent that new maps to better 
describe, analyze, and organize thought about them is necessary. 
One would be remised not to make clear that at no point are any assumptions made that 
these re-mappings will – or are meant to – unite theory and practice. As noted above, all 
maps are subjective such that none depicts everything. Moreover, as Hay (2010: 23) 
pointed out, “[As social scientists] [o]ur task is not to hold up a mirror to reality – and, 
hence, to reflect its ontological complexity – but to build and trace narrative paths 
through it”. Accordingly, the chapter’s most important goal is gaining analytical 
                                                
3 It is worth noting that insofar maps are normally thought of as static devices, they also risk becoming 
outdated with changing circumstances – a point returned to the context of the need for dynamic mapping. 
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purchase over the complexity coming out of blurring. Even the descriptive mapping that 
takes place and where precise depiction is privileged remains a simplification to the 
extent that it too makes choices as to what and how to portray on-the-ground 
circumstance. Thus, while all the re-mappings done below model very different 
arrangements from those traditionally used by and in IR, they remain similar to them 
insofar as they are subjective entities themselves. The argument is simply that they offer 
a better balance between parsimony and the substantive, real-world changes and 
complexities coming out of blurring.  
Descriptive mapping 
Having outlined what mapping and maps mean, the first task is sifting through how the 
tenets of blurring influence modern descriptive political and socio-political maps. Again, 
the goal is determining whether a new type of map is required and, if so, how one might 
define it. Prior to going into how one might actually do that, it is worth reiterating what 
descriptive mapping means, particularly in the context of the points made about the 
nature of mapping/maps. On one side, the stress of descriptive mapping is accurate 
depiction of real-world circumstance. In that sense, it is about re-mapping those 
sovereignty-based, colorfully drawn classroom maps in ways that incorporate blurring 
and jurisdictional variability. On the other side, while the study has been clear that it is 
problematic to draw a strict separation between what are sometimes termed the “real” 
and the “academic” worlds (and while that belief continues to be in effect), descriptive 
mapping purposefully skews the debate in favor of making a division in order to 
emphasize the extent of the on-the-ground changes produced by blurring – irrespective of 
the high levels of intricacies that results from it. Though all mapping is subjective, 
descriptive mapping biases towards depiction when compared to analytical and 
disciplinary mapping. Whatever knowledge is ascribed ought to therefore be more about 
the nature of “real-world” structures than academic usefulness.  
Descriptive challenges 
With that as the goal, the traditional international political map depicts states along 
clearly and cleanly divided sovereign, inside/outside borders. Moreover, the assumption 
is that individuals are socio-politically located within those units via the 
inclusion/exclusion effects of state citizenship such that one line denotes the territorial, 
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political, and socio-political boundaries of the unit – of the state. This bundling works, of 
course, insofar as there are pre-established beliefs about the number, scope, and method 
metrics – one, territorial, and statist – as well as an accepted form of socio-political 
inclusion and exclusion – state citizenship. Sovereignty is the assumed jurisdictional 
standard – a standard, one might add, that is uniformly applied across the globe.  
Given that standard, however, blurring levels three key challenges. First, it reflects the 
development of an alternative, non-sovereign jurisdictional type. As the previous three 
chapters established, blurring is at odds with sovereignty and state citizenship. The 
European case offers a different resolution to the jurisdictional problematique via it own 
unique positions with represent to the number (who), scope (what, where, over whom), 
and method (how) metrics as well as individual-polity relationships. It rejects the 
quadripartite response to the problematique occurring under a sovereign jurisdictional 
form by developing an alternative with more than one actor, varying, possibly conflicting 
and overlapping scopes, and multiple methods of administration. It also rejects the 
simplicity of the either/or, inclusion/exclusion dimensions of state citizenship, instead 
stressing the marble-caked nature of European socio-political relations. 
Second, blurring challenges sovereignty as the singular solution to the problematique. 
On the one hand, there are cases in which blurring is the jurisdictional conclusion and in 
which blurring replaces sovereignty (e.g. Europe). On the other hand, one also sees 
situations in which sovereignty remains more or less intact. Thus, as chapter 5 noted in 
the context of Rosenau’s (1990) bifurcation setup, blurring is not ubiquitous and, where 
it is not in play, other jurisdictional options remain viable. Just as a singularly 
sovereignty-based map is incorrect, so too is a singularly blurring-based one. Sovereign 
mapping cannot simply and simplistically be replaced with a new, but still uniform, 
mapping process. The task is depicting jurisdictional variation.  
Third, irrespective of whether blurring is the conclusion or not, its process-based tenets 
challenge the “staticity” common to sovereign mapping. As chapter 5 noted, the term 
“blurring” was used to capture its dynamic nature and the potential for change. 
Accordingly, if one takes process-based arguments seriously, then they ought to apply 
across the board. While the reasons for stressing blurring “the process” were, in some 
respects, linked specifically to its tenets (the fact that it contains a measure of 
jurisdictional restlessness), the underlying point is more expansive having to do with a 
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more general need to recognize the potential for change in global life. Therefore, whether 
new or old, blurring or sovereignty-based, any stationary map is inconsistent with the 
dynamism of the global environment. Descriptive mapping must leave room for potential 
shifts to and in political and socio-political setups – and with them transformations to 
jurisdictional forms.  
Descriptive re-maps 
If blurring yields those challenges, the question is how to re-map a world in which 
blurring exists as a specific conclusion, a world in which blurring and sovereignty 
coexist, and a world in which change is an ever-present possibility. Taking each in turn, 
descriptively mapping blurring as the independent conclusion requires, first and 
foremost, accepting the shift away from sovereignty-based setups to blurring ones. As 
the definition of blurring laid out in chapter 5 made clear, under it, one cannot neatly 
bundle together territorial, jurisdictional, functional, and socio-political factors. One 
cannot depict all of them with a single, static black line. That would, simply put, not be 
an accurate portrayal. By the same token, if accurate depiction is the goal, mapping 
blurring requires depicting the variability and intricacies – including the potential for 
conflicts and overlaps – associated with blurring. Accordingly, a blurring map would 
include a number of necessary elements.  
First, it would include a means of depicting all the jurisdictionally impactful actors – 
statist or otherwise. Second, it would include a means of depicting the extent of those 
actors’ jurisdictional roles, spatially and functionally, including the possibility for 
conflicts and overlaps between actors over particular functions/in common spaces. Third, 
it would include a means of depicting the various methods of administration, particularly 
whether they are formal or informal. Fourth, it would include a means of depicting the 
various socio-political relationships at play, both rights based and symbolic. Fifth, 
insofar as there is a possibility for different legitimacy structures underpinning the 
actions of the various actors (e.g. the basis of legitimacy for EU jurisdiction in external 
governance is different from that of a member-state’s over tax law) all of this would have 
to include a means of depicting where and when different legitimacy types come into 
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play (see below). Finally, being process-based, it would have to include a means of 
depicting the dynamism inherent to the jurisdictional form as a whole.4  
Whatever the artistic tools and techniques one uses in those regards – and this study does 
not pretend to have the tools to illustrate such a process – mapping blurring must ensure 
that all four tangible issues (number, scope, method, socio-political relationships) are 
included in ways that depicts the variability and dynamisms associated with them. 
Moreover, because there are likely different normative structures underpinning different 
actor scopes and functions, one must illustrate not only where jurisdictional lines fall 
(and perhaps conflict), but also why and on what bases they do. Indeed, without 
illustrating why an actor has jurisdiction in any specific case, there is no way to 
determine whether it is jurisdictional (which has a normative underpinning) or merely a 
power relation (which does not). In all those ways, mapping blurring would 
understandably and necessarily take on a highly descriptive and contextual character to 
ensure that all the various components and their interactions are addressed.5  
In saying that a thickness of description is necessary to map blurring, one must be clear 
that it is not merely a matter of creating a more detailed map compared to a sovereign 
one (though that certainly is the case). Rather, high levels of description are the 
unavoidable by-products of the political and socio-political complexity, variability, and 
dynamism coming out of blurring. Indeed, the need to take all of those aspects into 
account is what fundamentally sets the mapping processes needed under a blurring 
jurisdictional form apart from the relative simplicity of the inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international lines found under sovereignty. The fact 
that descriptively mapping blurring requires one to be more detail simply reflects the 
real-world complexity at play. 
Having looked at mapping blurring itself, one can shift perspectives and ask how the 
possibility for it – jurisdictional variability – affects descriptive dynamics. On one side, 
                                                
4 This is understandably a big task. Nevertheless, certain factors must be kept in mind. First, as noted 
earlier, the purpose of any map is likely to be case specific. As such, even (highly detailed) descriptive 
mapping likely has limits. Second, as also noted earlier, this discussion of descriptive mapping is primarily 
concerned with establishing the necessities need for accurate depiction – not generating analytical worth. 
As such, while that is an undeniably large task, the purpose of the exercise is simply to illustrate all the 
factors that must be taken into account – irrespective of the resultant complexity. 
5 This is also critical as not all instances of blurring are necessarily the same. See analytical mapping. 
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as blurring in Europe illustrates, any map that fails to incorporate its logics fails to offer 
an accurate picture. On the other side, because blurring is not ubiquitous, any map that 
depicts only it without taking into account non-blurring jurisdictional types, including 
sovereignty, is also problematic. In saying that, the two options highlighted thus far been 
blurring or sovereignty. However, the argument is more wide-ranging and allows for any 
number of alternative setups based on any number of different resolutions to the 
problematique (Rosenau, 1992). While this study does not track all those possibilities, it 
is firm that, just as one cannot assume that all setups are sovereignty-based, one cannot 
assume that all are blurring or sovereignty-centered either. Descriptive mapping must 
recognize and incorporate jurisdictional diversity. And that means bringing the 
problematique to the forefront as the means of creating the space necessary for hosting 
the variety of political and socio-political structures and relationships that might develop 
and that would need concurrent depiction. 
Saying that jurisdiction is the key to mapping raises the question of how one actually 
determines the nature of any particular setup; where and when a given setup might be 
blurring versus where and when one might remain sovereignty-based (or something 
else). While this study does not map every instance, a failure to take into account the 
potential for variation fails to map correctly. Of course, one is not rudderless in that 
process. In the grandest sense, the problematique offers the initial question. In a more 
applied sense, the number, scope, and method metrics as well as citizenship debates 
reflect the core variables. Indeed, the process used to examine Europe in this study is a 
prime example of how one might determine jurisdictional type in any particular instance. 
To foreshadow a point made in the analytical sections that follow, the need to undertake 
those sorts of in-depth, case-specific examinations underlines why descriptive 
examination must occur prior to the application of any analytical logic/precept. 
Finally, due to blurring and variability, descriptive mapping mandates shifts away from 
the singular application of static, sovereignty perspectives towards jurisdictional 
centrality and sensitivity. In the first case, the intricacies and processual nature of 
blurring mandates complex, dynamic, and illustratively rich procedures in which the 
number, scope, and method metrics as well as socio-political connections and legitimacy 
debates are all taken into account. Again, that high level of detail is not merely about 
creating detail for detail’s sake. Mapping blurring requires a thickness of description in 
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order to capture the complexities and dynamisms constitutive of it. In the second case, 
jurisdictional variability means that maps must retain sensitivity to coexisting and 
changing jurisdictional forms. And that requires maintaining, but not being beholden to, 
the variety of mapping techniques – in this case, sovereignty and blurring based 
procedures – needed to depict the various forms that might exist. 
In this context, it might be said that these new maps exist less as static prints made up of 
bundled black lines to be hung on a wall and, very much in line with the technology 
revolution at the heart of the globalizing processes driving many of changes reflected by 
blurring, more as interactive displays. Nevertheless, however one actually constructs 
such maps, the complexities and dynamisms associated with blurring mandates using 
techniques that can accommodate the thicknesses of descriptions, and the variety needed, 
essential for accurate portrayal. While remembering that any map is a representation of a 
more complex reality and that the goal of social science is to achieve some degree of 
analytical purchase over it, when it comes to highlighting the descriptive properties of 
blurring on mapping, thicker, more contextual, and more interactive portrayals are the 
inescapable by-products of a changing, more intricate, and more complicated world.  
Analytical mapping 
Having made the connection between blurring and descriptive mapping, and developed 
an updated vision based on that relationship, one can turn to the related issue of what that 
means for analytical understandings. It is worth repeating that while analytical mapping 
is the logical follow-up to descriptive mapping, each focuses on a slightly different issue, 
the latter on organizing the real-world impacts of blurring without direct concern for 
“academic” usefulness and the former making sense of those changes in ways that 
generates analytical purchase over them. In that regard, the descriptive effects of blurring 
necessitate adopting very different analytical starting points than those used under 
sovereign mapping – starting points that better bring together theory and practice; that 
create the conceptual room to debate issues that otherwise risk being stymied and/or 
skewed under traditional mapping; and that are better able to deal with political and 
socio-political change. 
One can again start with a snapshot of traditional analytical mapping. As has been 
implied throughout the study, IR’s maps typically assume that political and socio-
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political life can appropriately and usefully be divided into distinct levels of analysis 
based on varying degrees of analytical depth – things achieved through its assumptions 
about the inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations. The 
tactic has been to deconstruct political structures and socio-political relationships into 
different “levels” based on those separations in order to both generate interesting debates 
about them as well as to achieve overall analytical purchase over them (Onuf, 1995).6 
For IR, that meant constructing domestic levels – sovereign states populated by citizens – 
on the one hand and an international level – states in anarchy – on the other. Onuf (1995: 
52) writes, “Levels endow each field of study with primary units that we can treat as 
unproblematically simple”. Indeed, it was by mapping in such a way that allowed IR to 
carve-out its distinctive subject matter.  
To be clear, saying that levels are explanatory devices constructed and deployed to 
reflect varying degrees of analytical depth does not mean that they are merely academic 
creations. Done properly, they should, to some degree, be reflective of the underlying 
empirical conditions of which they seek to help understand. And, it must be said, that has 
largely been true of IR’s levels insofar as sovereignty is a long-standing feature of 
political life. Ruggie (1993: 159, emphasis in original) notes that because sovereignty 
allows political action to be defined “as it appear[s] from a single fixed viewpoint”, 
notions of distance, space, position, and levels are all proper and useful metaphors. By 
bundling territorial, jurisdictional, functional, and socio-political borders together, 
sovereignty offered the single, fixed vantage point from which one might map different 
levels of analysis and therein construct the domestic/international binary. Thus, saying 
that levels are analytical constructs does not mean that they are wholly divorced from 
reality. As Ruggie’s point establishes, the domestic/international mapping process makes 
sense in an environment in which sovereignty is the structuring norm, and therefore in 
which single, fixed viewpoints are possible. 
Analytical challenges 
Problems arise, however, if one loses sight of the fact the leveling ultimately rests on a 
particular empirical underpinning – in this case, the sovereign state. Thus, while Ruggie 
                                                
6  Leveling also has the effect of guarding against what Campbell (1969) terms “Leonardoesque 
aspirations” – the impossibility of gaining expertise across the multiple schools. See below. 
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(1993: 144) accepts that leveling is possible under sovereignty, he is very clear that it is 
sovereignty specifically that permits the tactic; that sovereignty is “the doctrinal 
counterpart of the application of single-point perspectival forms”. Sovereignty is the 
factor that makes the inside/included/domestic and outside/excluded/international levels 
appropriate. Logically, therefore, a shift away from it and the single, fixed perspectival 
form it allows for would necessitate a similar shift away from the leveling processes 
formed through it. And, to the extent that the empirical rationales for using a particular 
analytical perspective falter without a corresponding change in perspective, what starts 
out as a convenient and useful way of framing a debate risks becoming divorced from, 
and a blinder to, understanding the setups it was originally meant to deal with. Rather 
than being an organizational tool linked to, but separate from reality, leveling threatens to 
become constitutive of that which it was meant to help comprehend. IR’s descriptive and 
analytical maps combine, resulting in the reification of both. The theory-practice balance 
negates as it merges. 
To stress, that sort of reification risks stymieing and/or skewing appreciations of issues 
that need debating, but that do not readily fit into established parameters; issues critical 
to modern life, however issues that require recognizing and incorporating the descriptive 
changes that have taken place into analytical perspectives (see below). In this respect, 
while IR’s dichotomies have helped structure thinking, and therein advance knowledge, 
they have done so precisely by limiting the questions asked and organizing the means 
that the answers are arrived at (Peterson, 2000: 74). Again, that is not automatically 
“bad” and IR cannot be for everything and everyone. Nonetheless, the issue is whether 
its dichotomies, and the analytical limits coming out of them, remain appropriate and 
useful given the increasingly complex and dynamic nature of modern descriptive maps.  
In asking that, there are two interrelated issues at play. First, there is a problem of 
appropriateness; whether domestic and international leveling has become reified such 
that it is no longer reflective of/too divorced from on-the-ground circumstance. Second, 
there is an issue of usefulness; whether that theory-practice rift and the continued used of 
sovereignty-based leveling stymies and/or skews appreciations of otherwise critical 
debates. Jointly, the question is therefore whether leveling and the dichotomies 
constitutive of it are more conceptual prisons than useful tools of understanding and 
explanation. Ruggie (1993: 172) writes, in the context of the EU specifically, the debate 
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is what happens when it is “difficult to visualize the conduct of international politics 
among community members, and to considerable measure even domestic politics, as 
though [they] took place from a starting point of [27] separate, single, fixed viewpoints?” 
With those issues in mind, because blurring rejects sovereignty as well as challenges its 
position as the sole structuring arbiter of political and socio-political life, it quickly 
becomes clear that it generates serious problems for leveling. As the descriptive mapping 
sections developed, by rejecting the relevance of sovereignty in cases of blurring (e.g. the 
EU) as well as sovereign setups globally ubiquitous (e.g. bifurcation), blurring 
necessitates maps sensitive to the complexities and dynamism of jurisdictional 
variability. Analytically, because leveling requires the single-point perspectival forms 
offered through the tenets of sovereignty, and because blurring negates the ability to 
always define them, one’s ability to construct a domestic versus an international level is 
problematized.  
It is precisely that fact that leads Ruggie (1993: 171), specifically, to conclude that the 
EU may constitute the first “multiperspectival polity” and “truly postmodern 
international political form”. While not adopting the full extent of that argument’s 
imagery, the underlying point is sound. Blurring reflects the EU’s multiperspectival 
nature and therefore the dangers of applying a single-point, leveling approach to it. 
Moreover, while blurring does not occur everywhere, the possibility for it somewhere 
reflects the problem of uniformly assuming sovereignty-based logics apply across the 
spectrum of global life. Failing to make a shift away from leveling risks stymying and/or 
skewing critical debates due to an inability to shift out of a sovereignty-based shell and 
recognize the multitude to jurisdictional forms that might exist. 
Analytical re-maps 
If blurring and leveling are incompatible, the issue becomes what new analytical maps 
might be developed. There are four main possibilities. First, insofar as determining what 
is domestic and what is international becomes challenging, the resolution might simply 
entail a re-leveling process based around thinner analytical cuts – in effect, an application 
of the stratification option. Second, instead of re-leveling around thinner cuts, one might 
shift the issue entirely and focus instead on the rules governing the system as a whole, as 
institutional approaches do. Third, one might attempt to “bolt-on” addendums to the 
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existing approach to deal with blurring. Finally, blurring may require a wholesale 
rethinking of leveling and the development of new analytical maps altogether. 
Taking each option in turn, the first attempts to deal with the complexity coming out of 
blurring by adding more levels above, below, and/or between the domestic and 
international ones in order to create thinner, and therefore ideally more accurate, 
analytical slices. Thus, one might define a local level, a regional level, and a global level 
in addition to the existing international and domestic ones. On the one hand, this 
approach would not necessarily negate traditional methods or IR’s analytical purchase as 
a domestic/international cleavage would still exist. On the other hand, it would tighten its 
remit by adding more levels. The analytical response to blurring would therefore entail 
constructing more targeted understandings via more detail levels. 
While this option is cogent, the rationales for adopting it are not persuasive. As chapters 
3-5 made clear, under blurring, leveling of any scope fails as it does not take into account 
the substantive and substantial differences between blurring and stratification. While 
stratification accepts that political and socio-political life has become more intricate and 
attempts to accommodate for that by making thinner cuts, because it does not take note 
of the intermediacies, indeterminacies, and processual forces present, it remains wed to 
the notion that there is a singular position from which all those levels – new and old –
might be drawn. Mapping thinner slices might be more effective than assuming setups 
are either domestic or international, however by not accounting for the differences 
between blurring and stratification, it fails to grasp the critical contents of blurring. It 
does not bring theory close enough to practice. 
Moving to the second option, instead of developing thinner levels, one might disregard 
leveling altogether and focus on the institutions – the formal and informal “rules of the 
game” governing political and socio-political action (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999; 
Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). Outlining what this means Jupille and Caporaso write, 
Comparative and IR scholars are increasingly using institutional analysis, making 
common cause with the notion that institutions matter. It matters less whether politics 
occurs within or among nations. What matters more is that politics occurs within a 
framework of mutually understood principles, norms, rules or procedures – that is, 
within an institutional context. Institutionalism, for its proponents, promises a logic 
that can unify the analyses of politics and policy making at and across level of 
analysis, contributing to the increasing transcendence of the traditional comparative-
IR divide (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 30). 
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In offering that snapshot of institutionalism, one should be clear that the approach may 
be useful when it comes to assessing why a particular decision is or is not taken (and 
therein tracings the causal processes leading to it) without being unduly constrained by 
levels. In that sense, like stratification, it is an improvement over the assumption that 
political action must occur in either the domestic or the international realm. Nevertheless, 
wider justifications for adopting the approach are problematic.  
First, insofar as the focus is placed on the role institutions have in explaining the policy-
making process, less consideration is often given to socio-political issues, especially their 
symbolic aspects. As such, it risks missing a major component of blurring. Second, 
because the concern tends to be the construction of causal narratives, institutionalism 
risks shortchanging the more holistic implications of blurring – both its stresses on the 
political and socio-political factors as well as its position as a specific resolution to the 
problematique as a whole. While institutional thinking may be helpful in determining 
why/how a specific policy arises, and in that sense might be deployed to assess the 
operational dynamics of the number, scope, and method metrics, it seems less useful to 
establishing an overall perspective on the broader issue of jurisdictional type. In other 
words, one might deploy it within a situation of blurring, and therefore it is not 
incompatible with it. However, being an explanatory tactic, it seems less useful in 
making integrated, holistic jurisdictional determinations in their own right. 
The third option depicts a “bolt-on” process in which a challenge to the norm is dealt 
with through the addition of an addendum (Palan, 2007). Bolt-ons accept that the 
traditional method – sovereignty-based leveling – is problematic, however maintain that 
it retains some overall utility. Describing the outlook Palan (2007: 52) writes, 
“Knowledge is supposed to be cumulative and we should resist, as far as possible, the 
temptation to throw the baby out with the bathwater”. In offering that point of view, he 
cites Keohane and Nye’s (2001) interdependence theory as an example – a model that 
accepts that the international system is sovereignty-based, however argues that realism 
fails to explain certain cooperative elements of it. As such, Keohane and Nye “bolt-on” a 
new focus – interdependence – to the existing realist framework to deal with those holes.  
While this approach seems sensible, it encounters certain problems. First, because bolt-
on theories generally arise due to a failure of the norm to deal with a specific issue, they 
risk being historically/issue limited. For instance, one might be able to deal with 
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European blurring via a bolt-on process, however doing so risks creating an overly 
introspective setup (a charge often leveled as ES) as well as failing to take into account 
the possibility for change. Second, by using a theory as a “toolbox, out of which one can 
take individual concepts and theorems depending on one’s immediate goals, without 
have to worry about the rest of the theory”, bolt-ons risk undermining the model they are 
being attached to (Palan, 2007: 53). For example, Palan argues that while Milner (1998) 
emphasizes the need to “relax” IR’s unitary state thesis to better explain international 
outcomes through a domestic bargaining process, she effectively ignores it altogether. 
Third, because bolt-ons must walk a fine line between adding value without undermining 
their fathers, they may not actually deal with the issue at hand (e.g. stratification). 
Finally, to the extent that a problem has less to do with any one approach and more with 
the scope of the field itself, the issue may be less about how to level and more about the 
scope of IR’s intellectual project (disciplinary mapping). 
Given the problems with the first three options, one is left with the fourth possibility –
blurring requires new analytical mapping procedures based on a more appropriate theory-
practice balance. To establish these procedures, the study again elevates the importance 
of jurisdiction, arguing that analytically mapping contemporary political and socio-
political setups, including blurring itself, requires funneling one’s thinking through the 
problematique prior to the application of any theoretical or paradigmatic model. There 
are four main reasons for making this shift, and therein four reasons why a jurisdictional 
focus is more appropriate, more useful, and generates more analytical leverage than a 
sovereignty-based, leveling one. 
First, analyzing political structures is impossible without dealing with the problematique. 
As noted in chapter 2, to the extent that political action constitutes more than power 
relations – insofar as it reflects at least minimal movement out of the jungle – debates 
about it are contingent on some resolution to the problematique. Of course, treating 
sovereignty as the assumed solution traditionally allowed those debates to take place. 
However, problematizing that vision in no way removes the importance of jurisdiction 
more generally. That does not mean that newer jurisdictional forms must be similar to the 
sovereign one. The solution might be blurring or it might be something else. Regardless 
of what the actual jurisdictional solution is however, if sovereignty fails and because 
political action is difficult to conceptualize without first establishing a perspective on the 
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problematique, it becomes the concern. The empirical issue of establishing jurisdictional 
type is therefore the precursor to determining the sort of analytical mapping to deploy.  
Second, turning away from sovereignty and the leveling processes coming out of it 
towards one of jurisdiction generates the conceptual space needed for understanding both 
blurring and jurisdictional variation. In the first case, using jurisdiction to understand 
blurring primarily means using the number, scope, and method metrics as the key 
variables in assessing whether or not blurring is taking place (and, if it is, its nature). 
Harkening back to the definition of blurring provided in the previous chapter, when and 
where one finds more than one significant actor, complex, possibly conflicting and 
overlapping spatial and functional scopes, and multiple methods of administration, 
blurring is more likely to be the jurisdictional form than sovereignty. Moreover, when 
and where socio-political relationships are defined more by both/and and less by either/or 
blurring is more likely to be the conclusion than state citizenship. In that sense, a 
jurisdictional starting point offers the core variables through which one can judge when 
and where blurring occurs. 
One should be clear that, in addition to helping determine when blurring occurs, a 
jurisdictional focus also help differentiate between types of it. In one sense, the dynamics 
of the blurring found in Europe and instances of it found outside of it (e.g. globalization) 
are similar. They reject the particular constellation of jurisdictional logics found under 
sovereign setups and replace them with the proliferation of relevant actors with varying, 
potentially conflicting and overlapping scopes, differing methods of administration, and 
complex socio-political relations. Nevertheless, they are also distinct insofar as their 
specific configurations of the number, scope, and method metrics as well as socio-
political factors vary. For instance, while the ECJ and the ICC both challenge 
sovereignty, each does so in a different way. Indeed, difference in detail yet commonality 
in rubric underlines why a jurisdictional focus is an analytical and not merely an 
empirical argument. It is also why, in Weberian sense, the core of any investigation 
remains “in the details” (Thaddeus Jackson, 2011: 145). While jurisdiction can act as a 
guide towards asking questions about the ECJ or ICC, specific conclusions about them 
remains in their applications. 
In the second case, because blurring and sovereignty coexist, one must make analytical 
sense of jurisdictional variability. The possibility for blurring and sovereignty means that 
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one’s analytical gaze must be sensitive to both, but beholden to neither. Returning to the 
under-defined qualities of jurisdiction, the possibility for a plethora of resolutions to its 
problematique allows for that flexibility. To be sure, part of the “cost” of making this 
move is greater contextualization to determine jurisdictional type prior to the application 
of any paradigmatic or theoretical approach. However, that should not detract or distract 
from the necessity of holding jurisdictional structures in a stage of, at least initial, 
suspense. 
In making that point – that one analytically must start with what is essentially an 
empirical debate – the study opens itself up to criticism, specifically that it conflates 
analytical and empirical perspectives. In other words, one might argue that while shifting 
the focus to jurisdiction may better bring together theory and practice, that issue is more 
appropriately discussed under descriptive mapping. Moreover, because the goal of 
analytical mapping is not to hold a mirror up to reality, but as Hay noted to trace 
narrative paths through an undoubtedly complicated reality, exact description is not the 
concern. The concern is achieving some level of overall, often generalizable, explanatory 
purchase on an undeniably complex situation. 
While accepting that the purpose of analytical mapping is not to mirror reality, making 
jurisdiction the starting point to increase empirical accuracy remains analytically 
necessary. As made clear in the context of Ruggie’s (1993) comments, analytical devices 
need to be, to some degree, reflective of that which they seek to conceptualize. 
Therefore, saying that analytical mapping needs to take into account jurisdictional 
debates is not to abandon hope of gaining any explanatory leverage over an intricate 
political and socio-political environment. Because blurring applies to a number of 
distinct empirical settings, it remains an analytical simplification. Stressing the need to 
engage with jurisdiction prior to the application of any paradigmatic or theoretical model 
is really about emphasizing the appropriate language to help reach, organize, and 
comprehend individual conclusions. Highlighting jurisdiction, and with it the possibility 
for both blurring and sovereignty, is therefore really about rebalancing the relationship 
between theory and practice to provide the best opportunities to make sense of the 
particulars of global life. In that sense, it remains analytical in intent. 
Moreover, the third core reason for making jurisdiction the analytical starting point is 
that it proves not only more appropriate than sovereignty-based leveling, but also more 
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useful. It generates the conceptual room needed to debate issues that need discussion, but 
that risk otherwise being logically awkward and/or skewed under sovereign modeling. 
Thaddeus Jackson (2011) offers an entryway arguing that analytical devices (he uses the 
related concept of ideal-type) cannot be falsified as one would a hypothesis because, as 
ideal-types/analytical devices, they inevitably miss empirical nuance. Under them theory 
and practice are not, and are not meant to be, fully merged. Therefore, whether the shift 
from one device to another is good or bad is, at least partially, pragmatic. Judging 
whether a shift from sovereignty to jurisdiction is analytically beneficial rests on the 
degree to which it allows for more interesting and useful debates about contemporary 
issues. Thaddeus Jackson writes, 
The only meaningful way to evaluate whether an ideal-type is a good one or not is 
pragmatically: that is, to examine whether, once applied, the ideal-type is efficacious 
in revealing intriguing and useful things about the object to which it is applied 
(Thaddeus Jackson, 2011: 146). 
To give this concrete meaning, one might consider how a shift from a sovereign to a 
jurisdictional starting point alters perspectives on a number of contemporary issues.7 
Two central, modern debates are the nature of legitimacy and the appropriateness of 
intervention. In looking at these topics, the goal is not to offer any firm conclusions about 
them. The goal is to illustrate how a shift in starting point allows for perspectives on each 
that are not constrained by sovereignty infused logics; how a shift in approach offers 
more vibrant and useful understandings than would otherwise be possible. 
Looking first at legitimacy, there is no denying that it is an increasingly vital topic in 
instances of blurring (e.g. legitimacy in the EU) as well as in a jurisdictionally varied 
environment (e.g. legitimacy in a globalizing world). As the previous chapter hinted at, 
debating legitimacy from a context of sovereignty entails certain structural limitations, 
chief among them that the state is the primary political community through which human 
affairs flow. In saying that, the argument is not that all states, simply by being states, are 
legitimate in any particular action. Whether they are or are not is a more specific 
empirical question. The point is that because the state is the assumed analytical agent, 
there is an in-built belief that it is also the principal unit through which legitimacy is 
                                                
7 Because jurisdiction allows for both sovereignty and blurring it does not negate the insights offered under 
sovereign logics. However, one must determine that sovereignty is in play prior to applying them. 
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discussed and might form. And, in the democratic sense, that has generally meant 
treating the nation-state as the unit through which democracy arises (Kymlicka, 1999). 
Problems begin, however, when the possibility for establishing clear political and socio-
political lines is absent, such as under blurring. Noting this potential Glencross (2009: 4, 
emphasis in original) writes, “Democracy, as a political principle ultimately seeking to 
make the exercise of power accountable to a single sovereign political community, poses 
an acute challenge to the successful functioning of an anti-hierarchical states union”. In 
situations akin to blurring (Glencross’ “anti-hierarchical states union” term) traditional 
sovereignty-based approaches to legitimacy-as-democracy are problematic as they bring 
with them engrained beliefs as to what it must resemble and how it must function (e.g. 
the need for clear borders and national citizenries). In the case of the Union, Glencross 
(2007, 2009) notes that tends to yield an argument in which increasing European 
legitimacy requires either greater presidentialization or increased direct democracy – 
both things incompatible with its blurring setup. 
While both options may be viable means of fostering legitimacy within a state context, 
both risk “destabilize[ing] the EU order as they imply the establishment of a hierarchy of 
democratic legitimacy that is at odds with [its] continued ambiguity over sovereign 
status” (Glencross, 2009: 4). Because they attempt to, in effect, generate democracy by 
pushing the EU down a federal path and therein moving it towards a more traditional 
sovereign variant, they implicitly assume that to generate legitimacy, the Union must 
replace its blurring setup. The problem is that defining legitimacy from a state context is 
problematic in the EU as it is at fundamental odds with the Union’s unique jurisdictional 
settlement; it is at odds with blurring. The possibility for legitimacy developed 
specifically for scenarios of non-sovereign jurisdiction is hardly considered.  
Accordingly, understanding legitimacy in situations where there is neither a clear demos 
nor a clear jurisdictional hierarchy requires rethinking the form democracy takes not 
simply the level at which popular sovereignty might be expressed.  
When the aim is to overcome anarchy without replicating hierarchy, appeals to 
popular sovereignty will undermine foundational indeterminacy. To maintain 
ambiguity over sovereignty and who the people are in a democracy fashion will 
require a solution to the problem of what form of democratic accountability is 
necessary rather than the designation of a level at which popular sovereignty can 
rightly be express (Glencross, 2009, emphasis added). 
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Because blurring offers a different solution to the problematique than sovereignty – a 
solution which itself may require more than one form of legitimacy – understanding 
legitimacy under it requires rethinking the nature of it. That is hindered when done 
through sovereignty-infused contexts. While this study does not have the tools to 
determine what new forms of legitimacy ought to developed, the fact is that whatever 
they are, they will only be arrived at by recognizing the blurring finding, operating 
through its context, and therein freeing oneself from sovereignty’s structuring hold. 8 
If legitimacy offers an example of why a shift away from sovereignty is useful in Europe, 
intervention offers a non-European context. On the one hand, it logics, including its 
ethical parameters, are typically rendered through a prism of sovereignty (Weber 1995). 
The very term flows from an assumption that there are clear lines across which a 
military/humanitarian/economic intervention might take place. As a possibility, it is 
contingent on there being established inside/outside borders that might be breached. 
Thus, whether one is for or against intervention in any specific case and for any specific 
reason, the entire debate revolves around an assumption that there is a sovereign line that 
should or should not be cross; that whatever happens, an inside/outside border is at stake. 
In that sense, sovereignty and intervention are interchangeable terms.  
On the other hand, the question is whether a shift away from sovereignty towards 
jurisdiction allows for more robust interpretations of intervention in a situation akin to 
blurring. Setting the stage Weber writes, 
Intervention is a meaningful concept so long as it expresses a violation of state 
sovereignty. But what happens…when one cannot meaningfully speak of state 
sovereignty? What happens when state boundaries cannot be stabilized, domestic 
communities cannot be identified, and a transference of authority from a citizenry to a 
state government cannot take place?...[C]an one meaningfully speak of states, 
sovereignty, and intervention practices in the absence of clear foundations? (Weber, 
1995: 26-27). 
By removing sovereignty as the structuring assumption, debates about intervention 
immediately become less relevant. That does not mean that all the issues typically 
debated under its remit vanish. For instance, questions of whether or not to use military 
force to protect a population likely remain. Similarly, insofar as situations of sovereignty 
                                                
8 This perspective extends beyond the EU context, as Held (2002a, 2002b) does in the context of 
globalization and cosmopolitan democracy and Linklater (1998b) in terms of the ethnical needs for post-
Westphalian citizenship. In both cases, there is an attempt to model legitimacy outside the state context in a 
way that a sovereign starting point would likely deem either impossible or, the very least, fool-hardy. 
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remain possible, sovereignty-based intervention debates remain pertinent in those 
circumstances. However, in cases where sovereignty is not the conclusion – where 
something akin to blurring is in play – intervention is not the operative term and 
arguments should not be constrained by it. 
To give an example, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) note that many sub-Saharan African 
states are effectively “quasi-states”. While they have little ability to administer authority 
domestically, they maintain a measure of de jure sovereignty based on international 
recognition. As noted previously, they dub this “negative sovereignty”. From a classical 
point of view, despite this mixed jurisdictional setup, debates over what to do in cases of 
conflict/famine/disaster often end up being debates over the appropriateness of 
intervention/of breaching de jure sovereignty. To be sure, just as some will argue that 
intervention is justified in the name of humanitarian aid, others will argue against it due 
to concerns over stability and precedent. Whichever side one agrees with, however, both 
are constrained by a sovereignty starting point – in the first case, that sovereignty ought 
to be breached for humanitarian reasons and, in the second, that it should not be violated 
due to stability and the potential knock-on effects. Whether one is for or against it, one is 
making a sovereignty-infused argument to a situation that should not be interpreted 
through a sovereignty lens. 
To the contrary, were one approach the issue from a starting point of jurisdiction – a 
starting point that compels one to determine jurisdictional type prior to the application of 
any paradigmatic/theoretical model – one would likely arrive at a very different sort of 
debate and potentially a very different answer. In the situation laid out above, because 
the answer to the problematique would likely be “no one” insofar as jurisdiction is 
largely absent, sovereignty would never enter the equation. It would therefore not be the 
analytical starting point such that the “intervention” debate would immediately become 
less critical. (What is there to intervene across?) The debate would likely become more 
about determining the most effective and legitimate means of filling the jurisdictional 
vacuum and resolving the problematique. It would likely also become more pragmatic 
and focused on the underlying issue – stopping a conflict/famine/ disaster.  
In making these points, the goal is not to pass judgment as to how legitimacy ought to 
form under blurring or how to create jurisdiction in quasi-states. The point is that when 
and where such issues are discussed, they risk being mired in a sovereignty point of 
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view. Alternative perspectives – perspectives that need development given the 
proliferation of non-sovereign jurisdictional types – are stymied and/or skewed. Using a 
starting point that mandates empirical contextualization to determine jurisdictional type 
prior to the application of any analytical approach helps ensure that the core structuring 
logics and assumptions of sovereignty do not hinder debates. Again, this will not 
automatically reveal how legitimacy ought to form under blurring or how to restore 
jurisdiction in cases of negative sovereignty. However, operating under jurisdictionally 
sensitive methods would ensure that the most appropriate and useful approaches are 
utilized. An emphasis on context may therefore just be the price for understanding an 
increasingly intricate environment.  
The final key reason for making a shift to jurisdictional is the ability to deal with 
potential changes to political and socio-political setups. Put another way, treating 
jurisdiction as the key analytical variable guards against the sorts of reifications common 
under sovereignty by maintaining ontological flexibility. There are two sides to this 
issue. On the one hand, one of the dangers of relying on any analytical device is 
stagnation; the device fails to pick up on/adapt to a set of empirical changes due to in-
built beliefs about how the world must operate. Rosamond writes, 
Disciplines have a habit of reifying themselves to the extent that their internal criteria 
for the judgment of rigor and excellence become dynamic contributors to their 
reproduction regardless of whether or how their objects of study are changing 
(Rosamond, 2006: 518). 
In those regards, one of the major, and in this study’s estimations valid, criticisms of IR’s 
sovereignty-based starting point is the inability to deal with changes to the international 
system. Indeed, the potential for that sort of stagnation drove the pervious arguments for 
a jurisdictional turn – to redress the balance between theory and practice and to create the 
conceptual spaces needed for debating issues critical to contemporary life, but often 
stymied and/or skewed due to the in-built logics of sovereignty. 
On the other hand, for the sovereignty-to-jurisdictional argument to be fully persuasive, 
not only must it be able to offer a more appropriate and useful means of understanding 
modern political and socio-political life, but it must do so in a way that guards against 
potential future reifications of itself. While the methods developed thus far are 
appropriate for and beneficial to understanding the (blurring) environment within which 
they were built – that is a tautology – their ultimate efficaciousness rests in their ability 
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to deal with changes to that environment. Thus, the concern is not really whether the 
jurisdictional approach is better at assessing the world it formed under; of course it is. 
The real question is whether it can deal with a changing world. 
In that regard, a jurisdictional emphasis is both more in line with on-the-ground 
conditions as well as more sensitive to change due to its process-based construction. As 
has been stressed, jurisdictional mapping mandates that empirical analysis occur prior to 
the application of any individual theoretical or paradigmatic precept. It requires one to 
ask, first and foremost, whether a situation is sovereignty-defined, blurring-defined, or 
some other jurisdictional form-defined. Initial analysis is question-driven based on the 
“Who decides what, where, how and over whom” issue. While that does not prevent one 
from applying a more targeted analytical approach once jurisdictional type is determined, 
it contains an inbuilt guard against stagnation due to its case-specific scope. One can 
make a comparison.  
On one side, a sovereignty starting point assumes that the relationship between political 
communities – between states – is defined by inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, and 
domestic/international logics. An assumption is made that sovereignty is real and that its 
single, fixed viewpoint allows for the formation of distinct levels of analysis. The 
problem is, because everything is interpreted through those levels, any fundamental 
changes to the system risks being caught up in those structuring assumptions. It risks 
being missed altogether (e.g. de facto changes) or misinterpreted (e.g. the EU as either a 
polity or and IO). Moreover, even when an abnormality is of such a scope that it cannot 
be ignored, as chapter 1 noted, it is often simply bracketed away – a point often made in 
the context of why international theory frequently shows so little interest in the EU. 
Warleigh (2006: 31-32) writes, “[S]cholars are more likely to explain away anything 
potentially paradigm-challenging than to integrate it into their conceptual frameworks”. 
None of this is to say that all anomalies are missed or that there is no leeway in approach. 
Keohane and Nye (2001) certainly noticed the challenges produced by growing 
international independences and attempt to adapt the prevailing wisdom (realism) to deal 
with them. However, as noted, bolt-on tactics are fraught with difficulties. Moreover, the 
point is not that sovereignty approaches are always useless or always wrong. It is that 
sovereignty-based, analytical mapping is not geared towards dealing with change insofar 
as sovereignty tends to be simultaneously treated as an empirical outcome and an 
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analytical condition – the effect of which is feedback loop in which everything is 
interpreted through its lens. In that sense, Walker is right that “Theories of international 
relations tell us less about the character and consequences of state sovereignty than the 
principle of state sovereignty tells us about the categorical structures of international 
relations theory” (Walker, 1993: 23). 
On the other side, because jurisdiction is not a “completed” conclusion and assessing it is 
question-based there is an inbuilt guard against reification. Three points underlie that 
argument. First, making the problematique the starting point allows one to consider, 
without being beholden to, a variety of jurisdictional forms. Second, because 
“jurisdiction” is an under-defined concept, any application of it requires focusing on the 
empirical structures and relationships giving meaning to it. And, because that logically 
entails consistent contextual examination, there is a natural resistance to reification. 
Third, a jurisdictional focus allows for the type of process-based arguments represented 
by blurring. Insofar as blurring is an operationalizable form of it, it is compatible with 
jurisdiction-the-concept and process-based arguments. The stresses on context and 
variation that a jurisdictional focus and starting point compels mean that there is an 
implicit acknowledgment that setups need not be beholden to any particular present. By 
holding ontological finalities open, it is resistant to reification and sensitive to change – a 
point, as one sees, which becomes critical to the EU given the present turmoil over its 
future (concluding chapter). 
Put together, analytically mapping the effects of blurring means rejecting the singular 
application of sovereignty-based leveling and moving towards a jurisdictionally sensitive 
approach. Doing so offered four advantages. First, it recognized the need to deal with the 
problematique in any political analysis. Second, it helped redress the balance between 
theory and practice and, in doing so, offered a means of recognizing both the contours of 
blurring as well as jurisdictional variation. Third, a move towards jurisdiction created the 
conceptual spaces necessary to debate issues outside of the structuring starting points of 
sovereignty – particularly significant given chapter 5’s points regarding the importance 
of legitimacy debates under blurring. Finally, the switch helps guard against future 
reifications by stressing process.  
In a practical sense, the analytical map produced under this vision is less likely to be a 
single document with preformed structures and more a series of potentials to be applied 
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after empirical determinations are made as to the specific jurisdictional arrangements in 
play. Irrespective of what that actually looks like, however, the possibility of blurring 
means that studying the conduct of political and socio-political life, whether in the EU 
specifically or on the global stage more generally, requires being open to the application 
of multiple approaches however being beholden to none. Determining which applies 
requires a constant and consistent focus on the particular jurisdictional forms at play in 
any particular instance. While this may prevent wide-scale generalizations, it does mean 
that those that are made are based on an analytically appropriate approach given the 
empirical situations in question.  
Disciplinary mapping 
Having presented an argument as to what new sorts of descriptive and analytical maps 
are necessary under blurring and jurisdictional variability, one can return to the issue on 
which this study began – the appropriateness of mainstream IR. If descriptive re-mapping 
was about presenting a picture of blurring as well as a world in which it might coexist 
with alternative jurisdictional structures and analytical mapping a vision as to how one 
might logically navigate through those issues, disciplinary mapping focuses on how that 
all affects academic setups. In looking at this issue, one sees that blurring and 
jurisdictional variability necessitate holding disciplinary boundaries open, thereby 
prompting and promoting greater degrees of academic pragmatism and pluralism within 
international thinking and beyond. 
Prior to getting into the heart of those issues, it is important to remember where the study 
began and the sequence of the argument that it took. Chapters 1 and 2 argued that 
mainstream IR is comprised of four schools – realism, liberalism, the English School, 
and statist constructivism. They contended that, despite their very different visions of and 
hopes for the international realm, those models jointly subscribe to certain meta-
theoretical needs – most notably, the existence of a distinctly international realm of 
action. That, in turn, helped make real the academic distinction between political science 
and IR – a separation driven by the assumption that a domestic/international separation 
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exists, that it is important, and that it acts as an effective means of generating and 
furthering knowledge about the political and socio-political worlds on each side of it.9 
Chapters 3-5 challenged that vision through an examination of European political and 
socio-political setups. The chapters considered four possible effects to sovereignty and 
therein four potential jurisdictional outcomes. The conclusion was blurring. In making 
that determination, the study also noted the possibility for jurisdictional variability. 
While its analysis of the EU resembled the sort of thick empirical work often performed 
by ES, the examinations were done to provide the fodder for challenging IR’s overall 
construction. Europe was “the highly fruitful venue for exploring disciplinary politics in 
the social sciences” (Rosamond, 2007a: 234). 
Given all that, as well as the descriptive and analytical re-mappings just performed, one 
arrives at a point in which one has the information necessary to deal with the effects of 
blurring on IR’s disciplinary status. To do so, the study proceeds down two separate, but 
ultimately interrelated, tracks. The first, what is considered indirect disciplinary 
mapping, returns to the EU case asking what disciplinary project it ought to fall into. The 
focus is on ES as a mode of enquiry and whether it ought to be considered within IR, 
within political science (via CP), or as its own independent field. Offering perspectives 
on that provides the context for direct disciplinary mapping. Under it, the core question 
is what blurring and jurisdictional variability disciplinarily mean for IR specifically. 
Indirect disciplinary mapping 
Beginning with indirect disciplinary mapping, there are two critical issues – where ES 
fits in the disciplinary universe and whether that placement reveals anything about the 
nature of disciplinarity more generally. In looking at the first question, it is useful to 
return to Pollack’s (2005) schematic in which he argues examination of the EU has 
generally occurred across three broad categorizations – the Union as an IO, the Union as 
a polity, or the Union as sui generis. As one might have guessed, each of those is thought 
to line up with a particular disciplinary perspective – the IO point of view (maintenance) 
                                                
9 No assumptions are being made that this separation is driven solely by the domestic/international 
separation.  For instance, as noted earlier (pages 87-90) disciplines are not closed-boxes. Moreover, as is 
developed more fully below (pages 217-224) one might conceive of IR as an interdisciplinary field from 
the outset. The point being made is simply that the separation between IR and political science has 
traditionally been viewed as significant, and therefore the tenets of jurisdictional blurring compel probing 
that basic belief.
 208 
typically being rendered from IR perspectives, the polity option (breakdown) from CP, 
and the sui generis one (stratification or blurring) from a distinct ES. 
Prior to discussing those outlooks in detail, including how they fit with the arguments 
just made, it is important to note that this study acknowledges that none of them is fully 
cloistered. They, like the disciplines containing them, are ideal-types and the borders 
between them are not Maginot lines never to be crossed. Nevertheless, the chapter also 
maintains that the standards one enters a project with affect both what and how one 
interprets it, whether due to the standardized worldviews of a discipline, professional 
norms, and/or knowledge-based background. Rosamond (2007b: 196) writes, “Scholars 
from different vantage points in the disciplinary universe will see the EU differently and 
conceptualize it in different ways”. Therefore, given the study’s existing finding of 
blurring, the question becomes how that ought to be positioned within the disciplinary 
perspectives coming out of Pollack’s typology. 
Looking first at what is often treated as an IR-CP dualism, in accepting the blurring 
finding, it immediately becomes clear that neither option is sufficient to understanding 
the EU’s broader dynamics. As chapters 3-5, as well as the descriptive and analytical re-
mappings performed above made clear, understanding the EU is difficult in the context 
of any model operating under statist assumptions. Therefore, insofar as IR and CP both 
retain single viewpoint perspectives and operate under logics of sovereignty and 
methodological statism, both lack the tools necessary to recognize blurring. Arguing over 
whether member-state relationships remain international or are internalized to a EU 
polity simply misses the mark as the entire debate operates under the faulty assumption 
that the Union must fit into one category or the other; that it must clearly and cleanly fall 
onto one side of the domestic/international division or the other. As Johansson and Vifell 
(2006: 189) make very clear, the IR-CP dichotomy is “too sterile and misleading to 
enable us to capture and understand the dynamics and complexities of multi-leveled 
Europeanized politics and governance”. 
If the either/or nature of the CP-IR debate is too simplistic, one is seemingly left with the 
sui generis option – an option that views the EU as empirically unique and therefore in 
need of its own distinct academic community. Recalling the point made in chapter 2, a 
discipline is typically through to require a specific object of enquiry whose existence is 
real and non-reducible to other fields. In that regard, ES fulfills the first condition. It has 
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a defined an object of enquiry – the Union and its politics. It also seems to fulfill the 
second option. The EU is real, if by real one means a structure and set of processes that, 
for lack of better word, politically and socio-politically “matter”. Furthermore, under 
blurring, it would fulfill the distinctiveness/non-reducible criteria. 10  In that sense, 
blurring would go part-and-parcel with an independent ES. Indeed, that has often proven 
to be the case. Wallace notes that funding for EU-specific topics has drastically 
increased, professional associations regularly allocate panels specifically on Europe, and 
non-EU specialists increasingly “colonize” ES (Wallace, 2000). 
In making that argument, it is logical to return to the issue of whether a similar setup 
arises in the disciplinary sphere. In other words, does an ES-as-unique finding make the 
IR and CP alternatives wholly inappropriate to the study of it? Prior to addressing that, it 
is helpful to offer some points regarding the value of conceptual modeling altogether. 
Rosamond offers a good introduction writing, “The conduct of research requires a 
selection of approaches and/or theories which enable the resultant’s knowledge to be 
ordered meaningfully”. Accordingly, “the investigator’s job is to select the ‘best’ 
available conceptual toolkit to organize research in the domain under scrutiny” 
(Rosamond, 2007a: 231). In making those broad claims, two points are critical.  
First, there are any numbers of ways of constructing toolkits – a toolkit being the 
“general architectural principles guiding the conduct and assessment of scholarly 
inquiry” (Jupille, 2005b: 213). For instance, Jupille (2005b) argues construction includes 
making both meta-theoretical (e.g. ontological, epistemological, social theoretic) as well 
as methodological (e.g. qualitative, quantitative) judgments. Second, there is nothing to 
say that multiple kits, and thereby multiple disciplines, might not be used. Indeed, while 
it may be the case that a single toolkit or discipline is adequate, “it is rarely obvious that 
one…interpretation is superior to another” – especially, as one sees below, in the context 
of the political and socio-political messiness coming out of blurring (Harvard Review, 
2009: 33).11 In those cases, the tools one uses relate to the object under investigation and 
what one hopes to reveal about it. “Solid empirical work should be rooted in an 
                                                
10 If the EU were polity/IO, it would fail the requirement by being reducible to already theorized sub-roots. 
11 None of this implies that all toolkits or disciplines will be compatible with one another. However, 
without denying the possibility for incommensurability, that is not always the case (Jupille, 2005b). 
 210 
understanding of the investigator’s assumptions and the theoretical suppositions upon 
which they draw” (Rosamond, 2000: 196).  
By acknowledging that different toolkits, and therein potentially different disciplines, 
might be used to highlight different aspects of the same phenomenon based on the 
investigator’s interests, one can say both that blurring fits best when it comes to 
describing the EU as a whole such that a distinct ES is required as well as that 
alternative, non-blurring models may still be helpful when it comes to analyzing 
individual processes within it. In the latter’s case, IR and CP would therefore retain some 
utility. Indeed, as chapters 3 and 4 pointed out via their inductive reasoning, breakdown, 
maintenance, and stratification were never wholly wrong. Blurring simply offered the 
best overall picture. While blurring and a distinct ES may be the overarching claim, that 
should not imply that the other approaches are altogether unhelpful. Indeed, it asserts the 
value of incorporating them in nuanced ways. 
In those regards, returning to the IO and polity points of view and the disciplines most 
often accompanying them, IR and CP, one realizes that each has a utility insofar as it 
aligns with a researcher’s concerns. For example, as noted in chapter 1, Diez and 
Wiener’s (2009) argument links different historical stages of the EU with different 
disciplinary toolkits. To similar effect, for the individual interested in EP voting patterns, 
treating the EP as comparable with existing parliaments may be useful even if it distorts 
the EU’s more “international” qualities (e.g. defense policy). On the other side, Warleigh 
(2004) argues for the re-importation of some of IR’s toolkits to flesh out the relationships 
between regionalism in Europe and regionalism more generally, even if that distorts the 
Union’s more polity-like aspects. The point is, whatever one is interested in, the IR-CP 
debate is a non-issue so long as there is an admission that neither side explains the Union 
completely and that each side is deployed in a research specific manner. 
This thinking also affects the idea that blurring requires a distinct ES. The contention was 
that it is reasonable to treat the Union as unique due to blurring. While that continues to 
be the case, given the points just made, the implications of doing so blindly are 
problematic. While the EU may be sui generis insofar as it falls outside of established IR 
and CP models, that should not necessitate introspective study of it. Doing so risks 
“locking [ES] into a theoretical silo, where the infamous ‘N=1’ problem restricts the 
improvement of the conceptual lenses that scholars use by shutting them off from wider 
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debates in political science” (Warleigh, 2004: 302). Viewing blurring as “un-
comparably” unique risks replicating the problems often attributed to the traditional 
alternatives – reifying a certain image and approach at the expense of external 
comparisons. That does not mean that, once all the bits and pieces are put together, the 
EU is not distinct. It simply means that academically treating it as such risks reifying a 
form of methodological Europeanism just as IR reifies methodological statism. 
Consequently, while blurring reflects the sui generis nature of the Union, that does not 
mean that IR and CP lack all usefulness. Moreover, treating the Union as unique to the 
point of non-comparison risks locking it into a disciplinary silo.12 Based on those points, 
one moves to the second question – what that all reveals about the nature of disciplines 
more generally. By arguing that the EU reflects an instance of blurring, that a number of 
paths may be useful in analyzing it, and that ES ought not lock itself in a disciplinary 
tower, the question becomes how to structure that diversity. It is helpful to layout two 
potentials tracks, the first focusing on disciplinary mainstreaming and the second 
disciplinary pluralism (Verdun, 2003; Warleigh, 2004).  
Beginning with mainstreaming, it envisages rooting the study of the Union – in effect, 
ES – in the traditional modes and methods of other normal science disciplines based on 
an understanding that any social scientific phenomena ultimately rests on “scholarly 
communities working around tightly policed sets of norms…where there is little space 
for deviance or dissent” (Rosamond, 2007b: 22). In saying that, one should stress that 
mainstreaming does not necessarily compel one to adopt a specific vision of the EU. It is 
more about a discipline’s methodological, ontological, and epistemological predilections 
standards, and the institutional, professional, and pedagogical structures linked to them, 
than exact empirical outcomes. Therefore, at least at the initial stages, there is room for 
alterative disciplines to each examine the EU and decide whether and where it fits in 
their worldviews. Moreover, even ES could be mainstreamed under blurring insofar as is 
it treated as distinct field that operates under the same methods and logics of any other 
normal science discipline (Table 10).  
                                                
12 No assumptions are made that ES currently lacks diversity (Keeler, 2005; Jupille, 2005a). Indeed, Jupille 
(2005a: 216) notes, ES “operates within a metatheoretically and methodologically permissive environment 
within which a thousand flowers might bloom”. 
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Nevertheless, while it is theoretically possible to define the EU very differently, each 
approach is mainstreamed to the extent that it shares an overall belief that, once 
determinations are made as the appropriate discipline for studying it, explanations and 
understandings about it ought to stabilize around the intellectual, institutional, 
professional, and pedagogical structures linked to it. Whether ES is a sub-field of IR or 
CP or a field of its own, analysis would emanate from the confines of the particular 
research community linked to it and its standardized worldviews. Knowledge is therefore 
advanced through the application of circumscribed sets of mutually agreed upon 
axioms.13 Dissident, critical, and pluralistic approaches are sidelined (Manners, 2007).  
On the other side of the mainstream vision is the pluralistic approach – an approach that 
eschews closed, disciplined (in the most basic sense of the word) research communities 
and instead advocates the need for multiple research centers as well as critical and 
dissident perspectives. Under pluralistic thinking, accruing knowledge arises not only 
through the application of established, mutually agreed upon standards, but also through 
conversations and fusions between and across specializations – specializations developed 
without regard to traditional academic divisions and without concern for overall 
“completeness.” This implies a number of things. 
First, as Manners (2007) argues, it means tolerating critical approaches. In saying that, he 
cites a few large families, including, but not limited to, post-modernism, feminist theory, 
and critical social theory. Manners writes,  
Critical scholars…seek to escape the intellectual straitjacket of traditional political 
science by questioning assumptions about political systems and institutions, 
economistic rationalities and methodologies… [They] share a commitment to 
uncovering preconceptions about historical reality and the contextual nature of 
knowledge, and they seek to change politics (Manners, 2007: 89). 
In making that claim, Manners is not arguing that critical perspectives produce more 
parsimonious or more generalizable explanations than traditional approaches. He (2007: 
90) is not “claiming a new turn in theory, or the achievement of a Kuhnian paradigm of 
                                                
13 For example, Dowding (2000) argues that rational choice institutionalism has proven itself to be the 
appropriate method of explanation for the EU. As such, CP is the EU’s appropriate disciplinary location. 
He (2000: 139) writes that, “Institutional rational choice has revolutionized the study of the EU by bringing 
formal techniques to a subject which previously has been subject to mostly description accounts…the 
paradigm-shift in EU studies has occurred; now is the time to start settling down to normal science”. While 
this study disagrees with his assessment of the EU, the point is, once one determines the appropriate 
paradigm to study it, studying the Union should take place through its disciplinary logics – in Dowding’s 
case rational choice, comparative political science.  
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‘normal science’”. Rather, the point is that EU politics can (and in Manners’ view ought 
to) be viewed from a variety of perspectives – perspectives that accept the presence of 
other perspectives. Thus, he concludes his argument by citing Strange’s point (1991: 33) 
that one must be wary of “one-eyed monsters – one-eyed because they [are] oblivious of 
politics; monsters because they [are] so arrogant towards all outsiders”. 
Second, pluralism also means keeping academic horizons open. On the one hand, 
disciplines have the habit if reifying themselves and their worldviews. Wright notes,  
Once textbook have appeared or academic chairs been established under a given 
name; once curricula have been offered, degrees given, and learned journals initiated 
in a given field, once libraries have been organized according to a given scheme, a 
discipline has achieved a solidity and position which is difficult to change however 
illogical or inconvenient that particular subdivision may in time prove to be (Wright, 
1955: 25). 
On the other hand, stressing the usefulness of multiple methods spread across and 
between diverse methodological, ontological, and epistemological standpoints both 
prevents disciplinary stagnation as well as furthers overall levels of knowledge. 
Pluralism challenges the idea that the singular methods of a closed research community 
create the most virtuous source information. Of course, this pluralism could take a 
number of forms. As Manners (2007) noted, it could come in the form of critical and 
dissident perspectives from “within” a community. Alternatively, it could occur via 
sharing between and across disciplines. Warleigh-Lack and Cini (2009) lay out a number 
of options – multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, intradisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity 
– noting that each offers certain advantages (and disadvantages). Or, as Jupille (2005b) 
notes in the context of Campbell’s (1969) “fish-scale model of omniscience,” it could 
mean the development of narrow specializations in quintessentially interdisciplinary 
areas, like the EU.  
Irrespective of how one performs pluralism, and again there are professional, 
institutional, and pedagogical implications that go along with each of them, the 
underlying contention is that the complexities associated with the EU means that 
accruing knowledge about it requires communication within, across, and between 
methods without concern for disciplinary location or overall completeness. While 
commensurability between the various models may not always be possible, “there should 
not be a “partitioning off…[of] ES into prevailing ‘normal science’ disciplines” 
(Rosamond, 2000: 113).  
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In saying all that, it should come as no surprise that there is a natural and necessary link 
between blurring and pluralism. On the one hand, the empirical problems with the IO and 
polity points of view illustrate the dangers of operating strictly through CP or IR. On the 
other hand, attempts to model ES as unique, but still a mainstream, risk locking ES into 
an academic silo. While the EU may be unique, that uniqueness should not place ES into 
isolation. Because blurring implies a measure of ontological restlessness, a new academic 
division of labor risks recreating the very weaknesses associated with the more 
traditional disciplinary perspectives – what Campbell (1969: 12) calls an “ethnocentrism 
of discipline”. The empirical makeup and process-based form of blurring requires 
borrowing, conversing, and/or fusing across paradigmatic gaps, between specialties, and 
amongst individuals sharing the most in common. 
In making these claims, two points must be acknowledged. First, under pluralism, there 
are dangers of non-disciplinarity in which everything is relative such that there are no 
standards of academic judgment. All arguments would be mere descriptions without 
much explanatory power/leverage (Moravcsik, 1998: 11). Second, pluralism creates 
problems of feasibility. As Jupille (2005b: 229) notes, there is a “sheer impossibility of 
attaining expertise in multiple schools”. While these concerns must be noted, there are 
responses to them.  
First, pluralism is not necessarily deconstructionism. The point is to build, borrow, 
combine, and only possibly transcend existing modes. Second, social scientific insight 
can be gained from increased levels of complexity such that calls for increased 
description and contextualism need not take-on pejorative undertones (see below). It 
simply may be the case that the phenomenon in question requires more nuance. 
Moreover, description can help draw out latent assumptions – such as the reified 
domestic/international separation – and therein the possibly for new patterns (Hollis and 
Smith, 1990). Finally, to guard against “Leonardoesque aspirations”, Campbell (1969: 3) 
argues for a “continuous texture of narrow specialties…overlap[ing] with other narrow 
specialties”. By focusing on specific areas, and treating coverage as continuous, 
paradigmatic gaps lesson and disciplinarity becomes less critical. It is the conversations 
across boundaries, between specialties, and amongst individuals sharing the most in 
common that drives knowledge. Again, that does not mean that everything and everyone 
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will fit together. However, so long as those “share standards with those closest to 
them…collective scholarly endeavors [can] proceed” (Jupille, 2005b: 230).  
One should reiterate that all this is presented in an ideal-type format. Nonetheless, the 
effects of blurring appear to require, on a general scale, academic openness and less 
parochial methods and, on a deeper level, a recognition that the EU might act as a node 
for debating political and socio-political enquiry in its own right. It is that latter of those 
points that ultimately links with this study’s broader goals by underlying the critical 
function played by the Union in testing IR’s core commitments. Jupille and Caporaso 
(1999: 441) note that, insights on “the erosion of disciplinary boundaries might be the 
most lasting contribution of EU studies to political science[/IR]”.  
Table 10 - Models of European Studies 
Mainstream Pluralist 
IR CP Sui generis ES Sui generis ES 
EU-as-IO EU-as-polity EU-as-sui generis EU-as-sui generis 
The study of the EU is 
best served by the 
standard tools and 
models of international 
theory 
The study of the EU is 
best served by the 
standard tools and 
models of CP 
The study of the EU 
rests on developing 
tools and models 
unique to it 
The study of the EU 
requires novel 
approaches as well as 
conversations 
across/between existing 
tools and models 
Analyzing the Union 
rests on IR’s 
standardized world 
views and working 
within its traditional 
institutional practices 
Analyzing the Union 
rests on CP’s 
standardized world 
views and working 
within its traditional 
institutional practices 
Analyzing the EU rests 
on standardized, EU-
specific, world views 
and the development of 
EU-specific 
institutional practices 
Analyzing the EU 
requires and benefits 
from diverse toolkits; 
blurring mandates 
disciplinary openness 
and pluralism 
Direct disciplinary mapping 
Given the context of indirect disciplinary mapping just offered, one can return to what 
blurring and jurisdictional variability mean for IR. On one side, the argument just made 
was dubbed as “indirect” as it did not levy any specific charges against IR. Rather, the 
focus was on how one ought to approach the study the EU under blurring. And, as one 
saw, the most sensible and appropriate way was through a pluralistic and open ES. While 
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that did not negate IR’s (or CP’s) role entirely, it did reflect the need to move beyond it 
in substance and disciplinary structure.  
On the other side, it is necessary to turn directly to IR and ask what blurring and 
jurisdictional variability mean for it. Accordingly, both appear fundamentally 
incompatible with the singular application of mainstream IR insofar as both reject the 
sovereignty-based starting point underpinning the discipline. As chapter 2 made clear, 
realism, liberalism, the English School, and statist constructivism – IR’s conventional 
models – all require the ability to carve out a distinct zone of international action. To do 
so, they all assume the existence of sovereignty as a means of creating a 
domestic/international separation. Again, the theories differ when it comes to the 
operation of that realm. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that that realm is real, 
has an ordering problem, is distinct from domestic arenas, and requires its own 
conceptualizations. It was by making that sequence of assumptions that IR carved out a 
distinct zone of academic enquiry.  
The possibility for blurring upsets the ability to assume all of that. Whether with respect 
to a specific instance of blurring (e.g. the EU) or jurisdictional variability more generally 
(e.g. bifurcation), IR’s loses its ability to assume that there is going to be a clear 
international sphere of action. In the first case, the resolution to the problematique 
offered by blurring creates neither anarchy nor hierarchy. It therefore problematizes the 
ability to define a domestic/international separation based on the belief that there is clear 
hierarchy and with it sovereign jurisdiction in one sphere (domestic) and clear anarchy 
and with it the lack of analogous jurisdictional opportunities in the other (international). 
If the functionality of any discipline rests on there being a defined object of enquiry that 
is real and non-reducible to other fields, the effects of blurring therefore fundamentally 
challenge IR’s underpinnings.14 In an instance of blurring, IR loses the empirical support 
necessary for its analytical and by extension disciplinary keystone. 
                                                
14 While IR has been the focus, this logic extends to other fields – most notably CP, but also sociology, 
economics, and others. No assumptions are made that these other fields have not adapted. Nevertheless, 
insofar as they traditionally operate in a context of methodological statism, blurring challenges their 
starting assumptions – that there is a state with a clear domestic zone (CP), that there is clear 
nation/societal-state linkage (sociology), that economic action is filtered through state contexts 
(economics) (Wagner, 2009). 
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In the second case, one might respond simply by saying that cases of blurring ought to be 
excluded from IR’s repertoire – again, a prime reason why many note IR has shown so 
little interest in the EU (Andreatta, 2005; Rosamond, 2006). Nevertheless, even in 
instances in which blurring is not the conclusion, the possibility for it means that 
jurisdictional variability must be taken into consideration. Sovereignty cannot be the 
assumed jurisdictional form. As Rosenau’s bifurcation scenario illustrates, it may be the 
case that sovereignty exists in certain circumstances. In them, IR would seem to remain 
applicable, the critical question being its traditional one – which international theory is 
the most appropriate. However, one cannot assume sovereignty is the jurisdictional form 
from the outset. Therefore, and as the analytical mapping sections developed above made 
clear, there is a continual need to make empirical determinations as to jurisdictional type 
prior to the application of any one disciplinary mode.  
In making those points, a word of caution should be made. Saying that IR is not 
applicable in an unadulterated, mainstream form is not to say that it loses all utility in 
cases of blurring. As indirect mapping also made clear, because blurring represents 
neither anarchy nor hierarchy, it is problematic to say that all of IR’s logics ought to be 
simplistically replaced with those of CP (or a newly developed ES). It may be the case 
that a researcher’s individual needs justify working within IR’s disciplinary universe to 
deal with a particular issue, even in a condition of more general blurring. Therefore, 
saying that IR and blurring are incompatible is not to say that IR’s logics are wholly 
defunct. It simply means that when they are applied, they need to be attuned to the 
researcher’s specific focuses, appropriate to the particular contexts at play, and used with 
the wider understanding that they are neither able to nor meant to offer explanations of 
the totality of the situation. 
Based on that, there are three core paths down which one might go. First, in the context 
of the point just made, one could resign oneself to the fact that blurring means that the 
best one will be able to offer is contextual findings based on the circumstantial 
application of existing disciplinary modes – whether IR, CP, or some other field. Again, 
that is not without its benefits. Returning to the EU case, as noted above, Warleigh 
(2004) argues for the re-importation of IR’s toolkits to flesh out the relationships 
between regionalism in Europe and regionalism more generally – even if that distorts 
some of the Union’s more polity-like aspects. The limitation is that insofar as one wants 
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to make broader generalizations and offer a more integrated perspective on the EU/a 
situation of blurring, working from within that firmly disciplined approach would likely 
not offer the appropriate tools. 
Second, to the extent that one does wish to construct a holistic view of an instance of 
blurring, one may be tempted to conclude the exact opposite – understanding it requires 
thick description at the expense of overall social scientific generalizability. This is not 
altogether surprising. Because blurring creates “characteristics that historians would 
recognize but that many IR scholars would find alien…[such as] overlapping and shared 
patterns of authority; declining territoriality...[and] the erosion of barriers between 
internal and eternal political arenas of states…” understanding them may entail sidelining 
social science in the name of full-bodied, descriptive approaches (Ferguson and 
Mansbach, 2008: 372). As such, the implicit argument is that the complexity and 
processual nature of blurring prevents the application of any social scientific, disciplinary 
form. 
While each option – the deployment of IR in case specific way or a movement towards 
greater description at the expense of generalizability – are possibilities, each succumbs to 
the same problematic view of disciplinarity. In both cases, the assumption is that a 
discipline is disciplined in a way that makes it either applicable to a certain case (e.g. IR 
and the international realm) or non-applicable (e.g. IR and domestic realms) based on 
certain empirical conditions. Again, that tactic is not wholly bad and helps fix limits to an 
enquiry. It also creates an academic division of labor. Nevertheless, it has the overall 
effect of assuming that all analysis must occur through disciplined – often preexisting 
and predefined – boxes. To the extent that no single box fits a particular setup, one has 
no recourse but to non-scientific, thick description (Bates, 1996, 1997). 
Nonetheless, there seems to be a third option that recognizes the necessary links between 
disciplinarity and description in its own right, however that also adapts its own views on 
disciplinarity in helpful and useful ways. In the first case, Bates (1996, 1997) notes that 
the standard social scientific view of many “area specialists” – area specialists being 
shorthand for those who tend to undertake thicker, more descriptive, and less disciplined 
analysis – is negative. He writes, 
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Many see area specialists as having defected from the social sciences into the camp of 
humanists. …The fact that area studies centers possess clients beyond social science 
results in the application of criteria other than disciplinary standards to appointments, 
promotions and course offerings (Bates, 1996: 1). 
The problem with such a vision is that the traditional tools of disciplinarity cannot be 
applied “in the absence of verstehen” (Bates, 1996: 2). They cannot be applied absent the 
type of understandings offer by thick descriptions. As such, one should not disparage 
description “simply” for being description. IR “works” only insofar as one is able to 
define a domestic/international separation that, for all its analytical and disciplinary 
roles, is an empirical condition. Thus, calls for empiricism before analyticism should not 
be taken as a surrendering of the possibility for disciplinarity specifically or social 
science more generally. It simply reflects the basic truth that both of those projects rests 
on good empirical description. 
In the second case, this line of thinking also means that disciplines might be adapted to 
function in more efficacious ways. On one side, the conception of IR used thus far has 
been “mainstream” in terms of the conventionalism of the theories constituting it. 
However, in the context of the points made under indirect mapping, it is also 
“mainstream” with respect to its academic construction. Studying “the international” has 
generally rested on the application of certain standardized worldviews arrived at, 
advanced through, and debated within a distinct academic community.15 Again, if 
disciplinarity relates to the organization, concentration, and standardization of certain 
tools, methods, procedures, and theories (including the institutional, professional, and 
pedagogical tools associated with them) with the goal of furthering knowledge about a 
specific object of enquiry, for IR that has generally centered on the international realm. 
The problem is, if the object analysis is not clearly identifiable then the particular 
organizations, concentrations, and standardizations developed in the context of it are also 
no longer applicable. Indeed, the application of them risks stymieing appreciations of the 
new object and/or missing what is changed about the old one altogether. Warleigh writes,  
Like any established field of study, IR has its own historiography; hence, the 
deepening of European unification since the mid-1980s…is either declared virtually 
impossible…or rather casuistically semi-integrated into existing frameworks, rather 
than causing their fundamental revision…As Kuhn has long been telling us, scholars 
                                                
15 In this sense, the view of IR being presented excludes critical, dissident, and other non-mainstream 
models. IR is assumed not to be a divided discipline. See below. 
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are more likely to explain away anything potentially paradigm-challenging than to 
integrate it into their conceptual frameworks (Warleigh, 2006: 31-32). 
Thus, to the extent that dissident, critical, and other challenging views exist – and in IR’s 
case they do – they find it hard to reach the mainstream in the conventional sense as they 
do not fit the mainstream in the disciplinary one (Hobbes, 2000). In a world in which 
burring and jurisdictional variability are real possibilities, to the extent that all 
examination is filtered through a disciplinary view that assumes that there must be an 
international realm, at best one arrives a skewed picture of the global environment and, at 
worst, one fails to notice change at all. In that sense, as Brown notes, there may be a need 
to “de-emphasize the sui generis nature [of IR]” (Brown, 2007: 350). 
The obvious question becomes what is IR, as emblematic of mainstream disciplines more 
generally, to do. On the one hand, this study has neither the tools nor space to debate all 
the intellectual, professional, institutional, and pedagogical shifts that go along with 
making fundamental disciplinary change. In that sense, and as is returned to in the 
study’s conclusion, that area is ripe for future research. On the other hand, one is not 
rudderless in future thinking, particularly with respect to the relationship between a 
discipline like IR and its object of structuring concern. One can make three key points. 
First, as it applies specifically to IR, it may be the case that a re-reading of its history 
makes it more flexible with respect to issues that might otherwise be considered beyond 
its traditional “international” remit (Wilson, 1998; Ashworth, 2002, 2009; Schmidt, 
1998, 2002; Quirk and Vigneswaran, 2005, Long and Schmidt, 2006). As noted in 
chapter 2, revisionist scholars argue that a rethinking of the First Great Debate would 
reveal a longer, more varied history, particularly one less tied to the 
domestic/international separation. By stressing themes such as imperialism and 
internationalism, the object of IR’s enquiry might thereby widen, potentially allowing for 
more robust interpretations of a situation like blurring. 
While this is a viable argument, and a shift in IR’s disciplinary history might permit 
fuller comprehensions of the EU specifically and/or jurisdictional change more generally, 
one must keep in mind that the fundamental issue is not merely the content of a 
discipline, but also its construction. In that sense, a change in IR’s history might allow 
for better interpretations of blurring. However, without a corresponding shift in 
perceptions about how disciplines operate – and particularly given the processual nature 
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of blurring’s – simply refocusing-by-widening its object of enquiry may not be enough, 
as the problems with a mainstream, introspective view of a distinct ES reflect. Without 
fundamentally rethinking how disciplinarity works, broadening one’s object may merely 
cloak the core problem – the application of unresponsive, closed boxes to situations of 
complexity, variability, and change. 
Second, one would be remised not to note that IR has not been silent on the need to 
incorporate diversity and challenge standardized views. While the assumption running 
throughout this study has been that IR-proper is mainstream IR, there are alternative 
strands which self-identify as being theories of IR – critical, normative, and post-
positivist to name a few broad families. Moreover, these alternatives are often quite 
explicit in their challenges to the “empirical” content (that international theory requires a 
domestic/international split) as well as the “academic” construction of mainstream IR 
(that, as a discipline, it ought to function along certain standardized precepts) (Walker 
1993; Deibert, 1997; Linklater 1998b; DiMuccio and Cooper, 2000; Ferguson, 2000; 
Smith, 2000; Lapid, 2001; Devetak, 2005; Ferguson and Mansbach, 2008; Ashworth, 
2009). Indeed, and for many of those reasons, IR is often considered a “divided 
discipline” (Holsti, 1985; Buzan and Little, 2001). 
Again, this study has neither the space nor the tools to go into the totality of those 
arguments, however the logics advanced in them do point to a position in which it is 
beneficial to think of those debates less in terms of a zero-sum game – for instance, that 
positivism must trump post-positivism or that post-positivism must trump positivism – 
and more in a way that accepts that each side brings something to the table. In that sense, 
while IR may be a “failed intellectual project” in the sense of achieving a standardized 
worldview and constructing a traditional disciplinary container around it, fixing that 
“problem” by “solving”, for instance, the Third and Fourth Great Debates, may not be 
the most useful way forward (Buzan and Little, 2001). IR’s efficacy may ultimately 
come through its ability to apply its pluralism in empirical useful ways – not via the 
formation of a unified, disciplined field (see below) (Kennedy-Pipe, 2007: 352). Some 
may bemoan this as a further dividing of the discipline (Holsti, 1985; Almond, 1988). 
However, disciplinarity works only if the core focus of enquiry allows for clear, 
undivided answers – which blurring and jurisdictional variability do not. In that vein, one 
must “refuse to be seduced by ritualistic appeals for ‘disciplinary integrity’ that generate 
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legislative demands for ‘consensus’ and concern for ‘division’” (Griffiths and 
O’Callaghan, 2000, 196). 
Finally, bringing this back to the European case so central to this study, there is guidance 
to be gained from ES. As seen in the context of indirect mapping, disciplines can 
potentially interact in productive ways in the context of a common problem – whether 
through multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary approaches or the 
continuous overlapping of narrow specificities (Campbell, 1969; Rumford and Murray, 
2003; Warleigh, 2004; Jupille, 2005b; Rosamond, 2007a, 2007b; Ross, 2009; Cini, 2006; 
Manners, 2007). Outlining how this all might work Warleigh argues that, 
[ES] can demonstrate its utility to IR scholars by helping them change both what they 
study and how they study it in an era of evolving global governance… [ES] provides 
a useful resource for scholars engaged in the rethinking of international relations in 
the era of an emerging global polity which has been neglected for reasons of what 
might be called discipline blindness…[ES] acts as a transmission belt for ideas, 
concepts and approaches between the study of ‘domestic politics’ and the study of 
‘international relations’…to show IR scholars how these tools can be adapted and 
used to study politics in non-nation state contexts (Warleigh, 2006: 2, 31, 35). 
In saying that, and what is critical to keep in mind, is that the EU must be looked at less 
as a deviation from the norm – an exception to the standardized rules – and more as 
interesting phenomena in its own right. It must be treated as a node of disciplinary 
rethinking itself such that European change is the entryway towards wider debates about 
jurisdictional change. Indeed, that is a prime reason that Rumford (2008: 32) notes that 
the most interesting debates about Europe have “not emerged from within the 
conventional EU studies literature generated by the academic disciplines of political and 
international relations”. Rather, they have had “multidisciplinary provenance”. 
A similar point might be made in the context of IR, for example by focusing on, as 
Taylor puts it, “problem-specific” areas (Taylor, 2009). Indeed, one sees evidence of this 
trend with increasing focus being placed on problems that span disciplinary divides and 
across the academic universe – for instance, and as institutionally expressed via, 
problem-specific centers on migration, justice and peace, and/or democracy. As 
Kennedy-Pipe (2007: 352, emphasis added) so aptly notes, “In [IR] we do not have a 
discipline. Rather we have a meeting point, or even perhaps a crossroads.” She 
continues, “I think the best way of highlight the centrality and importance (and public 
interest) of our crossroads is to focus our attention on the real-world dilemmas people 
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face”. In that sense, the development, content, and maturation of ES offers both a real-
world as well as an institutional example to IR of how it might act as problem-focused, 
meeting point, and crossroads of wider study. 
Conclusion 
In the end, the complexities, indeterminacies, and processual nature of modern political 
and socio-political life requires a greater degree of contextualism prior to the application 
of any one analytical or disciplinary approach. While that does not mean that IR lacks 
any utility, it does require holding its borders in suspense to allow for more critical points 
of view to enter and to ensure disciplinarity does not become stagnated. None of this 
should be surprising. Throughout the study, whether in the descriptive or analytical 
sense, blurring and jurisdictional variability have come to mean and mandate stressing 
context and rejecting staticity. Because the international and the domestic are not always 
clearly separable concepts, studying them should not take place through neatly 
circumscribed departments. There is a need to shift away from closed, disciplined 
approaches to more open, humble, and pluralistic forms. As Brown (2007: 350, emphasis 
in original) fittingly puts it, “There is a world of difference between disciplined thought 
about international relations and the notion of a discipline of International Relations”. In 
that light, insofar as one believes blurring and jurisdictional variability are occurring, it is 
logical to conclude that similar alternations must be made to the ways in which one 
intellectually, professionally, institutionally, and pedagogically approaches the study of 
political and socio-political life. 
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Conclusion – Jurisdictional updates 
 
Key findings 
This study set out to explore the nature of contemporary jurisdictional arrangements and 
how changes to them impact the ability to map political and socio-political structures and 
relationships into explicitly defined jurisdictional locations. To do so, it asked whether 
the growth and development of the EU problematized IR’s core enabling conditions – 
most critically, that an international realm exists, that it is jurisdictionally different and 
clearly separable from domestic ones, and that it therefore requires its own theoretical 
conceptualizations. It hypothesized that a change in the nature of that setup via a change 
in the nature of jurisdictional arrangements would mandate substantive and substantial 
descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary re-mappings. 
To structure the debates embedded in those broad issues, the study looked at, and 
sequentially progressed through, four sets of core questions. As laid out in the 
introduction, those questions were: 
1.  What constitutes the jurisdictional problematique and why 
is it so important to understanding political and socio-
political dynamics? What is IR’s resolution of it?  
2. What happens to sovereignty and state citizenship-based 
inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion separations, and 
together the domestic/international one, in the EU’s 
context? Is there maintenance, breakdown, stratification, or 
blurring? 
3. Based on that answer, what are the new jurisdictional 
dynamics? How is the problematique resolved? How does it 
interact with existing jurisdictional forms?  
4. What sort of descriptive, analytical, and disciplinary re-
mappings are necessary as a result of any possible 
jurisdictional change? How does that impact IR? What new 
debates does it entail? 
Given those questions, the key findings associated with them, presented fully across the 
host of the study’s chapters, can now be summarized. As with the questions themselves, 
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they can be grouped into four categories – findings having to do with the importance of 
jurisdiction and its relationship to sovereignty, citizenship, and IR; findings having to do 
with the European case understood through the four outcome-possibilities; findings 
having to do with blurring as a jurisdictional type (and with it jurisdictional variability); 
and findings having to do with how one descriptively, analytically, and disciplinarily 
maps a world in which blurring and jurisdictional variability are both real prospects.  
Jurisdictional importance 
First, sovereignty was found to be a corollary of jurisdiction such that jurisdiction was 
possible in the absence of sovereignty. The assumption going into chapter 2’s analysis of 
these issues was that jurisdiction was possible only within a sovereign setup; sovereignty 
preceded jurisdiction. To the contrary, the chapter demonstrated that sovereignty was a 
jurisdictional form in its own right. By looking at both concepts (as well as power and 
authority) along metrics of number, scope, and method, one saw that jurisdiction’s under-
defined positions across each of those variables, as opposed to sovereignty’s defined 
ones, made it sensible to treat the latter as a corollary of the former; to treat sovereignty 
as a corollary of jurisdiction (Table 2). The logical follow up was that sovereignty was 
only one possible resolution to what the study dubbed “the jurisdictional problematique” 
– a debate over who decides what, where, how, and over whom.  
In making those conceptual claims, chapter 2 also offered historical placement. It showed 
that while resolving the problematique was a necessary aspect of political life, a 
sovereignty-based solution was not. As the medieval case illustrated, jurisdiction was 
possible in the absence of sovereignty. Offering that historical context (and contrast) also 
provided perspective on the particular resolution of the problematique found in instances 
of sovereignty (Table 3). Again, as developed in chapter 2, sovereignty was determined 
to rest on four elements – commitments to exclusivity in number, to territorialization, to 
a functional/jurisdictional/territorial congruency, and to clarity and stability of overall 
structure. Together, those factors defined a sovereign jurisdictional form. In doing so, 
they also conditioned an inside/outside separation. 
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Those more overtly politically focused arguments were then buttressed by an 
examination of socio-political aspects.1 Again, as chapter 2 developed, citizenship was 
defined as the relationship between an individual and polity mediated by variables of 
rights, access, and belonging (Table 4). As such, state citizenship reflected the 
relationship between an individual and his or her nation-state. In that relationship, a 
citizen was seen as having certain rights as well as sharing symbolic commonalities with 
his or her nation-state and co-citizens (via nationality) that non-citizens did not. 
Consequently, and in the context of the sovereignty-based state system, the difference 
between the citizen and the non-citizen, across both formal and symbolic areas, formed a 
socio-political inclusion/exclusion separation. That point, combined with inside/outside, 
helped condition a domestic/international binary. 
Both of those points – the tenets and products of sovereignty and state citizenship – were 
then linked to mainstream IR. The study first argued that mainstream IR was comprised 
of realism, liberalism, the English School, and statist constructivism. It contended that 
though each of those broad theoretical families had very different visions of and hopes 
for the international realm, they all assumed that realm was real, had an ordering 
problem, and therefore required its own theoretical conceptualizations. Moreover, the 
study argued that all of them rested on the structuring effects offered by sovereignty and 
inside/outside and state citizenship and inclusion/exclusion. Those concepts and 
associated analytical procedures drove to the heart of the domestic/international cleavage 
and were the core enabling conditions for mainstream IR. Consequently, any change to 
them logically was thought to produce more rippling effects across the discipline. 
The European case 
Second, the study turned to examining whether or not change to those binaries was 
occurring through an investigation of the European case. In that regard, the EU was 
found to be in a position of blurring with respect to all three of the separations developed 
in chapter 2 and in the context of the first core question. To reiterate, the EU case offered 
certain advantages over the more traditional, often globalization centered, arguments. 
Chapter 1 noted three major faults – a lack of hard-nosed, empirical support; a failure to 
                                                
1 As chapter 2 noted, no attempts were made to establish causal links. The point was merely to make clear 
that both political and socio-political aspects “matter” to the domestic/international separation. 
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offer firm perspectives on the exact nature of any jurisdictional alternative; and a 
tendency not to deal with political and socio-political changes in an integrated way.2  
To remedy those shortfalls, as well as for more independent rationales, the study 
developed the European case. Its existing institutions and rules offered an established 
testing point for debating challenges to sovereignty as well as for assessing the precise 
nature of an operationalized outcome. Moreover, changes in Europe were seen as 
occurring across both political (chapter 3) and socio-political (chapter 4) factors such that 
it offered an integrated view of jurisdictional transformation. Finally, Europe was 
historically significant. Not only did sovereignty develop in the region, but the 
circumstances and processes leading to its birth – a set of treaties ending a major war – 
were strikingly similar to those leading to a possible revision of that system – a new set 
of treaties arrived at in the aftermath of another major war. In that sense, a regional scope 
affecting both politics and people was preferred over globalization’s conceptual openness 
and an issue focus’s scope limitations.  
When it came to the actual examination of the Union, the study considered four possible 
effects to the binaries linked with sovereignty and state citizenship – maintenance, 
breakdown, stratification, and blurring (Tables 1, 5, and 8). Each option functioned in 
two ways. In the first case, they were illustrative portrayals of what might occur to the 
specific cleavage at play. In the second case, and when take to their logical conclusions, 
the options also represented jurisdictional outcomes in their own right.  
Chapter 3 examined European political structures across the four outcome-possibilities. It 
found that while breakdown, maintenance, and stratification were not wholly incorrect, 
the contradictions between them and inadequacies across them made blurring the most 
appropriate finding. Looked at across a range of issues, ranging from the EU’s basic 
structure and institutional rules to Schengen to enlargement only blurring contained the 
conceptual room necessary to account for the real and fundamental jurisdictional 
complications, complexities, and even contradictions constitutive of the European 
political process. Chapter 3 determined that cooperation has not produced jurisdictional 
clarity. The chapter determined that it was increasingly difficult to visualize a clean and 
                                                
2 That being said, this study ultimately does have allegiances with the globalization literature, particularly 
the need to move away from sovereignty as the core norm governing the global system. 
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clear, jurisdictionally meaningful inside/outside separation amongst Union members. The 
jurisdictional lines separating them were therefore found to be blurring.  
Having made that finding, chapter 4 then examined European citizenship juxtaposed 
against the state citizenship and inclusion/exclusion standard. Again, the four outcome-
possibilities – breakdown, maintenance, stratification, and blurring – were each 
considered. Again, the finding was blurring. Across the formal, rights components as 
well as the symbolic dimensions of EU citizenship, the chapter determined that EU 
citizens are effectively caught between conceptual models; they are caught between the 
particularism inherent to state citizenship (maintenance) and the universalism implicitly 
underpinning hopes of building a common European home (breakdown). Moreover, 
while stratification was seen as an improvement over that either/or choice, as Risse’s 
marble-cake perspective illustrated, even that argument proved problematic. Viewed in 
total, across the formal and symbolic formulations of EU citizenship, inclusion/exclusion 
was found to be in a state of blurring.  
Given those findings, one arrived at a point in which it was logical and appropriate to 
conclude that the sovereignty-based and state citizenship-based divisions separating the 
domestic and the international, as well as the European, domestic and international, 
levels were becoming increasingly tenuous. Drawing political borders, and therein socio-
politically locating people within them, was founded to be an unclear, overlapping, 
potentially conflicting, and definitely more contextual process. Defining a 
domestic/international separation between member-states was also no longer an 
empirically clear, analytically simple matter. The study determined that the domestic, 
European, and international levels existed more as dynamic mixtures than immiscible 
levels. While that did not mean separations could never be made (e.g. in the context of a 
specific function), holistically speaking, blurring offered the best description of European 
political and socio-political change. Recognizing that fact prompted, pushed, and 
required the study to consider what it might mean to move beyond analytical leveling 
and to consider the precise jurisdictional dynamics constitutive of blurring itself. 
Jurisdictional blurring 
Third, given the illustrative finding of blurring, the study proceeded to define it as a 
jurisdictional type. As chapter 5 developed, blurring in Europe represented the 
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simultaneous proliferation of the number of jurisdictional actors, the development of 
complex, variable, and potentially conflicting and overlapping spatial and functional 
scopes, a diversity of methods of administration, and a muddling of individual-polity 
relations. In making that definitional claim, chapter 5 began by making made clear why 
the term blurring, and not the more definite blurred, was used. As noted, that was done 
to stress its process-based nature and to accommodate both the jurisdictional restless 
historically seen in the EU as well as to prevent ontological closure and analytical 
reification. By “verbing” the core concept, and thereby holding open what political and 
socio-political setups must look like, blurring created the space needed for debating and 
re-mapping them under conditions of change. 
The bulk of the chapter was an attempt to pin down the precise dynamics of blurring. 
One of the key elements in that task was its relationship to jurisdiction-the-concept. The 
chapter argued that, jurisdiction-the-concept generated its “problematique” by holding 
open appreciations of the number, scope, and method metrics. On the one hand, that 
made sovereignty a type of jurisdiction as it offered specific resolutions to those metrics 
(and to the problematique more generally). On the other hand, because the hallmark of 
blurring was found to be its complexity, there was implicit tolerance of the possibility for 
jurisdictional debates within its remit; that multiple sources of jurisdiction might cohabite 
in a common space or over a common function. Political and socio-political setups could 
therefore not be neatly bundled under a single normative or analytical framework.  
From a starting point that assumed jurisdiction requires a single framework, like 
sovereignty, that was shown to be problematic. However, by keeping the broader 
meaning of jurisdiction in mind, complexity, context, and even contradiction did mean a 
lack of jurisdiction. Although blurring ultimately required new ways of mapping its 
effects (chapter 6), its complexity did not negate the possibility for jurisdictional action 
more generally. By defining the number metric as greater than one, spatial and functional 
scopes as complex, variable, and potentially conflicting and overlapping, and method as 
multiple, blurring did offer resolutions to the metrics. In that sense, both sovereignty and 
blurring resolved the problematique, just in different ways – sovereignty offering a 
solution based on assumptions about clean and clear political and socio-political setups 
and blurring rejecting that clarity, arguing that on-the-ground complexity and variability 
prevented such standardized, static answers. 
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Given that blurring was determined to be a type of jurisdiction, the issue became its 
resolution to the problematique. Summarizing the more complete findings made in 
chapter 5, “who” became a dependent variable appreciable only in the context of the 
specific function, scope, and/or socio-political relationship involved. “What” and 
“where” also became contextual – “what” determinations were found to be circumstantial 
insofar as no one actor had jurisdiction over all functions at all times and “where” ones, 
though generally territorial, were not always neatly “bundleable” around a 
territorial/jurisdiction congruency. “How” and “over whom” also varied – “how” 
determinations differing between actor type and across both formal and non-formal 
approaches and “over whom” aspects shifting based on who, where, and what contexts. 
Underpinning all of that were EU citizens found to be neither fully included nor excluded 
throughout the member-states.  
All of that was then feed into IR’s typical anarchy versus hierarchy logic. In doing so, the 
determination was made that while anarchy was left behind under blurring, hierarchy was 
not created either. Anarchy was seen as forming when there was either no accepted 
resolution to the problematique or when the answer that was offered logically precluded 
analogous jurisdictional structures in certain contexts (e.g. under sovereignty, in the 
international realm). Neither of these visions was true under blurring. In the first case, the 
problematique was resolved, just in situational, complex ways. In the second case, while 
the study accepted that there might be occasions in which aspects of sovereign logics 
function under blurring, it also made clear that that did not create outright anarchy 
between the member-states insofar as the full constellations of sovereign logics never 
lined up. There was no logical fallacy in saying that member-states retain exclusive 
jurisdiction in certain circumstances while maintaining that that does not reflect 
sovereignty within and, by extension, anarchy between.  
While there may not have been anarchy, chapter 5 also illustrated that hierarchy was not 
created either. Hierarchy was defined as an outcome of a sovereign system based on an 
established sequence of legitimate actor right – the antithesis of anarchy. Blurring in 
Europe problematized and rejected that dualism. Again, blurring did not prevent 
hierarchies from forming in specific certain, such as in the context of a particular 
function. However, the potential for jurisdictional conflict over specific issues and in 
certain circumstances meant that the sovereignty-based hierarchy was not the sole 
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organizing concept (e.g. as seen in the context of legal pluralism). Nor, therefore, was 
sovereignty the appropriate terminological approach.  
All of this opened the door towards debating the relationship between jurisdiction and 
legitimacy. Because the resolution to the problematique found under blurring modeled an 
interactive, variable, and potentially conflicting jurisdictional space, it created legitimacy 
questions. Whereas sovereignty offered a single, clear normative underpinning, rooting 
jurisdiction in a combination of territoriality (within a given territory, a government had 
supreme jurisdiction over all issues/people), by rejecting that underpinning, blurring 
upset that normative foundation. As argued, it both challenged the possibility for it in its 
own right as well as created the likelihood for multiple new ones under its rubric. 
Blurring meant accepting that multiple sources of jurisdictional legitimacy – state-based, 
EU-centric, or something entirely else – might simultaneously operate in the context of 
common functions, in common spaces, and even in competition for the right to underpin 
political and socio-political setups more generally. The need to debate legitimacy under 
blurring carried over to chapter 6’s thinking on analytical re-mapping. 
Chapter 5 concluded by extending out from the European case noting that the blurring 
seen in Europe presages blurring globally. On the one hand, the chapter was clear that the 
methodological factors at play limited the extent to which one might actually make a 
blurring conclusion in any specific circumstance. Moreover, it noted that sovereignty 
certainly still exists in many cases. On the other hand, given the context of the points 
made in chapter 1 with respect to globalization, the chapter also noted that blurring was 
not necessarily confined to Europe. While the exact dynamics would differ between 
regions, actors, and issues, whether in Europe or in the wider world the tenets of blurring 
represented the simultaneous proliferation of the number of jurisdictional actors, the 
development of complex, variable, and potentially conflicting and overlapping spatial 
and functional scope, a diversity of administration, and a muddling of individual-polity 
relations. Moreover, whether in Europe or in the wider environment, blurring existed in 
similar relation to the other core terms – negating sovereignty, updating jurisdiction, and 
creating legitimacy questions. Blurring was therefore possible – though not ubiquitous – 
outside of Europe. There was jurisdictional variability. 
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Re-mapping 
Finally, there were lessons learned with respect to how one descriptively, analytically, 
and disciplinarily maps a world in which blurring was both a reality itself as well as an 
example of jurisdictional variability. As seen in chapter 6, the old ways of mapping were 
no longer appropriate such that shifts in focus and terminology were necessary to better 
describe, analyze, and study the contours and conduct of contemporary political and 
socio-political life and thought. The chapter looked at these issue in terms of descriptive, 
analytical, and disciplinary mapping – both what challenges blurring yielded as well as 
what responses one might make. 
Descriptively, blurring and jurisdictional variability leveled three core challenges – they 
presented of an alternative, non-sovereign jurisdictional type; they challenged the 
position that sovereignty offered the singular solution to the problematique; and their 
process-based tenets contested the “staticity” common to sovereign mapping. For those 
reasons, blurring and jurisdictional variability mandated shifting away from the singular 
application of static, state sovereignty mapping towards ones of jurisdictional centrality 
and sensitivity.  
In the first case, the intricacies and processual nature of blurring mandated complex, 
dynamic, and illustratively rich procedures in which the number, scope, and method 
metrics as well as socio-political connections and legitimacy debates were all taken into 
account. That high level of detail was not merely about creating detail for detail’s sake. 
Mapping blurring required a thickness of description in order to capture the complexities 
and dynamisms constitutive of it. In the second case, jurisdictional variability meant that 
maps must retain sensitivity to and for coexisting jurisdictional forms. And that required 
maintaining, but not being beholden to, the variety of mapping techniques needed to 
depict the various forms that might exist. Finally, the process-based nature of blurring 
meant that any new maps were thought to exist less as static prints made up of clearly 
drawn black lines to be hung on a wall and more as interactive displays. Irrespective of 
how one actually constructed such maps, the point was that the complexities and 
dynamisms associated with blurring mandated using techniques and technologies that 
could accommodate the thicknesses of descriptions, and the variety needed, essential for 
accurate portrayal.  
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Analytically, one saw that IR’s typical leveling approach was neither appropriate nor 
particularly useful given blurring. In making that claim, chapter 6 considered four 
possible remedies – re-leveling around thinner analytical cuts; focusing on the rules 
governing the system (institutionalism); bolting addendums onto existing approaches; or 
a wholesale rethinking of leveling and the development of a new analytical mapping 
process. In considering each of those options, the chapter found the final one proved to 
be most convincing; blurring required the development of new analytical mapping 
procedures based on a more appropriate theory-practice balance. To establish those 
procedures, the study again elevated jurisdiction to the forefront. It argued that 
analytically mapping contemporary political and socio-political setups, including 
blurring itself, required funneling one’s thinking through the jurisdictional problematique 
prior to the application of any theoretical or paradigmatic model.  
There were four reasons for making that shift, and therein four reasons why a 
jurisdictional focus was more appropriate, more useful, and ultimately generated more 
analytical leverage than a sovereignty-based, leveling one. First, analyzing political 
structures – of any configuration – was determined to be impossible without first dealing 
with the problematique. Second, turning towards jurisdiction redressed the balance 
between theory and practice and, in doing so, generated the conceptual space necessary 
for understanding blurring and jurisdictional variation. Third, mandating that empirical 
contextualization to determine jurisdictional type take place prior to the application of 
any analytical approach ensured that any debates that did occur – legitimacy and 
intervention were used as examples – were mired in sovereignty-based assumptions. 
Finally, treating jurisdiction as the key variable helped guard against reification due to its 
question based, process oriented formulation. Together, analytically mapping the effects 
of blurring meant rejecting the singular application of sovereignty-based leveling and 
moving towards a jurisdictionally sensitive approach.3 
Finally, with disciplinary mapping, two lines of thinking were presented – indirect and 
direct. In the context of indirect mapping, there were two questions – what a blurring, EU 
form meant for ES’s fit in the disciplinary universe and whether that placement revealed 
anything about the nature of disciplinarity more generally. For the first issue, the chapter 
                                                
3 In a practical sense, the analytical map produced under this vision was seen less a single document with 
preformed structures and more a series of potentials to be applied only after empirical determinations were 
made as to the jurisdictional arrangements in play. 
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concluded that, while blurring reflected the sui generis nature of the Union, that neither 
meant that IR/CP lacked any and all usefulness in understanding it nor that it should be 
treated to the point of non-comparison as doing so risked locking ES into a disciplinary 
silo). For the second issue, that view of ES mandated a more pluralist, less mainstream 
interpretation about disciplinarity. The effects of blurring were shown to require, on a 
general scale, academic openness and less parochial methods and, on a deeper one, a 
recognition that the EU’s blurring form might make it a node for debating disciplinary 
politics more generally. That latter point linked with this study’s larger goals by pointing 
out the critical function played by the Union in testing IR’s core commitments. 
Informed by the logics of indirect mapping, the direct form asked what blurring and 
jurisdictional variability meant for IR specifically. In doing so, both logics were deemed 
incompatible with the singular application of IR insofar as both rejected the sovereignty-
based starting points underpinning it. Whether with respect to a specific instance of 
blurring (e.g. the EU) or jurisdictional variability (e.g. bifurcation), IR lost its ability to 
assume that there was going to be a clean and clear international sphere of action. 
Because blurring created neither anarchy nor hierarchy, it problematized the ability to 
define a domestic/international separation based on the belief that there was going to be 
hierarchy in one sphere and anarchy in the other. And because the foundation and 
functionality of a discipline rests on there being a defined, definite object of enquiry that 
is real and non-reducible to other fields, blurring fundamentally challenged IR’s 
keystone. It rejected that notion of a distinct international realm of action.4 Moreover, 
even when blurring was not the specific conclusion, the possibility for it meant that 
jurisdictional variability must be taken into consideration. Sovereignty could not be the 
assumed jurisdictional form. And, as the analytical sections made clear, that mandated 
the need to make empirical determinations as to jurisdictional type prior to the 
application of any disciplinary mode. 
Based on that, chapter 6 presented three options with respect to what one might do – one 
might resign themselves to the fact that blurring means that the best one will ever be able 
to offer are context-specific findings based on the circumstantial application of existing 
disciplinary modes; to the extent that one does wish to construct a more holistic views, 
                                                
4 As chapter 6 was clear, that did not mean that IR loses all utility. It simply meant that its assumptions 
would not be able to offer a holistic, integrated view/analysis in cases of blurring. 
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one might conclude understanding blurring requires thick description at the expense of 
overall, social scientific generalizability (e.g. an introspective ES); or one might 
recognize the necessary links between disciplinarity and description and, in the process, 
adapt one’s views on disciplinarity itself in helpful and useful ways. In the end, the third 
option proved the most convincing. It both understood that one should not disparage calls 
for greater description “simply” for being description. IR “works” only insofar as one is 
able to define a domestic/international separation that, for all its analytical and 
disciplinary roles, has always been an empirical condition. In that sense, all the calls for 
empiricism before analyticism noted in the context of analytical mapping were not a 
surrendering of the possibility for disciplinarity specifically or social science more 
generally. They simply reflected the basic truth that both ultimately rest on good 
description. 
Second, all of that also meant that disciplines themselves might be adapted to function in 
more efficacious ways. On the one hand, this study neither had the tools nor space to 
debate all the intellectual, professional, institutional, and pedagogical shifts that go along 
with making fundamental disciplinary change. On the other hand, one was not rudderless 
in that process. First, as it applied to IR specifically, it was noted that allowing for 
blurring may simply require a re-reading of IR’s history to make it more flexible to 
issues that might otherwise be considered beyond its traditional “international” remit. 
Second, while the assumption throughout the study was that that IR-proper was 
mainstream IR, there clearly are alternative strands – critical, normative, and post-
positivist to name a few broad families. Moreover, those alternatives are often explicit in 
their challenges to IR’s “empirical” content (that it requires a domestic/international 
split) as well as its “academic” construction (that it ought to function along certain 
standardized disciplinary precepts). Finally, there were lesson to be gained from ES 
itself. As seen in the context of indirect mapping, disciplines can interact in productive 
ways in the context of a common problem. The EU and ES were both considered 
examples of that process. 
Putting it together 
Put together, the study’s four sets of core questions offer an integrated view of 
jurisdictional change approached from a starting point and context of mainstream IR. In 
doing so, it presented conclusions about the nature and importance of jurisdiction, the 
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status of the EU in the context of four outcome-possibilities, the meaning and 
implications of jurisdictional blurring (and with it jurisdictional variation), and finally 
how one might re-map the outcomes of that entire setup. Those re-mappings proved 
beneficial to the extent that better brought together theory and practice, offered more 
appropriate and more useful analytical languages, and opened the door to rethinking 
disciplinary divisions in more sensible and efficacious ways. 
All told, this study’s contributions come both through its specific answers to each of the 
four sets of structuring questions as well as its more integrated view on jurisdictional 
change and the need to highlight the problematique in political and socio-political 
analyses. Merging a thick empirical examination with a more conceptual ethos therefore 
not only helped break-up IR’s reified groundwork, but also provided a clear example of 
how one might assess jurisdictional dynamics, across political and socio-political setups, 
in a changing world. The process used to examine the Union – most critically, the 
jurisdictional starting point and the four outcome-possibilities – offers a way forward for 
evaluating jurisdictional dynamics on a global scale. Whether not that process fits into 
any existing disciplinary box is far less important than the simple realization that 
jurisdictional change and variation requires thorough and thoughtful empirical analysis 
absent any prescribed limits. 
Ongoing change 
One would be remise not to reference that one of the most serious challenges to the 
entirety of this study’s arguments has to do with the current state of the Union. On the 
one hand, the study’s intent has always been to reflect outwardly from the European 
case. It underlying focus may have started with the European case, but it did not end 
there. Indeed, that is why it highlighted IR’s core enabling conditions, not any particular 
EU policy or programs, as well as continually ignored any impulses to label the EU. 
And, as the preceding sections all hinted it, many of its most significant conclusions – 
chiefly those having to do with jurisdictional change and re-mapping – contain broader 
conceptual implications not directly tied to Europe or the European case specifically.  
Nevertheless, the foundations of all those wider conceptual conclusions, whether the 
need to challenge sovereignty, the tenets of burring, or the re-mappings presented in the 
previous chapter, all gained plausibility based on the study’s examination of the EU as an 
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operationalized test case. As chapter 1 noted, the study turned to Europe specifically as a 
means of adding empirical viability and validity to existing commentaries on the need to 
challenge and move beyond sovereignty. And, if that methodological goal is at all 
important – and it continues to be viewed as critical – then all of the conceptual 
arguments made ultimately hinge on the European example. Current changes to the 
Union must therefore be acknowledged and dealt with to the extent that they potentially 
might have serious knock-on effects to the study as a whole.  
In that sense, current developments in Europe, ranging from the economic challenges of 
debt issues on the Euro-zone’s long-term stability to the politico-institutional conflicts 
between the member-states over what to do about it, risk challenging the empirical 
support for the blurring argument. In simpler terms, they risk making the blurring 
argument altogether less convincing by adding support to one of the other outcome-
possibilities. To give but one example, London’s unilateral December 2011 Council veto 
over a Franco-German treaty revision plan to deal with the spiraling debt issues arguably 
reflects more an instance of maintenance – the firm reassertion of British sovereignty at 
the expense of Europe – than of blurring. Indeed, much has been made of the political 
turmoil that has resulted from that decision (Parker and Barker, 2011).  
At the same time, however, while the challenges the EU is currently facing are real and 
must be taken into consideration, the surface reasons for rejecting (or at least 
questioning) the blurring finding are less convincing. First, the crux of blurring was 
never that it simplistically replaces sovereignty as the core factor governing all political 
and socio-political action. As seen throughout chapters 3-6, the most interesting and 
critical aspect of it was that it offered variable, potentially conflicting and overlapping 
resolutions to problematique. In that regard, the fissure between the UK and the Franco-
German plan does not necessarily conflict with blurring. Indeed, as noted in the context 
of the existing, variable membership programs (both “within” the EU and in the context 
of non-acceded, associate states), the fact that there is no single, homogenous European 
jurisdictional space is a central aspect of blurring. Therefore, the fact that Europe 
currently faces certain challenges to its existing structures and rules should not 
necessarily be interpreted as the firm rejection of blurring. 
Second, the fact that there are ongoing changes driven by on-the-ground circumstance 
underlines the importance of the process-based nature of blurring. As has been stressed, a 
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key strength of blurring is that it is not locked-in to anyone present such that political 
shifts are an indelible aspect of it. They are something that it recognizes as likely and 
therefore incorporates into its core ethos as well as its resultant mapping processes. 
Simply put, accounting for the jurisdictional restlessness of the EU (or any other 
political/socio-political entity) is built into the process-based nature of blurring.5 For that 
reason, the current “challenges” one sees in the EU’s case may actually be more 
challenging to a teleological view of it – that it is destined to reach either the breakdown 
possibility or revert to the maintenance one – than to a blurring one. Both of them 
discount the possibility that the current complications and conflicts may simply be part of 
the blurring nature of the system itself.  
Third, taken to a more conceptual level, questions about the EU’s future illustrate why 
the jurisdictional turn itself is so important. As chapters 5 and 6 stressed, one of the key 
advantages of recognizing blurring and jurisdictional variability is the contextual, 
process-based meaning they prompt. The study went to lengths to stress that because of 
both – because sovereignty cannot be assumed – determining jurisdictional type (an 
empirical issue) must increasingly occur prior the application of any one analytical or 
disciplinary point of view. Not only does that argument not change in the face of 
Europe’s current challenges, it is even bolster by it. The fact that the case under 
examination may be shifting illustrates the need to consistently and situationally map 
(descriptively, analytically, and disciplinarily) to ensure that the most appropriate tools, 
views, and logics are used. Even if the EU is on the verge of complete disintegration 
back to pure and utter statism – and this study does not take that point of view – even that 
would remain an instance of jurisdictional change that would require firm 
contextualization. It would force one to begin with the problematique asking, in the 
context of the debt issues and the associated political challenges associated with it, who 
now is deciding what, where, how, and over whom in Europe. The current challenges the 
EU faces therefore do not harm the argument offered in this study; they reinforce it. 
 
                                                
5 This argument also applies to cases of global change, whether that means a “reversion” to more statism 
where that had been more globalist structures or the “growth” of more globalized structures. In either case, 
the process-based nature of blurring, and with it the importance of jurisdictional debates, offer inbuilt 
guards against empirical and/or analytical reification. 
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Future lines of thinking 
Altogether this study paints a very different picture of how to approach political and 
socio-political phenomena than that of mainstream IR. Nonetheless, it also raises a 
number of core questions and future lines of research, four of which are particularly 
important. First, there is the simple and ongoing task of determining jurisdictional type. 
Given the pace of political and socio-political change, there is a need to make continual 
assessments of how the jurisdictional problematique is or is not resolved in any particular 
circumstance. One should note that jurisdictional change itself lacks normative worth. 
Thus, while the EU might be considered a “success” in terms of its transition away from 
sovereignty – in creating a structure that more or less is viewed as legitimate and that has 
prevented major European war for six decades – the movement away from sovereignty is 
not necessarily so neat and tidy – as the increasing number of failed states illustrates.  
Second, continuing research must be done with respect to the nature of legitimacy in 
situations akin to blurring; in situations in which there is neither hierarchy nor anarchy. 
What forms of democracy might be possible? How might different types of legitimacy 
interact? To be sure, part of that process is bound to be normative. Nevertheless, it ought 
not be exclusively so. While defining legitimacy under blurring requires one to make 
new normative assessments about how political and socio-political power ought be 
exercised in situation without firm jurisdictional hierarchies and over marbled people, it 
also requires practical assessments relating to, among other things, institutional design 
and legal structures. In other words, blurring upsets not only how one conceives of 
legitimacy, but also how one institutes it. 
Third, the study entails more case-specific thinking in the context of blurring. As the 
intervention debate cited earlier in this chapter makes clear, more research must be done 
with respect to how jurisdictional blurring and variability affect specific issues – issues 
ranging from the status of refugees to the dynamics and logics immigration to the 
application of “foreign” aid. Most critically, these issues need to be considered – 
normatively and practically – outside the traditional contexts of the inside/outside, 
inclusion/exclusion, and domestic/international separations. Only then will the most 
useful options arise. 
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Finally, much more work must be done on the nature of disciplinarity itself. On the one 
hand, one needs to thoroughly assess, likely in case-specific fashion, the efficacies of the 
various alternatives to it – for instance, the exact nature and logics underpinning intra, 
intra, multi, and/or transdisciplinary approaches. How precisely do they differ from one 
another? What are the positives and negatives of each? On the other hand, one also must 
deal with the associated structural, institutional, and pedagogical issues. Again, while 
some disciplinary innovation has already taken place in IR (as well as in other related 
fields) as reflected by the growth of more pluralistic thinking, such advancements risk 
failing to ever reach the mainstream in the conventional sense without accompanying 
shifts in the ways disciplines are institutionally situated, professionally managed, and 
pedagogically approached within universities.  
Conclusion 
While the sorts of questions outlined in the previous section remain open, the arguments 
made throughout this study offer the foundations and updated perspectives necessary to 
take them on. Whether based on the jurisdictional options – breakdown, maintenance, 
stratification, and blurring – used to help examine the EU or the descriptive, analytical, 
and disciplinary apparatuses developed as a result of the blurring finding, applying 
mainstream IR’s modes of thinking to a politically and socio-politically changing world 
is problematic. By focusing firmly on jurisdiction and its problematique, the study 
illustrated both the inadequacies of those traditional approaches as well as offered a new 
way forward for future examinations. It demonstrated the impact jurisdictional change 
has on international theory, and therein why jurisdictional debates ought to be placed at 
the center of all discussions about the contours and conduct of modern political and 
socio-political life and thought. It is through jurisdiction, and its question-based, 
empirically-driven foundations, that the most appropriate, most useful, and most 
interesting perspectives, debates, insights, and ways forward will be found.    
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